IS THERE EVIDENCE OF SYSTEMIC RACISM IN POLICING?

INTRODUCTION

Talk of systemic racial bias in policing has been more prominent in the public forum in the past couple years but this doesn’t mean there has been a lack of research into issues of race and policing. Far from it, research in this area has been going on for decades, it’s now only recently that claims of systemic bias have become more vocal. But while there is ample evidence of racial disparities in police interaction outcomes, as we were taught early in graduate school, “disparities don’t equal discrimination”. So the question becomes, is there evidence of systemic racial bias in policing?

In this literature review, I can only just touch on the massive amount of literature examining racial outcomes in policing that has gone on in even just the last 25 years but I hope to provide a general overview of the issues of disparities, the arguments presented for systemic bias, the explanation of these disparities through the scientific research on arrests and use of force, and the problems with current methodologies that try to prove systemic bias.

RACIAL DISPARITIES DO EXIST BUT IS IT BECAUSE OF RACIAL BIAS?

The prevailing argument for systemic bias is the data showing clear disparities between Whites and Blacks/Hispanics in police interaction outcomes in areas like stops, use of force, and arrests. However, in the public forum this is played out with extensive coverage of Blacks who were killed in confrontations with the police, which then is portrayed as racial injustice and proof of systemic bias to the public. As Reinka and Leach (2017) noted in sociologist Weitzer’s 2015 contention that “the seemingly serialized nature of publicized killing after killing of an unarmed Black person every few months since Trayvon Martin’s killing in 2012 can easily be viewed as a pattern of systemic bias” These minorities are stopped, frisked, arrested, and have force used against them disproportionately in comparison to their population demographic and in comparison to Whites (Petersilia, 1983; D’Alessio and Stolzenberg, 2003; Ridgeway, 2007; Gelman et al., 2007; Tapia, 2011; Buehler, 2017; Balko, 2020; Tobias and Joseph, 2020).

For example Ramchand et al., (2006) reference a study showing Blacks are 2.5 times more likely to arrested for marijuana possession than Whites. Gelman et al. (2007) noted in their examination of NYC PD stop and frisk records that although Blacks and Hispanics are stopped more frequently than Whites, since only 1 out of every 8 White person who was stopped was subsequently arrested, compared to 1 out of 9 Hispanics and 1 out of 10 Blacks, that this demonstrates the police are stopping minorities indiscriminately and with less cause, than Whites. Cooley et al. (2019) even demonstrated that the racial disparities between Blacks and Whites in frisks, searches, arrests, and use of force had slight increases,  between .3 and 1.7%, for people stopped in groups versus those alone, even after accounting for the discovery of illegal contraband. In their meta-analysis of probability of arrest, based on 27 independent data sets, Kochel et al. (2011) calculated that the odds of a Black person being arrested was 26% compared to a 20% chance of a White person being arrested. Lytle’s 2014 meta-analysis of suspect characteristics on arrest also found slightly higher arrest probability with minorities compared to Whites, with  Blacks 1.4 times, and Hispanics, 1.25 times more likely to be arrested than Whites and non-Hispanics. Mitchell and Caudy (2015) examined racial disparities and drug arrest rates  and after finding that the disparities could not be explained by differences in drug offending, non-drug offending, or residing in neighborhoods with heavy police emphasis on drug offending, concluded that racial bias is at work. Ross (2015) in an examination of racial bias in police shootings at the county level found that there was a 3.5 times higher probability of an unarmed Black person being shot by police than an unarmed White person being shot by the police. In a study of 2012 NYPD SQF data Morrow et al. (2017) found Black and Hispanic citizens were significantly more likely to experience non-weapon force than Whites

These disparities are seen of evidence as racist policing. Researchers like Richardson, (2010) and Pratt-Harris et al. (2016) claims that connection between race and crime is illusory and is produced by racist police officers, racist police practices, and other racially biased social institutions. Much of the promotion for systemic racism in policing comes from proponents of critical race theory (CRT) like Tolliver et al. (2016)and Tobias and Joseph (2020) by hearkening back to the country’s founding to make claims of a White supremacist basis of government and policing that was meant to subjugate Blacks and continues to this day. CRT proponents suggest that because of the difficult historical relationship between minorities and the police that policing is racist and populated by officers with racist attitudes,explaining that the police are simply a force to be used by rich White people to control an unruly Black populations (Roberts and Race, 1999; Pratt-Harris et al., 2016; Tobias and Josephs, 2020) and that the socialization that goes on in police departments have promoted the stereotype of Blacks as being violent criminals(Tolliver et al, 2016) and that police focus on minorities is in fact racist (Balko, 2020). Welsh et al. (2020), in their San Francisco PD traffic stop research, state that in interviews with officers that “officers’ accounts excuse, justify, or otherwise negate the role of race in routine police work” but yet despite a lack of explicit racism they see officers verbalize  micro racial aggressions by adhering to racial narratives, which they say will then eventually lead to disparate outcomes. Rose (2018) claims the biased nature of violent police interactions are not held accountable in court because she presumes that racism extends to prosecutors reluctant to judge officers’ actions as wrong, to  grand juries failing to indict, to juries failing to convict, and to judges failing to punish. Kahn et al., in 2016, found that based on use of force case files and subject booking photos, that police used less force with people who looked more “stereotypically White”.

OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH ON ARREST AND USE OF FORCE

However, simply because disparities exist in descriptive statistics or even in multivariate regression models is not evidence that there is racial bias or discrimination.. Descriptive statistics provide only raw numbers and exaggerate racial disparities and further analysis is needed to move beyond correlation and into causation (Ridgeway, 2007). Modeling with appropriate variables is important and can provides answers that less complete or nuanced models cannot. Multivariate statistical modeling is necessary to control for the influence of other variables that might drive the racial differences, such as variables like education, income, poverty, and social status, whose lower levels are both associated with Blacks and with greater likelihood of criminal involvement. Other variables like residency in high crime neighborhoods, crime rates, socially disorganized neighborhoods, and neighborhood gang activity help drive the amount of police presence and activity and these areas are also disproportionately populated by minorities. Because of the correlation, or association, that is shared between these variables and minorities like Blacks and Hispanics, they must be controlled for, in a sense, taken out of the equation. Without that accounting,  it may give the impression that the disparities in outcomes like arrest are because the subject is facing racial bias, when instead it is because of the other criminogenic variables that some minorities are disproportionately associated with. Two areas of policing that have been claimed to be racially driven are arrests and the use of force. In the following sections, an overview of some of the scientific research on race in relation to these police activities is examined that runs counter to the argument of racial bias in policing because of refinements in defining statistical modeling and the inclusion  appropriate variables

Arrests

While some commentators focus on racial disparities in arrest as evidence of racial bias, “social scientists remain unsure as to whether Black or White criminal suspects have a higher probability of arrest” while other research finds no significant association between a suspect’s race and the likelihood of arrest (Arndt et al., 2020). Often there are other variables that once accounted for allow those differences in probability to shrink or disappear and those racial disparities can be explained. While evidence of disparities have existed for decades so has research that examines the reason those racial disparities appear to exist. Disrupted or disorganized social structure, poverty and lower social status can confound racial data on arrests as minorities disproportionately reside in social disorganized and poor neighborhoods. For example both Hollinger (1984) in examining a DUI crackdown and, Sealock and Simpson (1998) in their research on Philadelphia juvenile offenders found the racial effects on arrest lost statistical significance once socioeconomic status (SES) was accounted, indicating a person’s social status, rather than their race, became the significant factor in whether a person was arrested. Fielding-Miller et al. (2020) in studying whether high proportions of drug arrests for Black males were linked to areas of higher levels of White female population found that the connection was attenuated, though not completely eliminated, by including socioeconomic variables in their model concluding that economics must be included in the discussion of criminal justice disparities, not just race alone. In 2008, Kirk also found that Chicago minority youths faced significantly higher levels of concentrated poverty and lower levels of collective efficacy than White youths and that unstable family structure explains much of the disparities in arrest across race and ethnicity. They conclude that while substantial arrest differences still existed,  numerous family level covariates are significantly and substantially associated with arrest and the racial and ethnic differences in  family demographics and structure explain large percentages of the disparities in arrest between Black youth and other racial and ethnic youths. Finkeldey and Demuth (2019)looking for a connection between self-identified race/ethnicity, self-identified skin color, and self-reported arrest found that  focusing on race or ethnicity masks difference in arrest by color but also found that social disadvantage partially explained those associations. In a youth survey, Schleiden et al. (2020) found partial support for a social disorganization hypothesis, determining that Blacks experienced more neighborhood disorder than Whites, which was linked to their young adult arrest rates and it was Blacks exposure to violence that was linked to more alcohol use, delinquency, and arrests in emerging adulthood.

Other behaviors specific to the conditions minorities may live in may be exhibited that expose minorities to a greater likelihood of arrest. Camplain et al. (2020) in their study on drug and alcohol arrests discovered that minorities were more likely than Whites to be booked into jail on both misdemeanor and felony charges alcohol /drug charges than Whites and it cannot be attributed to their greater drug or alcohol use in general. Mitchell and Caudy (2015) arrived at a similar conclusion suggesting disproportionate minority drug arrests are not explained by drug offending, non-drug offending, or residence in neighborhoods with a high police focus on drugs, but instead attribute it to racial bias. However, back in 2006, Ramchand et al. revealed that one likely explanation for part of the disparities is not use but the difference in purchasing behavior between Blacks and Whites. Their analysis showed that Blacks, as compared to Whites, were nearly twice as likely to buy outdoors, three times more likely to buy from a stranger, as well as significantly more likely to be buy away from their homes. These factors afford more police scrutiny and an increased likelihood of arrest.

A number of other factors, once included in statistical models, provide evidence that racial disparities can be explained by other variables, rather than support the suggestion that police officer behaviors are driven by racial bias. One of the most basic variables that needs to be accounted for is differential criminal involvement of different racial groups. Petersilia (1983) in her examination of arrest in California from 1980 found mixed findings with Whites being somewhat more likely than minorities to be arrested on a warrant and considerably less likely to be released with charges. While noting that the actual of likelihood for any offender to arrested is quite low, regardless of race, she found that Blacks were not overrepresented in their race relative to the kind or amount of crimes they commit. As Kirk (2008), Tapia, (2011),Schleiden et al. (2020) and other researchers have noted through official data, the National Crime Victim Survey, and self-reports that Black and Hispanic youths disproportionately commit serious crimes relative to Whites. D’Alessio and Stolzenberg (2003), utilizing National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) data, the successor to the UCR,  examined 335,619 incidents of rape, robbery, and assault in 17 states during 1999 and determined the likelihood of arrest for White and Blacks suspects was roughly equal and that the “disproportionately high arrest rate for Black citizens is most likely attributable to differential involvement in reported crime rather than racially biased law enforcement practices”. Schleiden et al. (2020) while not finding a difference in frequency of delinquent behaviors between Black and White youths, found significant differences in self-reported offenses with Black youth disproportionately being involved in buying, selling, or holding stolen property, deliberately writing a bad check, breaking into a house to steal something, using a weapon to get what they want, and using a weapon in fight. Despite these findings, Schleiden et al. characterize the higher arrest rates for Black youths as possible evidence of racial bias. They did not investigate whether the neighborhood disadvantage and exposure to violence for Blacks could lead to differentiated criminal behavior, for example more serious, or violent behavior, that would more likely result in arrest, as opposed to examining just frequency of behavior.

In that regard, another variable that has to be accounted for is seriousness of the offense, whereas the more serious the offense, the greater the likelihood of arrest.Schleiden and her colleagues (2020) had already noted the research that indicates minorities are committing more crime over a longer period of time, are engaging in more criminal behaviors, and committing more serious crimes than Whites, which consequently are more likely to be reported to the police , and thus more likely to result in arrest. Sealock and Simpson (1998) as well found that officers strongly considered offense seriousness in their decision to arrest. Brown  (2005) also found that regardless of suspect race, legal factors like offense serious influence the decision to arrest. The seriousness of offending was also a factor in Tapia’s  2011 national youth survey. Noting research that indicates Blacks’ self-reported serious offense rates are double that of Whites, Tapia found a disproportionate amount of minorities in gang membership and that delinquency and arrests rates are much higher for gang members than non-gang members. However their regression analysis showed that as gang members they had increased rates of arrest, but their race was not a significant factor in arrest. Tapia concluded that because minority youths make up a much larger portion of gang membership they feel the effect of arrest greater. This likelihood of arrest is affected by the introduction of criminal behavior, not by the race of the gang members themselves. Raphael and Rozo (2019) also found that offense severity and criminal history were significant factors in arrest. While Black juvenile offenders were booked at a higher rate, a significant portion of the Black/White disparity was attributable to differences in arrest offense severity and criminal history.

Another legal factor that also strongly influences the likelihood of arrest is the presence of evidence or solvability factors.Brown (2005) found that regardless of race, the presence of evidence was a significant factor in the decision to arrest. Briggs and Opsal (2012) in examining victim ethnicity on arrest in violent crimes found that while race and ethnicity of the victim are related to police clearance of cases, the relationship between case clearance and case solvability factors is stronger. Arndt et al. (2020) also found that in homicides, suspect race did not play a noteworthy role in influencing the likelihood of arrest once the strength of physical evidence against the subject is accounted for. Solvability and the presence of evidence, as well as arrest itself, may be linked to  demeanor of the individuals involved either as witnesses or suspects. Extensive research has shown that minorities tend to hold more negative views of the police. These negative views can prompt uncooperative behavior from victims and witnesses or behavior that is confrontational or resistive, which will influence the likelihood of arrest. However, Drawve et al. (2014) in their analysis of the likelihood of arrest for aggravated assault, found that Blacks had a significantly lower chance of being arrested than Whites, with the authors postulating that the decreased likelihood of arrest for Blacks may stem from Black witnesses and victims lack of cooperation with the police, or perhaps by less of a focus by police on Black crime linked to this lack of cooperation. Other researchers like Brown (2005) have also found that suspect demeanor plays a role in the likelihood of arrest. More than a negative demeanor may develop from vicarious or actual interactions with the police. Gibbons et al. (2020) in their longitudinal study of Black young adults found that those who perceived to have been racial discriminated against, including being “hassled” by the police, especially in their childhood, were more likely to have reported being arrested or incarcerated as adults. However, in the path to that connection were also self-reported deviant associates, substance use, and illegal behaviors that in all likelihood contributed to being “hassled by the police” and their subsequent higher arrest rates. They also found that those who exhibited high racial pride were less likely to commit illegal acts in general but yet reported more illegal behavior after perceived racial discrimination from the police.

Studies need to account for policing styles, practices, or policies that while not driven by racial bias, may disproportionately affect minorities. Drawve et al. (2014) notes that overall police strategies and resources will affect the likelihood of arrest. Police resources will undoubtedly be focused in areas of greater need as well as for particular efforts that focus on DUIs, street crimes, or drug activity. Crackdowns, problem oriented policing, and hotspot policing have all demonstrated effectiveness on reducing crime When these efforts are occurring in areas with large proportions of minorities, such as high crime areas, minorities will be affected by stops and arrests disproportionately (Weisburd et al, 2016) though Schleiden et al. (2020) fear that will affect officers’ perception of differences in behavior and character between Blacks and Whites. In examining the racial disparities found in the NYPD stop, question, and frisk practices,Evans et al. (2014) found the police focused those activities in areas with high levels of violent crime, which are areas that are highly populated by minorities. Lum (2011) describes that policing is moving away from a person based approach to one based on place. Various factors in areas or neighborhoods help drive criminal activity and disorder and addressing those underlying place based problems is at the core of community based policing, as well as utilized in hotspot policing and anti-gang and drug interventions. These places and their characteristics such as SES, poverty, racial and ethnic makeup, disorder, crime, pedestrian and traffic density and land use provide place-based cues which will affect officer behavior, decision, making and attitude (Lum, 2011) as well as affect precinct and department policy and behavior. She notes while they have proven to be effective as anti-crime efforts they’ve also drawn criticism because police presence in minority areas results in disparate arrest outcomes. In her place based study of the interaction of the proportion of race, level of wealth, and level of violence in an area, the more violent an area accounted for greater arrests but she also found the police more informally handled complaints (less likely to write reports or make an arrest and reducing the seriousness of crime classifications) in areas with greater wealth and in areas of larger Black populations who are more disadvantaged. Lum unfortunately wasn’t able to determine the reason for these opposing results, considering officer attitude or beliefs, department or precinct policing style, amount of police resources, community demands or expectations for service, or an interaction of all of them may have accounted for the results. Raphael and Rozo (2019) found that while there were racial disparities in non-violent felony youth arrest bookings, a very large share of that difference was accounted for by agency variables. Agencies that tended to arrest Black youth were equally likely to arrest Whites and Hispanics. Tougher policies regarding arrest in large cities will also affect minority arrests as these cities have higher minority populations. They note that 75% of the disparity in bookings between Blacks and Whites and 66% of the disparity between Hispanics and Whites were explainable by the observable factors of criminal history offense severity, and the penchant for certain law enforcement agencies to arrest and formerly book youth offenders

One area not frequently examined, typically for lack of data, is officer race in the decision to arrest. Brown and Frank (2006) note that some efforts in police reform have focused on increasing the number of Black officers with little empirical evidence that an officer’s race or ethnicity is actually related to their behavior toward citizens. In their systematic observation study in Cincinnati, they made an interesting finding. In general, White officers were more likely to arrest suspects than Black officers, but Black suspects were more likely to be arrested when the decision maker was a Black officer.

Unfortunately, not all researchers in preparing a study seek out, have access to, or utilize data from these explanatory variables. The types of data will significantly affect the quality of the findings. For example, Penner and Saperstein (2015) used the US National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health to “disentangle the effects of self-identifying as Black compared to others identifying you as Black on subsequently being arrested”. They revealed that the odds of arrest are three times greater for someone identified as Black, proclaiming that racial perceptions play an important role in arrest disparities. However they also admitted that they had no detailed information on the circumstances surrounding the arrests such as evidence, demeanor, or compliance. Other variables that were not included would also have been informative (criminal history, police record, type of offense) as these might also have factored into the arrests. A study like this has little social science value and amounts to little more than an observation as it seeks to determine a component that might have affected arrest, without actually looking at the arrest occurrence itself. Other studies as well face these limitations. In the previously discussed 2008 Kirk study, he notes the lack of data on victim/offender relationship, seriousness of the offense, and subject demeanor would all be factors related to arrest decisions. In preparing his 2011 examination of youth gang arrests, Tapia having discovered insignificantly higher rates of arrest for minority gang members compared to White gang members, also recognized limitations in the study that didn’t account for the complainant’s demand for arrest, presence of evidence, and subject demeanor which all affect the decision to arrest.

Other sociological reasons that lead to higher arrest issues that should be accounted for in samples include substance use and mental health issues, (Schleiden et al., 2020) which will likely have a disproportionate affected on disordered or poor neighborhoods, which will also likely be high crime neighborhoods with large populations of minorities. They emphasize that it is crucial that in examining racial disparities “to simultaneously consider multiple theories and include a variety of individual and contextual factors within the analyses”. However, Lantz and Wenger (2019) also demonstrated that researchers must approach their overall analytical approach carefully. They stated that in their quasi experiment examining potential differences in arrest for Black and White co-offenders, using traditional logistic regression, Black offenders were 75% less likely than White offenders to be arrested. Putting the data into a multi-level model with partnership data, including victim and offense characteristics, nested with demographic and arrest data, in examining within partnership differences between Black and White co-offenders they found that Black offenders were 3% more likely to be arrested than their White co-offenders. While the authors suggest that traditional regression analysis may contain significant selection and omitted variable bias, they do not provide an explanation about why the disparity may exist. Elliot (1995) even notes using arrest statistics to show anything representative about the general population or police activity is flawed. While many researchers are aware that arrest data may include false positives and errors of omission, it should be noted that arrest statistics may not be representative of offenders in the population. Elliot states that compared to self-reports of violent crime, arrest data underreports these offenses and research results are mixed on whether there are any racial differences in the number of self-reported offenses. Ultimately Lum (2011) determines that the only way to understand why the disparities occur is to continue to use further systematic and qualitative approaches including social observation, ethnographic analyses and in-depth interviews, and psychological examination of both officer and citizen mentality.

Use of Force

The same issues surrounding research into racial disparities in arrest exist for those disparities in the use of force. Researchers like Tolliver, et al. (2016) contend that the U.S. has a White supremacy basis and a racist adherence to the stereotype of Black males as violent criminals. They contend that White privilege is the cause of higher incidence of use of force with Black subjects. For proof, they reference evidence taken from shoot/don’t shoot videogame studies that a shooter bias exists because some results indicate Blacks were shot faster than Whites. The disparities witnessed between Blacks and other races in police use of force are often attributed to racial bias and discrimination (Buehler, 2017; Hehman et al., 2018;Ross et al., 2020; Durlauf and Heckman, 2020) For example, Pratt-Harris et al. (2016)contend that the core of policing is racist, incorrectly attributing policing’s roots to American slave patrols, and that Blacks disproportionate involvement in crime is untrue, blaming crime in those neighborhoods on racist city policies. They believe a stronger focus should be put on revealing the racist aspects of policing and that focusing on individual “bad apple” officers dilutes the message of systemic racism.

However, as with arrests, alternative explanations rather than racism exist as to why these disparities occur. Fridell and Lim (2016) note that neighborhoods matter; with more force used in disadvantaged, high crime neighborhoods. While these places are typically populated with minorities, once controlling for neighborhood context, the disparity in racial use of force disappears. Lautenschlager and Omori (2017), found a different neighborhood effect. While they found that use of force was concentrated in Black neighborhoods, neighborhoods with higher ethnic  and racial diversity  have decreasing force incidents but with increasing severity. Ross (2015) found that racial bias was most likely to occur in large metropolitan counties with low median income and a sizable portion of Black residents, especially with high financial equity, however he did not find racial bias in shootings to be associated with county crime rates.

It is well known and easily understood that serious crimes and crimes involving weapons or violence will more likely involve the use of force then other incidents. Arrest and complaint data have consistently shown a significantly higher degree of involvement of Blacks in these types of offenses like robbery, aggravated assault, and murder, which then drives disparities in use of force data. Research has indicated that use of force is related to racial/ethnic minority involvement in criminal activity and their resistance to police intervention (Fridell and Lim, 2016). Cesario et al. (2019) examined two year worth of officer involved fatal shootings. When adjusting for crime rate and minority criminal involvement they found no evidence of anti-Black disparities in fatal shootings, fatal shootings of unarmed citizens, and fatal shootings involving misidentification of harmless objects.

Subject demeanor compliance, and resistance strongly influence the application of force (Engel et al., 2000; Fridell and Lim, 2016; Mears, et al., 2017; Morrow et al., 2017) examined use of force in Terry stops and while Black and Hispanic had small but significant effects on the use of non-weapon force, many other factors had a much greater influence on whether force was used, including being frisked, arrested, matching subject description, engaging in violence, and noncompliance. In weapon use of force, race was no longer a significant factor but rather noncompliance was strongly related to that use of force, along with matching subject description, suspected of a violent crime, presence of weapons, being searched, frisked, proximity to offense and whether it was radio dispatch. High crime areas though had significantly lower use of weapons use and the racial makeup of the police precincts had no significant influence on whether force was used. Fryer (2019) found that in non-lethal force, while Blacks and Hispanics were 50% more likely than Whites to experience force in a police interaction, once situational context and subject behavior was accounted for no racial differences were found. He also found in officer involved shootings there were no racial disparities present. Atiba Goff and Barsamian Kahn (2012) suggest that officers have two kinds of authority, moral and physical. When subjects portray officers as illegitimate because of a presumption of racism, officers are stripped of their moral authority in the eyes of the subject, and thus themselves, and have only physical authority to rely on for compliance. This reliance on physical authority, generated from the situational context, may then generate racial disparities in the use of force, rather than actual racial discrimination.

Linking Implicit Bias to Racism in the Use of Force

Drakulich, et al. (2020) state that modern racism rests on two key principles: a denial or minimization of contemporary racial discrimination and inequalities, and a focus on individualism and meritocracy that (implicitly or explicitly) blames racial disparities on people of color by arguing that they lack the proper work ethic and discipline to succeed in today’s fair, equal-opportunity society. Levinson and Young (2009) declare that racism has been shifting away from overt and intentional racism of the past to covert and unintentional. They complained that in attempting to proving a case of racism; showing intent, and not just an adverse effect, is difficult and we should focus more on whether anything symbolic of racism was present rather than an actual intent to discriminate. They contend that racism can be non-conscious and automatic and that these biases can be uncovered by using the Implicit Association Test (IAT). Holroyd (2015) claims that because implicit bias exists, then if must be causing police officers to behave in a racially biased manner, and if it affects police officers then it must also affect policy makers in the department causing them to be racially biased as well, thus supporting his contention of institutionalized racism. Holroyd both calls for studies to examine if and how implicit bias affects policing, and yet proclaims that implicit bias is causing discriminatory police work. He states that raising awareness of implicit bias can change it, and that the effects of implicit bias must be mitigated because evidence of implicit bias mean policing is racially biased and thus illegitimate.

The Implicit Association Test basically measures the speed of a pushbutton response in an image/word association test. An image type, for example those indicating different races or genders, is paired with words that either have a positive connotation, like happy, or a negative connotation, like disgust, and participants are measured on their speed in correctly responding. The image and word types are then reversed and participants are measured again. If an individual associates a negative word faster with one image type than another it suggests they hold a bias or adherence to a stereotype. Humans tend to categorize people and object in to group membership, attributing stereotypes to those members in order to make sense  and add structure their world. These implicit biases operate outside of conscious awareness and are not necessarily based in animosity as research has shown that implicit biases exist in people who consciously hold no prejudiced attitudes (Fridell and Lim, 2016). Fridell and Lim also note that people can override their implicit biases and have controlled responses. By recognizing their biases, motivated individuals can implement bias-free behavior (2016).

Tests like these demonstrated that people have an inherent bias toward their ingroup (the type of people that resemble them the most) and bias against outgroups (individuals who do not resemble them) and that these biases occur within all people in areas of gender, race, sexual orientation, religion, and body shape (Fridell, 2016; Fridell and Lim, 2016). In that regard, people naturally will be quicker to make positive associations toward people that look more like them and slower to make those positive associations toward people who appear different to them. Likewise, people will naturally be slower in making negative associations about their ingroup and faster in making negative associations about outgroups. Fridell and Lim also note however, these tests can also demonstrate the possible degree that people adhere to negative stereotypes about race and possibly indicate a racial bias in an individual they were perhaps unaware of or preferred to outwardly conceal (2016).

Commentators and researchers state that a persistent stereotype of the violent criminal as a Black male may generate bias against Blacks and may prompt the use of force, or greater use of force than would be necessary, as compared to police reactions to other races. Wilson et al. (2017) found in college student studies that photo examples of Blacks were subjectively assessed to a very small, but significant, degree, as having greater size, strength, or formidability of threat. However, in 2019, Johnson and Wilson found that while race does impact judgments of size and strength to a certain degree, raters primarily tracked objective physical features. They even found that in some cases racial stereotypes actually improved group level accuracy as these stereotypes aligned with nationally representative data of racial group differences in size and strength  Kahn and her associates, in 2016, examined subject’s booking photos and coded them for the presence of  typical Black or White facial features while examining the severity of force used in the arrest. In their regression analysis the police used less force with highly stereotypically featured Whites and they suggest an intragroup bias from White officers is a protective factor in the severity of use of force.

However while there are stereotypes of Blacks as dangerous, violent, or criminals, other stereotypes that citizens have about policing exist as well. Mears et al. (2017)states that both police and citizens can bring their biases to police encounters and that when minorities express negative views of the police, question police legitimacy, and believe their neighborhoods are subject to coercive policing, Blacks and other minorities may still perceive professional and courteous demeanor from the police as discriminatory (2017). Both direct and vicarious experiences influence minorities’ views of the police and their behavior, and negative perceptions of the police by minorities have been longstanding (Tapia, 2011). This will lead to noncompliance and resistance, and prompts the use of force from officers. Mears (2017) also notes that in encounters with subjects who are defiant, disrespectful, or violent may also mold officers perceptions and biases as well. Cooley et al. (2019) demonstrated in two studies that after merely reading about White privilege, study participants had increased perceptions of racism in violent encounters between the police and Black men, indicating the perception of racism in police actions is subjective and subject to outside and vicarious influences. Levin and Thomas (2005) in a study of how racial identity affects perceptions of police brutality, produced videotapes of a police interaction, changing the race of the officers in the different recordings, and found that both Black and White participants were significantly more likely to identify identical behavior in police officers as racist when both officers were White. Hall et al. (2016) suggest, without any supporting evidence, that police officers are high in Social Dominance Orientation and are thus more likely to inflict severe punishment on those who don’t submit to there demands. They also claimed, again without evidence, that police officers  typically have high conformity and low universalism values and, similarly to the non-officers participants in their study, would rate failure to comply more seriously, are more supportive of harsh punishment, and have less sympathy for offenders. The authors suggest that it’s the officers’ desire for dominance that prompts them to use “resisting arrest” or “failure to comply” as a precursor and justification to employ lethal force when their demands aren’t met.

Research to determine if implicit bias affects behavior typically took the form of video shooter simulations. Participants watch a video portrayal and must correctly identify whether the Black or White target in the video is armed with a weapon or holding a harmless object and push either a “a shoot” or don’t shoot” button. Participants are timed in the speed of their responses and their accuracy in decision making. Results of these types of studies revealed some consistent results (Correll et al. 2007). Participants of all races were quicker to decide to shoot armed Black targets than armed White targets and decide not to shoot unarmed White targets faster than unarmed Black targets (Correll et al., 2002; Correll et al., 2007; Correll and Keesee, 2009; Sadler et al., 2012; Senholzi et al., 2015). This suggests an adherence to the stereotype that Black males are violent or dangerous and the magnitude of the bias varied based on the perceptions of the cultural stereotype but not with personal racial prejudice (Correll et, 2002). However, when comparing police officers to citizen participants, officers also were quicker to decide to shoot Black subjects, but while citizens tended to favor a shoot response for Black subjects, suggesting bias,  officers, who’s racial bias in response times did not differ between White and non-White officers, were significantly more accurate than citizens in making the right choice  and showed weak or non-existent  racial bias in their shoot/don’t shoot decisions  (Correll, 2007; Correll and Keesee, 2009;Sadler et al., 2012, Atiba Goff and Barsamian Kahn, 2012).  James et al. (2014)wanted to explore the possibility that the racial biases exhibited truly affected behavior and questioned whether those type of video shooter studies would accurately predict real world behavior as the tests differ significantly from a real life situation. The researches utilized general population participants in a highly realistic deadly force shooting scenario and found, similar to other research, that associations between race and violence did not translate to biases in shooting behavior.

Implicit bias is not universal or immutable. Individuals can control their implicit biases through implicit bias awareness, cognitive control, and training, (Richardson, 2010) which may be available to some officers as well as conventional officer training, that while not affecting response time on stereotype-incongruent subjects (unarmed Blacks and armed Whites), did improve accurate responses over those of a citizen (Correll, 2007; Correll  and Keesee, 2009;Sadler, 2012; Atiba Goff and Barsamian Kahn, 2012; Correll, et al., 2014). Fridell and Lim (2016) also note that reaction time biases amongst officers were not universal, with bias large for officers from large cities, those with high minority or Black populations, and for officers who perceive greater violence in their communities. As members of a community, officers may share the same biases of their community or area and it’s critical to examine these biases in the communities they serve and how these might influence officer attitudes and the implementation of police policies(Correll, 2007).

Plant et al. (2011) also explored the little researched interaction of gender and race influencing the use of force. Using a shoot/don’t shoot video simulator in a study examining gender, White participants were biased against shooting a White female compared to a White male. In a second study, White participants showed a bias toward shooting Black men but a bias against shooting Black women and White ingroup members. The authors indicate that not just race, but gender, and its connection to perceptions of violence, is an important factor in shootings that have a racial component. Sadler et al. (2012) also explored biases toward other groups than Blacks. Interestingly, while college students participants only showed a bias against Blacks in their reaction times, officer participants also demonstrated reaction time biases toward Latinos relative to Asians and Whites, and toward Whites relative to Asians; racial biases in their reaction times that mirrored perceived racial criminal involvement. They did find that the more aggressive police officers perceived the stereotype of Blacks to be, the more accurate they were in decisions about whether Blacks were armed. While increased perceptions of aggressiveness in Asians led officer to be more accurate in their decisions, they were less accurate with Latinos when having holding perceptions of aggressiveness. Participants were also better able to distinguish between weapons and  non-threatening objects better when held by Black and Latino subjects compared to Whites and Asians. The authors consider that the association of Blacks and Latinos with danger may lead to faster correct responses through increased cognitive attention to a potential threat but these biases in reaction times did not manifest themselves in the decisions themselves and no racial bias was evident in officers’ decision-making.

The influence of a potential threat doesn’t have to be based in race, but in the perception of the level of threat based on contextual cues or how attentive one is to potential interpersonal threat.. Correll et al. (2011)argue that the bias seen in faster shoot responses to armed Black targets and faster don’t shoot responses to unarmed White targets may not stem from  racial animosity but reflects the perception of threat, specifically the threat associated with Black males. To examine the influence of danger cues other than race, the researches used a shoot/don’t shoot video simulator with the targets embedded in threatening and safe backgrounds. While a typical racial bias was seen in decision making toward Black and White targets in safe backgrounds, threatening backgrounds saw this racial bias disappear as the dangerous contextual cues provided more influence on shooting behavior, with the reduction in racial bias largely due to an increased tendency to shoot White targets. . However, Miller et al. (2012) suggest that the basis of shooter bias may not involve racial or cultural stereotypes. In one study, using arbitrarily formed groups not based on racial or cultural stereotypes, and in another, using Asians as a group typically not stereotyped as dangerous, they found that participants with strong beliefs about interpersonal threats were more likely to mistakenly shoot outgroup members than ingroup members.

Different neural mechanisms underlie this increased cognitive attention to threat assessment based on the stereotype of the violent Black male. Senholzi et al. (2015) conducted a shoot/don’t shoot video simulator study with participants connected to an MRI. They exhibited the typical bias toward quicker shoot response for Blacks and  quicker to not shoot for Whites but different parts of the brain were activated depending on the race of the target. Greater implicit Black-danger associations were associated with increased activity in the amygdala (the portion of the brain responsible for the fight or flight response). The parietal and occipital regions (responsible for processing movement and vision information) also exhibited greater activity for armed Blacks than Whites and a greater connectivity of these regions to the amygdala with armed Blacks. However, the anterior cingulate cortex (an area of the brain that detects and monitors for error and suggests an appropriate motor reaction) was preferentially engaged for unarmed White targets over unarmed Black targets.

Correll et al. (2014) notes that while target race does affect officers’ reaction times they generally do not show a pattern of biased shooting, suggesting that police performance depends on the exercise of cognitive control which allows officers to overcome the influence of stereotypes. Mears, et al. (2017) also expands on the cognitive processes that goes into these decisions. Police/citizen encounters require rapid assessment that demands reliance on cognitive shortcuts, “thinking fast”. When rapid mental processing is needed, as in  a dangerous situation, all people rely on cognitive short cuts to make the quickest, most accurate assessments in a situation. However if those shortcuts are based on a flawed assumption they can lead to decision making errors. Ma et al. (2013) consider though that officers must have ample cognitive resources to fully regulate automatic response, and thus control implicit bias. If this cognitive control is compromised through fatigue it may lead to great racial disparities in shoot/don’t shoot decisions.Similarly, James (2018)in examining the stability of implicit bias in police officers found that implicit bias was not stable and that when officers slept less prior to testing they demonstrated stronger associations between Blacks and weapons. Nieuwenhuys et al. (2012)also explored the effect of anxiety on officers’ decision to shoot. By utilizing low and high anxiety physical experiment conditions, the researchers found that officers in anxious conditions made more mistakes in correctly shooting only armed targets, had reduced shot accuracy, but also responded more quickly when the target had a gun. With gaze behavior not changing, the authors concluded in anxious conditions officers were more inclined to respond on the basis of threat related inferences and expectations than relying on visual information.

Research Issues in the Use of Force

Methodological issues and disagreement between researchers complicate the question of racial bias in the use of force. While Ross (2015) found that Blacks had a slightly lower probability of being shot if armed vs unarmed compared to Whites and Hispanics, unarmed Blacks had a 3.5 greater chance of being shot than unarmed Whites. However, Ross’ study did not include important variables like level of compliance or resistance, type of weapons subjects were armed with, whether threats were made, the seriousness of the offenses, and encounter rates. Despite the authors stating that they can’t know all the circumstances involved or the psychology of the officers at the time, they suggest the disparities exist because of racist norms in police departments. However they ignore clear evidence supporting community violence as a factor as well as evidence of Social Disorder theory. Other study design and analysis problems exit as well. Legewie (2016) examined the rate of change in use of force incidents following the line of duty deaths of NY police officers. However, while the pretest period gathered data for a year, the post test period following the officers deaths was only two weeks. Legewie states that there was a significant increase in use of force against Blacks following two Black incidents, there was not a significant increase after a White and Hispanic incident, and no evidence of any institutional bias. However the small sample and a lack of examination of contextual issues lessens the quality of the study. Such things as,  three of the four suspects were killed or arrested shortly after the incidents, the attacker still on the loose was Black, one of the Black attacks was an ambush, and that Blacks contributed to more than one death may have influenced officer actions based more on the circumstances and less on race.

Fridell (2016) notes that seven studies on race and police use of force came out in the first half of 2016 that were announced in the media that paraphrased them ranging from “there is bias in the use of force”, to :there is bias in some types of force, but not others”, to “there’s no bias in the use of force”. She explains that these disparate findings hinge on the methodologies used; sample characteristics, the number and types of agencies examined, how concepts were operationalized and the number and types of variables used. The quality of the study making a claim is important and research consumers need to critically analyze the results of studies. Rivera and Ward (2017)also make the case for improving analytic frameworks and utilizing an integrated approach in the study of race and policing in both methodology and evaluative analysis. Perspective, approach, and study quality all matter. Differing methodologies and analyses, with varying degrees of rigor, can produce disparate results, with no clear research consensus. Hollis and Jennings (2018) conducted a meta review of 41 studies which examined public and police officer perceptions of force, rates of use of force, types of force used, neighborhood context correlates of use of force and the severity of the force used. In the end they concluded that the relationship between race and use of force “remains unclear”‘ This was the conclusion Petersilia reached in 1983, when 30 years of prior research still did not have a definitive answer. Fryer (2018) states that at while there are racial differences in the use of non-lethal force, in regards to potentially lethal use of force the most granular data shows there is no bias in police shootings. However Durlauf and Heckman (2020) take issue with that conclusion, contending that just because statistically no difference was shown between races in police shooting, doesn’t mean there wasn’t racial discrimination. Ross et al. (2020) also argue against the conclusions of Cesario et al. (2019) who stated that with proper benchmarking, data analysis shows no racial bias in shootings. Ross et al. argue that Cesario et al.’s benchmarking of crime rates doesn’t properly control for crime rate differences but instead masks true racial disparities in the killing of unarmed people by the police. Ross argues that unarmed individuals who were killed should be benchmarked as a ratio of the “noncriminal population”, simply assuming that not being armed, meant you were not aggressive, and thus not a  criminal. Taking those assumption, Ross states it would show there were racial biases. Roussell et al. (2017) takes issue with a James et al. 2016 study that demonstrated that officers had slower response times and fewer shooting errors in a video simulation. James and associates suggested that a fear of adverse legal and social consequences led police officers to be more cautious in shooting decisions involving Blacks than Whites, dubbing this a “reverse racism” effect. Roussell et al. take offense at this characterization, stating reverse racism can’t exist, the term is used to undermine efforts toward racial equity, that if officers  did fear repercussions they must realize how unlikely it would be that they are punished, and criticized James et al. for not properly considering that studying police and race is actually about studying racism and policing.

MAKING SENSE OF DISPARITIES

Atiba Goff and Barsamian Kahn, in 2012, examined why we know less than we should in regard to racial bias in policing. While research has found evidence of disparities, there is a lack of evidence establishing that racial discrimination exists in the social institution of policing. Public opinion data about the presence of systemic bias, often based on disparities, carries no value as it offers only subjective views and no evidence. Distinguishing between disparity and discrimination can be complicated by a number of factors. Limitations in department data, subjective claims of racism without witnesses, limitations in national data on crime and race, and other factors make it difficult to distinguish between simple racial disparities in policing and racial discrimination at the officer, local, or national level. In 1983, Petersilia discussed the reasons for disparate results and the difficulty of distinguishing racial discrimination from racial disparities, reasons that still exist today.. Some studies utilize databases that are too small to permit generalization, others failed to control for enough (or any) of the other factors that might account for apparent racial discrimination. Atiba Goff and Barsamian Kahn (2012) discuss finding the appropriate benchmark for the variables used in analysis can be problematic. For example, in research on racial profiling or racial disparities in stops or arrestees, trying to find an accurate ratio, essentially getting the proper denominator, is crucial, and different benchmarks can provide disparate results. In their analysis of pedestrian stops, using the population of crime suspect descriptions, Blacks pedestrians were stopped 20 to 30 percent lower than their representations in crime suspect descriptions. But Blacks were stopped at nearly the same rate as their representation in the arrestee population. However in using the least reliable (as it doesn’t take into account differential rates of crime participation by race or for differential exposure to the police) but more widely used census data, Black pedestrians were stopped at  rate 50% higher than their representation in the census.

Atiba Goff and Barsamian Kahn (2012) state while some research puts police officers racial bias at roughly the same level as the public in general it does not show that theses biases translate to discriminatory behavior, noting that in social psychology attitudes traditionally predicts less than 10 % of the variance in behavior. They note that even if racially biased attitudes produce some level of biased behavior it’s not clear how much it produces. Ridgeway discovered in 2007 that in the NYPD SQF program just 7% (2,756) of the total number of officers accounted for 54% of the total number of 2006 stops. In patrolling the same areas, at the same times, and with the same assignments a very small percentage of officers (15 total) stopped substantially more Blacks or Hispanics than other officers. Internal benchmarks are necessary to compare officers performance to similar officers to see if any discriminatory patterns exist but these can measure only officer behavior, not institutional behavior (Ridgeway, 2007; Ridgeway and MacDonald, 2009; Atiba Goff and Barsamian Kahn, 2012) However this would provide a statistical means to identify the “bad apples” in the department, important as these bad apples are possibly performing racially biased police, affecting those they interact with, as well as continue to reinforce the arguable narrative of racist policing (Futterman et al., 2007). Goff & Kahn also recount the problems of a lack of access to police data through secrecy or because it was uncollected, and a difference in police and academic culture that can result in a poor collaboration as well as problems with methodology and rigor. Using low quality data and focusing on base rates and descriptive statistics, research like this fails to utilize multivariate analyses which can isolate the roles of the institution and officer to examine their influences. With these limitations in demographics, policies, and outcomes, it is difficult to develop principles and theoretical frameworks with which to predict racial disparities and diagnose racial discrimination.

CONCLUSION

While the current social narrative beats the drum of systemic racial bias in policing, research tells a different, more nuanced story. It is a well-researched and undeniable fact that racial disparities exist in police/citizen interactions. But regardless of the opinions of social commentators and some researchers, these disparities are in no way proof of racial discrimination. Raw data and descriptive statistics exaggerate the real racial differences in police activities. Researchers need to locate and utilize appropriate benchmarks. Discrimination can’t be determined if the ratios that would indicate that conclusion are not calculated appropriately. Descriptive statistics do not allow to take into account other factors that will affect the likelihood of having force used or being arrested. There are a large number of factors that go into a decision to arrest or use force. While no statistical analysis can be perfect, if we are studying racial disparities in these areas, inclusion of as many of these important variables are necessary before claims of systemic bias can possibly be supported.

However, problems in methodologies arise in attempting to show that systemic bias in policing is present as much criminal justice research is conducted using pre-existing data; the data sets used for these analyses can be lacking important variables and their associated data. Criminal justice research has already established the wide variety of variables that strongly affect police activities like arrest and use of force outside of any racial effect. Research  with these data sets may not provide a complete picture of what is driving criminal justice outcomes when they lack important variables related to racial difference that affect outcome measures.

When examining police behavior for bias, the statistical model depends on the variables available within the dataset(s) used. If only a few independent controlling variables are used, the explanatory power is reduced. Many statistical models that rely on descriptive statistics, and even some multi-variate models will lack important variables that could influence racial disparities.

Some are geographical like neighborhood crime rates, neighborhood race demographics, crime distribution, and policing initiatives put in place by police or city management. Some are situational context variables at the scene like  violence occurring, the presence of weapons and evidence and may be hard to measure such as the victims’ desire for charges or arrests, witness cooperation and truthfulness, degree of evidence present, and factors contributing to the risk of officer safety like physical location, surroundings, number of people present, There also some contextual variables related to the subject, variables that may be disproportionately associated with minorities, like the seriousness of the crime, racial differences in crime involvement, presence in high crime areas, and demeanor, noncompliance and resistance.  All of these variables have a significant effect on whether or not an arrest is performed or force is used. Research has demonstrated once these variables are controlled for, the racial disparities shrink or disappear. The racially disproportionate amount of arrests and use of force stem from the other variables that drive crime and police activity, which negates a racial bias argument.

While comprehensive, well-constructed studies with quality data sets and rigorous methodologies do not suggest there is any systemic racial bias in policing, the search for racial bias has continued by examining behavior, specifically whether unconscious biases about race may generate racial disparities in the use of force. Even the concept of implicit bias doesn’t clearly indicate racial bias might occur in behavior. Research has shown that not everyone has the same implicit biases or even biases against outgroups, and that implicit bias can be controlled or mitigated, as well as that outside factors, like current events, situational factors, and physiological effects, can affect the level of implicit bias and how well it can be controlled.

The Implicit Association Test is a well established technique for examining biases held by individuals. It seems to also be well-established from the shoot/no shoot video simulations that not just police officers but the general population, of all races, adhere to the stereotype of the violent Black male by being quicker to react to armed Black targets and slower to react to armed White targets. However, some research actually shows officers reacting slower to armed Black targets, perhaps using an overabundance of caution that might result from implicit bias awareness training or from an awareness of the scrutiny that police/Black citizen interactions can generate. In regards to the behavioral response, while the general public tended to make significantly more errors by shooting unarmed Black targets, officers did not, further indicating a lack of racial bias.

However, none of this addresses policing activities in general. Despite the existence of implicit bias, there is no way to measure it at any specific moment in a real police interaction, and subject behavior and demeanor will all have an influence on the strength of the implicit bias, that if present, may also affect police behavior. It is unknown whether in any given instance of police contact to what degree, if any, implicit bias is at work, and what degree other factors affecting police behavior are accounted for such as, types of calls for service, suspect description, witness statements evidence of a commission of a crime, and objectively suspicious behavior (though Richardson, 2010, claimed that police cannot objectively gauge suspicious behavior because of the racial bias that must be inherently present in policing because of their contact with minority criminality) may influence or account for officer behavior.

When comprehensive modeling is used, research has shown that often the disparities between Black and White outcomes disappear or become reduced to a level that could be explained by other important variables not measured. Without a statistically significant indication of any sizable racial disparity in arrests and use of force, with indications that a small percent of officers may generate notable disparities, without clear evidence of systemic overtly racist departmental policies or behavior, and a lack of proof that implicit bias against minorities is ongoing in police interactions and actually affects their behavior, the argument of systemic racial bias in policing is not supported. While it appears that there is no evidence of systemic racial bias in policing, it doesn’t mean that improvements can’t be made in race relations with the police and that we shouldn’t continue to monitor policing for indications of racial discrimination. There are undoubtedly “bad apples” in police departments around the country who are racially biased and who have very profound effects on peoples’ of color lives. But in a desire to eliminate racism from policing, efforts to identify it must be conducted with scientific rigor, because the truth matters. As Fryer (2018) said, “Of course, Black lives matter as much as any other lives. Yet we do this principle a disservice if we do not adhere to strict standards of evidence and take at face value descriptive statistics that are consistent with our preconceived ideas. “Stay woke”-but critically so”.

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Welcome to Criminal Justice Access

Welcome to the New Year everyone. This month at CJ Access check out a new policing-focused posting under Research Briefs. Find out what police officers think about body worn cameras (BWCs), what factors affect their decision to charge and arrest on stalking behaviors in domestic violence, and how likely officers are to adhere to a “blue code of silence”. Also explore a longitudinal study to see if there is any support for claims of a “war on cops”, examine the factors that increase the likelihood of injury to subjects and officers in use of force incidents, and investigate the claim that witness and suspect interview transcriptions distort and contaminate oral testimony and confessions when used in court.

Research Briefs

Tapes, Transcripts and Trials: The Routine Contamination of Police Interview Evidence

Haworth, The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 2018

Haworth contends that the way police interviews are conducted, recorded, transcribed, and then used as evidence in court fundamentally alters the original content and meaning of the interview. This contaminated version, when used in court, is often to reinforce or contradict oral testimony based on the exact wording of the transcript. With the reliance of the prosecution on the written record, this contaminated evidence could influence jurors inappropriately or change the possible outcome of a case. Haworth’s UK study, where she compares and analyzes official police transcripts with her own transcripts, as well as a high profile case where both full audio recordings of the interview and the official transcript were made available, examines four areas common to the process of interview production that will result in errors in meaning or content; audibility, transcription, editing,  and courtroom presentation.  

Haworth notes that the original context of the interview can never fully be captured; the surroundings, environment, emotional content, and body language cues cannot really be articulated in an audio recording and properly portraying spoken language in a written format can be challenging. Editing for, and the actual production of, the transcript can also omit valuable information.

Audio recordings may be of overall poor quality, with some departments still using cassette recording equipment, and just through circumstances of the interview, some recorded portions may be inaudible. Haworth notes it is rare that transcripts indicate inaudible portions of the recording and references research where transcribers may just insert “what they thought they heard” in such instances, resulting in errors. Haworth also notes that some countries don’t even bother with audio recordings, relying instead on the interviewer recall in writing the interview summary, while some locations don’t provide an actual transcript but a monologue in first or third person that presents a synopsis of the interviewees’ information rather than a back and forth exchange.

The transcription process also is likely not to include the para and extralinguistic features people utilize in interpreting meaning in face to face interactions. Features like intonation, emphasis, breathiness, facial expressions, and body and head movements all provide details in face to face communication that help the viewer interpret truthfulness, emotions, and cognitive processes in the speaker but are typically lost in producing a transcription. The transcription process is also prone to “correcting” spoken word by omitting or changing speaking features like false starts, stammering, inarticulations, repetition, interruptions, and correcting sentence structure, syntax, and grammar to improve readability. However, she notes research has shown this correction is typically used for lawyers and police officers but not for witnesses and suspects. The author’s interviews with transcription clerks in her study indicate there is no transcription training and no formalization in transcribing these features, with each transcriber developing there own personal style to the transcription process. But Haworth notes that pauses convey important meaning in communication which isn’t imparted to the reader or listener. Non-response to questions were also handled differently with some transcribers, indicating everything from no indication in the transcript to transcriptions like “no comment” “no audible reply”, “no response”, “defendant remained silent”, or “defendant refused to answer” and each of the indicators present a slightly different interpretation of the suspects’ reaction following questions.

The transcription process of a police interview also involves substantial editing and typically produces a summary, (for example, just a simple text statement indicating that the suspect was informed about the charges or circumstances and not transcribing the actual interaction) with only certain parts fully transcribed to ease time and resource costs. These civilian employees of the police department were given guidance sheets on different offenses so they knew what particular points or elements of the crime, known as “points to prove”, to focus on instead of full transcription. For example, in regards to theft, points to prove would involve showing dishonesty, appropriation, property, that belonged to another, with intent to permanently deprive. However this relies upon the individual transcribers being knowledgeable enough  determine what is relevant enough to be transcribed. This transcription process is also geared toward prosecution. There is no indication that transcribers were given guidance to include full transcription in areas regarding duress, legal justifications, or exculpatory admissions. In summarizing interactions, transcribers can also inadvertently introduce value judgments or interpretations based on their perspective. For example, in summarizing an interaction transcribers can indicate behavioral motivations that are just assumed but not actually stated, or fail to transcribe communication indicating the detailed information and emotional content of responses that removes the tone and attitude of an interaction.

The transcript is typical the only evidence of the interview used in court as opposed to the audio recording of the interview. This evidence presentation system is further contaminated as transcripts are not provided to the jurors but are typically presented orally by prosecutors and police witnesses, thus adding another layer of interpretation to a document that had already gone through interpretive changes. This oral presentation allows for the presenter to produce their own intonation, emotion, inflections, and pauses, and either purposely, or inadvertently, present this evidence with a bias toward producing a conviction. Even when jurors are provided with a copy they are likely to be highly influenced by the oral court presentation which may be biased toward the prosecution. Haworth noted in a particularly high-profile case, that punctuation errors in transcription can change the meaning of the words related orally and that mistakes in reading the transcript aloud or prosecutors attempts to “correctly” use the right intonation or emphasis change the meaning of the transcript presented.

To eliminate or mitigate these problems, Haworth suggests that departments move to digital audio recording as well as incorporate video recording to capture the all important context. She also suggests, for use in legal purposes, the audio recording should be preferentially referred to over the transcript. The transcription process should be standardized with transcription marks indicating emphasis, the length of a pause, and interruption notations. Standardized training in transcription and understanding spoken and written word features is also recommend as is ongoing training in regard to legal changes and how if may affect their transcription process. These recommendation will bolster the evidentiary value of transcripts for their use in legal proceedings by providing more accurate and useful evidence.

Police Use of Force and Injury: Multilevel Predictors of Physical Harm to Subjects and Officers

Hickman, Strote, Scales, Parkin, & Collins, Police Quarterly, 2020

With closer scrutiny on police use of force, the authors sought to make determinations on the factors that lead to increased likelihood of injury to subjects and officers in police/subject encounters at an individual and agency level. They recognize that the police in order to do their job must have the ability to use coercive force in order to gain compliance or effect arrests and that  with the use of weapons, injury to either subject or officer, will be inevitable in some of the encounters.

The authors hypothesized that demographically, females and Blacks will have a lower likelihood of injury and that as age increased for subjects their risk of injury will increase, but as officer age increases, their risk of injury will decrease. They also hypothesized that when mental illness or drugs/alcohol were involved, the likelihood of injury to both officer and subject will be higher. Resistance and weapon use will likely increase injury to subjects but not officers but the greater numbers of officers on scene increase the risk of injury to both subjects and officers. The duration of the incident is also known to be related to injury, and they anticipate the longer force is used, the likelihood of injury to both subjects and officers will also increase. The authors also hypothesized that officer knowledge of more serious underlying offenses prior to the use of force, greater threats to officers/self/others, higher levels of subject resistance, warrants, and both attempted and actual flight, will result in higher likelihoods of injury to both subjects and officers. The authors also consider exploratory hypotheses that agency size and type may show some variation as well as the anecdotal hypotheses that agency and state variation on their training for use of force, and emphasis on different or preferred types of force, may also account for variation.

The authors used the Police Force Analysis System and Network, a regional database of law enforcement incident reports and officer narratives. It has served as a police management tool to assess trends and patterns in use of force as well as identify high-risk officers. The analysis utilized 10,564 subject-incidents drawn from 81 agencies across eight states. Most were small to medium municipal agencies serving small to medium towns. Two thirds were from Washington, a fifth from Wisconsin, as well as some from California and a few other states. Their analyses denoted both descriptive statistics as well as using multivariate logistic regression to examine the incidence and risk of injury to subjects and officers.

Across all agencies and incidents, in use of force incidents, subjects were injured 52% of the time and officers were injured 16% of the time, similar to previous research rates. The large majority of subject injuries were minor with, cuts, scrape, bruises, punctures, and Taser probes making up 79% of the injuries while gun and knife wounds and fatalities made up only .7% each of the injuries. 49% received hospital treatment and 35% were treated at the scene, while 16% refused or not offered treatment. While the race of subjects in use of force incidents involved 44% White, 27% Black and 22% Hispanic, as well as other races, the injury rate ranged from 47.5% for Blacks and 50% for Whites to 57% for Hispanics and higher than 60% for Asians and Native Americans.

Injury rates were also higher for subjects and officers if mental illness, drugs/alcohol, prior knowledge of past incidents, and warrants were involved. The severity or seriousness of the investigated offense was also positively correlated with injury rates for subject ranging from 35% to 65% while officer risk was mixed with the  lowest rate for a violent offense with a weapon at 13% to the highest for disorderly conduct/drugs/trespassing at 18%. The risk of subject injury increased with severity of the threat the subject presented, ranging from verbal threat (39%) to deadly weapon (68%) but officer injury rates were also mixed with the lowest rate involving deadly weapon (11%) but the highest rate involving assault or self-harm, or less than lethal weapons (22%). The range of subject resistance to officers was also correlated with subject injury rates from 37% with no resistance to 75% to those who resist with a deadly weapon. Officer injury rates remained low in all but the top resistance categories with the highest in active physical resistance (31%) and less than lethal weapon (34%). Both attempted and actual flight from officers showed higher rates of injuries for both subjects, 49% and 59% respectively, and officers, 19% and 17% respectively

The greater the number of force sequences, or duration of the incident, also increased injury rates for both officers and subjects. Officer force factor (subject resistance level subtracted from officer force use) indicates that when resistance and officer force are equal (force factor=zero), subject injury rates were low but increased as force factor increased. Officer injuries rates decreased with higher force factors in use. However when force factors are negative, with subject resistance greater than officer force, risks of injury to both officers and subjects are increased. Weapons used is also indicated in injury risk. Two thirds of incidents were physical force only and 12% involved only a weapon. Physical force presented the lowest risk of injury for subjects while incidents that involved a weapon resulted in 75% of subjects injured. For officers, while injury rates were lowest when using a weapon only (3%) injuries rates increased to 15% when using physical force and were highest at 25% when using both physical force and a weapon. Tactics also affected injuries with subjects and officers receiving the most injuries during strikes, lateral neck restraints and wrestling. The risk of injury for subjects was high with impact weapons, like batons, being associated with a 71% injury rate and canines with a 97.5% injury rate, though officer injury rate was high with baton use and low with canines.

Injury rates for officers and subjects were both associated with agency size and jurisdiction size , with risk of injury increasing as the size increases. Rates for injuries of both subjects and officers was slightly higher in Sheriff’s Departments compared to municipal agencies. The authors, while noting the examination of regional differences was limited, found that Midwestern agencies (18, primarily Wisconsin) had lower subject and officer injury rates (20.5% and 10.5% respectively) than non-Midwestern agencies (63) rates (59 and 17 percent respectively).

The authors’ multivariate regression analyses examined both subject injury and officer injury models. The subject injury model predicted lower rates of injuries for female (compared to males) and Blacks (compared to Whites), while increasing age increases the risk of injury. While the level of threat presented was not significantly associated with risk of injury, level of resistance was, and showed an 188% odds increase in subject injury when a deadly weapon is involved, and a 132% odds increase when active physical resistance is used. Actual flight from officers also raised the odds of subject injury by 22%. Officer use of a weapon had a 342% odds risk increase for subject injury while those involving a weapon and physical force only increased the odds 181%. Each additional sequence (or length of force incident ) increased the risk of injury, so minimizing the length of incident will decrease injuries. However, they also found that officers’ increased level of force, which could end the incident more quickly, was also associated with increased subject injury. Subject injury odds were also greater in larger agencies’ but a decrease in odds if the agency is Midwestern.

For the officer injury model, demographics indicated females subjects and Asian and Native American were associated with decreased risk of officer injury, and risk of officer injury decreased with increase in subject age. While drug/trespass/disorderly crimes were significantly related to a 30 percent increase in officer injury odds, none of the threat or resistance levels were significantly related to officer injury odds. However attempted and actual flight significantly increased the odds of officer injury by 26 and 47 percent, respectively. Force incidents in which an officer only used a weapon was associated with a 78% decreased odds of officer injury as well as those involving alcohol or drugs. Duration and force factors were similar to subject injury analysis where decreased duration and higher force factors by officers were significantly associated with a  decrease in odds of officer injury. Officer injuries were less likely in midsized agencies compared to small agencies and if the agency is Midwestern, the odds of officer injuries is 36% lower than in non-Midwestern agencies. The authors suggest that exploratory analysis of tactics used may contribute to additional knowledge on officer and subject injury as weapon use was not as common in Wisconsin agencies. The authors suggest that agencies could adopt more standardized training on use of force but ultimately the use of force will reflect community standards. Further research could focus on the systematic evaluation of training methods as well as other more specific incident variables that may also influence subject and officer injury outcomes.

Ambush Killings of the Police, 1970–2018: A Longitudinal Examination of the “War on Cops” Debate,

White, Police Quarterly, 2020

The author notes that a few high profile ambush attacks on the police in recent years, which have coincided with high profile deaths of minority suspects in police encounters, have led some observers to conclude there is a war on the police. He notes that although recent research shows significant declines in felonious killings of police officers since 1990, data from the FBI indicate an increasing percentage of those deaths are classified as ambush killings which the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) describes by four characteristics: “an element of surprise; concealment of the assailant, their intentions, or weapon; suddenness of the attack; and a lack of provocation”. IACP data indicates that from 1990 to 2012, the proportion of ambush killings increased by 33%. Other research also indicates increases in ambushes, for example, in 2016, ambush attacks against police reached a 10-year high. The research also indicates varied motivation for attacks on police, from revenge for a perceived transgression to attacks that are designed to avoid arrest or facilitate escape. However,  the “war on cops” thesis implies a very specific motivation for an ambush: hatred of police and/or desire to seek vengeance in response to police killings of  citizens. They authors, utilizing data from the Officer Down Memorial site, examined felonious killings from 1970 to 2018 (n=3,379) and analyzed 913 ambush style attacks, to determine if they’re has been any trends in these killings. In a time series analysis, they examine two types of ambush; one (pre-encounter, n=206) making up 6.1% of all officer killings, where officers had no knowledge of the suspect prior to the attack, had no opportunity to anticipate the attack, and weren’t actively engaged in “police business (such as sitting in a car eating lunch or writing a report): and the other (anticipation, n=707) making up 20.9% of all officer killings, where officers were responding to a call or other police business and had a general knowledge of the suspect but no contact with him prior to the  incident (for example searching an area for a suspicious person when the officer is surprise attacked). These trends were also compared to two types of felonious non-ambush killings of officers, one where an officer is attacked in the very initial stages of contact with a suspect, which made up 22% of all officer killings (n=745), and a second which makes up 50.9% of all officer killings, where the attack comes after the initial contact stage, for example during an interview with a subject (n=1,721). The authors also examined if the rate has changed significantly since 2013 to determine if there is support for the war on cops contention. Rates were standardized to ambushes per 100,000 officers to account for changes in officer population fluctuations and the quasi-experimental time series used to points of intervention. July 2013, date of the formation of Black Lives Matter following the acquittal of George Zimmerman  in the Trayvon Martin case and August 2014, the month that Michael Brown was killed in Ferguson, MO and BLM was prominent in the media. (Author’s note: Both relatively early occurrences in the current focus on police brutality and racial justice).

The authors note that in 1970, anticipation ambushes rates (12 per 100k officers) were more than three times higher than that of pre-encounter but through the ’70’s and ’80’s anticipation ambushes dropped rapidly to between 1 and 2 officers per 100K and pre-encounter ambushes dropped as well from a high of almost 3 officers per 100k, to one and sometimes less than one officer per 100k through the ’90’s and beyond. While this rate of decline was statistically significant, the authors also found two 20 year high spikes in both 2011 and 2016 for anticipation ambushes and spikes in excess of 1997 rates in 2002, 2014, and 2016 for pre-encounter ambushes. Initial entry, which in general had a lower rate than information stage attacks, and information stage attacks showed a similar trend with sharp drops through the ’70’s and ’80’s, declining 79 to 88 percent. Like ambushes, there were also spikes relative to 1997. In 2005 and 2011 there were spikes in early stage attacks and spikes in 2002, 2004, 2008 and 2017 from later stage attacks, though there was also a sharp decline in 2013. The rates of the declines were also statistically significant. Examining the time series for the two types of ambushes separately and combined, neither showed any significant increases after 2013, indicating that neither the formation of Black Lives Matter or the death of Michael Brown had any effect on police ambushes. Nor is there support for a war on cops based on an overall downward trend. However, eight of the last 20 years studied showed spikes in excessive of the overall decline shown in 1997. These spikes over the period 2009 to 2013 and 2014 toward 2018 accounted for a 25% increase in pre-encounter ambushes, a 9% increase in anticipation ambushes and a 22% increase in later stage attacks. While the downward trend doesn’t suggest a chronic problem, spikes do warrant observation as they can predict the emergence of a chronic problem.

The authors do note limitations in the study include a lack of known motivation for the attacks, such as revenge, which would inform the hypothesis of a “war on cops”. Also, since non-fatal injuries were not included in the study, changes in rates of officer killing may also be a function of advancements in emergency medical response and treatment, police training, and equipment like body armor for officers and may mask increased rates of potentially deadly attacks on officers. (Author’s note: The study also didn’t examine non-injurious attacks on officers. For example, in 2020, the number of officers in Chicago who were shot doubled compared to 2019 but the number officers shot at increased three times, which also may be masking the effect of an increase in attacks on officers).

Police Ethics and Integrity: Keeping the ‘Blue Code’ of Silence

Westmarland and Conway, International Journal of Police Science and Management, 2020

The authors examined police ethics and integrity within a UK police force with a questionnaire presenting ten hypothetical ethical dilemma scenarios. An Us vs Them mentality, the blue code” and the “code of silence” as portrayed in other research suggests that police misconduct may be promoted or go unreported as officers seek to protect their own.. Other research has examined this issue and the current study includes not only sworn police officers but police community support officers, akin to US Community Service Officers, and police support staff. The authors analyzed 1,509 responses from a large non-metropolitan police organization that had both urban and rural policing areas. The survey asked respondents what offenses they found most serious as well as how likely they were to report various types of misdemeanors, what influenced their decision to do so, and their attitudes about reporting offenses. Officers were presented with ethically problematic policing behavior in ten scenarios and, on a 5 point scale, asked to rated them in seriousness and how likely they were to report the behavior, with some scenarios querying whether the officer believed it was against departmental policy and how the officer would go about reporting the offense. Officers were also asked how they felt working with a whistle blower and the degree of confidence in the department’s anonymous messenger system.

Four of the scenarios were regarded as only minor infringements (running a side business unrelated to police work, taking reportedly legal bodybuilding supplements, addressing a disturbance at a party for police staff, and an investigating officer having a romantic relationship with a former crime victim) and were very likely to go unreported, likely because they involved off premise and off duty behavior. Two scenarios were considered major infringements, one involving an officer keeping an expensive watch that was inadvertently received by him, and the other involved an officer taking a sum of cash from a criminal during a search. In regards to the watch, while 85% felt that it was a serious or very serious infringement fewer than half of the respondents stated they would be highly likely to report it, with the authors postulating that keeping the watch may not necessarily be perceived as theft. However, when it came to a clear issue of theft in taking cash from a suspect, 97% responded it was a very serious infringements with 95% of respondents indicating they would be highly likely to report it. Some of the other scenarios also showed some disjuncture between the stated serious and likelihood of reporting. While accessing confidential police data for personal use was considered at the highest level of seriousness by 83% of respondents, only 69% reported they would be highly likely to report the infringement. This was the largest gap evidenced between seriousness levels and other scenarios had notable gaps as well. Witnessing sexual harassment among co-workers was judged as serious to very serious by 93% of respondents though 85% indicated they would be prepared to or likely to report the incident, with a number of responses wanting to gain more information about what they witnessed before reporting. However, opinions were split on the appropriateness of engaging in a romantic relationship with a crime victim by the investigating officer with 39% saying it was acceptable, 26% saying it was inacceptable, while 34% were unsure. While the average response as to whether they would report it was “not very likely”, 40% said they were unlikely to report and only 11% said they were highly likely to report the relationship. Two of the scenarios were regarded as potentially harmful by the researchers, applying extra physical force to a captured fleeing suspect and covering for an off duty officer driving drunk and accordingly, officers viewed these scenarios as very serious (83 and 88 percent respectively) as well most officers being very likely to report the incidents (74 and 77 percent respectively).

The researchers also explored officers’ attitudes about working with whistleblowers and the anonymous messaging system. In regards to the whistleblower question, respondents had the options of choosing more than one response and while some officers had reservation about not wanting to work with the officer, or feeling they couldn’t trust the officer, 42% of officers said they would be on guard around the officer. However two thirds of respondents indicated they would have no reservations working with a whistleblower resulting in some difficulty reconciling officers who both have no reservations about working with a whistle blower, yet feeling they needed to be on guard, or would be mistrustful. The authors suggest that is suggestive of officers commitment to  “adhere to formal rules, regulations and ethical principles, while simultaneously recognizing the existence of normative standards which may technically qualify as an infringement”. Confidence in the anonymous messaging system was not high, with respondents’ confidence split mostly evenly between the five levels of confidence, with 17% expressing no confidence to 18% being highly confident with a number of respondents questioning how it could maintain anonymity.

The authors conclude that while research does provide indications of in-group secrecy and solidarity, other research indicates that while new recruits value teamwork and comradeship, the code of silence has been overwritten by the “code of self-protection”. As departments become more accountable to the public and risk aversive, officers fear doing the “wrong thing” more than self-isolation that might come with whistleblowing. The authors’ results indicate that there is some evidence of the blue code with the average gap between level of seriousness and likelihood of reporting at about 10 points, though one departure from this was the high level of very serious assessment of accessing police data but the lower likelihood of reporting it. The authors also note however, that the excessive force and DUI scenarios, which were used in previous research in 2005, showed an over 20% increase in the “highly likely to report” category for both scenarios, suggesting a move toward doing the “right thing” over maintaining a blue code of silence.

A Sign of the Crimes: Examining Officers’ Identification of, and Arrest for, Stalking in Domestic Violence Complaints

Brady, Reyns, & Dreke, Police Quarterly, 2020

The authors state that despite stalking as a risk factor for intimate partner homicide, little research has explored the officer decision making process in domestic violence (DV) complaints that involve stalking. Some research on domestic violence indicates that officers may minimize stalking behavior or fail to recognize stalking behavior as actual stalking. Officers have indicated the complexity of the statues, and the need to establish a pattern of behavior that elicits an emotional reaction from the victim, can make investigation and prosecution difficult. To examine the issue, the authors utilize a focal concerns perspective. Accordingly, “criminal justice actors weigh three main considerations when faced with a decision—the blameworthiness of the offender, protection of the community, and any practical constraints or consequences associated with different courses of action or inaction… theoretically, greater criminal justice action (e.g., arrest, charging, sentencing) is positively related to blameworthiness and the need to protect the community, whereas the effects of practical constraints and consequences will vary depending on the organization and how the concept is operationalized”.

The authors’ study examined five years’ worth (230 cases) of intimate partner complaints that met the legal standard of stalking where officers either did or did not identify stalking behaviors in domestic violence complaints, in order to explore legal and extralegal factors in officers’ decisions to arrest suspects for intimate partner stalking. The authors examined three research questions; to what extent are suspects arrested for stalking in DV complaints, which legal and extralegal factors figure into officers’ identification of stalking behavior in DV complaints, and which of those factors are associated with officers making an arrest versus writing an incident report.

Outcome variables included whether officers acknowledged stalking behavior that is, whether the officer indicated that stalking was an observed offense citied in the incident reports or whether the officer articulated stalking behavior but did not identify a specific charge of stalking in the incident report and whether, in the cases where stalking was cited in the incident report, an arrest was made or if only an incident report was made. For the independent variables, in order to examine the focal concerns perspective, the authors operationalized blameworthiness as whether the victim was threatened,  total number of offenses articulated in the report, and whether the suspect had violated an active protection order. Community protection (as gauged on the dangerousness to community or victims) was operationalized as whether the subject had been incarcerated, whether they had committed previous physical assaults, and whether the location of the incident was private or public. Practical constraints and consequences included six variables: whether there had been prior police responses involving the parties, whether there was physical evidence, the presence of witnesses, whether the victim or someone else contacted police, whether the victim exhibited fear, and whether the victim was cooperative. The authors also examined the perceptual shorthand used by officers, the cognitive schemas of credibility, dangerousness, cooperation, and risk of recidivism that come from contact with other officers and work experiences that may be influenced by the current relationship status of the parties, age, race, and ethnicity.

Results showed that officers identified stalking behaviors in less than half of DV complaints reported to RI police departments from 2001 to 2005. Of the 94 police-identified stalking cases, however, the majority resulted in an arrest (61.7%). Of the 141 total cases that resulted in an arrest (61.3%), 41.1% were specifically for stalking and 58.9% were for a non-stalking DV-related offense, meaning stalking arrests accounted for 25.2% of all DV cases reported. Officers were significantly more likely to identify stalking behaviors if  subjects had committed a greater number of offenses, if the incident occurred in public and if there had been  history of prior police responses involving the parties. Officers were significantly more likely to not specifically identify stalking behavior (classifying the incident as a non-stalking DV complaint) when the victim was the complainant, was threatened, or reported prior physical assault by the subject. The logistic regression model isolated the key factors in officer decision-making. Incidents that occurred in public versus a private location were nearly 4 times more likely to be identified. Officers were also two times more likely to identify stalking behaviors if the suspect had committed multiple offense and almost three times more likely if there were prior police responses to previous complaints. Even though officers articulated stalking behavior in the report itself, officers were significantly more likely to classify incidents as a non-stalking DV-related offense when the suspect threatened the victim (OR .41) or the victim had alleged prior physical assaults by the suspect (OR .39). None of the other factors such as the suspect’s relationship to the victim, age, race, prior criminal history, victim fear, who called the police, the availability of witnesses, physical evidence, victim fear, and the presence of an active protection order significantly influenced officers’ identification of stalking. The logistic regression model also examined the significant variables affecting officers decision to arrest versus generate a report in cases they identified as involving stalking but the only factor that had a significant influence on that decision was whether the victim is deemed cooperative by submitting a written statement. No other independent or demographic variable influenced the decision to arrest.

The authors discuss that the results may explain some officer decision-making processes. In some ways, officers may treat stalking as an “add-on” offense, something to be added when multiple charges are present but not warranting a sole charge, and may be contingent on the other two factors;  public incident and prior police involvement as this may signal the relentlessness of the subject which supports the need to establish a pattern of behavior, and public pursuit may provide the opportunity for more corroborating evidence like witnesses and surveillance footage. While some of the variables fall into the scope of focal concerns in identifying stalking, the authors conclude the perspective is not useful in determining the factors related to establishing an arrest in stalking cases, as the sole, and strong, factor influencing this was the victim’s willingness to cooperate by filing a  written statement. This cooperation has been shown in previous criminological research to be positively correlated with arrest in other areas as well.

The authors suggest that training and standard operating procedures be developed and implemented that help officers understand the stalking statutes, and identify stalking behavior, by having them inquire specifically about stalking and the presence of fear to establish probable cause. Officers also need to know and accept the illegality of stalking, instead as  just a component of the power and control dynamic present in these types of domestic relationships, thus providing better support for victims.

Attitudinal Changes Toward Body-Worn Cameras: Perceptions of Cameras, Organizational Justice, and Procedural Justice Among Volunteer and Mandated Officers

Huff, Katz, Webb, and Hedberg, Police Quarterly, 2020

The authors examine some issues involving body worn cameras (BWCs) by using a recently implemented BWC mandate in the Phoenix, AZ Police Department to determine the attitudes surrounding camera use and its effect on perceived organizational and procedural justice. They note that previous research on BWCs has yielded a variety of results. There are implications that BWCs could have a deterrent effect on officers, limiting their discretion in citizen encounters and making them more mindful of proper behavior and procedures, but that deterrent effect may not be equally found in all officers.

Many of the previous studies focused on attitudes prior to the implementation of a BWC mandate but did not demonstrate how the attitudes abut BWCs may have changed following the mandates. Some research indicated officers believed BWCs would limit their discretion, would increase adherence to departmental policies, and  that it may not affect their behavior to a great degree but that it could have a positive effect on citizen behavior, and could assist in report writing and producing better evidence for prosecution.

However, results after BWC adoption have been mixed. UK officers believed that the cameras had a positive impact in a number of areas and was a means of improving officer effectiveness, but in the US, where adoption has met with more resistance, the suggestion is BWCs were to improve problematic officer behavior, with some officers believing they were necessary as the word of a police officer is not trusted in court anymore. Patrol officers versus those in special units also had differing needs and concerns surround BWCs but the findings generally suggest that officers in departments that have already deployed BWCs have a more positive perception of the technology than those where it had yet to be implemented. Studies that have examined officer attitudes toward BWCs prior to, and following, the adoption of BWCs have largely found that officers become more favorable or remain neutral toward BWCs after BWC programs are implemented. They also found officers believed, as the programs went on, that they improved officers’ ability to protect themselves against citizen complaints and that they improved citizens willingness to talk to officers. However, some studies have found evidence that after implementation officers had no change, or a negative change in attitude to BWCs, believing that they limit officer discretion, and force them to act more legalistic than informal in dealing with citizens, but sometimes these individual attitudes depended on the attitudes of officers in their social network as well.

The authors state that two areas that will be affected by BWCs and a possible deterrent effect are perceptions of organizational justice and procedural justice. Perceptions of organizational justice pertain to officers’ feeling of fairness in implementing, utilizing, and monitoring a BWC program, and the outcomes associated with them, which would be associated with officers’ job performance and commitment to the organization. Research has indicated that when officers have concerns about BWCs generating public disapproval and perceive high monitoring of BWC it can affect their emotional well-being, and when they lack organizational support for BWC officers, has also been linked to burnout. When officers felt their department was more just and fair in its monitoring of BWCs they had more positive perceptions of BWCs. Officers’ positive perceptions and support of BWCs were also linked to perceptions of a strong trust relationship with their supervisor. Research also indicated that officers were concerned about how the footage would be reviewed and used, fearing it would be used to hold officers accountable and get them in trouble over minor issues, and thus limit their proactive contacts.

The authors also suggest that BWCs can enhance procedural justice during citizen encounters. “Citizens have higher perceptions of procedural justice when they feel they were allowed to contribute to the encounter, when the officer used objective criteria to make decisions, when the citizen felt they were treated with dignity and respect, and when the citizen trusted the officers’ motives in the interaction” and when citizens perceive more procedural justice they are more likely to be compliant and cooperative. Supervisors have the opportunity to monitor or review BWCs to ensure officers are engaging in procedurally just methods. However, research results are mixed with some officers feeling BWCs made them more professional and patient, while others felt it was stifling and limited establishing rapport, while some research found no effect between establishing procedural justice and BWC usage. Associated reductions in complaints with BWC officers may stem from the appearance of more procedurally just behavior as officers narrate their decision making to the camera as well as citizens.

The authors conducted a survey of 467 officers on their attitudes about BWCs in a pre-test phase before the research entered into the BWC wearing phase. A random sample of 177 survey participants was drawn and three groups were established; a group that declined to volunteer to wear a BWC (resistors, n=96), a group that volunteered to wear the cameras (volunteers, n=47) and a third group who were mandated to wear the cameras (mandated, n=34),  A random sample of 110 officers were also selected from the pre-test group that had no involvement in the BWC program to serve as a control group. After 6 months, of the 287 officers in the BWC study 237 completed the post-test survey. The survey, identical to the pre-test, contained items related to officer efficacy, officer behavior, citizen reaction, general perception, overall recommendation, and organizational and procedural justice.

Overall, the researchers “identified few statistically significant and only small substantively meaningful changes in officer perceptions of BWCs, organizational justice, and procedural justice over time.” Relative to the control group, BWC officers had more negative perceptions about officer efficacy (i.e. having a more accurate account of the case, obtaining high quality evidence, or assisting in the prosecution of cases), though the authors suggest this may stem from officers not being privy to the benefits derived in the courtroom as research has shown that BWCs were more likely to result in charging, conviction, and a more punitive sentence. Positively though, relative to the control group, volunteer officers showed small declines in their perceptions that BWCs may negatively affect police officer behavior, being less likely to believe that BWCs inhibit contacts with citizens, cause hesitation in making decisions, and feeling they had less discretion. However, both mandated and volunteer officers had lower levels of agreement than the control group of officers that BWCs would increase citizen cooperation, increase citizen respect, decrease citizen resistance, and decrease citizen aggression, mirroring prior research. The authors suggest that a lack of observable effect in this area may stem from citizens not being aware of officers’ BWCs and thus citizens may be unlikely to change their behavior which increased these officers skepticism that BWCs affect citizen behavior positively, as compared to resisters and the control group which did not vary in their views on this issue. Prior research had indicated when citizens were aware of the camera their behavior changed and the authors suggest this result might inform policy issues regarding informing citizens that a BWC is in use. Compared to the control group, mandated officers were also less likely to have positive general perceptions following their field use. These officers were less likely to agree that police and citizens benefit from BWC use, that BWCs are well received by coworkers, and that BWCs improve job satisfaction and performance, training, and officer safety. Similarly, mandated officers reported more negative overall recommendations for BWC use, being less likely to recommend BWCs to other departments or other officers in their department, however the officers mandated wearing status may have generated feelings of loss of autonomy, and affected those results, the researchers surmised.

In contrast to other research, and in contrast to the control group, resistors, mandated, and volunteer officers all held higher perceptions of organizational justice (support and fairness in implementation, monitoring, and outcomes). The authors note this interesting result in comparison to the other study results which indicate BWC wearers did not see them as having an effect on citizen behavior and were less likely to recommend implementation. The researchers suggest that BWCs represent a supervisory program and with being given the opportunity to wear a BWC, perceived a greater capacity in the department for organizational justice. In contrast, there is no significant difference among any of the groups on BWCs prompting more procedural justice behavior. The authors note that the relatively small changes in officer attitudes, regardless of exposure to BWCs, suggests that “efforts to increase officer support for BWCs should be made early in the BWC adoption process. Our results, combined with prior research, highlight the importance of a communication strategy that disseminates information about the benefits and limitations of BWCs prior to their deployment so that officers buy-in to their agency’s BWC program, rather than resist its implementation.”

Welcome to Criminal Justice Access

Greetings everyone,

While there was no posting for August, for September at CJ Access be sure to check out “Analysis of a Traffic Stop” under For Discussion, as I break down the recent traffic stop between Moorhead, MN police and a local BLM organizer. I examine what both parties did right and wrong and how adopting different behaviors and attitudes could make these encounters less confrontational. Links is provided to the dash cam videos and police reports as well.

Also under Editorials and Opinions in “A Free Cup of Coffee”, I briefly examine and critique a couple of prevalent theories regarding police corruption, the Rotten Apple Theory and the Structural (Rotten Barrel) Theory and suggest an interaction exists between the two as well as examining what remedies might exist to address police corruption.

Analysis of a Traffic Stop

https://www.valleynewslive.com/2020/08/18/moorhead-police-release-dash-cam-videos-of-interaction-with-blm-organizer/

On August 15th, 2020 Moorhead, MN police officers stopped local Black Lives Matter organizer Faith Dixon for a speeding violation. The dash cam videos of the encounter can be seen at the link above and analysis of the incident clearly shows that the encounter became needlessly confrontational, with both the officers and subject playing a part in the dysfunction. The following analysis examines how officers could have taken a different approach to the stop and how the driver could have adopted different attitudes and behaviors toward both the officers and the stop which would have resulted in a much more positive encounter. Society has seen instances of both officers making tactical and judgement errors in dealing with subjects and subjects being non-compliant and resisting arrest in their encounters with law enforcement and these scenarios inevitably lead to escalation in the incidents resulting in injury and death. Understanding the mistakes made by both parties is important so that an honest discussion can be had about what changes need to be made in law enforcement and public behavior to help reduce police/public encounters from resulting in injury and death.

Officer Analysis

After turning around on the subject, the subject was stopped, was instructed through the PA where to pull over and eventually pulled over correctly, two minutes into the dash cam video. When the subject was initially stopped, she stopped her vehicle in the middle of the road partially blocking lanes. The officer using the PA instructed the subject to move over to the right side of the road four times, and by the fourth time the annoyance is evident in his voice. However the officer should be aware that the subject does have to see behind the patrol car parked directly behind her and cross two lanes of traffic on a busy road which may slow the subject’s action and the officer should take this into account in his own situational awareness, the positioning of the squad car to assist in this movement, and in the tone of his verbal instructions.

Stopping in the middle of the road is unusual and this behavior might have suggested certain approaches and informed officer behavior. In this initial contact, and throughout the encounter, officers should try to keep in mind the components of procedural justice. Because it was unusual, it may indicate that the subject is unfamiliar with the rules of the road and traffic stops, intoxicated, or in some way incapacitated, perhaps from a medical condition, and an approaching officer could show concern for the subject by addressing this in their initial contact, which did not occur..

Two officers, a training officer and a newer officer approach the vehicle, each taking a position on opposite sides of the vehicle. Officer 1 (Oldham), the newer officer, at the driver’s side window introduces himself and asked if the subject knew why she as pulled over. When the subject denied that she was traveling 44 in a 30, the officer could have offered to have the subject step back to the squad to see the radar for herself, presenting an opportunity to reinforce the legitimacy of the stop.

Officer 1 requests the subject’s drivers license and proof of insurance and after a delay the subject produces only a drivers license. Officer 2 (Zimmel) the Field Training Officer, who has repositioned himself on the driver’s side, tells Officer 1 to request registration as well. The subject, already annoyed with Officer 2 and refusing to speak to him, begins to complain about harassment and states “black lives matter”. While understandably Officer 2 is also annoyed with the subject, his sarcastic response of “Good job Ma’am for making it racial” does nothing to deescalate the situation or employ procedural justice components. While difficult in these circumstances Officers 1 & 2 could take some time to inquire as to what specifically she felt was biased about the stop or why she believed race was an issue. This does give a voice to the citizen and lets her know that her concerns are being listened to but it also gives officers an opportunity to possibly correct misperceptions about how police work is conducted and address or counter any specific claims of bias during the incident.

At 4 minutes into the video and 2 minutes since officers unsuccessfully requested the subject’s documentation, Officer 2 pulls on the subject’s driver’s door handle, which doesn’t open, and demands “let’s go, grab your stuff, you’re not just going to sit there staring..”. While officers are within their right to open a driver’s door and demand they exit if they feel the subject is being problematic, considering the friction between Officer 2 and the subject, the attempt might have been done more surreptitiously to avoid drawing the subject’s attention to it and further antagonizing the subject. Wearing a tactical vest, Officer 2’s stance, demeanor, and tone is stern and rigid and in marked difference to Officer 1, who the subject referred to as the nice officer. Officer 2, however, also wisely disengaged from the situation and let Officer 1 continue to deal with the subject.

At 5 and half minutes since initial officer contact with the subject, the subject still hasn’t produced proof of insurance and tells the officer she has to look through her bag, produces an expired insurance card which the officer points out to her. It is also around this time a third officer, requested by the unit who took the call, showed up. While the presence of more police officers may escalate a situation and provide bad optics, it was a necessary call as the subject had been communicating with an individual believed to be her husband requesting he arrive at the scene, and an additional unit was necessary as officers were going to be having unknown individuals rolling up on them. Whether by design or happenstance, the third officer was a woman, and in a potentially volatile situation having an officer of the same sex or race as the subject may help ease tension in the situation and anxiety in the subject.

Officer 1 continues to grant the subject time until finally after 7 and half minutes since the initial contact, he states he’s returning to the squad to start righting the citations. The subject then produces another proof of insurance but this was one for the wrong vehicle. Both officers are at the driver’s side now stating she is delaying the process. However, officers themselves could have cut this portion of the stop short by informing the driver that, common in many jurisdictions, if the driver presents current proof of insurance to the court the charge is waived. This would have cut short the subject’s searching, would have allowed the officers to start citation processing earlier, and made leveling an accusation of delaying at the subject unnecessary.

After 9 minutes since the initial contact officers return to their vehicle to enter data for the citations. Computer problems delayed the citation processing and 12 minutes after the initial contact, the subject’s husband pulls up in front of the subject and is met by Officer 3 (Bischoff) and the initial responding unit is repeating an earlier request for an additional unit to help manage a potential situation. At over 15 and half minutes from the initial contact, Officer 4 (Kvam) arrives and takes a position on the passenger side of the subject’s vehicle to monitor the situation while Officer 3 is briefing Officers 1 & 2 on her contact with the subject’s husband. However, Officer 4, who ends up engaging in conversation with the subject didn’t appear to have received  an in-person briefing from the officers at the scene, leaving him somewhat unaware of the issues and friction going on. This leaves him lacking in his ability to communicate effectively with the subject on the issues or concerns the subject may have.

At almost 20 minutes after the initial contact, a sergeant arrives on scene. After addressing both subjects, he concludes the stop. Officer 1 attempts a few times to get the subject to take the citations until she finally accepts them. As the subject continues to complain and level accusations, one officer lingers. It’s unknown if this officer was trying to listen to the subject’s complaint or if he was intent on engaging the subject regarding her tirade but at this point further communication with the subject is a lost cause, and the supervisor wisely calls him back to the squads.

You can read Officer Oldham’s incident report and FTO Zimmel’s supplemental report here which provides more details about their interaction with Dixon and her behavior.

https://beta.documentcloud.org/documents/20384715-complaint-file_2

BLM Dixon Traffic Stop Reports

Subject Analysis

The driver in this encounter did virtually everything wrong in her traffic stop. This may stem from  a lack of understanding of police work and their authority and a pre-existing negative attitude about the police, which helped fuel the confrontation between the subject and law enforcement. Knowing how to behave in a traffic stop is key to avoiding needless confrontation. There are some very simple guidelines to follow in an encounter with the police, particularly in a traffic stop.

Know the rules of the road and your expected behavior when an officer is trying to pull you over. It should be common knowledge among drivers that when you are being pulled over by the police, you pull over to the right side of the road. This is standard practice and should be adhered to by all drivers. By not doing so suggests to the officers that there is something wrong with you; you lack knowledge of the rules of the road, or you are intoxicated or mentally incapacitated in some way. This increases both officer alertness and suspicion. This lack of following a simple proper procedure already sets the stage for tension in the encounter.

You should have your driving documents ready to be presented. This as well should be standard practice for drivers. Rolling down your window, and keeping it down, and having your correct and valid license, registration, and insurance ready to present to the officer when he approaches, or quickly accessible when he requests it signals to the officer that you understand and intend to be compliant with the process. In this instance, the subject’s disconnect from the situation, putting a barrier between herself and officers, and her delays in presenting driving documentation (9 minutes after initial verbal contact with the officer) draws the officers’ ire because delaying compliance suggests the subject wants to delay the process because they have something to hide or they intend to make the stop difficult for the officer. This is again going to make the officer suspicious or prompt the officer to view the subject as a ‘”problem person”, further introducing tension and suspicion into the encounter. Compliance with an officer’s directives is so often at the heart of whether an encounter with law enforcement escalates into use of force because officers have the legitimate legal backing and expectation that lawful commands and directives be obeyed. If they are faced with noncompliance they have the legal authority, the expectation of both the public and their employer, and their own work ethic and personal expectations, to gain that compliance by force if necessary. The public too often forgets, or doesn’t understand, that component of policing and that when noncompliance leads to resisting arrest, officers have the duty and obligation to effect those arrests, even if deadly force is needed. Subjects aren’t going to avoid arrest by noncompliance, which will lead to use of force, nor will resisting arrest prevent them from being arrested. By fighting with officers, subjects will likely be injured or killed.

Searching through your vehicle looking for documentation will heighten officer alertness, putting them on edge, as they have to be observant and wary in case the driver is trying to conceal contraband, or possibly draw a weapon. Dixon, correctly, informed officers that she was going to look through her bag for vehicle documentation. If a driver is going to digging for anything, reaching for anything, or pulling something out, they should inform the officer where they are going to look and for what, so that the officer is not surprised or alarmed by sudden or furtive movements and suggests you’re not a threat to officer safety. In Zimmel’s supplemental report, he notes Dixon’s other behavior and movements prompted him to use his flashlight to see in the vehicle and open the door to see more clearly in order to help ensure officer safety.

If you have a complaint about an officer’s behavior or attitude, it is best to address that issue through a formal complaint with the department or informally by speaking with the officer’s sergeant after the incident has concluded. Complaining during the traffic stop about how you perceived the stop to be unjust and generalizing police behavior as biased or discriminatory will only escalate the tension in the situation. It will certainly rub officers the wrong way as the overwhelming majority of officers operate without bias and are merely trying to do a difficult job in  ensuring public safety and investigating possible criminal conduct. Painting an officer as racist or suggesting that race was a factor in the stop will likely offend officers and they will definitely become less accommodating. This is seen in the dash cam video as Dixon needlessly plays the race card in a situation where there was no evidence of any racial bias or animosity. If a driver has questions about the stop, they should respectfully ask specific question of the officers rather than making claims and accusations. Name dropping to officers, for example, calling the mayor, or calling the police chief, will also not add any legitimacy to your concerns or complaints addressed to officers, as they have seen this “I’ll get you in trouble” tactic numerous times, and again, suggests to the officer you are a problem person who should not be afforded any accommodation. It may be unfair, but it is a fact, that disrespecting an officer, and impugning their integrity, will likely result in harsher treatment as they see themselves as a symbol and the authority of the law and when you disrespect on officer, you disrespect the law they are sworn to uphold.

If you are stopped by officers you are better served by putting down your phone and paying attention to, and interacting fully with, officers. You were stopped for some violation of the law or traffic code and as the driver you should be engaged in the encounter at hand, not concerned over filming it for social media fodder. Being distracted in the situation can cause you to not hear or misunderstand officer commands and can lead to tension and escalation. Calling someone else to the scene, “just in case” as Dixon did in this encounter is also ill advised. While she may have felt misplaced apprehension in dealing with the police officers, calling an unknown person or persons into a traffic or investigative stop will send up red flags for officers. This new arrival will also generate some apprehension as this new arrival is an unknown factor and will possibly escalate the situation or may attack the officers. For officers to manage this new possible threat, backup will need to be called and so Dixon, through her behavior again escalated the situation, requiring multiple officers to respond to help ensure officer safety and traffic stop management.

Dixon did Facebook the incident while on her phone as well as file a formal complaint with the Chief of Police, stating officers were aggressive and disrespectful and that one officer tried to open her door and had his hand on his gun, causing her to fear for her life. Dixon was also seeking to meet with the mayor. Moorhead police, in response to her claims, subsequently released the dash cam videos of the incident. Dixon has since taken down her Facebook post of the incident.

Conclusion

So in this situation we see both the officers and Dixon could have taken steps to ensure the traffic stop went more smoothly, however the negative encounter that occurred was mostly set in motion by Dixon through her atypical behavior during the stop, followed by her delays in providing documentation, her inattention to officers, her unfounded accusations and attitude pointed at officers, and introducing a possible threat into the situation. It are these actions that have occurred in other traffic and investigatory stops around the country that have contributed to injuries and deaths of individuals who have escalated the situation while officers struggle to obtain compliance. Undoubtedly there will be lost causes on both sides. Some officers will never adopt procedural justice guidelines and will introduce tension and escalation into a situation regardless of how polite and accommodating the subject is. Some citizens too will continue to assess officers not on their behavior in the situation, but as a stereotypical racist cop bent on harassing minorities and will do so regardless of how much procedural justice is employed by the officer. But besides the lost causes, there is work to be done on both sides. Officers must adopt and support procedural justice to ensure their authority is viewed as legitimate, which will help in gaining compliance, ease tension in citizen encounters, and foster a more positive view of policing. Citizens must also set aside the derisive and divisive narrative that the police are “out to get them”, and start to deal respectfully and compliantly with officers. This will reduce tension, de-escalate situations, and help eliminate the need for use of force in stops that shouldn’t have warranted it in the first place.

So watch the video and tell me what you think. Could officers have done better? How much did Dixon instigate the problems? Could this have been an encounter that might have turned out differently or was it set to fail from the get-go? Please comment below.