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At Issue-Reviewing the literature on School Resource Officer effectiveness and evaluation, including the measures used, whether SROs inappropriately criminalize students, and what constitutes a good SRO program

Research Briefs-looking at professional criminals with a cost benefit analysis of bank robbery, defining professionalism in marijuana cultivation, and constructing a typology for contract killers

Original Research-My 2012 Master’s thesis exploring assessments and recommendations in addressing domestic illegal firearms trafficking

School Resource Officer Effectiveness and Evaluation

Introduction

When I originally approached this literature review, I had  in mind an examination of studies that would empirically demonstrate the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of School Resource Officers (SROs) on some different measures of their duties. However, in examining the literature, there has been limited research into measuring the effectiveness of SROs (Cray and Weiler, 2011) and some lack methodological rigor such as relatively few time series studies (pre and post SRO installation), experiments or quasi-experiments, and designs that didn’t address possible confounding variables that might have influenced perceptions, arrests, or reported incidents (James and McCallion, 2013). The following literature review will cover what some of these studies have found, noting the above caveat, as well as examine the criticism of criminalizing students, and what constitutes a good SRO program.

Early Implementation

School resource officers programs have been in existence since the ‘80’s but following well publicized school shootings, from 1995-2002, there was a greater push to get police officers into schools to not only enhance security by providing a quick response to active shooters but to address other student safety and crime issues as well (Stevenson, 2011). The 1999 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act encouraged partnerships between schools and the police, encouraged new SRO programs, and providing funding for existing programs (Stevenson, 2011) In the 21st century, SRO funding grants were made available through a number of programs like Cops in Schools, Safe and Drug Free Schools and Communities, and the Comprehensive School Safety program under the COPS program (James & McCallion, 2013).

Measuring Effectiveness

Studies looking at the effectiveness of SROs tended to examine two different research fronts. One was perceptual, which utilized surveys of students or school administrators to enquire about feelings of school safety, number of SRO contacts, and feelings about the SROs. The other is more number-data driven, examining juvenile court and schools records pertaining to the number and types of complaints, incidents, or arrests.

Earlier research from the late ‘90’s to early ‘00’s demonstrated support from both administrators and students for SROs, feeling that they made schools safer and reduced violent and criminal incidents (Finn & McDevitt, 2005; Stevenson, 2011). When more current research examines the perceptions of students, large percentages of middle and high school students felt that the SROs treated students fairly and did a good job (Theriot, 2016), enhanced school safety (Finn & McDevitt, 2005; Thomas, et al, 2013; Theriot, 2016) improved their perception of police at school, and had a good relationship with students (Theriot, 2016), as well as generating a positive opinion of the SRO with students (Finn & McDevitt, 2005; Theriot, 2016) . Theriot’s 2016 study also examined school connectedness and found that the greater the number of contacts with SROs produced more positive feelings about SROs, more school connectedness and greater feelings of safety at school. However, students who experienced more types or more intense violence at schools tended to have more negative feelings about SROs (Theriot, 2016) as well as feeling less safe (Theriot & Orme, 2016). Finn and McDevitt  (2005) also found that the frequency of interactions with the SRO, having a positive opinion of the SRO, and feeling safe at schools were positively associated with being comfortable reporting a crime to the SRO. However, Theriot and Orme’s 2016 study of middle and high schools students found that while interacting with SROs wasn’t related to feeling safe at school, students with more school connectedness and more positive attitudes about SROs felt safer.

The research that explored the perceptions of administrators found some similar support for SROs (Finn and McDevitt, 2005, Thomas et al, 2013), feeling that utilizing a full-time SRO was effective in increasing school safety (Anderson, 2011; Gauthier, 2015) as well as combatting the threat of a school shooting (Gauthier, 2015). They were also viewed as building good relations with teachers and staff (Anderson, 2011). School administrators perceived that when SROs demonstrated procedural fairness with students, they are viewed as more legitimate authority figures and are more effective at  improving school safety (Wolfe, et al, 2017)

Other research also focused on records data that compared the numbers of arrests and incidents pre and post SRO, and the number of different offenses SROs responded to. These studies would hypothesize that SROs might either increase the number of arrests as student disciplinary problems are criminalized (or alternatively, that an SRO is handling criminal issues that had previously gone unaddressed) or that arrests and incidents would decrease from a deterrence effect. Incidents that are focused on in the studies typically were associated with drugs, violence, weapons, and disorderly conduct and the results are mixed.

Theriot (2009), found that schools with SROs had a higher arrest rate than schools without an SRO but once accounting for economic disadvantage, there were no differences in the total arrests or arrests for disorderly conduct, assault, weapons, or drug and alcohol possession, nor did they find any bias against low income students as arrests declined as poverty increased in SRO schools. Anderson’s 2018 study discovered that providing matching funds to increase policing, and their training in schools, was not associated with a decrease in reporting school infractions. Noting that school violence was significantly higher in schools with a greater frequency of bullying, racial tensions, student disrespect, and gang crimes. Jennings et al (2011) conducted a study on the presence of SRO and serious violent crime incidents and found that the presence of an SRO was significantly related to a school having a high incidence of crime but was also significantly associated with lower incidence of serious violent crime. Na and Gottfredson (2013) found that as schools utilized more SROs, arrests for weapons and drug increased as well as reporting a higher percentage of non-serious violent crime to law enforcement and Devlin, D. N., & Gottfredson, D. C. (2018), in a longitudinal study, found that a police presence in schools led to an increase in reporting and recording crime. Stevenson’s longitudinal study (2011) found that having an SRO, two years after implementation, did not decrease the total number of school incidents reported however, following an initial increase in reporting assaults, there was a reduction in assault and weapons reports which the author suggest mays be due to a deterrence effect. Zhang (2019) indicated that while the presence of SROs were associated with increased drug related crime reports, whether in a single year or across multiple years, there was a reduction across years for violent crime and disorder incidents when SROs were present in schools, also suggesting a deterrent effect.

Arrests and Criminalizing Students

One of the major criticisms of SRO programs is that officers and school administrations are criminalizing “normal” student behavior, and (by way of the criminological Labeling Theory) that by utilizing a law enforcement response to criminal and disruptive activity in schools, students are introduced to the criminal justice system. This labels them as criminal, stigmatizes them, and causes them to adapt a delinquent role. This prompts more offending as well as leading to worse educational outcomes when exclusionary discipline like suspensions and expulsions are utilized, which also may adversely affect minority students since their number of arrests tend to be higher (Petteruti, 2011; Lynch et al, 2016; Ryan et al, 2018, Courtney, 2019)).

However, the “School to Prison Pipeline” is a narrative forwarded by some academics and the media that is lacking both theoretically and factually. Labeling theory fell out of fashion in the ‘80’s as research found little support for it in the criminology field. This current revisiting of the theory doesn’t fare much better. Much of what has prompted concerns is the zero tolerance stance taken by many schools regarding drugs and weapons (policies which some researchers contend has led to the mass incarceration of adult minorities) and the primarily anecdotal accounts of officers or schools over-reacting to trivial rule or conduct violations. While some of the anecdotes seem excessive, like gum chewing or hat wearing, the data on arrests and incidents tell a different story, suggesting a lack of evidence supporting the ”school to prison pipeline” narrative.

Na and Gottfredson (2013) found that students at schools with SROs, compared to those without, were not any more likely to face harsh discipline for committing any offense that was reported to the police. Johnson’s review of the literature (2016) found that SROs were just as likely as other officers to refer juvenile for processing in serious felonies but less likely to process them for misdemeanors and status offenses. He states he found “no empirical evidence to suggest widespread actions by SROs in the US criminalize the minor behaviors of students in general, or minority students in particular” and that the general pattern is that SROs make arrests under the same circumstances that would cause a school principal to call the police. Fisher and Hennessy (2016)  examined two meta-analysis of SROs and exclusionary discipline and while one analysis found a significant relationship between SROs in high school and exclusionary discipline, the other meta-analysis found no relation between the two. May et al (2018) found that SRO juvenile justice referrals were similar to those made by law enforcement outside of schools for status and serious offenses and SROs were less likely to refer juveniles for minor offense compared to police outside of a school setting. Pigott et al (2018) found “zero evidence” that the presence of SROs increased the likelihood of high school students being official processed through the criminal justice system or removed from school.

Different factors may influence SROs decision to arrest. Hall’s study (2015)  found that SROs with 10 or more years of experience believed the juvenile justice system could benefit and deter misbehaving students. She also found that females SROs were more likely than males to arrest to calm a student down while males SROs were more likely than females to arrest for reasons of ensuring a misbehaving student received punishment or to maintain control of the school environment. School administration policies and decisions also play a part.in the reporting, and thus the arrest decision. Brown (2006) examined what offenses school administrators typically reported to the police. While the majority reported illegal drugs and weapon incidents, they typically did not report tobacco and alcohol use, or fighting on school grounds. However, May, et al (2018) concluded that schools, not solely police in schools, make a large contribution to the number of juveniles referred to the justice system for less serious offenses.

SRO Multiple Roles

While much of the focus on SROs is their law enforcement role, SRO programs are designed to utilize SROs in teaching and counseling roles (Theriot & Anfara Jr., 2011; Thomas et al, 2013; Lynch et al, 2016; Rhodes, 2017). SROs are in a prime position to present programming related to school connectedness and school safety, to be key stakeholders in setting school policies, and alleviate fear and mistrust of the police (Theriot and Anfara, Jr., 2011). Finn and McDevitt (2005) in their national assessment of SRO programs found on average the SROs spent 20 hours a week on law enforcement, 10 hours on advising or mentoring, 5 hours on teaching, and 6-7 hours on other activities. In over half the programs, SROs advise school staff, students, or families and about half the programs focused on teaching students about drugs, legal issues, safety education, crime awareness, and conflict resolution. However, they did find that many programs were facing many more school safety problems than they were originally established to address and that many SROs were engaging in activities for which they hadn’t been trained including mentoring and teaching. Lynch et al (2016) found that, according to school administrators, SROs in more disadvantaged schools compared to schools with greater social and educational advantage engaged in more law enforcement duties (security enforcement and patrol, maintaining school discipline, coordinating with the police, identifying problems and seeking solutions) than education duties (train teachers in school safety, and teach, train, and mentor students).

Ivey (2016) in a survey of SROs, their supervisors, and school principals, discovered that while the principals, generally agreeing with SROs and supervisors, felt that SROs’ law-related counseling was effective, the principals disagreed with law enforcement, generally feeling that SROs law-related education efforts were ineffective. However, their association with students is likely a factor in SROs being more effective educators and planners of anti-bullying initiatives than other departmental officers (Kudronowicz, 2016). School administrators also found disagreement with SROs (and school mental health professionals) with administrators giving less effective appraisals of crisis response plans and crisis postvention activities.

The views of SROs are informative in regards to the roles they engage in and their interaction with administrators. Rhodes (2017) found that SROs who work in urban schools and high schools engaged in more law enforcement activities and order maintenance, while SROs who were supportive of community-oriented policing engaged in more service, mentoring, and teaching roles. SROs felt establishing rapport with students was important in receiving information, providing guidance, and gaining cooperation, and that they acted as mentors, parental figures  advisors, and informal counselors to students. Some officers focused on helping at-risk students. However, they less frequently advised parents, teachers, and school staff and less commonly worked with teachers on addressing student issues but instead worked more in partnership with administrators. While it was apparent that SROs functioned as educators, only about half  taught or regularly presented in classes. When Barnes (2016) interviewed SROs in the model North Carolina SRO program he found that they also spent a lot of time in positive interaction with students, attempting to counter negative impressions about the police, alleviate fear of, and create more regard for, law enforcement. Officers felt that their interactions with students provided for an intelligence source and that they enhanced school security and safety, as well as providing a deterrent. However, they cautioned against the administration misusing them, feeling that it was important that the administration used them properly. SROs related that too often teachers and administrators didn’t understand the SRO role and used them as security guards and go-fers, and over-used them to respond to minor issues like bathroom monitoring and classroom control. SROs were also expected by teachers and administrators to deal with discipline issues despite not being authorized to do so and they felt that teachers had abdicated their disciplinary role. SROs related that using them inappropriately will cause the program to lose focus and not meet program goals..

SRO Program Evaluation and Improvement

Research has also evaluated some of the SRO programs and suggestions exist on how these programs might be strengthened or improved. Counts et al (2018)  in their review of state policies and recommendations on SRO programs found no state legally required the use of four recommended practices; required certification, required training, the creation of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), and evidence of data based decision  making regarding the need for and effectiveness of SRO programs.

Crucial to meeting program goals, conducting program evaluations, and fostering good relationships with students, faculty, and parents is the utilization of a Memorandum of Understanding (Cray & Weiler, 2011; Weiler and Cray, 2011, James & McCallion, 2013). These documents, produced through the joint effort of the school or school district and law enforcement, sets out the duties and expectations of the SRO in the school. MOUs address issues like appropriateness and guidelines for student and locker searches, under what circumstances arrests will be made, to what degree SROs will be utilized for minor disruption and disciplinary issues, and the roles and extent of those roles for SROs as educators and counselors (Thomas et al, 2013; Courtney, 2019). Having an MOU in place can help schools avoid the inappropriate or excessive actions by SROs in dealing with student incidents and discipline (Ryan et al, 2018). The MOU should also address the goals of the program which will be dependent upon the desired outcomes of both school administrators and the SROs and could include things like, increasing feelings of safety for students, reducing the number of specific types of offense, increasing the likelihood of students reporting a crime, or improving relationships between the police and youth (Thomas et al, 2013). Proper training is also viewed as essential, in that officers should be familiar with techniques and practices like the proactive SARA model, effective counseling approaches, and trauma informed interviewing, as well as insuring that in-service training is available, funded and utilized (Thomas et al, 2013; Courtney, 2019). Because of the importance and necessity of student contact in the roles SROs engage in, the manner in which SROs are chosen for the program also needs attention to ensure that the officers have the right temperament, and be well versed in communication, social skills, and rapport building. The ability to liaison with school and community stakeholders, and to be actively engaged in policy discussion with school administrators will also be crucial to the acceptance and success of the program in reaching its goals (Thomas et al, 2013; Courtney, 2019). Finally, a system of program evaluation should be utilized to ensure that standards are met, guidelines and policies are adhered to, and that goals of the SRO program are being addressed or reached (Thomas et al, 2013; Courtney, 2019).

Implications

While SRO programs seem to be enjoying strong support from law enforcement, school administrators, and students, there is room for improvement, both in SRO programs and the research analyzing them. .Longitudinal studies will be more informative then cross sectional ones in analyzing the effects of SROs in schools as the outcomes variables can be assessed before and after SRO implementation, however these studies also need to account for variables that may have an effect on perceptions of safety, of the SRO, and any increases or decreases in reporting or arrests, which may include school administrative policies and actions, prior student victimization, school conduct records of arrestees, school safety and crime climate, race of students, students’ acceptance of criminal behavior and misconduct in the schools, and the existence of, and adherence to, an MOU. SRO programs would benefit from a revisiting of their stated goals and purposes, with an eye toward establishing good communication, a best practices approach, and a means of evaluating the program.

The majority of students had positive feelings about SROs in school and this majority of students, their well-being, and their connectedness toward school should be paramount rather than focusing on an imagined school to prison pipeline. Violent, delinquent youth in the schools would likely be engaging in this kind of behavior outside of the school, subjecting them already to law enforcement scrutiny, and with the presence of an SRO, those unwanted illegal and disruptive behaviors might be somewhat curtailed through deterrence, or when they occur,  properly addressed in the legal system, just as they would be if they occurred on the streets. We shouldn’t expect that schools provide a sanctuary for illegal, violent, and disruptive behavior, especially when these few students have such a negative effect on the much larger student population.

Removing aggressive students from the school may have benefits. Despite claims there is a school to prison pipeline for those put into the juvenile justice system, research has shown that individuals who exhibit bullying behavior (assaults, threatening behavior, school disruptions) are already more prone to engage in criminogenic behaviors including skipping and missing school, and substance abuse. Bullies cause harm both to their victims and bystanders who witness the events. School connectedness is important for more positive life outcomes, yet victims of bullies, and bystanders who witness bullying events, are also more prone to substance abuse and missing school, negatively affecting their school connectedness and reducing feelings of safety. There is an expectation that when dealing with these problematic students in a serious way, that it will support the tenets of deterrence (which is a desired effect of having an SRO in the school) by ensuring that certainty of repercussion takes place and that it is both done quickly, and with appropriately administered severity. Longitudinal studies suggest deterrence is a factor in reducing violent crime and weapons charges in schools. When students witness these no-nonsense responses to disruptive, aggressive, violent, and illegal behavior, we can expect the majority of students to feel safer and more positive about SROs.

It is when SROs are ineffectively or inappropriately used, typically through mismanagement by the school administration or by ignoring the MOU, that less positive impressions of SROs are generated. As a wider disciplinary net is cast, there is less time available for positive interactions with students and officers have less opportunity to engage in the role of educator and policy and plan developer. This means they may be less able to effectively engage in problem solving to address issues of bullying and violence, which will lead to higher levels of victimization, which in turn decreases positive views of SROs and decreases students’ feelings of safety.

References

Anderson, C. R. (2011). The benefits of a school resource officer program to school districts and law enforcement agencies.

Anderson, K. A. (2018). Policing and Middle School: An Evaluation of a Statewide School Resource Officer Policy. Middle Grades Review, 4(2), n2.

Barnes, L. M. (2016). Keeping the peace and controlling crime: What school resource officers want school personnel to know. The Clearing House: A Journal of Educational Strategies, Issues and Ideas, 89(6), 197-201.

Brown, B. (2006). Understanding and assessing school police officers: A conceptual and methodological comment. Journal of Criminal Justice, 34(6), 591-604.

Counts, J., Randall, K. N., Ryan, J. B., & Katsiyannis, A. (2018). School Resource Officers in Public Schools: A National Review. Education and Treatment of Children, 41(4), 405-430.

Courtney, M. T. (2019). Improving school resource officer programs to address issues posed by school-to-prison pipeline research.

Cray, M., & Weiler, S. C. (2011). Policy to practice: A look at national and state implementation of school resource officer programs. The Clearing House: A Journal of Educational Strategies, Issues and Ideas, 84(4), 164-170.

Devlin, D. N., & Gottfredson, D. C. (2018). The roles of police officers in schools: Effects on the recording and reporting of crime. Youth violence and juvenile justice, 16(2), 208-223.

Eklund, K., Meyer, L., & Bosworth, K. (2018). Examining the role of school resource officers on school safety and crisis response teams. Journal of school violence, 17(2), 139-151.

Finn, P., & McDevitt, J. (2005). National Assessment of School Resource Officer Programs. Final Project Report. Document Number 209273. US Department of Justice.

Fisher, B. W., & Hennessy, E. A. (2016). School resource officers and exclusionary discipline in US high schools: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Adolescent Research Review, 1(3), 217-233.

Gauthier, D. H. (2015). Perspectives of Law Enforcement and Principals in Effectiveness of School Resource Officers and Armed Staff.

Hall, M. S. (2015). Functionality of school resource officer arrests in schools: Influencing factors and circumstances (Doctoral dissertation, Capella University).

Ivey, C. A. S. (2017). School Resource Officer Program Evaluation in the United States. Journal of Law and Criminal Justice, 5(2), 43-56.

James, N., & McCallion, G. (2013). School resource officers: Law enforcement officers in schools. 977-1020.

Jennings, W. G., Khey, D. N., Maskaly, J., & Donner, C. M. (2011). Evaluating the relationship between law enforcement and school security measures and violent crime in schools. Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations, 11(2), 109-124.

Johnson, R. R. (2016). What effects do school resource officers have on schools. Dolan Consulting Group, 1-4.

Kudronowicz, K. (2016). The effectiveness of bullying interventions between school resource officers hired by school districts compared to law enforcement agencies.

Lynch, C. G., Gainey, R. R., & Chappell, A. T. (2016). The effects of social and educational disadvantage on the roles and functions of school resource officers. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 39(3), 521-535.

May, D. C., Barranco, R., Stokes, E., Robertson, A. A., & Haynes, S. H. (2018). Do school resource officers really refer juveniles to the juvenile justice system for less serious offenses?. Criminal justice policy review, 29(1), 89-105.

Na, C., & Gottfredson, D. C. (2013). Police officers in schools: Effects on school crime and the processing of offending behaviors. Justice Quarterly, 30(4), 619-650.

Petteruti, A. (2011). Education under arrest: The case against police in schools (Vol. 1). Washington, DC: Justice Policy Institute. Ret. from http://www.justicepolicy.org/research/3177

Pigott, C., Stearns, A. E., & Khey, D. N. (2018). School resource officers and the school to prison pipeline: Discovering trends of expulsions in public schools. American Journal of Criminal Justice, 43(1), 120-138.

Rhodes, T. (2017). School resource officer perceptions and correlates of work roles. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice.

Ryan, J. B., Katsiyannis, A., Counts, J. M., & Shelnut, J. C. (2018). The growing concerns regarding school resource officers. Intervention in School and Clinic, 53(3), 188-192.

Stevenson, Q. W. (2011). School resource officers and school incidents: A quantitative study (Doctoral dissertation, University of Alabama Libraries).

Theriot, M. T. (2009). School resource officers and the criminalization of student behavior. Journal of Criminal Justice, 37(3), 280-287.

Theriot, M. T. (2016). The impact of school resource officer interaction on students’ feelings about school and school police. Crime & Delinquency, 62(4), 446-469.

Theriot, M. T., & Anfara Jr, V. A. (2011). School resource officers in middle grades school communities. Middle School Journal, 42(4), 56-64.

Theriot, M. T., & Orme, J. G. (2016). School resource officers and students’ feelings of safety at school. Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice, 14(2), 130-146.

Thomas, B., Towvim, L., Rosiak, J., & Anderson, K. (2013). School resource officers: Steps to effective school-based law enforcement. National Center for Mental Health Promotion and Youth Violence Prevention, 7.

Weiler, S. C., & Cray, M. (2011). Police at school: A brief history and current status of school resource officers. The Clearing House: A Journal of Educational Strategies, Issues and Ideas, 84(4), 160-163.

Wolfe, S. E., Chrusciel, M. M., Rojek, J., Hansen, J. A., & Kaminski, R. J. (2017). Procedural justice, legitimacy, and school principals’ evaluations of school resource officers: Support, perceived effectiveness, trust, and satisfaction. Criminal justice policy review, 28(2), 107-138.

Zhang, G. (2019). The effects of a school policing program on crime, discipline, and disorder: A quasi-experimental evaluation. American Journal of Criminal Justice, 44(1), 45-62.

Research Briefs

Robbing banks: Crime does pay–but not very much.,

Reilly, Rickman, & Witt, Significance, (2012)

While pop media and culture portrays bank robbery as exciting and lucrative, the authors conducted an examination of the actual economic profits and costs of bank robbery in the UK, both to the robber and the bank. The authors were given access to confidential information on the amount of cash lost in bank robberies as well as other data in a cost/benefit analysis of bank robbery. They report that in 2007, there were 80,000 robberies reported to police, 7500 occurred at businesses, but with over 10,500 bank locations in the UK, only 106 bank robberies were attempted, accounting for only .13 % of robberies. Compared to the 2006 data for the US over the 4440,00 robberies reported, 12,000 occurred at banks (2.7%), indicating that in even in the US, bank robbery only makes up a small proportion of robberies.

The authors examined some factors that may influence whether a bank was targeted like size of municipality (defined by distance from a police station), size of the bank based on number of employees and, how busy the bank was based on the number of customers, but none of these factors had a significant effect. Of the robbery attempts in the study, very few were repeat location attempts and the amount stolen also wasn’t related to the size of the bank. Without clear indicators as to which bank branches may be targeted, improvements in bank security must be borne by the whole branch system, the costs of which are often ultimately borne by the customers.

The profitability for the robber was also considered. Using UK data from 2005-2008, of the 364 attempted bank robberies examined, the average loss was £20,330 (five times as much as their US counterparts), however 1/3 of  the attempts were unsuccessful with no money stolen, so the average haul for successful robberies was £30,000 pounds. The authors note that with approximately 20% of bank robberies solved, and some of the haul recovered, this does reduce the financial gain for robbers.

The authors constructed an equation using economic constructs to help identify the robbers’ input into the robbery balanced against expected gains and losses from the attempt. Robbers’ input include labor costs (number in the gang), whether a firearm was displayed (capital costs) and a difficulty vector accounting for size of branch, number of customers, and branch security measures. The output (value of money stolen) is a function of all these factors, however the output may also be influenced by robber apprehension and incarceration. The difficulty vector had little significant influence on the take; average travel distance from a police station was 4.5 minutes, the average number of customers was two, and alarms were activated 85% of the time  

While the average number of robbers were 1.6 (60% were lone robbers) increasing the number in the gang had a significant effect on increasing the amount stolen. For each additional robber employed, the expected value of the haul increased by over £9,000 pounds (with all other factors being equal). Working in teams indicates more professionalism (including planning and surveillance) and task division and while additional gang members increase the total take, it also reduces the take of each individual gang member.

A firearm was displayed in 36% of the robberies. The display and inherent threat of firearm use was also a significant factor in the size of the haul; with all other factors being equal, displaying a weapon increased the average take by £10,000. However, the use of a firearm in some cases may ultimately affect output as the incarceration costs are higher for armed robbery if they are apprehended.

One factor reduced the profit output. Being more common in the UK, as compared to the US, 12% of bank branches utilized fast-rise security screens. Their use reduced the expected value of robbery haul by over £24,000, all other factors being equal. In a regression model to determine whether the screens foil robberies or just reduce the take, on average, and all other factors being equal, using fast-rise screens reduced the probability of a successful robbery attempt by 32% compared to other security systems. Two thirds of the reduced output effect was from a reduced probability of robbery success when using the screens, while the other third was attributable to the screens reducing the financial value of the robbery haul.

As discussed in the criminological Rational Choice theory as well as in economic models, cost/benefit analysis should be a factor in the commission of the act. If the costs outweigh the benefits, a rational choice would be to not engage in the act. The authors constructed a mathematical formula, utilizing the probability of success, the probability of apprehension, the average take for one robber, and a monetary calculation of the cost of imprisonment in terms of lost income, to determine the tipping point where the costs outweigh the benefits. The formula demonstrated the monetary cost should be in excess of £33,000, which is roughly equivalent to three years’ income from a full-time minimum-wage job. Thus a three year incarceration would represent that monetary cost, as well as have a deterrent effect, however it should be noted that the average sentence for a convicted bank robber in England is a little less than three years.

As a means of income, bank robbery may not be very lucrative though the actual work to income ratio is large. The average annual full-time employment income is £26,000 and at an average of £12,706 per robber per robbery, one bank robbery can support  a modest life style for six months. However, with only an 80% success rate, after three robberies (a year and half average income) the likelihood of a success is roughly 50/50 and each subsequent robbery will typically increase the odds of apprehension and incarceration. This overall smaller take may be influencing the overall decrease in UK bank robberies but also may explain an increase in their armored truck/security van robberies as a competing criminal opportunity that provides more returns. The low take in robbery also affects the implementation of security measures. While the authors noted the effectiveness of fast-rise security screens in foiling robberies or reducing their costs, suggesting widespread use could cut successful bank robberies in half, the cost of £4,500 per teller window would suggest the cost of the robbery is a smaller financial cost itself when compared to the security measure.

Reilly, B., Rickman, N., & Witt, R. (2012). Robbing banks: Crime does pay–but not very much. Significance, 9(3), 17-21.

Professionals or amateurs? Revisiting the notion of professional crime in the context of cannabis cultivation.

Bouchard and Nguyen, World Wide Weed, 2016

The authors discuss how historical literature (like Edwin Sutherland’s The Professional Thief) recognizes the level of a professional criminal but more current research hasn’t explored the concept as to its validity or applicability to any great degree. The authors explore defining professionalism by constructing a four classification matrix ranging from amateurs to professionals and applying that to marijuana cultivators in Canada.

There are certain elements that constitute professionalism in all fields; skill and knowledge in the craft or occupation as well as a commitment to the craft or occupation including its function as full-time or significant employment and immersion in its social milieu. Skills would include, good growing skills like feeding, watering, breeding, cloning, trimming, and light management. Skills also involve grow operation construction, management, and security and these skills could be operationalized as outcome measures such as plant (or lamp) yield, attrition rate (proportion of plants harvested), and criminal earnings. The social milieu in this case would be association and connectedness to other growers and laborer/service providers within the industry and subculture, receiving and offering mentorship, and an appreciation for, and dedication to growing, marijuana The matrix classifies commitment  and skill level as either being low or high, resulting in four categories; Amateurs (low skills, low commitment) Average Career Criminals/Growers (low skills, high commitment), Pro-Ams (high skills, low commitment), and Professionals (high skills, high commitment).


Figure from authors’ publication


The authors apply this matrix to a series of interviews conducted with 13 marijuana cultivators in Montreal, Quebec, and Vancouver. The Montreal and Quebec growers were all white males, and the 4 growers from Vancouver were of Vietnamese descent (“the Vietnamese population has been identified as key players in Vancouver’s cultivation industry”) and two were female.

Of the 13 growers, their classification defined three Professionals, five Pro-Ams, three Amateurs, and two Average Career Growers. The authors didn’t feature all the interviews but examined two case studies as descriptive of the classifications of professional and average career grower. In defining the categories, the authors note that the professionals had been involved in growing for 7 years or more and owned or managed operations larger than 100 plants. However, also linked to professionals was a social opportunity structure. For their professional case study of a grower with 12 years’ experience, this entailed having early or intimate introduction to the social milieu through family and friends, early growing experience, and social and technical mentorship by more experienced growers. An early introduction and mentorship allowed the development of growing skills. This commitment and skill level led to more trust, responsibility, and contacts, which led to involvement in larger growing operations, which allowed for involvement and gaining experience in different industry areas and tasks. As this professional became involved in areas of hash production, clipping at large sites, cuttings production, helping manage a large site (2,000 plants), and finally moving on to managing a large site, legitimate employment tapered off, replaced by illegal income.

Their other case study involved a Vietnamese average career grower of 5 years. Different then the professional, this grower entered the industry mainly as a way to make money and had no initial indoctrination into the milieu. She did not receive any mentoring and began to learn the skills only as she became employed in an existing grow operation. While aspiring to reach a professional level, this grower was unsuccessful as she lacked good growing skills with a lot of trial and error experiences and had difficulty in the management of a grow operation. She eventually left the industry after not achieving her desired level of income. In the context of the cannabis cultivation industry, these average career growers are attracted to the potential to make money but never realized that cultivation would be so much work or would require a learning curve.

The authors didn’t discuss Pro-Am growers in much detail but they note “A review of the past typologies of growers found a similarly high prevalence of growers who were sometimes highly skilled but never transformed those skills into a full-time occupation”. The Pro-Am classification accommodates these types of growers as “labeling them as either professionals or amateurs would be unsatisfactory.” The authors consider that “Pro-ams are interested in the intangible rewards from cultivation; they are passionate and knowledgeable about the plant, its appearance, its taste, and its physiological effects. They are not amateurs but connoisseurs; not professionals but aficionados. Even if cultivation can be time consuming for pro-ams, it is not a full-time occupation, and never a means of living. Many of these participants are accomplished growers but opt to grow smaller amounts for personal consumption rather than profit.

The authors conclude that this classification system provides a useful discrimination tool that can be applied not just to growers. The classification system could be used to explore and research the professionalism of all types of criminal activity and that professionalism in criminals careers can be defined both by the skills of the offender and the degree that the offender is committed to a particular offense or type of offending. This commitment can be gauged by the characteristics noted by the authors; early introduction to, and involvement with, the milieu, an active mentoring process, and increased labor and involvement in larger activities or operations.

Bouchard, M., & Nguyen, H. (2016). Professionals or amateurs? Revisiting the notion of professional crime in the context of cannabis cultivation. In World Wide Weed (pp. 129-146). Routledge.

Differentiating contract killers: A narrative‐based approach.

Yaneva, Ioannou, Hammond, & Synnott, The Howard Journal of Crime and Justice, 2018.

The authors desired to construct a psychological-based typology framework that will assist in the analysis and understanding of contract murders. Previous attempts at typologies have utilized professional, semi-pro and amateur categories, solicitor or contractor designations, or more behavior-based categories of aggressive behaviors, inept behaviors, and criminally sophisticated behaviors. However the authors consider a psychologically based framework will also serve as a n investigative tool in profiling contract killers through the crime scene indications of offender characteristics. They utilized the Narrative Action System that suggests that for the full range of human action, four different fundamental narrative action modes are utilized: Professional’s adaptive adventure, Revenger’s conservative tragedy, Victim’s integrative irony, and Hero’s expressive quest. These typologies represent behavioral styles, attitudes, outlooks, and behavior motivations. “In psychological terms, criminal and deviant behaviors form a distinct subset of this general set of human actions, distinguished from other behavior by the absence of legal or moral code.” The themes have been utilized on other studies of different types of criminal behavior and the authors attempted to see if it can be utilized with contract killers. The characteristics of these typologies are discussed below in the context of contract killer behaviors.

Using media accounts as a source for data, 75 cases from nine different countries were subjected to content analysis. A total of 83 individual variables were derived from the analysis, 65 behavioral variables (crime scene behaviors) which included things like location and types of wounds delivered, body position, how the victim was controlled, and how the victim was isolated. For example they found the most frequently engaged in crime scene behaviors were: weapon brought to crime scene (88%), victim was ambushed (84%), victim’s body left at crime scene (83%), murder happened as planned (83%), victim was found as fell (80%), victim was shot (68%), victim had head wounds (58%) and offender used a vehicle for transportation (53%). They incorporated 56 of these variables into multidimensional scaling to explore subsets of behavior. The remaining 18 variables (victim, instigator, and offender characteristics) like gender, age, instigator motive, victim-instigator relationship, instigator-offender relationship, and offender’s previous convictions were used for descriptive purposes.  For example, instigators were 51% female, financial gain was the instigator’s primary motive (43%), and only 44% of offenders were strangers to the instigators.

The authors used Smallest Space analysis which “is a non-metric multidimensional scaling procedure in which the relationships between variables are represented as distances in space and the resulting spatial configuration is examined to determine whether meaningful regions can be identified”. The most common features to all contract killings, as noted above, form the core of behavior typical to all the offenders while the other behavioral variables in the periphery reflect the different aspects of the contract killer. This core behavior demonstrates these murders are typically very instrumental and centered on monetary gain and not the victim or the murder itself.

The authors’ analysis of the data describes the characteristics of different contract killer typologies linking their psychological and behavioral components as shown below.

The Professional’s adaptive adventure-View themselves as professionals and display methodical and criminally sophisticated behavior. They view each job as an adventure, seek to master the environment, and take pride in a job well done. Offenders tend to be masked and forensically cognizant, and use firearms at close distance.

The Revenger’s conservative tragedy-Sets out to right a wrong or address a problem, has a selfish or ambivalent nature, and rationalizes the crime as necessary or the right thing to do. Their extreme violence is not expressive but instrumental, often to send a message from the instigator. The offender and victim may be acquainted and are often abducted or lured. This typology is usually found in organized crime.

The Victim’s integrative irony-Generally inexperienced, and dispassionate, they hold a pessimistic world view and lack a moral code. There is evidence of incompetence at the crime scene and they may commit the murder for drugs/drug money or some other support. This typology is associated with mistakes in the job, and kills in the home and while the victims were sleeping, typically slashing their throats. There may be expressive behaviors at the crime scene that aren’t readily apparent.

The Hero’s expressive quest-A mix of instrumental and expressive behaviors; characterized by excessive, extreme violence that demonstrates their power and demands respect but instrumental in their preparedness. They may depersonalize the victim and use available weapons at the scene that includes vehicles, stabbing, and bludgeoning.

The characteristics for each typology as derived from the analysis are shown in the authors’ figure below.

Figure from authors’ publication

The authors conclude that this typology can be used as a basis for examining the individual type of contract killers so as to examine the connection between the psychological construct and behaviors, as well as an investigative tool to link possibly similar offenses together, and as a basis for therapeutic treatment approaches.

Yaneva, M., Ioannou, M., Hammond, L., & Synnott, J. (2018). Differentiating contract killers: A narrative‐based approach. The Howard Journal of Crime and Justice, 57(1), 107-123.

Assessment and Policy Recommendations for Domestic Illegal Firearms Trafficking

This was my 2012 Masters thesis on firearms trafficking. I present a three level approach, based on scope and complexity, to the assessment of firearms trafficking, assess US trafficking at these levels and present policy recommendations applicable to the different levels. Topics and areas covered include gun laws, gang involvement with military thefts and trafficking, assessment of the BATF as inspectors and law enforcers, overview of BATF programs and policies, FFL regulation, gun tracing data, utilizing task forces, and trafficking into Canada and Mexico.

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Welcome to Criminal Justice Access

Criminal Justice Access Mission Statement

Catering to practitioners, scholars and the public, Criminal Justice Access (CJA) brings historical, original, and current criminal justice research, practitioner interviews, and crime data together in an easily accessible and user-friendly format. The field of criminal justice is broad so CJA is devoted toward focusing on issues in policing, Part One Crimes, drugs, gangs, and deviance. By aggregating and summarizing data and information from literature in the criminal justice field, CJA tries to simplify the process of keeping abreast of current criminal justice research and information. I will be publishing content monthly so check back at see what’s new.

As this is my first month of publishing, there are no archived posts, however be sure to check the site categories. For November:

Research Briefs covering a possible new role for detectives, clearance rate differences in gun homicides vs gun assaults, reluctance in talking to the police, and differences in attitudes towards stop and search

At Issue looks at marijuana driving impairment and roadside testing

For Discussion explores recognizing a beat management philosophy called beat integrity

US Crime Data focusing on seven Part One Crimes from the UCR

Original Research is featuring past academic research by the author with this month featuring my PhD dissertation, a qualitative study of patrol officer behavior and decision making

Editorials and Opinions examines a possible deviance continuum from motorcycle enthusiast to outlaw through the mechanism of differential association

Marijuana Driving Impairment and Roadside Testing

Introduction

            This literature review will examine marijuana’s effects on driving performance, determining impairment levels, and the use and effectiveness of Drug Recognition Experts (DREs) and roadside testing in making determinations of driving under the influence of marijuana. Marijuana use and acceptance is on the rise and this has contributed to more incidence of drugged driving. 34 states have legalized medical marijuana, and while some strains are produced with relatively higher CBD to THC ratios to optimize their medical use, some strains ostensibly sold for medical purposes may have a relatively high THC level that has the potential for misuse. Legalization at the state level has been expanding. Currently 11 states and Washington D.C. have legalized recreational marijuana, while in 15 states decriminalization has been an ongoing process. When combined with a change in public perception, this can lead to increased incidence of driving under the influence of marijuana. A 2001 study examining roadside testing found that of 209 positive drug tests, 113 indicated cannabis (Steinmeyer, et al). A ten-year Swedish study found measurable THC levels between 18 and 36 percent of suspected drugged drivers (Jones, et al. 2008) and a UK lab sample of over 3,600 suspected drugged drivers showed 58% were positive for cannabis (Wolff and Johnston, 2014).

What was once an underlying marijuana subculture decades ago, has now reached a new level of acceptance in overall society as research has dispelled some of the myths about marijuana use and its negative consequences, and revealed suggested medical uses and benefits. Marijuana awareness, and its use, are also becoming more normalized with depictions in popular media in the form of news reports and specials, programming focusing both specifically and tangentially on its use, movie and TV characters using marijuana in a normalized context similar to how drinking has been portrayed, and websites that describe and rate different strains of marijuana as well as provide growing and usage tips. This normalization may contribute to some users minimizing the risks of driving while high.

Research into Driving Effects

Marijuana users have believed, and research has shown, that frequent users who are experienced drivers are able to compensate to a certain degree for marijuana’s effects while driving (Robbe, 1998; Kelly, 2004; Sewell, et al, 2009; Wolff and Johnston, 2014; Micallef et al, 2018) and some users forward the argument that driving high is safer than driving drunk (Kelly, 2004) . However, marijuana can impair driving performance, but typically in a way that differs from the effect of alcohol on driving performance. In research, impairment identification testing while under the influence of THC typically measures car following (maintaining distance with a car under varying speeds) and the standard deviation in lateral position (SDLP), or lane tracking (amount of weaving off center within the lane), as well as some other driving related tasks. Studies typically provided THC in two ways, either in 100-300 microgram/kilogram of subject body weight, or in 10-30 milligram doses of THC, irrespective of subject body weight.

Many studies when examining driving performance find significant effects on car following and SDLP. Robbe (1998) found at higher doses of THC tracking and following were significantly negatively affected compared to a control group and Ramaekers et al’s (2000) research revealed that low doses only moderately impair drivers actual driving performance in those areas Micallef, et al (2018), also found THC had a significant effect on lane tracking. However, a 2001 Netherlands study didn’t find any significant difference in visual search frequency with a 100 microgram/Kg THC dose (Lamers, et al). In 2009, Sewell and colleagues reviewed marijuana driving impairment studies and found, beside marijuana effects on driving being dose dependent, that there were differences in the type of impairment between alcohol and marijuana. Marijuana’s effects are more pronounced with tasks requiring a higher automatic driving function as opposed to alcohol’s more pronounced effects on conscious, cognitive function. SLP is affected by marijuana and not subject to compensatory behavior the way other driving functions are, and other effects like poor speedometer monitoring, increased decision time in passing, and increased time in responding to a light change or sudden sound were also present. Alcohol was implicated more in pursuit tracking, divided attention, signal detection, hazard perception, and lowered concentration, reaction time, and hand-eye coordination.

Research has shown the driving impairment effects are dose, and frequency of past use, dependent, as well as demonstrating significant effects differences from placebo or control groups at the THC levels used for testing. But how marijuana contributes to car crashes also requires examination. In 2014, Romano and Pollini, examining 12 years of crash data, found 26% of single car fatal crashes involved a drug other than alcohol, with cannabinoids present in approximately a quarter of those cases. However, previous work has not provided a clear indication of marijuana’s influence. Kelly (2004) in a review of driving studies found inconsistent associations of THC with traffic accident involvement. A 2005 multivariate study found that once accounting for things like speed, seatbelt use, and BAC, marijuana use was no longer a significant factor in car crash injury. However, it was a significant factor in those that identified as habitual marijuana users (Blows, et al). In 2014, Wolff and Johnston reviewing a meta-analysis showed that drivers were twice as likely to be involved in a car accident with a THC blood plasma level of 5 micrograms/liter. Huestis (2015) in her review of two recent meta analyses found a significantly increased crash risk (2-2.6 times more likely) with a measurable amount of THC and a six-fold increased risk at a 5 microgram/liter level. However, in 2016 Rogeberg and Elvik found that marijuana involvement in crash risk is low to moderate, similar to a BAC level of .04-.05.

While the possibility of increased risk of car crashes may yet to be determined because of dose dependent effects and other factors, research has been consistent on the effects of combining a small amount of alcohol with marijuana. BACs of .04-.05 when combined with even low levels of THC significantly increased the severity of driving impairment, resulting in impairment equal to a BAC of .08-1.9 (Robbe, 1998; Ramaekers, et al, 2000; Blows et al, 2005; Sewell, 2009; Huestis, 2015).

Determining and Setting Intoxication and Impairment Standards and Limits

            As a practical application, identifying and utilizing THC levels in determining impairment for drivers in the real world is important for state legislatures and municipalities in legalization states, as well as for those adjoining states, and other states considering legalization, as the country continues to progress toward greater medical and recreational legalization. Standards are typically expressed as THC parts per volume of oral fluid or serum/plasma concentrations, either as nanograms/milliliter or as micrograms/liter (note that these are equivalent measures-1 nanogram/milliliter = 1 microgram/liter). Setting driving limits typically take two approaches; a per se approach, where any amount of THC above a preset limit indicates a violation of the law, similar to the .08 BAC limit currently used in the U.S. but could also resemble a zero-tolerance level where any detectable THC amount is a violation of law. The other approach is to determine a THC fluid concentration that indicates impairment, often based on driving performance deficits comparable to a specified BAC level.

The approaches vary around the world, and approaches and levels can change or be set by a combination of research, politics, and public opinion. In 2007, a toxicology lab survey in 24 states found cutoff and confirmation levels of THC ranged from 2 to 70 ng/ml. While recommending that a 2 ng/ml confirmation level be used in drugged driving investigations, it is a level based more on good analytic methodology and lab practice than in an indication of impairment (Farrell, et al, 2007). While European workplace testing typically has a cutoff (the drug screening point where a concentration above the cutoff indicates a positive test for the substance, and below that point is a negative result) of 10 ng/ml (Moore, 2012) European driving limits varied widely; Sweden (a zero-tolerance country) sets a cutoff at .3 micrograms/liter, Germany-.5, France-1.0, Norway-1.3(declaring it an impairment limit), Switzerland-1.5 (declaring it a prosecution limit), and Portugual-3. A Swiss study of drug impaired drivers found that a 5 microgram/liter fluid level correlated to observable driving impairment (Wolff and Johnston, 2014). However, a German study from 2007 suggested a range of 7-10 micrograms/liter as a non-zero per se limit after finding that it correlated to an impairment comparable to a .05 BAC and that concentrations below 10 micrograms/liter were not associated with increased accident risk (Grotenherman, et al). Huestis (2015), in reflecting on an appropriate measure for the U.S. suggests a two-tiered approach, similar to what is used in some European countries and Australia. that when combined with driver education, has been shown to deter drugged driving. It provides for a small fine and driver education for exceeding a per se limit and provides for a more severe penalty and criminal prosecution for demonstrated impairment.      

Testing for Marijuana Intoxicated Drivers

            Regardless of where the cutoff points are established, the concern for law enforcement is utilizing the tools at their disposal to identify drivers who are intoxicated or impaired. Drug Recognition Experts (DREs) and roadside testing can be utilized both on active patrol and at driving checkpoints. DRE use is expanding and the options for roadside testing include oral fluid (saliva) testing with point of collection testing (POCT) that can provide results in minutes. Time can be an important factor as THC concentration levels peak approximately 15 minutes after smoking but then go on a rapid decline over the first hour after smoking, and drops even further between one and three hours after smoking. However, while THC levels drop off quickly, the subjective high of the user declines at a much slower rate, meaning people who have a broad range of THC levels may exhibit the same level of being high, and thus impairment.

DRE Effectiveness

            According to Brown, (2001), the DRE program was first started as a partnership between the LAPD and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in the 80’s and the program became more popular in the 90’s, resulting in the majority of states utilizing DREs in law enforcement agencies. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) is the national certifying agency for DREs and instructors.

There are three phases of training and DREs must re-certify based on the past two years of their evaluations. Typically, DREs are called in during a DUI traffic stop when the suspected driver appears intoxicated from something other than alcohol. The DRE evaluation is a 12-step process that involves a BAC test, pulse checks, eye examinations, temperature, muscle rigidity, and ingestion exams, interviews with the suspect and arresting officer, a standardized field sobriety test (SFST), the DRE’s opinion, and a toxicology test. Some studies have demonstrated moderate to high effectiveness in determining intoxication and drug classification. A 1995 Phoenix PD study compared DRE opinions to the toxicology reports and found DREs identified at least one of the drugs in 91% of the samples confirmed as containing drugs and overall the DREs impaired decisions were correct 83.5 %. Marijuana was the drug most often missed though, and the study notes it’s unknown whether this was due to DRE accuracy, or the time course of the drug (Burns and Adler, 1995). A 2002 study found that when DREs reports were stripped of all information except DRE observations, the DREs tested were 95% accurate in determining intoxication and 81% accurate in identifying the cannabis category. Beirness, et al (2009) examined over 1,300 Canadian DRE evaluations and found the DREs were 95% accurate in determining true positives, 80% accurate in determining true negatives, and 92% accurate on drug classification, compared to lab results.

However, in 2009 Porath-Waller, Beirness, and Beasley were examining whether a simpler approach to the DRE evaluation could be utilized, focusing on the most relevant of the twelve physiological testing criteria for the three most common classifications; stimulants, cannabis, and narcotics. They found nine of the criteria were more predictive of drug category including pulse rate, condition of the eyes and eyelids, lack of convergence, hippus, reaction to light, rebound dilation, systolic blood pressure, and the presence of injection sites with an overall accuracy of 81% across the three drug classifications, however only 72% accuracy in identifying cannabis.

Other research has focused on the SFST. In 2014, Porath-Waller and Beirness examined three components of the SFST in determining THC impairment; the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN), the One Leg Stand (OLS), and the Walk And Turn (WAT). Their results showed only the OLS was a significant predictor of THC. In a two-year study, Declues et al (2016) found that while SFTSs are sensitive to marijuana impairment that there was no correlation between SFTS performance and an average 9 ng/ml THC level, however the number of SFTS cues were greater the higher the THC level. Their study found that the WAT was a better indicator of marijuana intoxication that the OLS (contrary to DRE evaluation studies) and the Lack Of Convergence (circular tracking with eye cross) was also a strong indicator. Hartman et al (2016) arrived at somewhat different conclusions. In their study they found no difference in SFST performance between those above and below 5 ng/ml. They found the Finger To Nose test was the best predictor of cannabis intoxication, along with MRB eyelid tremors, OLS sway, pupil rebound dilation and two or more WAT cues.

Brown, in 2001, did raise an issue related to the accuracy of DRE’s and whether they can provide valid, reliable, expert testimony. He argues because DREs are labeled as experts and are construed by juries to be giving expert testimony then the basis of their evaluations should be subjected to Daubert or Frye tests of evidence admissibility. Brown considers the program would or should not pass these tests as they have not faced peer reviewed evaluations, or general acceptance in the relevant scientific community. However, some court rulings have concluded that the twelve-step evaluation is not scientifically novel enough to warrant putting it to the test of admissibility. Brown believes that with reviews of different DRE programs indicating correct hit rates of between 47 and 86%, and with only a 75% correct hit rate needed for re-certification, that DRE evaluations should not be considered reliable scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge and should continue to face challenges of admissibility in court.

ROADSIDE TESTING

THC can be found in high levels in the saliva immediately after smoking, and similar to blood serum levels, declines quickly in the first hour and steadily downward over a few hours (Cone, 1993). Roadside testing has focused on oral fluid testing as opposed to urine or blood for a number of reason including, it is less intrusive, a smaller amount of fluid is needed for a sample, it’s easier to administer, can identify parent drugs, not just metabolites, has a close correlation to serum drug concentrations, and provides quicker results (Cone, 1993; Verstraete, 2005; Bosker, 2009; Huestis, 2011). A 2001 German study of roadside testing found they were 97.6% accurate compared to lab results, with no false negatives and only 2.4% false positives. In a 2009 Australian study of random roadside testing, cannabis was the third most common drug, found in 26% of drugged drivers. Their results showed that oral fluid testing correctly identified targeted drugs 98% of the time.

But there are some caveats to oral fluid testing. Delays in testing may yield negative results if cutoffs are set too low, (Cone and Huestis, 2007) and there is a lack of conclusive evidence tying THC levels to the subjective high, (Cone, 1993) and thus, possible impairment. Verstraete (2005) considers that there should be a better correlation between drug presence and impairment, better discrimination for cannabis, better proficiency in testing, and safeguards against passive contamination before oral fluid testing will be forensically reliable. Earlier devices suffered from poor accuracy and current devices still lacked adequate reliability (Boker et al, 2009) but Huestis (2011) predicts that the move to oral fluid testing will expand as better tests become available.

Evaluations of more recent devices provided varying results. A 2007 study of the RapiScan tester demonstrated a 96% accuracy for positive samples and 100% accuracy for negative samples but was more sensitive to stimulants than cannabis (Dewey et al, 2007). Couch and associates’ 2008 study of ten different tests including RapiScan, DrugWipe, and OraLab showed nine of the ten devices were accurate in identifying THC but all had a much higher cutoff than the 4 ng/ml suggested by SAMSHA. A European Union 2011 study evaluated eight testers on sensitivity (ability to detect a positive result), specificity (distinguishing between negative and positive samples) and accuracy (the rate of true results compared to false results). Cutoff levels for the devices varied between 5 to 100 ng/ml. Specificity ranged between 90 and 100% but sensitivity was poor, ranging from 20-60%, resulting in accuracy between 78-88% for the five best performing devices. None of these multidrug testers had over 80% in each of the three measurement categories. A 2012 Italian study of four different devices found the sensitivity ranged from 38-92% accurate compared to lab results. In 2019, a Brazilian study analyzed four devices for ease of use, operational success, and acceptable analysis and collection time, using feedback from patrol officers. Three of the four devices were rated in the 80th percentile in these categories. To complicate things, some drugged drivers may be trying to confound the test by using different fluids or mouthwashes to dilute a possible sample. de Castro (2014) found that a commercial product designed to dilute for the test was ineffective, but a plain water mouthwash at 3 hours after use was effective in dropping THC to below 25 ng/ml. However, developments continue to be made in oral fluid testing. Plouffe et al (2017) describe a new roadside testing technique they were developing, utilizing existing fluorescent scanners, that’s highly reliable, can utilize a cutoff of 1 ng/ml or lower, and from sample insertion to readout, take less than 10 minutes to complete.

IMPLICATIONS

            As improvements are made in oral fluid roadside testing, the role of a DRE may be scaled back to assisting in drug investigations or in cases involving an indeterminate drug, as may be the case as synthetic designer drugs continue to be developed and find their way into the recreational market. But in order to make oral fluid testing a viable means of deterring, detecting and stopping drugged driving, yet distinguishing from residual THC in the system that has no effect on driving performance, reasonable, science-based decisions will need to be made regarding per se or impairment levels, and the proper testing device for the intended purpose, such as the suitability of using the device for a DUID checkpoint. Jurisdictions should also be prepared for legal challenges to the admissibility of testimony from DREs as well as challenges to the reliability of some testing devices. Despite some drawbacks still present in oral fluid testing devices and the validity in determining impairment by THC level, it is the direction that roadside testing is moving. As such, jurisdictions and legislatures will need to stay current on the best testing equipment, and best practices and research, in this continually emerging field.

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Research Briefs

The New Detective: Rethinking Criminal Investigations

Eck and Rossmo, Criminological and Public Policy, 2019

Eck and Rossmo discuss developing a new role for law enforcement detectives. Research on the role of detectives has demonstrated that they solve only a small portion of cases, with witness and victim statements, and initial efforts by patrol officers, contributing more to case clearance than detectives and their work. Most innovations and reforms in policing have been focused on patrol officers and how they conduct their work and interact with the public (like problem-oriented policing, community-oriented policing, intelligence-led policing) but little attention in that regard has been made toward investigations. But the authors also consider that a traditional method of measuring detective effectiveness by the number of closed cases or clearance rate is a poor measure and does nothing to address improving detective performance.

Clearance rates have been in decline since the 60’s despite improvements in investigative technology and while law enforcement believes this is related to higher crime, less time, and lack of cooperation from the public, and charge reluctance by prosecutors, the authors contend the amount of crime is not the issue as crime has been on a downward trend since the ‘90’s. Eck and Rossmo believe that the wealth of information detectives have on crime and criminals is not being used effectively when detectives are being tasked with solving individual cases. Rather than working specific cases, detectives should be focusing on crime patterns, which may actually have an effect on reducing crime and improving clearance rates.

The authors suggest three areas that investigative management and detectives can improve on and orient themselves to; focus on quality and the reduction of errors, better organize detectives to address repeat problems and patters, involve detectives directly in crime prevention. Detectives can improve their investigations by understanding and utilizing inductive, deductive, and abductive reasoning better, thus reducing wrongful arrests. Referencing a 2014 study, the authors state that of three factors affecting “criminal (case) failures” to identify offenders and arrest them (organizational, environmental, and personal), the personal factor, like a rush to judgement and confirmation bias, was the most common cause. Utilizing the acronym SRIP, detectives should evaluate the quality of evidence for significance (strength of the evidence as it points to guilt, exoneration, or other explanations) reliability (assessed before significance, how likely is the evidence to be true), independence (independently, does the evidence make a unique contribution, or is it merely derivative) , and patterns (how does the evidence fit in the overall information pattern of the case, evidence should not be cherry picked).

When too much focus is put on solving individual cases, detectives aren’t recognizing and understanding patterns and developing resources. Victims and witnesses provide much of the information needed to solve cases and detectives, and these participants, as well as offenders can deliver more information to detectives and help them recognize potential patterns. Knowing that crime patterns can be offender or situational based, this information can help link persons and places to crime patterns and disrupt these factors which lead to patterns. Detectives understand crime, criminals, and crime opportunities but that knowledge largely goes unused when detectives are only focusing on individual cases instead of taking a broader problem-solving approach.

The authors suggest there are four way detectives can better utilize their investigative knowledge and work toward crime prevention:

Routine debriefings of victims and offenders. Not just focusing on interviews and interrogations in a specific case to gather evidence and solve it, but utilizing after the fact interviews which can help detectives in determining patterns and conditions which can assist in future investigations and crime prevention.

Repeat victims and offenses. Detectives may not need to be assigned to a specific case but instead to victims or places, also to recognize and assess criminogenic factors and situations.

Place based investigation. Utilizing a problem solving approach they can eliminate or reduce offending when the precipitating factors are identified.

Detective involvement in problem solving. Utilizing their knowledge, detectives can be folded into more problem solving efforts, taking the lead or coordinating with other units to bring more of their specialized knowledge to bear in addressing and solving larger problems.

The authors contend that while detectives are being under (or incorrectly) utilized, trying to improve detective performance and utility by making marginal organizational changes, while still having detectives doing their job the same as they have for decades, will be insufficient.  Departments need to re-think and re-organize their detectives toward a larger, crime prevention mandate.

Eck, J. E., & Rossmo, D. K. (2019). The new detective: Rethinking criminal investigations. Criminology & Public Policy, 18(3), 601-622

While Eck and Rossmo see clearance rates as a faulty measure of detective effectiveness, many departments, and the public, see this as an indication the police are doing their jobs. But clearance rates can vary on a number of factors between various crimes based on evidence, available information, and investigative effort. Authors Cook, Braga, Turchan, and Barao examine these issues in the differences between gun homicide and gun assault clearance rates.

Why do gun murders have a higher clearance rate than gunshot assaults?

Cook, Braga, Turchan, & Barao, Criminological and Public Policy, 2019

To explore the title issue, Cook and colleagues examined Boston shootings data from 2010-2014, comparing 204 homicides and 231 non-fatal shootings investigations with a quasi-experimental design using case narratives, data, and detective interviews. The authors mention that research from the ‘70’s indicated that investigative work had little effect on solving cases, indicating the importance of patrol officer work, and witness and victim statements. However, research in the ‘90’s revealed some investigative factors that were associated with arrest including what the first responding officer did at the scene, how soon the detective arrived, how many detectives were assigned, and how the scene was documented. However this previous research was more descriptive and couldn’t demonstrate a definitive causal relationship.

Initial comparison of gun homicides and gun assaults showed no statistical difference in the situational circumstances between the types of shootings with the exception that indoor shootings were more lethal. It also showed that gun homicide clearance by arrest was twice as high as gun assaults (43% vs 19%) and that clearance rates in both types were higher in personal disputes or domestic violence situations as opposed to gang and drug related disputes. The on-scene arrest rates for both types were 6% and arrest rates during the two days immediately following the shooting were the same for fatal and non-fatal cases, 11%. The difference in arrest rates arose later and the authors consider that the early matching rates are reflective of the “easy” cases in both types of crime. Easy cases are solved quickly and without the need for the extra resources deployed in homicide investigations; those resources being a possible source of overall higher clearance rates. Eyewitness testimony and the effort in gathering direct evidence were also prominently factored into the differences in the two types.

The prevalence of investigative success that comes from cooperating witnesses was the same in both types of cases, but the lower clearance rates for non-fatal shootings suggest less cooperative witnesses in these shootings. However, the data also indicates that witness cooperation is not always immediate and spontaneous, and that efforts may be necessary to locate and gain the cooperation of witness. Data also indicated that the likelihood of a surviving victim being cooperative was greater in homicide cases than assault cases. This may stem from a recognition of the more serious nature of a death, as well as assault survivors’ attempts to hamper witnesses from speaking out.

Another important factor in case clearance was the greater amount of forensic evidence gathered in fatal cases versus non-fatal and since the situational circumstances between the two types of crimes are very similar, it speaks to the greater amount of effort and resources put into fatal cases compared to non-fatal. The statistical analyses bears out that a significantly greater amount of evidence is collected in fatal shootings versus non-fatal, including latent prints, DNA, ballistics, electronic data analysis, and post-scene witness interviews, which may be a function of the finding that a greater number of officers were providing information in fatal cases versus non-fatal.

The authors summarize by referencing the 1976 RAND study that carried a lot of weight in presenting the view that detectives  have little effect on clearance rates, whereas on-scene arrests and eyewitness testimony matter more. While these were also determining factors in clearance rates in the current study, the authors disagree that detectives are of little value . Their findings show that 30% of homicide arrests where an eyewitness was a key factor occurred 6 months or more after the incident, and that this comes from the detectives’ effort and skill at locating witnesses and gaining their cooperation. The authors contend that clearance rates for gun assaults could be improved if additional resources and efforts were employed, even if not at the same level employed in homicide investigations.

Cook, P. J., Braga, A. A., Turchan, B. S., & Barao, L. M. (2019). Why do gun murders have a higher clearance rate than gunshot assaults?. Criminology & Public Policy, 18(3), 525-551.

Cook et al. mention the difficulty that investigators may have in gaining witness cooperation in non-fatal cases, as they may be viewed as less serious crimes that don’t as heavily prompt cooperation, as well as witness suppression efforts by victims or other witnesses. Brunson and Wade explore this lack of desire to cooperate with the police in gun violence incidents.

Oh Hell No, We Don’t Talk to the Police

Brunson and Wade, Criminological and Public Policy, 2019

The authors interviewed 50 young, black males from high-crime neighborhoods in Brooklyn and the Bronx who were high risk of violence individuals (active and former gang members, and others who had prior associations with illegal guns, and gun violence), endorsed retaliatory violence and anti-snitching, and who had knowledge about illegal gun markets, and the associated violence, in an attempt to understand the lack of witness cooperation in urban, low SES neighborhoods. Prior research has already pointed to factors that influence this lack of cooperation. Perceptions of both over and under policing can reinforce Blacks’ collective belief that policing is racially biased, harming police legitimacy, which can foster more community violence as Black residents feel the need to engage in retaliation and protection strategies that don’t involve the police. Individuals involved in violent crime can also take advantage of this perceived lack of legitimacy and non-reliance on the police to discourage witnesses from coming forward. These efforts help foster the impression with the police that anti-snitching attitudes are prevalent in urban communities. Though not often mentioned in police/race discussions, most Blacks are law abiding and support the role of the police in the community. While there should be opportunities for positive, mutually beneficial community partnerships between the Black community and police, these opportunities are undermined when Blacks engage in civil unrest following a publicized police action. This presents the image of wholesale denunciation of the police by Blacks, suggesting to law enforcement that Blacks are tolerant of crime and view the police as an intrusion.

The authors, while recognizing a no-snitching policy has long been part of  minority urban culture (a la E. Anderson’s code of the streets), also noted recent literature has shown inconsistencies in what offenders think constitutes snitching. While perceiving the police as illegitimate may provide an excuse for not cooperating with the police, it doesn’t fully explain the reticence of law abiding citizens from coming forward with information. This suggests that victim or witness intimidation, either actual or feared, may factor into whether there is cooperation with the police. High crime rates in neighborhoods and mistrust of the police can lead these residents to perceive they are being under-policed, while aggressive policing tactics prompts the belief in a racially biased police force and a feeling of being over policed. Residents question whether the police are concerned with reducing crime or are just interested in cracking down on minor offenses. This in turns raises questions of police illegitimacy and generates legal cynicism, not just with the police but the criminal justice system as well. This legal cynicism is directly related to the support of retaliatory violence, which leads to higher level of community violence, and can prompt conditions of over-policing as law enforcement struggles to deal with increasing levels of violence.

In the study interviews, several participants explained their dislike of the police because of negative, aggressive personal interactions but many (54%) also referenced widely publicized media accounts of police misconduct and the fatal shootings of unarmed Black men as reasoning for their dislike and mistrust of the police. 90% stated they wouldn’t call the police if a loved one was threatened with gun violence. Some participants also complained that the police were too focused on drug offenses, and were not concerned about addressing violence in the neighborhoods with 76% of participants offering up very negative comments about the justice system as a whole, believing it to be oppressive and not dedicated to justice in minority communities. Participants also indicated that most of the gun violence pertained to “beefs”, trivial conflicts involving disrespect, arguments, and misunderstandings. These beefs generate hard feelings between individuals and prompt them to carry guns for protection against “the people [that] don’t like you”. Many who were shot at claimed they didn’t know who (74%) or the reason (48%) and many feared being in the wrong place at the wrong time in a random shooting, though the prevalence of beefs with individuals on a block or in a neighborhood was a common occurrence in their narratives.

With so many of the participants holding views of police illegitimacy and legal cynicism, they preferred retaliatory violence (92%) as opposed to contacting the police after a shooting. As one participant put it, “If I go and tell the [cops and] this nigga fuck around and beat the casethis nigga still out here smoking blunts, doing everything while my [friend] dead, you feel me…that’s why I don’t understand that snitching to the cops shitthis nigga shot my [friend]a real nigga would just go out and kill that nigga.” They viewed the police as ineffective because they would not be able to stop or prevent threats of violence against them and held mistrust of police motives, especially after feeling mistreated by the police when interviewed in previous incidents. As one participant said, “I got shot up here [on Wabada] and the cops [said] If I don’t cooperate, then [they] gonna take me to jail, take me to jail for what? I didn’t do anything to nobody, just because you stereotyping me and feel that I know who did it, now I’m in trouble? You don’t gotta drag people and belittle them and make them feel lesser than who they are to get stuff out them.That’s  whyI won’t go to cops for nothing, if imma die, imma dieI ain’t going to cops for nothing, I’ll go to the ambulance before the cops.”

Many of the participants embraced a no snitching stance, saying it just went against their culture and referenced the code of the street. Those who retaliated were revered but those who went to the police were viewed with contempt, however some of them considered there were acceptable exceptions; with female family members, intimates, and boys. It was also noted that beside their adherence to the edict, they used intimidation of community members to ensure their compliance as well.

Fear over repeat victimization prompted the participants to carry a gun. The participants were willing to face arrest for gun possession in order to ensure their safety on the street, feeling that the police are ineffective at finding and stopping known shooters, and won’t be around to save them when confronted over a beef. As one participant said, “I was just thinking about my safety.I don’t wanna say that I was clueless to the consequences, I just didn’t care about thembecause it was like, once you get shot, the only thing you care about is, [not] getting shot again, because it really, really hurt[s]so I’m just like, I don’t want this to happen again.”

Brunson and Wade consider three goals to be achieved; reducing gun violence so high risk people can live in safety, launch grassroots campaigns countering pro-violence and anti-snitching, and improving police-minority relations. However with the prevalence and necessity of carrying defensive firearms in high-violence neighborhoods, disarming individuals will be difficult. However, allocating more resources to gun assaults may improve perceived police legitimacy as well as improve clearance rates, helping to reduce fear. Focused deterrence programs have also been shown to be effective in reducing gun violence.as well as using community intermediaries to help quell violence.

Brunson, R. K., & Wade, B. A. (2019). “Oh hell no, we don’t talk to police” Insights on the lack of cooperation in police investigations of urban gun violence. Criminology & Public Policy, 18(3), 623-648.

While the suggestion of allocating more resources toward investigations may improve clearance rates, as well as perceptions of police legitimacy, citizen perceptions can vary of police actions especially when accompanied by a difference in policing style. Deuchar, Miller, and Densley examine this variance in perception in stop and search efforts in Scotland. The article also reminds us that procedural justice and police legitimacy are not just in the purview of minority-police relations but rather the issues pertain to those who are targeted; young, lower income males.

The Lived Experience of Stop & Search in Scotland: There Are Two Sides to Every Story.

Ross Deuchar, Johanne Miller, and James Densley, Police Quarterly, 2019

The authors consider there has been little interconnected research between procedural justice and stop and search practices but research has shown that the disproportionate use of stop and search in ethnic minority communities fosters a perception that the police are biased and lack legitimacy. Similar to “stop and frisk” in the U.S., in Scotland, police have the power to stop and search, without arrest or charge, if they have “reasonable grounds to suspect” that an individual is in possession of a weapon, drugs, or that an offense has or is about to be committed. This requirement was applicable even if the person gave consent (though voluntary searches are typically not legally challenged).

When the policy had a widespread rollout in 2012, there were concerns that it would have a negative effect on perceptions of procedural justice and hamper building positive relations between the police and the public. To address youth crime in high crime areas, Force Flexible Policing Units were assigned to areas of  juvenile crime hot spots with highly visible patrol and stop and searches. Glasgow and some surrounding areas in the west of Scotland used a predominantly aggressive approach toward policing while areas in the east including the capital of Edinburgh used a “softer”, more negotiated, order maintenance style. Populations in both areas were approximately 88% White.

The authors utilized a participant observer approach shadowing officers and observing 55 incidents, 30 in the west and 25 in the east that primarily involved white, male teenagers. They also conducted 23 interviews with officers on the reasoning behind stop and search, why they are conducted in the neighborhoods they are, and whether they are achieving goals, as well as commenting on young peoples’ perception of the police and how stop and search may influence this. 46 young people (8 from Edinburgh in the east and 38 from Paisley and Glasgow in the west) who had recent stop and search activity with police were also interviewed about their views of the police, their experiences with stop and search, the perceived influence the experience had on views of the police, as well as their views on improving police/public relations.

Officer views on stop and search found it to be an effective tool at crime prevention, locating knives and thus preventing and deterring violence as well as addressing drugs on the street. One officer said, “I think it’s a very valid tactic, personally . . . it’s helped to take a lot of knives and other offensive weapons off the street, and drugs too . . . it’s not just necessarily getting that small bag of a drug, or that weapon, you know, it can lead to vast quantities of drugs being recovered . . . if it’s used and done properly it can lead to better and bigger things.” However the youth participants did not view it as a deterrent to carrying weapons or contraband, but the researchers, and a number of youths, noted that they seemed to be targeted for stop and searches based on their demeanor or style of dress

The difference in policing style in carrying out stop and search did generate different attitudes. Youth in the west of Scotland felt resentment toward the police, feeling they were being treated like criminals during the stops. The different approach used in Edinburgh (East) generated different reaction from youths. Stop and search was conducted in a more unobtrusive and procedurally just manner, with officers speaking politely and respectfully to those stopped. As one sergeant from the east side said, “It’s no’ nice to be stopped by police and to be searched, and it’s quite embarrassing and things. So, I suppose it’s about getting that, that rapport, and getting a bit of a relationship wi’ this person, even if it’s a two or three minute interaction, just quickly trying to put them at ease a wee bit, and just saying “listen, you know, I’m no’ saying you’re a horrible, bad person, but this is why we’re here and actually your behavior has just, just caught our eye, and it was a bit strange. And, you know, there might be a perfectly logical explanation for it.” During the interviews, many of these youths perceived that the officers were doing their jobs fairly and believed that stop and search was effective in addressing youth crime issues. While youths in Edinburgh believed that the officers were professional, responsive, honest, and fair, the youths in the west of Scotland more often experienced aggressive, confrontational stops that in turn made them determined to avoid contact with the police as well as being confrontational during stops. As one youth stated “Most of the time I havnae done nothin’, and most of the time if they didnae stop us we wouldnae have committed the crime we done which is police assault or resisting arrest”.

Part of the difference in approaches stemmed from the basis for the stops. Besides statutory searches (requiring reasonable grounds to suspect) up until the Spring of 2017 Scottish Police could stop and search non-statutory, commonly referred to as voluntary or consent searches. Voluntary search numbers were high in west Scotland and many youths complained they gave consent even when they didn’t want to because of the belief that if they refused, it would make matters worse as it would turn into a statutory search. If they refused, officers would then claim they’re being stopped under the relevant statute and the majority believed the police would just make up a reason for it be statutory. Officers also had an obligation to tell individuals that they had a right to refuse a consensual searches but often this was not done. However, officers in the east typically employed the statutory standard and implied informed consent on searches.

Political, public, and media concerns over the high number of consensual stops led to reforms in 2014 that defined stop criteria, would end a presumption of consensual searching, and in such cases, requires informed consent, and reinforced the need for procedural justice. This change negatively affected the morale of officers in both east and west Scotland. Officers in the west felt anxiety that these reforms took away a valuable tool at deterring violent crime and instilled a “rights culture” among people that prompted them to be obstructive. Officers in the east didn’t experience much concern over the reforms and the ending of consensual searches because they typically used statutory searches, engaged positively with youth, and appropriately documented their searches. However their morale suffered as they felt their integrity was being questioned. Regarding the reform, youth in the west felt little would change in regards to the procedural justice they experienced as policing as typically more aggressive there, but youth in the east, because of law enforcement’s already existing low key approach, had more feelings of trust and legitimacy about the police. The authors concluded the study shows the connection between procedural justice and police legitimacy, and that procedural justice tenets should be safeguarded in police practices that may be construed as intrusive or confrontational. The positive examples shown in Edinburgh could be used as a training model to help support officers in redefining a policing style more synonymous with procedural justice. They also consider that “procedural justice is only one part of a broader narrative around police legitimacy” that should include an examination of whether the style of enforcement expresses the shared values of the community as well as examining the legality of some police activities.

Deuchar, R., Miller, J., & Densley, J. (2019). The Lived Experience of Stop and Search in Scotland: There Are Two Sides to Every Story. Police Quarterly, 1098611119849646.

Beat Integrity-A Beat Management Philosophy

While I was gathering data from my dissertation (a qualitative analysis of patrol officer behavior and decision making), during the analysis coding of officer statements, I saw the formation of what could be best described as a beat management philosophy. Twenty-nine percent of the officers I interviewed mentioned the term “beat integrity” as an ideal of  how to manage your area of responsibility. That coding process teased out some of the details in how this philosophy is regarded and constructed as well as a related concept of “jumping calls”. Below, drawing on content from my dissertation, including quotes from officers, is a discussion of the characteristics of “beat integrity, and how it was viewed and used in the study department. Full of quotes from officers, it provides a sense of how patrol officers think beats can and should be managed to both the public benefit and in service to their fellow officers. Hopefully this will lead to future research and, in our current context and forum, to discussion on what other departments and officers experience and utilize.

Introduction

In asking patrol officers whether they held any particular philosophy regarding how patrol should be conducted or their beat managed, most officers expressed general ideas about conducting patrol but nothing really akin to a philosophy. However, a beat management philosophy became evident in the exploration and discussion of the beat integrity concept and in the practice of jumping calls. A review of the literature did not reference this term in the context of a beat management philosophy. However, some components of the concept have been discussed in the literature. Mazerolle, Adams, Budz, Cockerill, and Vance (2003) mentioned the concept of beat ownership as a component of beat policing and Paoline III, Myers, and Worden, (2000) stated that beat knowledge, generated from stable beat assignments, was a component of community oriented policing. In a similar vein, researchers have examined the use and adherence to informal work rules (Ricksheim and Chermak, 1993; Paulson, 2004; Cope, 2004; Stroshine, Alpert, and Dunham, 2008; Worrall, 2013), unwritten expectations of officer workplace behaviors dictated by the behaviors and expectations of co-workers as well as workplace conditions. Beat integrity incorporates some of these components into an articulable philosophy that guides officer attitude and behavior. It also provides an understanding of what officers value in their own, and other officers, work performance and provides a guide for further research in analyzing the way officers manage their beat.

Defining Beat Integrity

Two concepts regarding officers’ management of their area of responsibility emerged during the interviews that, while both could be considered positive, may also at times be at odds with one another; the concept of beat integrity, and the concept of being a team player by jumping calls, that is taking a dispatch call not specifically assigned to the officer. Neither of these concepts were known to me prior to data collection and the interview guide did not contain any questions pertaining to the concepts. Both concepts and their interrelatedness came about through the transcript analysis process; as the terms and definitions became apparent, additional coding and analysis was conducted to develop the concepts and their relationship.

While some officers referred to the concept that came to be defined as beat integrity as beat ownership, examination of the concept revealed that beat ownership is a dimension of beat integrity. Beat integrity is a mindset; a way of approaching and understanding your own beat that’s in concert with other officers in the department.

Seventeen officers (29%) made reference to the concept of beat integrity. From officers’ descriptions and mentions of beat integrity three characteristics of the concept were identified; beat knowledge, beat ownership, and beat work ethic. While they are distinct, these characteristics are also inter-related. If officers have a sense of ownership, then it should stand to reason they should have or want to develop knowledge about their beat and serve their beat through a good work ethic. Wanting to, and being able to, handle your calls effectively and efficiently (good work ethic) is driven by a sense of ownership and facilitated by beat knowledge. Developing beat knowledge is contingent on being involved with and having that sense of ownership and experiencing and handling the types of calls present on the officer’s beat.

The first characteristic, beat knowledge, was having knowledge of your beat and a focus—the geographic layout of the beat, who the “problem people” are and where the hotspot and high call volume (“problem”) areas are, and what activities the officer should be or can be engaging in. For example, Officer 66 spoke about the beat knowledge component relating to geographic layout, “For the most part I know the short cuts, that kind of stuff. It is one of the fastest growing beats, a lot on the edges I don’t know necessarily by the name or the address. You give me a name and address, if it’s a named street some of those I’m not real familiar with however we got the map system which is nice. Other than that, I’m comfortable with business and residential sections. But that’s part of beat integrity, you learn it and especially if you’re sent there once or twice you’re gonna remember it then.” Officer 72 spoke about the aspect of understanding the problems on the beat and what officers should focus on, “I think a lot of it is that beat ownership, beat integrity, beat ownership, all that kind of stuff. This is a problem and if I don’t find a way to take care of this problem or issue, I’ll have a supervisor telling me this is a problem, let’s fix it. So if I can nip it in the bud before it becomes a problem, or gets to the attention of my supervisor, I think I’ve accomplished my job.”

The second characteristic was having a sense of beat ownership—that the area “belongs” to the officer, they are responsible for what goes on within their beat and are responsible to the citizens and businesses on the beat, as well as wanting to be on their beat and not elsewhere. The concept of beat ownership was mentioned by Mazerolle, Adams, Budz, Cockerill, and Vance (2003) when they examined “beat policing” in Queensland, Australia. They defined “beat policing” as relying “on an intelligence-driven, proactive police response” where officers “are assigned to a defined geographical location and are encouraged to take ownership of that area by responding in a proactive manner to problems within their beat” (p. 1). Officers in the current study also had that sense of beat ownership. For example, Officer 57 said, “I drive my beat and try to keep an eye out for whatever I can and be around so if we do get a call I’m near usually. I usually don’t stray far from my beat, it’s kinda my responsibility to be around here.” Officer 34 also noted, “I try and stay within my district, I don’t usually go to other districts, I just try to work my beat the most, obviously, ‘cause it’s my beat and I take pride in my beat.” A couple officers said that having assigned beats increased the sense of beat ownership. For example, Officer 66 said, “Talking about beat integrity, it used to be when you didn’t know what beat you were gonna be on, you didn’t really care about your beat. You’d come to work, take your calls, and that was it. Now you try and be more pro-active, being visible…” This accords with Kane’s (2000) study of permanent beats within the context of community oriented policing; he found that officers with permanent beats engaged in more proactive activity, suggesting a sense of increased beat ownership. Some officers also felt that the sense of ownership in beat integrity should extend to district integrity. For example, Officer 50 said,

This isn’t my beat but it sure the hell is my district. So talking about responsibility, I’m responsible to my beat and then I’m responsible to my district. I’m not responsible for this other district… I think efficiency for patrol and effectiveness comes down to district ownership. I own my district. We have a lieutenant, three sergeants, and nine police officers. We own that district. Yes, I will go off my district for a short duty, for an assault, something that’s a type one call or activity, that’s not what I’m talking about. Ninety-five percent of the day to day we cover, I don’t go off my district, I stay within my district, it’s my responsibility to make sure—you can call it power shift, power-aid for officers, call it whatever you want but we’re meeting the requirement for whatever happens in that district. So we can handle all our calls, all our traffic. The way I see it, we should be a police department within our district.

The third characteristic, beat work ethic, was being able to handle your calls for service— being able to finish your calls and move on to the next without getting overwhelmed with calls and requiring other officers to come over to your beat and take some of your calls. Officer 33 explained, “Also having that beat integrity, having some ownership of what’s going on in your area, your calls are your calls, make sure you resolve them, don’t push them off on other people. So having that ownership and work ethic.”. Officer 62 also mentioned that desire to handle their own calls, “… at Fargo PD every officer is good at beat integrity. If it’s a call on your beat, you might not be the first one there but it’s your report, you’re taking it. And everybody cares about their beat. If I was busy on something and someone on [Beat] X gets sent to a shoplifter on [officer’s beat] Y, I’m like ‘crap, crap, crap’, I wanna take that, it’s my responsibility.” Officer 34 also addressed the importance of handling calls on beat and in your district, “Other officers do this as well, if you hear on the radio when people from other districts are getting sent to your district, you try to cancel them because when you start crossing like that, and we’re traveling further distances, and then it backs up everybody, ‘cause then our response time is slower, so now you clear that up and you try to go to a call in your district where now you’re way out in another district, so that slows us down. So that’s an inefficiency issue also.”

Beat integrity acts as a set of informal work rules for officers as to how they should manage their area of responsibility. It is an expectation for officers themselves that they feel a sense of ownership and have knowledge of their beat, and are determined to “work” their beat the best way they can. It is the way they believe a patrol officer should manage their work environment. It requires them to be self-sufficient, motivated, and knowledgeable and officers have that expectation of themselves as well as expecting it from other officers.

Challenges to Beat Integrity

 While the concept of beat integrity seemed important and useful to officers, they also faced challenges to that beat integrity. Situations and circumstances could make keeping and establishing beat integrity difficult, including having to engage in assigned tasks, changing beat assignments (exacerbated by short staffing on the shift), and heavy call volume.

While one officer mentioned that assigned tasks, for example CSI (crime scene investigation), take away from officers’ beat integrity, eight of the 17 officers that spoke of beat integrity mentioned feeling a loss of beat integrity when being called to or assigned to a different beat. Officer 50 mentioned how during a time in the department without assigned beats, beat integrity suffered, “When I first got here we weren’t doing COPs and you got assigned a different beat every day, you were all over the place. They had no ownership, no real knowledge of that beat, or that area ‘cause they’re all over hell. It’s totally ineffective but because I work in the same area every day, it’s nice to have those communications, it’s nice to have the crime reporting statistics thing but the biggest thing is I’m out here.”

Situations, however, would arise where officers are assigned or dispatched off their normal beat. Some officers noted the rotating shift structure allowed for officers to occasionally be assigned to other beats. Beats that are not assigned an officer must be covered by other officers and officers can be moved off their beat to cover an open one. Officer 36 explained, “Generally speaking, on each shift there’s two officers assigned to each beat but you’re generally opposite of each other so on my Monday and Friday [Officer Y] and I work [our same beat], so if were short, I’m gonna get bumped [moved] off my beat [to cover an open beat] so you lose that sense of ownership. It’s like that’s my area, that’s where I work, I don’t wanna go over there, I wanna be over here.” As one officer noted, “[Officer X] and I are responsible for taking calls on our beats as well as [Beat Y]. And there’s also no [Beat X] car so that’s left open, and that’s the beat we’re close to, so it’s going to be—dispatch will…the right answer would be is to send us. The problem is it’s not our district and it’s not our area of responsibility, it’s not an area we focus patrol on, things like that so when we get sent over there to work it frustrates us when we have to go over to focus on issues that aren’t related to our area.”. While noting that staffing problems contributed to a loss of beat integrity, this officer recognized that having to assign or dispatch officers to a different beat was necessary to serve the public need, “And the whole idea of patrolling your own beat and your own sector just goes out the window ‘cause you’re just getting pulled over to help other people on their beats. But, that’s what you gotta do when you don’t have enough people. You can’t keep people waiting forever. I know if I call the cops I don’t wanna wait an hour and a half for them to get there. And I see that happens pretty frequently.”

Calls for service volume may also dictate that officers are pulled away from their beats to assist other officers or to focus on problem areas on other beats. One officer explained,

Beat X is a humongous beat. Beat X is on the [direction] edge of town and I’m constantly getting sucked downtown, they need staffing downtown, they got problems downtown. Last night I spent—I think I did one traffic stop on my beat last night and the rest I was pretty much downtown… my former lieutenant, you could say he was pretty much willing to take a hit on crime increase on Beat X if by me spending all my time during the first half of the shift, on Friday nights and Saturday nights downtown, to help them reduce crime on Beat 11 which is downtown. Sooo, that’s what he wanted, so that’s what we did. I don’t always feel an obligation that my beat is my beat and (inaudible) than downtown.

While officers had to contend with assigned tasks, short staffing, and call volume as a challenge to establishing and keeping beat integrity, another factor existed, the desire to engage in, and practice of, jumping calls, which could influence officers’ perception and understanding of beat integrity.

Jumping Calls

The underlying concept of beat integrity is beat and, in some instances, district management. The desire and ability to manage an area of responsibility, both for their own benefit, and for the benefit of other officers, can prompt officers to “jump calls”. Officers, based on their own awareness, or the dispatch screen in the car terminal, identify that an officer, usually on a different beat in their district, is falling behind in answering calls. Officers referred to falling behind in your calls for service with terms such as calls are “stacked”, “getting buried”, or “getting slammed”. The observing officer would then “jump” a call, that is take the call themselves, that was dispatched to the officer falling behind. The observing officer would radio in and request dispatch to assign the call to them. This officer then leaves their beat and proceeds to the location of the jumped call.

I witnessed a strong sense of solidarity amongst officers and they try to demonstrate this support by being a “team player’ and helping out other officers. For example, Officer 45 related this during the interview process:

Participant: …a lot if you’re gonna have two beats to patrol. Just remember that you’re gonna want guys to help you.

Interviewer: So you gotta show, in a sense, that you’re a team player…

Participant: Oh it’s about being a team, absolutely. You don’t wanna be the guy that’s not helping out, you don’t wanna let a district partner have three reports holding and you not help him out, it’s just not ok as a district partner. You’ll see guys who check the call logs, we got a District 2 guy down in (inaudible), we just got one call but he’s a District 2 guy so I wanna make sure he doesn’t get dogged with reports. He helps me out a lot, we go on a lot of calls together, so I try and be mindful if he’s out of the district.

Jumping calls sometimes occurs when officers are looking for action or trying to gain experience with different types of calls, though it more typically occurs because officers are trying to help their busy beat and district partners manage an area of responsibility. For example, Officer 16 said, “Basically I jump a lot of runs, might not get assigned a lot, but I jump a lot just ‘cause it’s not fair the guy downtown gets 30 calls and I get two, you know, so if I can I’ll jump calls. I probably jumped five or six yesterday.”  Another officer expressed a similar view of trying to make a fair distribution of work, “On day shift, anyway, there’s a group of us who are pretty good if people are busy and getting blasted, you jump calls for service to get things done or help ‘em out or you end up with five reports and nobody [else] was doing anything all day. Maybe you take some of the reports or calls for service for them, ‘cause you know they’re working on reports.” Officers typically get behind in answering their calls because of call volume, or the complexity of calls and the time involved in handling them. One officer explained,

And it’s not just calls for service on my beat. [adjoining beat] has one of the highest calls for service, you have complex calls, a lot of domestics, fights, thefts, tons of shoplifters ‘cause of [a local mall]. Call volume kinda puts you out there. If there’s a night where he’s getting multiple shoplifters, he gets bogged down, and I’ll go and back him up just ‘cause we take care of each other in my sector [district]. If he’s getting his butt slammed, I’m gonna go up there and help him out and try to alleviate some of his work load. And he does the same thing for me.”

Conflict Between Beat Integrity and Jumping Calls

There were indications that the concept of beat integrity and the practice of jumping calls did not always mesh smoothly. Some of the responses indicated that a few officers felt certain officers exhibited what might be characterized as low beat integrity and took advantage of other officers’ willingness to jump calls. Though I did not observe this behavior, it was reported that these officers may be slow in doing their work, or slow to respond to calls they do not like, knowing that if they get too swamped with calls, other officers will help them out. Therefore, they allow other officers to jump calls on their beat, thus avoiding their own work. One officer explained,

Now on the flip side of that not every patrol officer is willing to put that effort in [establishing beat integrity]. You need to have buy-in from the patrol officers, the patrol officer has to take ownership of the problem or trying to solve the problem. And sometimes that takes a lot of effort to get that, sometimes it doesn’t, sometimes you have officers who’re ‘Great, I want to do my job, I wanna work hard, I wanna do this’ and sometimes you have officers who are lazy, I’m not going to sugarcoat it. I mean there’s people who don’t wanna do this job, they wanna come here, sit and drive around in their car all day and then go home and not take a report, not take a call, and the people—and sometimes the crime statistics in their beat show because of that.

Another officer expressed a similar sentiment noting how officers with low beat integrity negatively affected the other officers working, “I think taking the calls, doing what you need for the call and clearing the scene for the next call to help your—otherwise you end up screwing your beat partners. And there’s people that will milk a call, they’ll take forever and it’s like, really? You got like five calls stacked up on your beat and we’re gonna get sent to them. I’m right in the middle of [Beat X] and [Beat Y]. So if something happens on Y and I’m not doing something, and they need two cars, I’m going. If something is happening on X and they need two cars, I’ll go. So I get pulled both ways so if you milk those calls out people get pissed off at you.”

It was more common, however, for officers to state that certain officers may have very high beat integrity. These officers were characterized as tending to refrain from jumping calls on the other beats because it detracted from their beat integrity by leaving their beat open; nor did they appreciate other officers jumping calls on their beat as it suggested they were losing beat integrity. For example, one officer said, “Usually I jump around beats, when we’re busy I like to go to other districts and help out. I get bored real easy. Some people frown on that, they don’t like you going into their beats which I can understand why but I guess it’s good and bad.” Officer 66 elaborated further, “Like we were talking earlier about helping other officers out in your district. There are people that are so beat oriented that they won’t help another person in their district unless they’re dispatched to do it or (inaudible) come help. Which I can understand the beat integrity but if you’re getting your butt handed to you, you want someone to come and help. If you’re not busy on your beat you should kinda turn that beat integrity into district integrity.”

One problem mentioned by officers, and one that can occur in the dispatch process when staffing levels are low as well, is a cascading effect from jumping calls. When officers took calls on other beats, their assigned beat is then left open, which may require a different officer to cover that beat. Officer 54 commented on this cascading effect, ‘Cause inevitably what seems to happen is it creates a domino effect because they’ll pull officers from another district and then they get a call out there that needs attention right away so they’re pulling officers from other districts, it’s almost comical ‘cause you’ll see officers from other districts all over town ‘cause of this cascading effect.”

Cascading can occur on occasions where call volume is heavy or officers engage in injudicious call jumping, leaving officers engaged in activities or answering calls on unfamiliar beats, and a lack of beat integrity on this new beat reduces their effectiveness in their activities. I witnessed this cascading effect on a few occasions where officers were dispatched off their district and while engaged in the call, another call comes into the beat the officer just left, requiring someone else from a different beat to take that call. This can become frustrating for officers as not only did they feel the loss of beat integrity but it gave a sense of disorganization to their activities. This frustration was especially evident when officers were dispatched to drive a lengthy distance to a call in an unfamiliar district. The extra time involved answering that call by dispatching a distant officer, especially on a busy night, suggested to the officer that the dispatch process was unorganized and inefficient, and that it would likely result in some other officer now having to take a call on their beat. One officer half-jokingly predicted that as soon as we arrived at the call destination on the other side of town, a call would come in on his beat, and he was correct.

To ensure they do not become entangled in a jumped call that prevents them from attending to the calls on their own beat, officers must be able to negotiate and balance the expectation of being a team player with that of beat integrity, take into account other officers’ feelings regarding their beat integrity, and account for call volume. This balancing act affects how officers patrol and what activities they engage in while on patrol, to insure they are open to assist other officers quickly if need be, or whether they may even jump a call. Officers might not invest themselves too heavily in any particular activity when the potential and need for jumping calls, or being dispatched on some occasions, might require the officer to break away from that activity.

A District 2 officer noted the practicality of being available and geographically close to areas they may be called to, “Really we’re a North car, so a lot of our calls we spend on District 1. I take a lot of calls on District 1 so I’ll rarely go down to District 2, I spend a lot of time helping these guys. It would leave them short if I spent a lot of time down there, so my patrol is kinda beat specific and I won’t roam as much as probably other beats do, down south, other parts of the district [2] like [Beat X] or [Beat Y]. I won’t roam down there ‘cause downtown’s pretty busy and like you said when you get a two-car run, two cars go there and it’s too busy of a district for me to be all the way down in 21 when he needs help up north.”

Officer 36 mentioned this practicality aspect as well as the expectations of other officers, “I think patrol feeds off of what everyone else is doing now, so we have a lot of cars tied up on stuff right now so I’ll stay closer to downtown ‘cause it doesn’t make sense for me to go all the way up in my beat just to get sent all the way back down again. Especially when you’re down to just two or three [officers], you’re not all looking for traffic stops, you’re staying available. ‘Cause you don’t be that guy, who’s out busting T-stops while everybody else is humping calls.”

Officer 44 also referenced the expectation of other officers, and the public, that officers be available to help answer calls, “If every beat is busy, and I’m not getting a single call and I’m out running traffic, that’s probably not-it’s going to be frowned upon, if I’m running traffic and everybody’s getting slammed with reports, ‘cause I should be helping them out. ‘Cause those are priorities, helping other community members who are calling for our help. We have to help them.”  Negotiating this balance may be difficult at times and for some officers there might be a steep learning curve which can change their view or approach to patrol. Officer 67 related how negotiating this balance affected his outlook.

Some officers have extreme beat integrity, extreme district integrity. I’m not really one of those officers where no matter what I’m not letting another officer take a call on my beat if I can help it. Or if a call comes out to my area or district and I’m free, I’ll help out as I can but I have more of a team wide mentality and the districts and beats have more of a district mentality which is department wide for the most part. I was reassigned to District 2 one night and I’m used to my beat where I patrol and a call came out on the next district over but only a couple blocks away so I went and helped out. Well another call came on my beat and I was asked to clear that call [I was on] in the middle of an interview and afterwards I took a little bit of flak for that. Someone drove past that call [on my beat] to take that [call], the one I was on, because it was their beat and I didn’t really understand all that, so it changed a little how I patrol, help out less in different districts in the areas so I can be available for calls that come out on mine. I don’t really agree with that; I would rather work more team wide but officers from different districts are coming across to help me take calls so I understand why they feel the way they do. But I don’t necessarily agree with it so that changed a little bit of how I approach it.

Officers incorporate the concept of beat integrity, and its three characteristics, beat knowledge, beat ownership and beat work ethic, into how they believe proper management of their area of responsibility should be performed. Officers expressed wanting to have beat integrity, and an understanding that officers expect it of them and they expected it of other officers. However, the degree that officers invest in the concept of beat integrity could vary and beat integrity may run afoul of another concept, the shared responsibility and teamwork that prompts officers to jump calls. Both of these concepts take on the form of informal work rules, which influence officer behavior and are viewed as effective and meaningful, as suggested by Stroshine and colleagues (2008); there was an expectation among the patrol officers that the concepts were accepted and engaged in, and officers who failed to understand or participate in these work concepts were viewed negatively, as they did not demonstrate self-reliance or a desire to be a team player.

Conclusion

The definition and adherence to the concept of beat integrity forms a set of personal and inter-officer informal work rules that dictate how beats should be managed and how officers should behave. Beat integrity, and the inter-related practice of jumping calls, sets out the desirable qualities of officers and beat management in that officers are responsible for their beat, have good beat knowledge, incorporate a good work ethic by handling their calls independently, and willing to function as a team player in the process of managing their beat. While informal work rules are meant to guide behaviors, especially in situations without official mandates or direction, officers in the study indicated that adherence and acceptance of beat integrity were not universal. However, officers who failed to abide by the beat management philosophy were perceived negatively.

When asked specifically, most officers had no articulable beat management philosophy. However, the results of the current study indicate that officers do in fact operate under a beat management philosophy in the form of informal work rules. These results revealed beat integrity, as a beat management philosophy, a concept which was derived from officers’ behavior and statements, may be a unique discovery in policing literature. It is possible that, given the description and utility of the components, that officers in other police departments may use a similar beat management philosophy that takes the form of informal work rules, and may not be recognizable to officers, police departments, or researchers as a specific beat management philosophy.

Given that, lets have some discussion. Have you noticed in your department or agency, a “catch-word” or an overall adherence to a philosophy, regarding the way a district, sector, or beat should be managed or patrolled, one that was developed, practiced, and accepted by officers? Do you, or other officers you know, have an articulable set of informal work rules or guidelines that are followed as a sort of “best practices” in terms of beat management? Let me know your thoughts and send me some feedback.

Officers On Patrol: A Qualitative Examination of Patrol Officer Behavior and Decision Making

This was my doctoral dissertation which I completed in 2018. I spent over 300 hours with on-duty patrol officers in a participant-observer role, while conducting semi-structured interviews with them. Some of the many patrol related topics are discussions about purposes, goals, expectations, being a good patrol officer, beat and shift characteristics, patrol methodology tactics and techniques, patrol intensity, obstacles to patrol, interacting with the public, beat management, discretion, inter-department communication, and the use and value of different kinds of police intelligence.

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A Continuum of Deviance-From Motorcyclist to Outlaw Biker

Frank Heley 2009

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is to examine the deviant subculture of bikers and outlaw motorcycle clubs and determine the sources of the deviance and what factors contribute to increased deviance as deeper immersion in the subculture occurs, eventually culminating in serious, organized criminal enterprise. I believe that there is a continuum of deviance that starts at an individual’s basic socio-economic level and is coupled with an interest in motorcycling and upon entry into the subculture there is a natural progression toward deeper deviance. Most of the general observations contained here about bikers and the lifestyle come from my personal observations over the years, both in Fargo, ND and Dallas, TX. From 1986, when I bought my first motorcycle to 2003, when life’s circumstances took precedence over riding, I worked for and with bikers, had friends who were bikers, and I spent time in biker and biker friendly bars.

DEFINITIONS

To facilitate the exploration of the continuum of deviance within the biker subculture, it is important to provide some context and definitions. The term one percenter is common amongst the vernacular of bikers and law enforcement alike. The term is said to have reportedly originated from an American Motorcycle Association estimate in the ‘40’s that one percent of motorcyclists were causing trouble for all motorcyclists (Barker, 2004). While the term is used with little empirical evidence and subject to disagreement as to the exact origin, it has become so commonplace as to be a legitimate label for outlaw motorcycle gangs and their members (Heley, Personal Knowledge).

The use of the term gang is also related to those who invoke it. The members themselves will always refer to themselves as a club. The press and law enforcement will frequently if not exclusively, use the term gang to define motorcycling organizations whose members engage in or are believed to engage in criminal activities (Quinn & Koch, 2003). This may institute a degree of bias into sociological and law enforcement analysis of these organizations. Minnesota statute defines a criminal gang as an organization consisting of three or more individual which has as one of its primary activities, is the engagement in felony level criminal activities, who have a common name, sign or symbol who individually or collectively currently or have in the past engaged in a pattern of criminal activity. In this report the term motorcycle club (MC) and outlaw motorcycle club will be utilized rather than gang but the term 1% in reference to clubs and members will be used to give a better indication of the level of deviance and criminal activity in MCs that are being addressed.

It is important to recognize that amongst the thousands of MCs, are around 300 that are one-percenters. (Barker, 2005) Amongst those are a handful of MCs that have been more than prominent in the eyes of the public, press, and law enforcement. The Big Five as described by Barker, the Hell’s Angels, the Bandidos, the Pagans, the Outlaws, and the Sons of Silence have distinguished themselves from other 1% clubs through size, criminal activity, prosecution, and press coverage. There are also a number of 1% clubs that are major independents in that they are limited by the number of chapters, member strength, and lack of affiliation or geographical competition with the Big Five. (Barker, 2005) 

The Big Five clubs originated in the 50’s and 60’s (Barker, 2005) and according to anthropologist Daniel Wolf, bikers are alienated products of anomic, urban, technological society who adhere to their own version of a wild west ethic (as cited in Quinn & Koch 2003). While this may be somewhat applicable to the origins of these clubs, I feel it falls a little short as the progression from simple deviance to outright criminal behavior is not so easily explained. Quinn and Koch also portray the one-percenter world as both countercultural and subcultural, in that their lifestyle and behaviors seem to run counter to the rest of societal norms, but that their respect for hierarchy, power, and belonging are a “caricature of a subterranean norm” (2003). This is a more comprehensive view of a lifestyle that is at the same time both secretive and highly visible.

THE CONTINUUM OF DEVIANCE       

The assertion of this work is that there is a continuum of deviance within the motorcycling world that can be explained and defined through various sociological and criminological views. Since the inception of the motorcycle, riders have been viewed with some trepidation. At a time when the automobile was still a relatively new invention, the motorcycle was thought of as dangerous and those who rode them were viewed as unconventional, adventurous, or reckless depending on the viewpoint of the observer. The formation of 1% clubs cannot be explained solely by disenfranchisement and anomie. The Hells Angels were formed by former WW II vets, the Pagans by a biochemist employed at the National Institute of Health, and the Florida based Warlocks, a major independent, by a Vietnam era sailor. (Barker, 2005) Indeed, a number of now defunct clubs were started by WW II servicemen (Heley, Personal Knowledge)

 In the case of these servicemen I believe it is not anomie per se but, as Quinn agrees, the bonds of brotherhood and risk-taking behavior fostered in the military prompted the formation of the clubs (2001). Others, I believed were formed as a means of binding like-minded loners, which is the view of former National President of the Hells Angels Sonny Barger and anthropologist Daniel Wolf, though this loyalty is magnified by their distrust and rejection of mainstream society (Quinn, 2001). Already viewed as somewhat outside of the mainstream by virtue of being motorcycle riders, those more comfortable in a “saloon society milieu” (Quinn, 2001), gravitate toward one another in a sense of kinship that I believe runs deeper than just a means of dealing with blue collar stress.

AFFINITY, AFFLIATION, AND SIGNIFICATION

This suggests the continuum of deviance that exists amongst bikers, typified by       Matza’s theory of affinity, affiliation, and signification. Motorcyclists now are relatively conventional but not completely mainstream. The motorcycle is an acceptable means of travel, but it has also come to signify freedom seeking. From this very nominal deviance it’s possible to transition from motorcyclist to biker. It is in the saloon society, that Quinn refers to, that bikers associate in; one of lower class focuses and attitudes. It’s here that affinity starts. Based on my observations, bikers are defined by themselves and other based on the style of dress, the make and model of motorcycle, overt behavior, and dedication to motorcycle riding. Dress and personal style indicate toughness with black leather, denim, chains, heavy boots, and the typical carrying of a weapon, often a knife. Violent or sexual imagery, or those related to the biking lifestyle are typical tattoos within the subculture. To support this image of toughness, real toughness is required. It is important to show perceived masculine traits; those associated with a penchant for, or at least an acceptance of, violence, misogyny, substance abuse, and minor criminal activity. Hard drinking, recreational drug use, and a willingness for confrontation are typical behaviors. (Heley, Personal Knowledge) 

However, the other defining factor is riding itself. It is important not only as a primary means of transportation but in making very sharp distinctions. What you ride, American made Harley Davidson versus import, is important, as well as how often you ride. Bikers who tow their bikes to shows and on long runs are treated with derision. So too are those with too many luxuries and accessories on their bikes versus the stripped down or chopped ride. Distinctions are also made between those who ride the smaller Harleys called Sportsters and those who ride the “Big Twins”. Another very important distinction is between those who repair and modify their own bikes versus those who rely on shops to service and customize their bikes. There are a large amount of subcultural norms that need to be understood and accepted, and this also takes an investment of time, dedicating oneself to the lifestyle if you wanted to be viewed as and consider yourself a biker (Heley, Personal Knowledge).

This indicates that there are certain expectations that must be met to achieve full status, i.e. being a real biker. Within the subculture, bikers are very quick to make distinctions between “righteous bros” and “posers”. It are only these righteous bros that move further down the continuum.

Joining a motorcycle club moves the biker from affinity to affiliation. The club becomes a source of personal and group identity (Quinn and Koch, 2003). If you are a member of a club, you can now wear the label of biker with no argument, but you have a new role to fulfill. MCs can be either conventional, those just interested in motorcycling and that are recognized by the AMA, or norm violating, which is our focus here. Membership can occur in different ways. One can request membership if sponsored by a member, one can be recruited by a nomad affiliated with a 1% club, or you can be patched over (Quinn and Koch, 2003). As a member of the club there are further expectations to be adhered to, primarily loyalty to the club. New members are typically socialized to the ways of the club by “prospecting”. The prospect is in a probationary period designed to see if he is worthy to be a club member. They may be assigned a variety of mundane and dirty jobs and in some of the 1% clubs, may be required to commit a felony for the club to insure membership. (Barker, 2005) Once a full member, the prospect is allowed to wear the club insignia or “patch” and now has a patch holder status. The patch holds ultimate importance for a club member. It is never to be surrendered or allowed to be desecrated. Patch holders will also typically procure more tattoos that further show allegiance to the club. MC members have a fierce loyalty to not only the club and its members but its activities. Club members are expected to be active in the club by participating in runs, attending meetings, paying dues, and abiding by club rules which dictate behavior towards other members, allowable drug use, and other behaviors that affect the club’s cohesion or reputation (Quinn and Koch, 2003).

This image of a MC fits thousands of clubs around the US and world. Patch holder membership is typically made up of the type of biker described previously. However, within the context of 1 % clubs, and MCs in general, criminal activity by individual club members and the club itself varies widely (McNally and Alston, 2006). Individual deviance may go beyond recreational drug use to minor dealing or petty theft to grand theft. These criminal activities and behaviors usually occur on an individual level or between cliques in the club (McNally and Alston, 2006) but are not typically club directed.

The National Association Of Gang Investigators put the number of 1% clubs at over 300 nationwide. (Barker, 2005) It is during club membership, either in an existing 1% club or in a club that is transitioning into one, that signification takes place. The member is no longer a biker who may commit some crimes but has now become a criminal biker, an outlaw. There is sufficient evidence from law enforcement to suggest that 1% clubs do engage in ongoing criminal operations that are diverse and lucrative. The crimes are designed to benefit the club and are typical of the subculture they occupy and the norms they conform to, but at a more extreme level such as drug manufacturing and dealing, prostitution, auto & bike theft, gun running, and contract killings (Barker, 2004). The continuum toward more extreme deviance culminating in extreme criminality is enhanced by a few features within the subculture, the differential association and the hierarchy that exists in clubs, especially the one-percenters.

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DIFFERENTIAL ASSOCIATION

Within the subculture of the MC exists hang-arounds, friends, and associates of the club, and puppet clubs, i.e. weaker clubs affiliated with the larger, stronger clubs. These peripheral components demonstrate a varying level of involvement and loyalty to the club and subsequently, the criminal and deviance associated with each (McNally & Alston, 2006). They are usually subservient to ranking gang members and often must be sponsored by a member to achieve this status. Typically, they are involved in only a limited degree in club business but may participate in the criminality associated with the club. Also, with each chapter are a number of cliques. These members associate to a greater degree because of the task sharing and specialization in maintaining criminal activity. In using a social network analysis, McNally and Alston assert that the level of criminality that exists relates to the club’s hierarchy and the closeness of core and peripheral member contact. Core members and officers account for only 15-20% of criminal activity in McNally and Alston’s analysis, with the bulk of the crime committed by rank and file members. While individual members may engage in criminality, the level at which they associate, or are in contact, with core members and club officers helps determine their level of criminal involvement, supporting a differential association view regarding the members (McNally and Alston, 2006).

HIERARCHY, ONE-PERCENTERS, AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

MC’s including 1% clubs have a very distinct hierarchy. There is a home or mother chapter, the original chapter of the club. Its president is typically the national president. The Big Five have a varied number of chapters and members. Exact numbers are unknown but most of the clubs have around 80 chapters worldwide, with member numbers in the hundreds, if not thousands. (Barker, 2005) The home chapter set rules and guidelines, and issues charters for the chapters. However, it appears that criminal activity is not dictated by the home chapter but through individual chapters, though some in law enforcement believe the national chapter sets drug prices (Quinn, 2001). The national chapter may not dictate the requirement of criminal behavior to the chapters, but they are a means of resolving disputes regarding criminal activities engaged in by chapters or individual members. There is continued disagreement over whether the criminality in MCs are simply expressive acts or are actually instrumental, but it is likely that it is a combination of both (Quinn and Koch, 2003).

There is evidence of advancement in status within the club. Within the chapters, they have elected officials; the president, vice president, secretary/treasurer, sergeant at arms, and the road captain, each with their distinct duties within the club. (Heley, Personal Knowledge). Within the Big Five and undoubtedly other outlaw clubs, are sub groups like the Hell’s Angels’ Filthy Few, which law enforcement reports act as hit squads, but the club maintains they handle internal security and recruiting. Also, within the clubs are Nomads who are members of the club but are not affiliated with any chapter and answer only to the home chapter. Purportedly they serve as recruiters and inter-chapter liaisons (Quinn & Koch, 2003).

 Because a hierarchy exists there is an incentive to achieve more status. This is accomplished by evident adherence to club rules and extraordinary loyalty to the club and its activities. As Sonny Barger, the Original President of the Hells Angels put it, you have to “show class” (Thompson, 1966). As Thompson also related, the Hell’s Angels, and other clubs as well, are very well aware of their outlaw status as viewed by the general public and with that, it carries a certain level of protection from societal censure at least in the first person, especially with the promotion of a “one on all, all on one” view of total retaliation (Thompson, 1966).  Because of this, as a club member they become socialized deeper and deeper into a subculture where criminal activity is increasingly acceptable. With less societal sanctions, there ceases to be limiting factors to the members’ behavior. Peer pressure is also significant. Because your loyalty is scrutinized, it becomes increasingly important to participate in club activities no matter the extent of the criminal activity. This loyalty to the club and members is enhanced by the social isolation that comes from being a member of the subculture (Quinn, 2001).

Also crucial to the 1% club is the acquisition and maintenance of territory. This is usually accomplished through violent means and your loyalty to the club is again tested by your participation in inter-club violence. Most of the serious violence attributed to 1% clubs are directed at other clubs. Smaller clubs or their chapters are “patched over”, in a sense a hostile takeover accomplished through violence and intimidation, by a larger 1% club, incorporating the other clubs’ members and their turf. (Quinn & Koch, 2003) The larger market for illegal gains becomes an important commodity for the club, and it protects it from any perceived threats (Quinn, 2001). The level of inter-club violence has increased in recent decades, as evidenced in a paramilitary attack by the Hell’s Angels against the Mongols MC at a casino in Laughlin, NV in 2002 and the use of army ordinance rockets against the Banditos in Holland and Scandinavia in the ‘80’s and ’90’s (Barker, 2004). Canada has within this decade and the previous one been marred by turf wars between the Outlaws and Hells Angels to control the methamphetamine trade (Quinn & Koch, 2003).

CONCLUSIONS

From this research I’ve concluded that the first stages in the continuum of deviance, from being a member of saloon society who likes motorcycles to becoming a biker is not easy. It requires strict conformity to norms of the subculture, which is enhanced by a significant amount of peer pressure to conform. The more you conform, the more accepted you are and the more likely you will be presented with an opportunity to prospect. Having already been involved in the minor criminal activity that is associated with being a biker and saloon society in general, such as theft, assault, and drug use, differential association becomes a factor. You have a group of criminal-minded individuals who reap benefits, both in status and financially, by engaging in more serious criminal behavior like organized theft, and drug dealing which is further facilitated by the level of commitment to the club and the associations they maintain within the club. Within the 1% clubs there are both conservative and radical members and that “hegemonic radicalism at critical turning points in the development of the club is a significant determinate of its eventual commitment to organized crime” (Wolf, 1991 as cited in Quinn, 2001). Because the club member so strongly identifies with the club, loyalty to it being paramount, actions that benefit the club are viewed favorably, strengthening the incentive to engage in serious criminal behavior. This behavior can occur in any number of MCs, through the differential association that takes place. With the true 1% club, especially so with the Big Five and major independents, the gains made from criminal enterprises push the behavior from just sub-cultural deviance to its pinnacle within the continuum, that of an outlaw. The nature of the club requires that you firmly accept this label, as evidence of your loyalty is always necessary. While there seems to be scant evidence that the national chapters are the real heads of sophisticated criminal enterprises, you have to consider that loyalty and respect for the club and its ideals, as dictated by the national chapter, will exert some influence on individual chapters’ operation. It would be hard to imagine a Hell’s Angels chapter being in existence long if its members did not support the tough criminal image (and actions) that needs to be maintained to control lucrative criminal gains.

I contend that the level of criminal gains to be made for the club, and the level of involvement and association of the members, help set the club’s and members’ level of deviance. The profits a large club can reap by benefit of the control of large section of territory necessitate extreme means to keep control. It is inter-club conflict over criminal territory and activity and the depth of their association with other criminal organizations, including other clubs, street gangs and the mafia, (Quinn & Koch, 2003) that leads to the violence associated with outlaw clubs. As criminal opportunities are limited within the context of control by MCs, the level of criminal activity needed to manage it is necessarily less. As gains and markets become smaller, the criminal activity moves toward a less organized level. It now becomes more dependent on the individual level of deviance of the members and the associations that they make in the subculture and there is less incentive to engage in criminal activity. However even if there is no or only a nominal level of organized criminal activity in the club, doubtless there will members who are engaging in illegal activities in accordance with their own level of social deviance.

References

Barker, T. (2004). Exporting american organized crime-outlaw motorcycle gangs. Journal of Gang Research, 11 (2), 37-50.

Barker, T. (2005). One percent biker clubs: a description. Trends in Organized Crime, 9 (1), 101-112. doi: 10.1007/s12117-005-1005-0 

McNally, D. and Alston, J. (2006). Use of social network analysis (SNA) in the examination of outlaw motorcycle gangs. Journal of Gang Research, 13 (3), 1-25.

Quinn, J.F. (2001). Angels, banditos, outlaws and pagans: the evolution of organized crime among the big four 1% motorcycle clubs. Deviant behavior, 22 (4), 379-399. doi: 10.1080/016396201750267870

Quinn, J. and Koch, D. Shane (2003). The nature of criminality within one-percent motorcycle clubs. Deviant Behavior, 24 (3), 281-305 doi: 10.1080/01639620390117291

Thompson, H. S. (1966). Hell’s angels. A strange and terrible saga. New York: Ballantine.