Analysis of a Traffic Stop

https://www.valleynewslive.com/2020/08/18/moorhead-police-release-dash-cam-videos-of-interaction-with-blm-organizer/

On August 15th, 2020 Moorhead, MN police officers stopped local Black Lives Matter organizer Faith Dixon for a speeding violation. The dash cam videos of the encounter can be seen at the link above and analysis of the incident clearly shows that the encounter became needlessly confrontational, with both the officers and subject playing a part in the dysfunction. The following analysis examines how officers could have taken a different approach to the stop and how the driver could have adopted different attitudes and behaviors toward both the officers and the stop which would have resulted in a much more positive encounter. Society has seen instances of both officers making tactical and judgement errors in dealing with subjects and subjects being non-compliant and resisting arrest in their encounters with law enforcement and these scenarios inevitably lead to escalation in the incidents resulting in injury and death. Understanding the mistakes made by both parties is important so that an honest discussion can be had about what changes need to be made in law enforcement and public behavior to help reduce police/public encounters from resulting in injury and death.

Officer Analysis

After turning around on the subject, the subject was stopped, was instructed through the PA where to pull over and eventually pulled over correctly, two minutes into the dash cam video. When the subject was initially stopped, she stopped her vehicle in the middle of the road partially blocking lanes. The officer using the PA instructed the subject to move over to the right side of the road four times, and by the fourth time the annoyance is evident in his voice. However the officer should be aware that the subject does have to see behind the patrol car parked directly behind her and cross two lanes of traffic on a busy road which may slow the subject’s action and the officer should take this into account in his own situational awareness, the positioning of the squad car to assist in this movement, and in the tone of his verbal instructions.

Stopping in the middle of the road is unusual and this behavior might have suggested certain approaches and informed officer behavior. In this initial contact, and throughout the encounter, officers should try to keep in mind the components of procedural justice. Because it was unusual, it may indicate that the subject is unfamiliar with the rules of the road and traffic stops, intoxicated, or in some way incapacitated, perhaps from a medical condition, and an approaching officer could show concern for the subject by addressing this in their initial contact, which did not occur..

Two officers, a training officer and a newer officer approach the vehicle, each taking a position on opposite sides of the vehicle. Officer 1 (Oldham), the newer officer, at the driver’s side window introduces himself and asked if the subject knew why she as pulled over. When the subject denied that she was traveling 44 in a 30, the officer could have offered to have the subject step back to the squad to see the radar for herself, presenting an opportunity to reinforce the legitimacy of the stop.

Officer 1 requests the subject’s drivers license and proof of insurance and after a delay the subject produces only a drivers license. Officer 2 (Zimmel) the Field Training Officer, who has repositioned himself on the driver’s side, tells Officer 1 to request registration as well. The subject, already annoyed with Officer 2 and refusing to speak to him, begins to complain about harassment and states “black lives matter”. While understandably Officer 2 is also annoyed with the subject, his sarcastic response of “Good job Ma’am for making it racial” does nothing to deescalate the situation or employ procedural justice components. While difficult in these circumstances Officers 1 & 2 could take some time to inquire as to what specifically she felt was biased about the stop or why she believed race was an issue. This does give a voice to the citizen and lets her know that her concerns are being listened to but it also gives officers an opportunity to possibly correct misperceptions about how police work is conducted and address or counter any specific claims of bias during the incident.

At 4 minutes into the video and 2 minutes since officers unsuccessfully requested the subject’s documentation, Officer 2 pulls on the subject’s driver’s door handle, which doesn’t open, and demands “let’s go, grab your stuff, you’re not just going to sit there staring..”. While officers are within their right to open a driver’s door and demand they exit if they feel the subject is being problematic, considering the friction between Officer 2 and the subject, the attempt might have been done more surreptitiously to avoid drawing the subject’s attention to it and further antagonizing the subject. Wearing a tactical vest, Officer 2’s stance, demeanor, and tone is stern and rigid and in marked difference to Officer 1, who the subject referred to as the nice officer. Officer 2, however, also wisely disengaged from the situation and let Officer 1 continue to deal with the subject.

At 5 and half minutes since initial officer contact with the subject, the subject still hasn’t produced proof of insurance and tells the officer she has to look through her bag, produces an expired insurance card which the officer points out to her. It is also around this time a third officer, requested by the unit who took the call, showed up. While the presence of more police officers may escalate a situation and provide bad optics, it was a necessary call as the subject had been communicating with an individual believed to be her husband requesting he arrive at the scene, and an additional unit was necessary as officers were going to be having unknown individuals rolling up on them. Whether by design or happenstance, the third officer was a woman, and in a potentially volatile situation having an officer of the same sex or race as the subject may help ease tension in the situation and anxiety in the subject.

Officer 1 continues to grant the subject time until finally after 7 and half minutes since the initial contact, he states he’s returning to the squad to start righting the citations. The subject then produces another proof of insurance but this was one for the wrong vehicle. Both officers are at the driver’s side now stating she is delaying the process. However, officers themselves could have cut this portion of the stop short by informing the driver that, common in many jurisdictions, if the driver presents current proof of insurance to the court the charge is waived. This would have cut short the subject’s searching, would have allowed the officers to start citation processing earlier, and made leveling an accusation of delaying at the subject unnecessary.

After 9 minutes since the initial contact officers return to their vehicle to enter data for the citations. Computer problems delayed the citation processing and 12 minutes after the initial contact, the subject’s husband pulls up in front of the subject and is met by Officer 3 (Bischoff) and the initial responding unit is repeating an earlier request for an additional unit to help manage a potential situation. At over 15 and half minutes from the initial contact, Officer 4 (Kvam) arrives and takes a position on the passenger side of the subject’s vehicle to monitor the situation while Officer 3 is briefing Officers 1 & 2 on her contact with the subject’s husband. However, Officer 4, who ends up engaging in conversation with the subject didn’t appear to have received  an in-person briefing from the officers at the scene, leaving him somewhat unaware of the issues and friction going on. This leaves him lacking in his ability to communicate effectively with the subject on the issues or concerns the subject may have.

At almost 20 minutes after the initial contact, a sergeant arrives on scene. After addressing both subjects, he concludes the stop. Officer 1 attempts a few times to get the subject to take the citations until she finally accepts them. As the subject continues to complain and level accusations, one officer lingers. It’s unknown if this officer was trying to listen to the subject’s complaint or if he was intent on engaging the subject regarding her tirade but at this point further communication with the subject is a lost cause, and the supervisor wisely calls him back to the squads.

You can read Officer Oldham’s incident report and FTO Zimmel’s supplemental report here which provides more details about their interaction with Dixon and her behavior.

https://beta.documentcloud.org/documents/20384715-complaint-file_2

BLM Dixon Traffic Stop Reports

Subject Analysis

The driver in this encounter did virtually everything wrong in her traffic stop. This may stem from  a lack of understanding of police work and their authority and a pre-existing negative attitude about the police, which helped fuel the confrontation between the subject and law enforcement. Knowing how to behave in a traffic stop is key to avoiding needless confrontation. There are some very simple guidelines to follow in an encounter with the police, particularly in a traffic stop.

Know the rules of the road and your expected behavior when an officer is trying to pull you over. It should be common knowledge among drivers that when you are being pulled over by the police, you pull over to the right side of the road. This is standard practice and should be adhered to by all drivers. By not doing so suggests to the officers that there is something wrong with you; you lack knowledge of the rules of the road, or you are intoxicated or mentally incapacitated in some way. This increases both officer alertness and suspicion. This lack of following a simple proper procedure already sets the stage for tension in the encounter.

You should have your driving documents ready to be presented. This as well should be standard practice for drivers. Rolling down your window, and keeping it down, and having your correct and valid license, registration, and insurance ready to present to the officer when he approaches, or quickly accessible when he requests it signals to the officer that you understand and intend to be compliant with the process. In this instance, the subject’s disconnect from the situation, putting a barrier between herself and officers, and her delays in presenting driving documentation (9 minutes after initial verbal contact with the officer) draws the officers’ ire because delaying compliance suggests the subject wants to delay the process because they have something to hide or they intend to make the stop difficult for the officer. This is again going to make the officer suspicious or prompt the officer to view the subject as a ‘”problem person”, further introducing tension and suspicion into the encounter. Compliance with an officer’s directives is so often at the heart of whether an encounter with law enforcement escalates into use of force because officers have the legitimate legal backing and expectation that lawful commands and directives be obeyed. If they are faced with noncompliance they have the legal authority, the expectation of both the public and their employer, and their own work ethic and personal expectations, to gain that compliance by force if necessary. The public too often forgets, or doesn’t understand, that component of policing and that when noncompliance leads to resisting arrest, officers have the duty and obligation to effect those arrests, even if deadly force is needed. Subjects aren’t going to avoid arrest by noncompliance, which will lead to use of force, nor will resisting arrest prevent them from being arrested. By fighting with officers, subjects will likely be injured or killed.

Searching through your vehicle looking for documentation will heighten officer alertness, putting them on edge, as they have to be observant and wary in case the driver is trying to conceal contraband, or possibly draw a weapon. Dixon, correctly, informed officers that she was going to look through her bag for vehicle documentation. If a driver is going to digging for anything, reaching for anything, or pulling something out, they should inform the officer where they are going to look and for what, so that the officer is not surprised or alarmed by sudden or furtive movements and suggests you’re not a threat to officer safety. In Zimmel’s supplemental report, he notes Dixon’s other behavior and movements prompted him to use his flashlight to see in the vehicle and open the door to see more clearly in order to help ensure officer safety.

If you have a complaint about an officer’s behavior or attitude, it is best to address that issue through a formal complaint with the department or informally by speaking with the officer’s sergeant after the incident has concluded. Complaining during the traffic stop about how you perceived the stop to be unjust and generalizing police behavior as biased or discriminatory will only escalate the tension in the situation. It will certainly rub officers the wrong way as the overwhelming majority of officers operate without bias and are merely trying to do a difficult job in  ensuring public safety and investigating possible criminal conduct. Painting an officer as racist or suggesting that race was a factor in the stop will likely offend officers and they will definitely become less accommodating. This is seen in the dash cam video as Dixon needlessly plays the race card in a situation where there was no evidence of any racial bias or animosity. If a driver has questions about the stop, they should respectfully ask specific question of the officers rather than making claims and accusations. Name dropping to officers, for example, calling the mayor, or calling the police chief, will also not add any legitimacy to your concerns or complaints addressed to officers, as they have seen this “I’ll get you in trouble” tactic numerous times, and again, suggests to the officer you are a problem person who should not be afforded any accommodation. It may be unfair, but it is a fact, that disrespecting an officer, and impugning their integrity, will likely result in harsher treatment as they see themselves as a symbol and the authority of the law and when you disrespect on officer, you disrespect the law they are sworn to uphold.

If you are stopped by officers you are better served by putting down your phone and paying attention to, and interacting fully with, officers. You were stopped for some violation of the law or traffic code and as the driver you should be engaged in the encounter at hand, not concerned over filming it for social media fodder. Being distracted in the situation can cause you to not hear or misunderstand officer commands and can lead to tension and escalation. Calling someone else to the scene, “just in case” as Dixon did in this encounter is also ill advised. While she may have felt misplaced apprehension in dealing with the police officers, calling an unknown person or persons into a traffic or investigative stop will send up red flags for officers. This new arrival will also generate some apprehension as this new arrival is an unknown factor and will possibly escalate the situation or may attack the officers. For officers to manage this new possible threat, backup will need to be called and so Dixon, through her behavior again escalated the situation, requiring multiple officers to respond to help ensure officer safety and traffic stop management.

Dixon did Facebook the incident while on her phone as well as file a formal complaint with the Chief of Police, stating officers were aggressive and disrespectful and that one officer tried to open her door and had his hand on his gun, causing her to fear for her life. Dixon was also seeking to meet with the mayor. Moorhead police, in response to her claims, subsequently released the dash cam videos of the incident. Dixon has since taken down her Facebook post of the incident.

Conclusion

So in this situation we see both the officers and Dixon could have taken steps to ensure the traffic stop went more smoothly, however the negative encounter that occurred was mostly set in motion by Dixon through her atypical behavior during the stop, followed by her delays in providing documentation, her inattention to officers, her unfounded accusations and attitude pointed at officers, and introducing a possible threat into the situation. It are these actions that have occurred in other traffic and investigatory stops around the country that have contributed to injuries and deaths of individuals who have escalated the situation while officers struggle to obtain compliance. Undoubtedly there will be lost causes on both sides. Some officers will never adopt procedural justice guidelines and will introduce tension and escalation into a situation regardless of how polite and accommodating the subject is. Some citizens too will continue to assess officers not on their behavior in the situation, but as a stereotypical racist cop bent on harassing minorities and will do so regardless of how much procedural justice is employed by the officer. But besides the lost causes, there is work to be done on both sides. Officers must adopt and support procedural justice to ensure their authority is viewed as legitimate, which will help in gaining compliance, ease tension in citizen encounters, and foster a more positive view of policing. Citizens must also set aside the derisive and divisive narrative that the police are “out to get them”, and start to deal respectfully and compliantly with officers. This will reduce tension, de-escalate situations, and help eliminate the need for use of force in stops that shouldn’t have warranted it in the first place.

So watch the video and tell me what you think. Could officers have done better? How much did Dixon instigate the problems? Could this have been an encounter that might have turned out differently or was it set to fail from the get-go? Please comment below.

A Free Cup of Coffee: A Brief Analysis of Police Corruption (2008)

INTRODUCTION

            A free cup of coffee. To the general public, it’s not what one usually thinks of in terms of police corruption. But it’s this humble beginning that supposedly will put police officers on a slippery slope of corruption. Police corruption is not a new phenomenon nor is the desire to eliminate it, as evidenced by the Law Enforcement Council report on official corruption from 1973 urging all elements of the criminal justice system “to join it in increased efforts to “eradicate corruption” as urged in a 1969 resolution of the International Association of Chiefs of Police”. (Crime and Delinquency, 1974)   That corruption is such a prevailing problem it should, to some degree, be expected in every law enforcement agency given the power and discretion afforded to law enforcement officers. 

            Police corruption encompasses a broad range of activities but a defining factor in this discussion is the willful behavior of law enforcement, not simple negligence or incompetence. Corruption can manifest itself in literally every aspect and duty of police work. Besides simple gratuities, it can be seen in a variety of street policing activities like theft of property from burglary crime scenes, street shakedowns, organized payoffs and bribes, protection rackets, drug rip-offs and sales, and violent crimes ranging from simple assaults to murder. It can also be seen in  unequal treatment of victims and suspects based on racial, gender, ethnic, and socioeconomic status, as well as in false arrest, and illegal search and seizure. It also involves a  range of simple  job performance related ethical issues; activities like willful non-enforcement of laws beyond the boundaries of established discretionary powers, truthfulness in report writing and in viewing and reporting the actions of other officers, along with other mundane but time and resource wasting activities.

            This corruption can also be seen not only in the ranks of patrolmen and detectives but in supervisors and chiefs as well; making biased determinations about the quality of investigations or which investigations are forwarded for prosecution, and stalling or derailing internal investigations. These officials offer little guidance to personnel on the issue of corruption or actually tacitly approve of the corrupt actions of the department’s personnel.

            There are a few theories as to why it occurs (including the Society Itself Is Corrupt hypothesis) but this discussion will focus on two predominant theories; The Rotten Apple Theory and The Structural (Rotten Barrel) Theory. One blames the individual officer for lacking in a sufficient moral or ethical code and the other focuses on the culturalization undergone by officers in the rationalization of questionable ethical behavior. Underscoring both of these theories is the existence of the Code of Silence, a thin blue line that officers do not cross in order to prove their allegiance to fellow officers by keeping silent about corruption.        

            This discussion will analyze these two hypotheses, their causes and remedies, in an attempt to better understand the mindset of officers on corruption issues, how this affects the view of the police by the public, whether it is reasonable to expect high moral standards within the occupation, and how these standards can be achieved.

 POSITION A

            The traditional view of police corruption, typically espoused by police administration and some criminologists, has been addressed through the Rotten Apple Theory. It harkens back to the cliché that “One rotten apple spoils the barrel”. The theory very simply puts the onus of police corruption on the individual officer.

            Corruption exists all around us and it is not limited to a handful of jobs or occupations. Employees from all professions may engage in theft from the employers, ranging from office supplies to actual embezzlement. Theft of time, shortcuts that violate policies (or laws), and falsified reports are not strictly the domain of law enforcement. The common factor is employee honesty and ethics. Human beings, whether viewed as individuals or as parts of an organization are fallible. They are tempted by wealth, power, and status, wherever it is available to them. Police organizations, by their very nature present these potential ethical dilemmas to officers in the field. The discretion and responsibility associated with the power to relieve someone of their freedom or their life can be a heavy burden and when coupled with environments that allow officers easy access to wealth, privilege, and drugs it can challenge even the most ethically stalwart.

            It is key then that officers put in a position of the public trust be of the highest character. While a small bribe or gratuity from a diner might easily be accepted by a waiter for preferential treatment and viewed by the public as well as an acceptable way of doing business, the same public has an expectation that our police are and should be above reproach as do law enforcement professionals. The Chicago Crime Commission “placed an emphasis on the type of police officer on the force” in examining the major causes of police criminal behavior. The Commission concluded that poor recruitment methods permitted many men to enter the department who were not suited for law enforcement work. The commission recommended that all police candidates be subject to “a complete character investigation”. (Delattre, 2006 p.84)  If substandard candidates are granted employment in law enforcement, we should certainly expect to see corruption within the ranks. These rotten apples not only degrade the image of police in the public’s eyes,  they are also detrimental to other officers in the field. Unscrupulous officers may play on the brotherhood inherent within the police community to drag other officers into morally questionable actions, testing these officers resolve in the face of not only temptation, but in the approval and acceptance by partners and/or other shift officers. We cannot simply assume that every individual who has joined a police force did so with an overall altruistic sense. The power and discretion afforded to officers can be a temptation not only to officers already employed but to prospective officers looking for power and opportunity to bolster their own self-worth or to exercise dominance.

            The police, as a group of individuals, don’t fail to recognize corruption. They are very aware of it and because corrupt officers do not usually make up the majority of a police force, they believe that severity of the sanctions should be appropriate for the severity of the corrupt behavior and that corrupt behavior should be reported. (Klockars, 2000) What is also evident in the Klockars report is that police officers do not view all corruption as the same. Some hypothetical situations presented in the report prompted officers to respond that some small offenses warrant no, or very minor, reprimands and that these minor offenses do not warrant reporting the officer to a superior. This would suggest that there are indeed different standards in ethical consideration amongst individual officers, in that the issue is not black & white, corrupt or not corrupt. This disparity is certainly influenced by individual officers’ perspectives as not all officers in the study categorized the hypothetical situations at the same level of corruptness.

            Police administrators are then confronted with the necessity of detecting and removing rotten apples, preferably before they become entrenched in a department. High employment standards are one remedy. The very concept of policing involves placing a great amount of power in the hands of an individual, leaving that person to use his best judgment in applying his authority. It is foolish to believe that you can employ officers of the highest caliber if hiring standards are lax. Literate, college educated, criminal offense-free candidates are absolutely necessary to populate a department with personnel that are worthy to carry the public trust. The candidates should have a demonstrable ethic code that helps insure that not only are they morally solid but that these morals can withstand assault. Supervisory personnel are also key in seeking out and removing officers who may be prone to and/or engage in corrupt behavior. They must remove the rotten apple before it spoils the barrel. This is accomplished through increased supervision of marginal officers, periodic proactive internal investigations, thorough reactive corruption investigations and psychological screenings before and after employment. All of these remedies can easily exist within a department’s current structure with minimal costs, especially when balanced against the potential costs that a corrupt officer can bring down on a department.

POSITION B

            The Structural Theory behind corruption has gained more traction in the past 30 years. As more scholars look deeper into the subculture of police, they have come to realize that corruption is a feature in police work that is ingrained within the structure itself. Delattre explains it as a young, naïve individual enters a profession where the worst of people is exposed to them and they are socialized to this environment by senior officers who have become cynical and lost faith in police work. Under pressure to form bonds of mutual trust and reliance while witnessing corrupt practices, it’s realized that superiors don’t support efforts to behave honorably, that sanctions for corruption are negligible, and the young officer will probably accept the status quo and join in the corrupt practices (Delattre 2006).

            The body of work supporting this theory is impressive and evidence of the Structural Theory is witnessed in reports of corruption within units in departments and whole departments themselves. The idea is that prospective officers enter with high ethical standards, as one would expect of a police officer. Because of a great degree of social isolation related to their profession, officers tend to only socialize with officers and consequently take away a similar environmental view. Complaints of public misperceptions of police work reinforce social isolation and the unique nature of the profession, it’s dangers and pitfalls, leaves officers feeling an increased need to bond together, unfortunately forming a siege mentality; it’s Us vs. Them. In such a scenario, mutual trust becomes almost paramount, and this continues up the chain of command. Supervisors who have already been socialized tend to view minor corruption as something that just happens and unless the matter is serious i.e. serious enough to be easily exposed and bring censure or sanctions down on the department, the minor issues are ignored or minimized. If such behavior and attitudes continue up the ranks to the Chief or Police Commissioner, you have a wholly corrupt department.

            If we also include the “Code of Silence” in the mix, these strong subcultural norms of support and brotherhood above all, tends to detract from the moral belief systems held by individual officers. We cannot expect police officers to be made of iron, they are human and subject to human frailties and eventually the cynicism and social norms within police work change the officer and allow for the acceptance and practice of behaviors that would have been eschewed outside of the police force.

            Within this framework, we can look at two structures that contribute to the problem of police corruption, opportunity and organizational structures as denoted by Kappeler’s 1998 work (White et al, 2008). By the nature of police work and structural organization, there lies an opportunity structure that provides police with a unique authority, a public perception that the police can be trusted, social isolation, high discretion (and I might add low visibility) and a lack of supervision.

            Bureaucratic institutions like police departments contain common organizational structure elements that facilitate deviance. These features include a division of labor with specialized units, limited career mobility, and the existence of a distinct sub-culture that is defined by social isolation and solidarity and governed by informal rules that value autonomy, secrecy, and maintaining the status quo. (White et al, 2008).

            In viewing these two structures, we have to understand that there are features within the  opportunity structure that will be difficult to control but the most amenable to change is the lack of supervision. The expectation is that officers have a good understanding about criminal procedures and the law and that in most cases supervisory input in regards to enforcement duties is not needed. Supervisors must play a larger role though as role models and as an actual supervisory force. Officers typically look to superiors for proper behavior and attitudes in unfamiliar territory and it is crucial that the wrong message not be sent. If the message is anything other than all corruption is wrong, all corruption should be reported, and the reporting of corruption is appreciated, then the wrong message is being sent, allowing officers to utilize their discretion in inappropriate ways. While it may put pressure on some officers, the need for monitoring is essential. It must be realized that even the most ethically strong officer can be tempted, and if there is temptation, there is a possibility of succumbing to that temptation. Supervisors need to be proactive in their monitoring efforts to send a message that misconduct within the force is not tolerated.

            From an organizational structure standpoint, the most detrimental feature is existence of the subculture itself. The existence of this subculture is well established and subcultures typically establish their own social norms. The elimination of the subculture is not entirely feasible but what is possible is the modification of some components that facilitate misconduct and, more importantly, hide the misconduct from internal and external view.

            There is no denying that an Us vs Them mentality unofficially exists within a number of police departments. Public misconceptions, lack of public appreciation and recognition, and cynicism among officers fosters an attitude that objectifies and labels the public. In doing so, it’s easy for officers to lose their perspective that they are servants of the public and that they should be held accountable to them. It becomes much easier to identify only with their departmental perspective and rely only on the approval and acceptance of other officers. In this way the Code of Silence is a protective function against those who simply don’t understand the police. This unfortunately lends itself to secrecy and an acceptance of the idea that police actions are inherently right.

            To counteract these forces, remedies exist both internally and externally. Internally, comprehensive selection processes, effective supervision and internal affairs, and ethics training and policy mandates concerning whistleblowing and misconduct are all viable. Externally criminal and civil liabilities and citizen review boards can address issues of misconduct when a department fails to adequately address them itself.

CRITIQUE OF POSITIONS

The Rotten Apple Theory (RAT) has fallen from favor over the past 30 years to be replaced by Structural Theory (ST). The Knapp Commission characterized RAT as “border(ing) on official department doctrine, any policeman found to be corrupt must be promptly denounced as a rotten apple in an otherwise clean barrel. It must never be admitted that his individual corruption may be symptomatic of an underlying disease.. The rotten apple doctrine has in many ways been a basic obstacle to meaningful reform …[and] the commission examined and rejected the premise upon which the rotten apple doctrine rested” (White 2008). While the Knapp Commission claims to reject the premise of the doctrine, to deny that RAT is not a factor to consider would be short-sighted.  

            As is typical in certain fields of science, some in the research community would like to see a particular theory (usually their own) elevated to a singular defining analysis of a problem. This is simply not the case. There is no doubt that some misconduct and corruption stems from the personal moral failings of an individual officer, whether this deficiency was present at the time of employment or whether it manifested itself over time if given opportunities to grow. We must consider there is significant interplay and co–dependence within the two theories and even in their remedies. While morally deficient officers do exist within our police forces, it cannot solely be attributed to one theory or the other. “Rotten apples” do exist and they are found in all varieties of occupations. There will always be individuals who are on the look out for opportunities to profit at the expense of others. Inevitably you will find that given the broad scope of human nature that there are certain individuals who should never be police officers. That they exist within a police force, given officers’ power and discretion, should be a cause of grave concern.

            If you place ethically deficient officers in a workplace environment where misconduct is merely given a wink and a nudge, you do provide tacit approval of their actions and send a message to the rest of the force that misconduct is acceptable and over time may influence those with stronger ethics to put them aside in place of acceptance within the workplace. The Code of Silence does serve a function in police subculture and while this certainly fosters a sense of brotherhood it also contributes to either theory of corruption. Individual morally deficient officers find that their moral failings are less likely to be noted and censured, allowing for continued morally aberrant behavior. Officers attempting to follow their own reasonably sufficient moral compass find that the subculture they are employed in doesn’t recognize their efforts in maintaining professional ethical standards,  let alone community standards.

            But how prevalent is the ethical breakdown within the police structure? A self-report study (with its inherent flaws and biases) conducted in Georgia seems to indicate that police have more willingness to, and are more prone to, actually reporting corruption than employees in other civil service positions. While this may speak to officer integrity, the report notes that they are only slightly more prone to this behavior. Given there are features within the Georgia law enforcement departments, like  reporting policies, internal investigation units, and polygraph use not present in other civil service jobs, these ST remedies seem to provide for only a slight increase in ethical reporting. One point of the Georgia study is that a mandatory reporting policy was related to almost all of the measures of willingness to blow the whistle, but none of the measures of frequency of whistleblowing. Were those features not present, it is likely that ethical reporting would be at the same level, if not lower, than other civil service positions. This could suggest that overall, people in general, and police officers in particular, have the same basic ethical nature. If that were the case, it is the few rotten apples who have spoiled the barrel.

            Even though there was only a slight increase, it doesn’t belie the significance of the ST. If ST remedies do provide only a small positive effect on ethical behavior and reporting, it is better than none at all. The public does expect a higher ethical standard from the police than they would from a city meter reader and it may be necessary to force those ethical standards onto officers through departmental policies and changes to ensure that higher standard. Remedies within the ST do have an influence especially if they come from within the department. Supervisors  set the parameters for the street level officers and comprehensive ethics training and the supervisors’ willingness to mandate, approve of, and follow up on reports of misconduct sends a message to lower ranking officers that the former cover of the “blue curtain” has ended. Supervisors and departments must not only expect  but  require ethical behavior.

            As neither theory is completely comprehensive, we must look to a combination of the two. To deny the existence of rotten apples as a feature of police corruption is to put too narrow a focus on the institution. To imagine that a subculture doesn’t significantly influence it’s members is naïve.

AUTHOR’S POSITION

            As stated above, a remedy for corruption must come from multiple sources. We would like to expect that our prospective law enforcement candidates come to the academy with the highest ethical standards. This is simply not going to be the case. High employment standards can certainly be used to weed out marginal candidates. While exemplary candidates are preferred, it’s likely we will end up with a typical range of personal ethical standards. In these candidates we will find a typical human thought process. Namely, that we bond with co-workers through trust and respect, that we want others to trust and respect us also, and that in order to function within a workgroup, we must adopt some of their attitudes. The nature of these attitudes is the key here. Hardly anyone, no matter what their occupation, does not have some reservations about getting a co-worker in trouble for what is viewed by the actor, the witness, and the workgroup as merely a minor infraction of policies or law. No one wants to set an impossible standard of behavior  yet an environment of integrity must be maintained in the workplace.

            Perhaps a more definitive standard of what constitutes misconduct would be beneficial. When a department sets clear policies and guidelines as to what is acceptable and what is not, it will help guide officers’ actions as opposed to them adopting the attitude that “this is the way things are done” among their colleagues. Departments must recognize that officers are human and that not all misconduct necessarily leads to that slippery slope,  as long as there are departmental roadblocks. Policies could be designed that actually allow the acceptance of some gratuities while setting clear boundaries as to where gratuities stop and where low level extortion begins. This not only prevents innocuous actions from becoming a slippery slope but it can allow for better rapport between the police and the public. It is important that the police are recognized for the work they do and the permittance of a small gratuity, that free cup of coffee or discounted meal, I think, will help foster better relationships between the public and police. With Community Policing currently being the buzzword within the field, these small gratuities could be seem as humanizing of both the police and the public and hearken back to the day when the policeman was a neighborhood figure and friend.

            Given that, serious infractions must be dealt with swiftly and severely. With clear guidelines, departmental policy is the reigning factor and the attitude must be fostered that officer loyalty is first and foremost not to the members of the organization but to what the organization stands for. It must be enforced that officers are called upon to use their discretion in a way that benefits the public. Officers that fail to meet that standard have not just failed other officers and the department but the public and themselves. A very high standard of professionalism, honesty, and ethical behavior must be reinforced as law enforcement qualities. Openness and the freedom to whistleblow must be so ingrained in the subculture as to make the reporting of misconduct an honorable action. The police subculture, as any subculture, is a distinct microcosm that sets the mores of the group. If it can do this, it can also be changed by both the willingness of its members and the added support of the community. Fostering better relationships between the public and the police helps negate their differences and shortens the distances between the two groups.  Eliminating the Us vs Them mentality is the only way the Code of Silence can be eliminated. Utilizing community resources like substations, neighborhood watches, and crime meetings help bond officers to the public and vice versa.

            While most departments have mechanisms that address allegations of misconduct, i.e. internal affairs, there will be a need for citizen review boards. While it’s uncertain that the public in general will be better able to determine incidents, causes, and remedies of police misconduct, than an internal review. Just as internal review boards should not be a rubber stamp acceptance of police behavior, civilian reviews don’t need to serve as a rubber stamp that finds fault in every police action simply because it involves the police. These boards do bring transparency to the process, and if conducted fairly, that transparency is more important than the results of a civilian review board, as it existence reinforces the notion that the public and police are partners.

            It is no mystery that the police function better when the public and the police view themselves as one. Conceptually, it has been shown over and over again. But concepts are meaningless without the backing of the actors involved. Police departments really do have a duty to perform to the benefit of the public and the management of the department not only defines the actions but the attitudes of its officers. Departments must consider themselves not only as a management tool but as a resource that the individual officer can draw upon. The attitudes within police forces are defined by the management of the department and those managers must take definitive steps to foster and enforce ethical attitudes. Most of the measures described in this paper have little cost associated with them. Resources within the community as mentioned above can certainly change the attitudes of both the public and police. It is this change from an Us vs Them mentality that I think is the key to ending corruption. There will always be rotten apples, and some will always find their way into police forces, but what can be eliminated is the systemic corruption that is witnessed when the police stop viewing the public as partners and see them as the enemy.

Welcome to Criminal Justice Access

Greetings everyone,

There was no posting for June, but for July 2020, in the  Editorial and Opinion section, I question the current rush to police reform with Careful Examination Not Defunding Needed in Police Reform

Also this month in Research Briefs, discover whether formal criminal sanctions deterred or promoted future juvenile misconduct in a British twins study, understand how Adverse Childhood Trauma scores can both be used and misused in determining the needs and risks of those affected, explore the racial differences, including those of Asians and American Indians, in juvenile homicide offenders, examine the concept of “social death” as a way of understanding honor killings in Turkey, and finally, investigate how a simple Excel formula and social psychology theories may provide a framework for accurate crime hotspot forecasting

Research Briefs

Does Contact with the Justice System Deter or Promote Future Delinquency? Results From a Longitudinal Study of British Adolescent Twins

Motz, Barnes, Caspi, Arseneault, Cullen, Houts, Wertz & Moffitt, Criminology, 2020

The authors note there is contradictory research in regards to the effects of the criminal justice system on those introduced to it. A labeling tradition suggests that youths introduced to the criminal justice system’s formal punishments will exhibit the opposite of the intended behavior and engage in future misbehavior, especially if considering claims of a criminogenic effect from the criminal justice system. A deterrence perspective suggests that youths will be deterred from future criminal activity by these formal punishments. In an attempt to address this issue, the authors conducted a longitudinal study of 901 British twins pairs (the use of twins can eliminate any confounding factors like genetics and parental and home differences that may influence study outcomes and allow focus on the environmental factors) to see if different forms of contact with the juvenile justice system earlier in life was associated with an increase of decrease in delinquent behavior. The outcome variable was level of delinquency at age 18, which comprised a number of delinquent acts as self-reported by the participants, with key independent variables including whether they had been in police custody,  jail, or prison, whether they had a criminal record or criminal cautions (a legal warning with an admission of guilt that differs from an actual conviction for minor crimes) and whether they had been issued an Antisocial Behavior Order (ASBO). ASBOs, which were introduced in England in 1999, are defined by the Home Office as “civil orders that exist to protect the public from behavior that causes or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress. An order contains conditions prohibiting the offender from specific anti-social acts or entering defined areas and is effective for a minimum of two years. The orders are not criminal penalties and are not intended to punish the offender.”

While the twin design rules out many familial sources of confounding, the authors also controlled for other confounding influences that are not shared by twins, such as cognitive and behavioral differences. These included different specific measures of self-reported delinquency at age 12, externalizing problems at age 12, evidence of low self-control up to age 10, cognitive ability at age 12, educational achievement at age 16,and first born twin. The authors used regression modeling utilizing the three independent variables, and in final steps included the family fixed effects.

In analysis, spending the night in jail was shown to significantly increase delinquency at age 18, that effect remained once the covariates like education, cognitive ability and low self-control were included though they did reduce the size of the effect. Similarly, adding the family fixed variable continued to demonstrate a significant but smaller increase in delinquency after spending the night incarcerated. The authors also performed regression on the residuals of the models to ensure that the other non-locked up twin did not experience a deterrent effect from their sibling locked up but the results showed a deterrent effect wasn’t present and that the labeling perspective was supported.

Results followed a similar pattern with ASBOs and criminal record/cautions in that contact in these ways in the juvenile justice system increased delinquency at age 18 even after accounting for the family fixed effects and other criminogenic variables like low self-control, earlier delinquency and cognitive level. However, in regards to criminal records and cautions, the effect sizes were much smaller than observed in the other two models, and the effect on monozygotic (identical) twins in the full fixed effect model did not reach a level of statistical significance. Though the authors didn’t determine if there was a statistically significant difference, interestingly, the effect of increased delinquency was greater in monozygotic twins pairs than in dizygotic (fraternal) twin pairs.

The authors conclude their study supports a labeling theory perspective over a deterrent theory perspective in juvenile justice in that contact with the justice system in these ways promotes misbehavior and results in increased delinquency later in life. The authors note the study suggests future research in this debate could examine whether the “dose” of these sanctions influences level of delinquency, whether the effects are crime and offense dependent, and make attempts to dissect the criminal justice system to determine what mediating mechanisms in these contacts promote delinquency.

Motz, R. T., Barnes, J. C., Caspi, A., Arseneault, L., Cullen, F. T., Houts, R., … & Moffitt, T. E. (2020). Does contact with the justice system deter or promote future delinquency? Results from a longitudinal study of British adolescent twins. Criminology, 58(2), 307-335.

Motz, et al suggest the negative experience of criminal sanctions can generate negative outcomes in the form of increased delinquency. However, Bateson, McManus, and Johnson examine how using the negative experience of childhood trauma to predict negative outcomes in later life can be problematic.

Understanding the Use, and Misuse, of Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs) in Trauma-Informed Policing

Bateson, McManus, & Johnson, The Police Journal, 2019

The authors discuss the use of Adverse Childhood Experience (ACE) scores in policing as a component of a trauma informed approach but the authors caution the scores may be misused in determining when it’s appropriate to intervene. ACE scores are determined by positive responses to 10 adverse experiences that include physical, emotional and physical abuse, physical and emotional neglect, and household dysfunction that includes parental substance abuse, mother subject to physical abuse, parental mental illness, parental incarceration, parental separation/divorce. Research has demonstrated a strong and almost linear, as well as additive, effect of ACEs on negative life course outcomes, including a host of health problems, mental and emotional issues, relationship problems including domestic abuse, and substance abuse, as well as poor educational, employment, and life satisfaction outcomes. Recent research has indicated that about 50% of the population have experienced at least one ACE and about 10-20% have experienced four or more.

The authors note this information can assist in developing and presenting a trauma informed approach, as they stated “there is potential to develop a common language and understanding about trauma informed practice across different workforces. For professionals, it encourages a shift in thinking from “what’s wrong with you?” to “what’s happened to you?” and for service users a shift from “there’s something wrong about me” to “I’m not a bad person, I’m like this because bad things happened to me”.” ACE scores can also assist in policing by identifying to law enforcement individuals who may be vulnerable to negative outcomes, and can assist in the decision in how to relate to and intervene for that individual. However, the simple process of producing an ACE score may contribute to an oversimplification in the decision of intervention. As the ACE score is a list of different kind of diverse experiences an individual has encountered, it doesn’t measure the duration, severity, or magnitude. A low score could mask the level of trauma an individual has actually experienced from the event. The authors caution ACE scores, while suggestive. cannot assess risk for committing an offense or experiencing other negative life course outcomes, nor can it be used to assess current needs, as the ACE is retrospective and should not be used in place of  careful assessment of the individual. Research has shown that a number of other factors not included in the ACE score like poverty, housing, social isolation and discrimination, can significantly influence adult outcomes. While research has demonstrated that early trauma can result in negative psychological adult outcomes, and that different kinds of trauma can have different psychological effect, the exact relationship between different kinds of trauma on different physical and behavioral outcomes remains unclear. Complicating this is research that demonstrates that children can vary in their resiliency, with some being more susceptible to negatives outcomes after suffering ACEs compared to other children.

The authors believe there is a potential for misuse in using ACE scores a screening device. Practitioners should understand that individual ACEs should be weighed differently as some may have more of a negative impact than others, as well as that impact differing dependent on the developmental stage of the child. While the subscales may need to be weighed differently in different cases, determining whether ACE scores are valid and reliable means of assessing future needs is lacking evidence. One main drawback, because they rely solely on self-reports, is the possibility of faulty recollection or assessment and it may be an unreliable predictive tool of criminal justice outcomes. and while the use of data available to the police such physical abuse or parental separation and substance abuse may provide confirmatory evidence, other ACEs like emotional neglect may be more difficult to determine and may require follow-up investigation

The authors conclude that “ACEs may provide an easily understandable framework to identify  vulnerable adults and children, which could help to develop trauma informed practice and responses, ultimately safeguarding children from harm. In addition, it has the potential to enable a common language and understanding across different workforces nationally and internationally. The advantages and enthusiasm around ACEs offer great opportunities to drive the prevention, early intervention and trauma-informed agendas. However, there are valid concerns about the limited research base being misunderstood and yet translated into practice…hence, use of ACEs questionnaires as a checklist, using ACE scores or thresholds in practice are not yet supported by evidence.” The authors encourage further inquiry into issues of validity and reliability, consent and information sharing of the data and appropriate training and supervision of practitioners, while holding the view that knowledge of ACEs does not need fuel a fatalistic or deterministic view because childhood adversity does not always result in negative outcomes.

Bateson, K., McManus, M., & Johnson, G. (2019). Understanding the use, and misuse, of Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs) in trauma-informed policing. The Police Journal, 0032258X19841409.

Understanding the factors that signal negative life outcomes is important as the greater our knowledge of the influences that push young people and adults toward criminal behavior, the more that can be done to address it. Examining the circumstances around juvenile homicides can also lead to a better understanding of the influences of race, region, and different types of social conflict on who might perpetrate these murders.

Racial Differences Among Juvenile Homicide Offenders: An Empirical Analysis of 37 Years of U.S. Arrest Data

Heide, Michel, Cochran, & Khachaturian, Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 2017

The authors state that while initially concerning as youth murder offenders rose to prominence during a couple of periods in the twentieth century, youth and adult murder offenses are declining but interest in youthful offenders continues, especially in potential differences by offender race. However, most research on juvenile offender race had been limited to White and Black offenders as the number of Asian/Pacific Islander and American Indian/Alaskan  Native offenders have been very small, For example in 2012, of Juvenile Homicide Offenders (JHOs), 98% were either White (47.2%) or Black (58.8%), numbering in the hundreds, while there were only 10 American Indians and 1 Asian JHOs. To enhance the ability to examine racial differences, the author use 37 years (1976-2012), divided into three distinct time periods including a pre and post period of an epidemic period of juvenile homicides, worth of JHO (aged 6 to 17) arrests from the UCR’s Supplemental Homicide Reports and asked three research questions: 1) Did the offender and offense characteristics of all JHOs arrested during the study period vary by race and 2) did the characteristics of victims, weapons used, crime circumstances, and offender count in incidents in which JHOs killed single victims differ across racial groups, and 3) are offender, victim, and offense characteristics predictive of racial classification?

Chi square was used in the bivariate analyses to determine significant relationships. The authors found a number of relationships that were both statistically significant and had a large enough effect size to be  meaningful (only the percentages for the significant different racial categories are shown). Results demonstrated that there were significant differences, and medium effect sizes, in the race more likely to be arrested by region. Black youth (43.7%) were significantly more likely to be arrested for homicide in the South than the other racial groups. AI/AN juveniles (50.6%) were significantly more likely than White and Black youth to be arrested for murder in the West. A/PI youth (63.7%) were significantly more likely than all three other racial groups to be arrested in the West. AI/AN juveniles (2.6%) were significantly less likely than Black, White, or A/PI youth to be arrested for murder in the Northeast.

There was also a small but significant effect size on arrest location by race. In general, nearly 80% of JHOs were arrested in large cities (59.5%) or suburban areas (19.9%) while the remaining 20% were arrested in small cities (12.6%) or rural areas (8.1%). By race Black and A/PI youth (68.7% and 66.9%) were significantly more likely to be arrested in large cities than their White and AI/AN counterparts (47.8% and 25.9%). White youth (26.7%) were significantly more likely than the other three racial groups to be arrested in suburban areas. AI/AN juveniles were significantly more likely to be arrested in rural areas (42.7%) compared with White youth (12.6%), and Black and A/PI youth (4.2% and 3.4%).

Offenders varied significantly by race within the different time period within the study frame albeit to a small effect. Black youth became significantly more involved in homicide arrest during the 37-year time frame than White youth, although both increased across the three time periods. A/PI juveniles stood apart from the other three racial groups in significant way, notably, while their involvement in the pre-epidemic period (6.5%) was far lower than the three other groups, their arrests increased dramatically during the post-epidemic period compared to the other races. Nearly 64% of A/PI JHOs were arrested between 1994 and 2012, compared with less than 50% of JHOs in the three other racial groups.

There were also large significant racial differences found in comparing JHO race to the victim race. While in general, almost 97% of JHOs were arrested for killing White or Black victims, each of the four racial groups was significantly more likely to kill members from their own racial group. However, there were significant differences found for each racial group with respect to killing White victims. While 90.4% of the victims of White JHOs were also White, 48.3% of American Indian/Alaskan Natives JHOs killed White victims, while for Asian and Pacific Islanders, 32.8% of their victims were White, and for Black JHOs, 22.6% of their victims were white.

The relationship between JHOs and the offense characteristics also varied significantly, although to a small effect, in three areas, victim-offender relationship, weapon used, and circumstances of the offense. While the typical victims of JHOs in general were acquaintances (46.0%) or strangers (35.9%), the authors’ data showed White juveniles (8.1%) were significantly more likely than the other three racial groups to be arrested for killing parents while A/PI and Black JHOs were significantly more likely to be arrested for killing strangers (39.5% and 39.3%) than White and AI/AN JHOs (31.6% and 27.3%).

For JHOs, firearms (69.7%) or knives (15.9%) were most commonly used to kill their victims but the four racial groups differed significantly from each other on the use of guns with Black JHOs being most likely to use guns (76.1%) followed by A/PI JHOs (71.5%), then by White JHOs (61.5%), and finally by AI/AN (42.9%). In contrast, AI/AN (28.0%) were significantly more likely to use knives than White JHOs (21.3%), A/PI (13.6%), and Black JHOs (11.7%). AI/AN were also significantly more than twice as likely to use personal weapons (16.7%) than the other racial groups (all 7% or less).

A large majority (85%) of JHOs were arrested in crime-related (33.8%), conflict-related (35.7%), or gang-related killings (14.5%) but different races predominated in these three homicide circumstances. Black JHOs (39.7%) were significantly more likely to be involved in crime-related homicides relative to the other three racial groups. In contrast, AI/AN JHOs (45.6%) were significantly more likely to be involved in conflict-related killings than the other racial groups, while A/PI JHOs (40.6%) were significantly more likely to be arrested for gang-related killings than their White (19.9%), Black (9.6%), or AI/AN (6.0%) counterparts.

The authors put the significant variables of region, location, victim race, victim-offender relationship, weapon and homicide circumstances, from the bivariate analyses into three homicide circumstances logistic regression models. Each of the four racial groups had significant difference from the others in the different homicide variables and only those significant relationships are described below.

Whites

Regarding differences involving White offenders, JHOs who killed a White victim were 36 times more likely to be White than Black, 5% more likely to be White than Asian/Pacific Islander and 7% more likely to be White than AI/AN. JHOs who killed a family member were twice as likely to be White as Black and 39% more likely to be White compared to A/PI. White JHOs were also 33% more likely than A/PI JHOs and 62% more likely than AI/AN JHOs to be involved in a homicide in the South. White offenders were also significantly more likely (24%) than AI/AN to be involved in a homicide in a large city. White offenders were also 52% more likely to use a gun in a homicide compared to AI/AN. Gang-related juvenile homicides were almost 3.5 times as likely to involve a White offender than a Black offender and 25% more likely than an AI/AN offender. For conflict-related juvenile homicides, White offenders were about 1.5 times more likely to be involved than a Black offender and 63% more likely than A/PI offenders.

Blacks

Significant differences also existed between Blacks and other races in regard to their homicides. Juvenile homicides committed in the South were 57% more likely with Blacks than Whites, 19% more likely than Asian/Pacific Islanders, and 18% more likely than AI/AN and those committed in large cities were 67% , 65%, and 35% more likely to involve a Black offender than White, Asian/Pacific Islander, and American Indian/Native Alaskan offenders, respectively. Also statistically significant, juvenile murders involving a gun were 67% more likely to be committed by a Black offender than by a White offender and 35% more likely than an AI/AN offender. Finally crime-related juvenile homicide incidents were 30% more likely to involve a Black offender than a White offender, twice as likely to involve a Black offender than an AI/AN offender, and 35% more likely than A/PI JHOs.

Asian

White victims were 1.9 times more likely to be killed by Asian/Pacific Islander JHOs than by Black JHOs. For juvenile homicides committed in large cities, Asian/Pacific Island offenders were 21% more likely involved  than American Indian/Alaskan Native JHOs. Gang-related juvenile homicides were 15% more likely to involve A/PI than American Indian/Alaskan Native offenders and they were also more likely to be involved in those homicide circumstance than White offenders (1.6x) and Black offenders (6x). Asian/PI offenders were also 1.2 times more likely than White JHOs to be involved in crime related homicides. Juvenile homicides involving guns were 1.3 times more likely to involve Asian/Pacific Islander than White JHOs and 40% more likely than with AI/AN.

American Indian

 White victims of juvenile homicide offenders were 2.5 times more likely to involve American Indian/Alaskan Native juvenile offenders than to involve Black juvenile offenders and 1.3 times more likely than involvement from A/PI JHOs. In addition, juvenile homicides involving family members were 1.7 times more likely to involve American Indian/Alaskan Native offenders relative to Black offenders and 2.3 times more likely than Asian/Pacific Island JHOs . For conflict-related juvenile homicides, American Indian/Alaskan Native JHOs were 1.7 times more likely to be involved than both Black and A/PI JHOs. Crime-related juvenile homicides were more likely to involve American Indian/Alaskan Native compared with White JHOs (1.7x) and Asian/Pacific Islanders JHOs (1.4x).

The authors conclude that in some regards such as offender age and sex, number of offenders, number of victims, and age and sex of victims there were no significant differences by race of the offender however in other aspects like homicide circumstances, type of victim, weapons used, region, and location there were significant differences between the races. The authors noted this was likely the first nation-wide study on race and offending that had a significant focus on Asian and Native American offending and revealed some interesting results. Regression analysis found that American Indian/Alaskan Native and Asian/Pacific Islander juveniles involved in murder could be distinguished from White and Black JHOs. Gang-related juvenile homicides were much more likely to involve A/PIs than Blacks, Whites, or AI/ANs. Juvenile killers of White victims were also more likely to be A/PI JHOs than to be Black JHOs. In addition, gun-involved juvenile homicides were much more likely to involve A/PI JHOs than either White or AI/AN JHOs. In contrast, juvenile homicides of White victims, family members, and those arising from conflict-related circumstances were much more likely to involve American Indian/Alaskan Native JHOs than either Black or Asian JHOs. American Indian/Alaskan Natives JHOs examined in this study were significantly more likely to kill with a knife and during a conflict-related situation than JHOs in the other three racial groups The proliferation of knife and conflict-related homicides among American Indians may be attributed to frustration that stems from the structural disadvantage faced by many American Indians, as well as the strong culture of honor in Native American communities.

The authors explain that other distinctions between the races exist because of social, cultural influences and geographic locations. Southern murders tend to involve more Blacks and Whites, suggesting their historical exposure to the honor culture and subculture of violence in the south, while rural murders were more associated with AI/ANs. The authors also suggest the data can be useful for making investigative decisions in that by focusing on the homicide circumstances and  locations, law enforcement may be better able to determine the race of the offender for example focusing on Black offenders if the homicide was crime related or on Asian offenders if the murder is gang related.

The authors state that future research in this area could focus on four areas: (a) multiple victim homicides committed by juveniles; (b) correlates of juvenile homicide within the individual periods that include the pre-epidemic, epidemic, and post-epidemic periods; (c) broadening the racial analyses from simply White and Black JHOs, if possible, to include Hispanic and White and Black non-Hispanic JHOs; and (d) more in-depth analysis of JHOs’ social histories, levels of functioning, motivational pathways, and their crime scene behavior.

Heide, K. M., Michel, C., Cochran, J., & Khachatryan, N. (2017). Racial differences among juvenile homicide offenders: an empirical analysis of 37 years of US arrest data. Journal of interpersonal violence, 0886260517721173.

Heide, et al find distinct differences between juvenile killers of different races in the circumstances around their homicides, including geographic region with the suggestion that Black homicide offenders prevalence in the South may be influenced by its traditional honor culture. Dogan examines a possible theoretical underpinning to honor killings in a qualitative study of Turkish offenders.

Can Honor Killings Be Explained With the Concept of Social Death? Reinterpreting Social Psychological Evidence

Doğan, Homicide Studies, 2020

Dogan explains that while often associated with Muslim countries, honor killings can occur in a society or culture that has an inordinate focus on honor and respect. Honor killings are described as homicides where typically the victim has engaged in some sort of behavior that is viewed as unacceptable and thus disrespectful in the eyes of the culture and their family. This damages the honor of the victim’s family and the way that honor is restored is by killing the person responsible for bringing dishonor on the family. Victims are typically female and the perpetrators are typically male family members. Behaviors that cause a loss of familial honor might include being accused of prostitution, being an unaccompanied female which generates rumors of immoral behavior, being suspected of engaging in an extramarital affair, or having, or claiming, a family member was raped. As Dogan explains, “the concept of honor that inspires violence has a collective aspect, shaped and constructed by a gender-specific formula. To a large extent it is shaped by the perception that a man’s honor not only depends on his own conduct but is also dependent on the proper behavior of his female relatives and the members of his family or group. In this gender-specific conceptualization, the honor of a man obliges a man to defend his honor and the honor of his family, and the honor of a woman obliges a woman to maintain and protect her purity. In other words, the collective honor of the group is dependent on the control of female sexuality, and controlling female sexuality is a prerequisite for a man’s honor. The establishment, protection, and restoration of honor are paramount in honor societies and killing the individual who brought the victim or victim’s family dishonor is seen as necessary and acceptable. Individuals in these cultures, indoctrinated into accepting that loss of honor must be answered with violence, come to accept that while criminal, killing to restore honor is the correct response.”

Dogan considers that the social psychology concept of “social death” might be applied to cases of honor killings to offer an explanation of the psychological mechanism that drives these killings. The social death concept is “generally used when a person/group has experienced extreme and profound loss, such as loss of social identity, role, networks, and connections.” Social death occurs when an individual experiences  isolation, ostracization, maltreatment, and stigma This social death, and its separation from culture, society, family, and friends subjects the individual to a state of nonexistence, both in others’ eyes, and in their own. A person who has lost honor no longer exists

Dogan applied this concept by examining 39 cases of 34 male perpetrators and 5 females perpetrators. For the scope of the research article, Dogan focused on 16 interviews where they made reference to having experienced explicit or implicit pressure from the community or extended family members to restore the family honor. He describes some of the scenarios that led to the killings and examined whether indications of social death were present in the interviewees accounts. Some interviewees indicated the exclusion and pressure to act in these cases:

“But, as the villagers knew what was going on in my home, they did not visit me. Even my wife kept telling me that we did not have any right to go out and look at people’s faces.” (Interviewee 30, male, age 43)

“As he (victim) continued to sexually harass me, people started to treat me differently and they started to treat me as if I was a tart and infidel to my husband; and it was me who should be blamed for what had happened. People did not believe that I was raped. I felt as if I was excluded.”
(Interviewee 36, female, age 23)

“Ten months passed between my sisters’ elopements and the killing. During this period, many things happened to me and my family . . . People began to stop greeting me. Then, I started to go out secretly. I used to check the corner of every street whether there was anybody that I knew. What I felt most was shame. I still feel shame . . . I was having difficulty to find a permanent job as a concrete worker because of the shame brought by my sisters… If they feel that they can question your honor, or your honor is in question, they try to take advantage of this point to find support among people. They say “Look! He did not do anything to his sisters and he thinks that he is a man! No way. Go save your honor first.” (Interviewee 34, male, age 35)

“There were rumors about my mother. Everybody was telling me different things about my mother . . . Especially my cousins and half-brothers were doing that. I talked with them and said “What do you want me to do? Do you want me to kill her or kill myself?” This time they said, “No, just ask your father to divorce her.” But, then they said “Those days were in the past. You cannot find any more such brave men who kill their relatives if they behave like that.” (Interviewee 7, male, age 23).

The evidence suggests that exclusion and loss of identity play a role in the scenarios as members of the community disassociate with the dishonored and deny their existence. Dogan contends that “if a person has previously been subjected to a powerful behavior pattern and mind-set suggesting how to act in specific situations, conditions, or circumstances, he or she will act or think in accordance with this pattern in such situations without judging the propriety or justifiability of the suggestion. However, this does not necessarily mean that all individuals who are engrossed in the way of thinking that the right to claim honor requires killing, and who experience the same or similar pressure are bound to commit honor killings. As I illustrated before in detail, as long as there is a way to escape from the publicity of dishonorable conduct, there may still be an alternative to restore honor without seeking violence.”

 Regarding community members’ attitudes toward the perpetrators in their community after the murder, 16 perpetrators mentioned in the interview that they experienced an affirmative attitude from the community or extended family members, and their behavior either in the form of words or actions was supported by them. Some perpetrators said that people from their hometown or the community supported them in prison by sending money and visiting them, or asking how they were. Some perpetrators said that their visitors mentioned that they had done what was required, and had cleansed their honor.

“Everybody in my village was expecting the murder; they knew that it was going to happen. After the offence, they started to write me letters and send money and visit me. Later, when I was granted permission to visit my village, even people that I do not know approached me and said, “Well done, you did right thing.” (Interviewee 7, male, age 23)

Dogan did note that in three of the cases perpetrators were told by people they did not approve of the murders and that it was not right but for many of the perpetrators (11 male and three female), there is simply no other way to deal with the issue of dishonor other than the killing suggested or designed by the community, by making reference to such social determinants by using expressions such as “I had no choice,” “it was not in my hands,” “there was no other remedy,” and “this problem could only be solved like that.” Dogan states that by using these words in their interviews, they both tried to reflect the pressure that they had experienced as well as neutralize the killing they have committed by appealing to their loyalty toward cultural norms.

“A person lives for his honor and his dignity. Honor is something that holds the family and people together. It enables people to have a decent life and you live for your honor.” (Interviewee 26, male, age 26)

“Honor is a person’s pride and praise. It means everything for a person. Without it nothing can happen, nothing has a meaning. It would be better for a person to die rather than being dishonored. Without honor death would be better than life.” (Interviewee 21, male, age 47)

This social death also generates a psychological pain on the level of physiological pain that helps drive the cognitions and behavior of those afflicted.

“In my childhood, I grew up with the idea of honor, respect and reputation. My family used to say, “if somebody tries to steal your bread, or points a finger at your honor, kill him.” I was brought up like that. Therefore, for me, suffering from a wound caused by being labeled as dishonorable is more painful than a gunshot wound.” (Interviewee 13, male, age 43)

“Honor is not something light and easy. It is like a heavy burden. It is too heavy to carry. But, it has to be carried.” (Interviewee 12, male, age 43)

Dogan does declare that it’s implausible to state that all honor killings in Turkey invoke a social death dynamic nor that all those who do experience a social death are bound to commit honor killings but the concept of honor that equates loss of honor with loss of life, and thus suggestive of violence to restore honor and life, can “endure and exist mainly in such societies or communities where the individual constantly uses the concept of honor and shame to assess his own conduct and that of his fellows, and face to face personal, as opposed to anonymous, relations are the main type of relationships among members of the society.” Dogan indicates his findings suggest that whether or not an individual seeks approval through violence is dependent on the frequency, duration, and intensity of his association with the perceived norms and discourses of honor killing. It is also dependent on whether there is a way to escape from the publicity of dishonorable conduct but the lack of an alternative course, i.e. being trapped, means violence is more likely to occur.

Dogan, R (2020). Can honor killings be explained with the concept of social death? Reinterpreting social psychological evidence. Homicide studies, 24(2), 127-150.

Dogan suggests utilizing a social concept to understand the psychological mechanism behind the murder of family members. However, psychological and criminological theories can go beyond understanding what drives human behavior in a current event to being able to assist in predicting future criminal events as Lee, et al examine the nature of hotspot offending and predictions.

A Theory-Driven Algorithm for Real-Time Crime Hot Spot Forecasting

Lee, SooHyun, & Eck, Police Quarterly, 2020

The authors claim that real time crime hotspots forecasting algorithms currently in use have some drawbacks. They note a high percentage of hotspot misidentification as well as a lack of transparency in the methodology used in constructing the algorithms because they typically contain proprietary information. They consider this can be important when stop and frisk is practiced in hotspots as  recently New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles police departments have been sued over not releasing information about the algorithms used by their predictive programs.

The authors contend that the many different forecasting models lack agreement on the spatial unit to be analyzed as well as the appropriate temporal period for use in predicting future crime events based on previous events. While new models continue to be developed to assist in both short term and long term hotspot predicting, they invariably have limitations. The authors note one such limitation is that, outside of the field of criminal justice and criminology, these forecasting models rely heavily on mathematical constraints and statistical assumptions but lack theoretical foundations. The authors state their forecasting model includes the theoretical underpinnings, common  in social science, of population heterogeneity and state dependence.

In the context of criminal justice, population heterogeneity would suggest that, amongst  the “population of places”, certain places, i.e. targets, have features that signal desirability and vulnerability to individual offenders, making them want to target that place. For their study, the authors explain “We classify places where the hot spot forecasting is consistently successful over several months versus  places where forecasting is not successful. First, for each place in the study area, we calculate the probability of crime occurring in the target month based on the distribution of crime in prior months. The more true-positive cases over several months, the more a place is consistently experiencing crime. Thus, our algorithm selects places with high amounts of true-positives over the entire study period, and screens out places with no crime, randomly occurring crime, and low probabilities of crime.”

 A state dependence perspective explain repeat victimization as experiencing a crime elevates the victim’s chance of being revictimized in the short term. In the context of place, state dependence suggests that once offenders have learned about the suitability of a place for crime they will continue to engage in crime at that location. The authors note that the two theories can work in concert to understand crime patterns and predict future offenses and utilized crime data from Portland and Cincinnati to test the model using Excel statistical software and a grid cell geograph.

The authors overlaid the cities with grid cells 500′ square and for the population heterogeneity component they calculated the Poisson probability of a crime occurring in each grid cell, in each month, based on the previous 12 month distribution of crime in that cell. If the probability is greater than a .5 threshold and the target month experiences crime, the forecast has produced a true-positive case and the distribution of true positives over the study period indicted some areas are more predictable than others.

For each grid cell, the Excel formula they utilized returned either a 1 or 0 for each month. Averaging these binary values over the entire study period, they obtained the average true-positive value for each grid cell. The closer this value is to 1, the more predictable the grid cell is. Using these average true-positive values, they sorted the grid cells from the most predictable to the least predictable, analogous to a situation where some places are more vulnerable while other places are less vulnerable to crime.

 For the state dependence component of the model, the number of crimes recorded for the current month were assessed to calculate the elevated risk on the grid cell toward the forecasted month. The grid cells were sorted by their average true-positive values (from the most to the least predictable ones), then sorted by the number of crimes in the most recent month from the highest to the lowest.

In a three step process the authors explain that “Step 1 inputs average true-positive values for each grid cell based on the distributions of crime in the past 12 months. In Step 2,  grid cells were sorted by their average true positive values in descending order from highly predictable ones (e.g., 100% and 90%) to less predictable ones (e.g., 10%). (In Step 2) based on the population heterogeneity, we select highly predictable grid cells ..but discard less predictable ones. Then we look at the number of crimes in the most recent month for each grid cell to apply the state dependence process in the final step. In Step 3, we reorder the preselected grid cells in Step 2 by their number of crimes in the current month.”

The authors used measures of accuracy and efficiency to test the model. To calculate the accuracy, or how well the model correctly forecasted what areas would actually become hotspots, they used the ratio of the number of forecasted hot spots that became true hot spots in the forecasted month compared to the total number of true hot spots that developed that forecasted month. For a measure of efficiency of how well the forecasting algorithm predicted the number of crimes in the forecasted hotspots they developed a Prediction Efficiency Index, (PEI) which is the ratio of the number of crimes in forecasted hot spots compared to the number of crimes in actual hot spots.

Comparing their Portland calls for service data forecasting results to the winners of the NIJ Crime Place Forecasting Challenge they found that the PEI scores for the winning model only performed slightly better than the authors’ model in the one, two and three month forecasting periods for the CFS groupings but still generated efficiency scores ranging from over 90% for all CFS, over 80% for streets crimes, around 20% for Burglary and almost 60%  for auto theft in the first month, which, similar to the challenge winners, dropped to approximately 35% for the three month forecast. Accuracy ranged from over 70% for all CFSs to over 60% for Street Crime CFS but down to an average of around 15 % for Burglary across the forecasting periods. While accuracy for Auto Theft was over 40% at 1 and 2 months, accuracy dropped to slightly more than 20% at the 3 month mark.

The authors also analyzed Cincinnati incident report data and found that for all crime incidents the PEI increased from 69% to 82%, as did accuracy from 43% to 54%. PEI (41%-59%) also increased across the forecasting periods for Part One Violent Crimes but while the accuracy was approximately 40% for the one and three month forecasts, its highest accuracy (62%) was in the 2 month forecast period. Auto theft PEI and accuracy were both low but did increase  with future forecasting, ranging from 7 to 21 percent, and 7 to 19 percent respectively. For Part One property crimes, PEI increased from 70 to 82% across the forecasting periods. Accuracy ranged between 53 and 58% but the lowest accuracy for auto theft was in the 2 month forecasting period. In Portland, while PEI scores decreased with more distant forecasting, for Cincinnati, the PEI tended to increase as researchers forecast further into the future

The authors found, as has past research, that property crimes are not as easy to forecast accurately as violent crime, and that further model development should be done to enhance the forecasting of specific crime types. The authors conclude that while the NIJ Challenge winner’s algorithm performed slightly better in its PEI score, their model is an improvement over other algorithms in use which are extremely poor at capturing the number of crimes relative to crimes in actual hot spots. The authors also note that compared to other forecasting models theirs involves a lower fiscal investment and is easier to utilize as it can be  done as a simple formula in Microsoft Excel and provides transparency for methodology and data inquiry purposes.

Lee, Y., SooHyun, O., & Eck, J. E. (2020). A theory-driven algorithm for real-time crime hot spot forecasting. Police Quarterly, 23(2), 174-201.

Careful Examination Not Defunding Needed For Police Reform

Following the killing of George Floyd pundits, politicians, and social justice warriors have been calling for a dismantling or defunding of the police. However, what that means varies depending who you talk to, their knowledge of policing, and where they believe the problems in policing exist. There are roughly 800,000 law enforcement officers in the U.S. having hundreds of thousands of contacts with citizens everyday where no one is injured. A little over 1000 people are killed a year by police (who also suffer the loss of a couple hundred officers a year as well) and only around 100 unarmed citizens (of all races) are included in that number While Blacks accounted for only 25 unarmed citizen deaths in 2019, anecdotal incidents like the George Floyd case where the police were clearly in the wrong, while making up a very small fraction of all police encounters, engender anger that policing is a racist institution  and that police brutality is out of control.

Despite much criminal justice research demonstrating there is no systemic racism in policing, or other CJ institutions for that matter, social commentators driven by conformity toward this “broken police” narrative, are calling to end biased policing by implementing extreme measures. Deep cuts in personnel will reduce police presence on the street making citizens more at ease with less police in their neighborhoods. Eliminating preventive/self-directed patrol will keep officers from “harassing” citizens through investigative field stops and stop and frisks and officers will only need to respond to dispatch calls. Eliminating an armed police response will force officers to use de-escalation and people skills to handle situations rather than force. Mandating that the use of force only be used when a risk of serious bodily injury or death is present will keep officers from using force against unarmed citizens who are non-compliant, thus preventing suspect injury or death. While these might sound good to a citizenry that has convinced itself that all police are brutal racists and that we need to scrap the current state of policing and start with something new, the reality of policing is different.

Most of the commentators offering up these ill-conceived ideas seem to lack knowledge about policing in general or the current state of policing. For example the desire to decrease the member of sworn officers may require legislative action. The Minneapolis city charter mandates a ratio of officer to citizen and to change it would require a vote by the people. However research has indicated that a visible police officer presence can make the public feel safe. That presence is enhanced by officers’ self-directed patrol and that patrol does provide opportunities for positive interactions with citizens, which is essential in improving police/public relations. The idea that an armed response can be eliminated from policing is to not understand policing in America. Gun rights in this country mean that criminals do have access to guns and we cannot have the police at a such a disadvantage when called upon to protect the lives of victims, bystanders, and themselves. Calls for service and fields stops can be dynamic, and volatile, situations that may quickly evolve from a “standard” stop to a fight for an officer’s life and officers should not handcuffed by a lack of force options. Attempting to require officers to utilize force in only the most serious circumstances in public encounters limits officers’ ability to gain subject compliance when verbal attempts at compliance have failed. Officers need to have their authority submitted to if they are to be seen as legitimate institution and the ability to gain compliance, despite the subject’s refusal and resistance, is necessary to ensure law and order. One area of policing that has been under reform for decades is the use of force and the means of applying that force. The idea of a continuum of force has led to the development of non-lethal or less than lethal force options beyond the classic night stick to include pepper spray, tasers, non-lethal rounds. Departments are also refining their use of force policies in regards to allowed techniques, and appropriateness of armed response. These policies are also supplemented by more realistic training exercises for officers in use of force encounters.

We need to remember that policing is in a constant state of reform. It is a sociopolitical institution that provides for a great amount of authority over citizens and rightly it has been under scrutiny for decades. As problems become evident in a police department that scrutiny results in departments operating under consent decrees to address these problems, and many of the largest U.S. cities have. at one point or another, operated under a consent decree in order to force police reform. Many departments, large and small, have also implemented citizen review boards to serve as a form of watchdog agency that ensures that the public is represented when police officer behavior is called in to question.

But reform doesn’t always come following inappropriate officer or department behavior. Academics and police management have focused on change within the institution of policing in a variety of ways. Morphing form the Problem Oriented Policing of decades ago Community Oriented Policing (COP) has been viewed as an important change in how policing should be viewed. It provides officers a means to interact more closely with the community, which allows them to develop innovative, non-conventional solutions to problems rather than a strictly law enforcement response. This increases understanding and cooperation between the police and the public, promotes a diversity of ideas, and involves an increased participation of other city agencies in addressing issues and problems. Changing attitudes and the way public interactions are conducted by officers is the goal of Procedural Justice (PJ) reforms. An important internal structure in policing for over ten years, procedural justice seeks to incorporate, fairness, empathy, respect, and two-way communication in all police/citizen encounters.

Other current innovations in policing that have sought to moderate a law enforcement approach to police encounters include the use of Community Service Officers (CSOs) and Crisis Intervention Teams (CITs). Community Service Officers are not sworn officers, are more casually dressed, and are unarmed. They provide a number of policing services that do not require the response of a sworn law enforcement officer such as taking theft and missing property reports, retrieval of abandoned property, animal at large calls, etc. These officers serve as representatives of the local police department and their interactions with the public tend to be non-confrontational and rely on service and assistance to members of the public. While some critics unwisely suggest putting all mental health related issues solely into the hands of social services, Crisis Intervention Teams provide a more comprehensive response to homeless, substance abuse, mental health, and domestic issues and problems. These teams are typically made up of multi-agency members and may include, a nurse,  a mental health professional, a social worker, and a plainclothes officer, who not only provides for police authority and response but also to insure the security of the other team members in case the subject becomes aggressive or the situation turns violent, as can often be the case in dealing with emotionally disturbed individuals. These multi-disciplinary teams are better equipped to address the varied needs, and manage the risks, of these segments of the population.   

Police reform in a broader scope continues to be addressed by the larger concepts of COP and procedural justice and more and more departments are orienting themselves to these concepts but it doesn’t mean we solved the problems in policing. However, the messages that should be conveyed about the real problems in policing are wrapped up in the false narrative of “the  police are racist”. While many departments have adhered to the COP and PJ concepts, there is certainly work to be done in policing that may not need a broad prescription but rather with policies focused on the particular needs of a department, adapting programs and policies that address what may be lacking or needing support within the individual departments or their communities. For example, some departments could benefit from a  high functioning early warning systems for officers, which might have picked out Derek Chauvin before he killed Floyd, or requiring in-service training that goes beyond law enforcement skills and includes communication skills and group social interaction. Other programs can also work toward improving public relations and outreach towards both children and adults, like preventing gun violence, after school programs, participation in neighborhood and community social events, promoting personal and online safety, and crime prevention awareness. While some departments and communities could benefit from the inclusion of these programs and features, many communities and departments have already incorporated these into their social structure. Too often critics standing on the sidelines, judging the police by anecdotal evidence, fail to see that in the vast majority of communities the narrative of an authoritarian force hell-bent on suppressing minorities rings hollow. Rather the police are but one of a number of sociopolitical institutions that have been working together and striving for peaceful, safe communities. But it is within these communities as well as the more troubled ones that vigilance needs to be maintained against problematic officers and divisive attitudes, and that is assisted by supporting policing programs, not defunding the police.

Departments need to be examined and see what can be done to bring them up to speed in some areas. While the policing literature has been talking about change and innovation in policing for decades, some departments may still just simply be behind the times. Municipal governments and departments themselves should take an outside view of the department and assess how current they are within the forward movement of policing and implement change; for example, adopting or more strongly reinforcing the COP and PJ concepts, reexamine their use of force policies, or whatever is pertinent and appropriate to their circumstances, not just take a blanket approach to a problem that might need very specific answers. Its important to fix those problems, not just simply dismantle the police, essentially throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

Police reform is best accomplished on a local level, specific to the problems and issues of the particular community, not as an overly broad mandate that could potentially waste resources on non-problematic areas. In the departments that are still lagging behind the curve, and there are a number of them, we have to consider that reform and change are not so easily implemented because of political and societal  realities. At that local level, there may be a variety of roadblocks that exist to implementing change. Cities need to hire chiefs who are progressive in their policing style and methods and are willing to adopt to the best practices that have been supported by research evidence; something that the cities’ elected officials must actually be willing to do. Even if you have buy-in from a chief on incorporating more PJ in the patrol officers’ interactions, you need that officer buy-in as well, and that comes from good middle management within the department. If that is weak, sergeants and officers will just continue along with policing as usual and will be slow to adopt or resist change. City budgets, rather than defunding the police, are needed to maintain funding for departments so that the departments can continue to support a wide array of officer training programs, community support and outreach, crime prevention programs, as well as provide for the ability to attract high quality officers by providing attractive pay scales. In defunding the police, it is likely these areas would receive budget cuts before any kind of cuts in hours or layoffs of personnel would occur. Now in times of economic downturn, as cities may have to slash budgets, the implementation and support of these programs may fall away, and without that support, needed reform is more difficult to implement. Calls to limit police presence on the streets may receive applause from some quarters of the community but other community members, particularly the business community may strongly object to a decrease in police presence, especially following the wave of violence and destruction that swept across cities during the protesters’ calls to implement justice by reducing police authority and presence. Others in the communities, such as in Fargo, my hometown, saw protesting and rioting against a police force that has actually had strong community ties and strong community support. Many here saw the protestors’ reaction to the local police as misguided, and in turn the overall idea of police reform that the protestors push for loses their support. Without  strong, influential community support to push for reform cities will quickly lose the will to do the hard work to implement change in social institutions. The community may also reject some new forms of policing, and the public often sends conflicting messages about its expectations of the police. Fargo PD spoke of dispatch trying to send the casually dressed, unarmed CSOs to take crime reports but citizens often objected to the approach, wanting “a real cop” instead.

So if there is a desire to cause positive change or reform in a city’s police department, a knee jerk reaction of slashing budgets, implementing new policies to address non-issues and dismantling the police structure without a clear plan for replacement is a recipe for disaster as police morale drops, cities with already high levels of calls for service will suffer response time delays, and beneficial programs and training lose their funding. Rather, the correct response needed is a careful assessment of the department in question. Determining weakness or problems in the department, whether in the command structure or with officers, examining the acceptance and progress of policing models like COP and PJ, assessing the current state of new officer, and in-service, training with an eye toward improvements, utilizing improved use of force training and the existence of officer accountability structures, incorporating technical improvements like the use of bodycams, and establishing a diversity of community related programs. City and police officials meeting with community leaders on concerns and issues should precede a joint effort by these groups to determine what problems exist, if any, and the best approach to solving problems, which may utilize a variety of efforts, resources, agencies, and groups. This ensures the process is focused and based on need while resources aren’t wasted on misdirected blanket efforts. This process will not as likely involve defunding as it will redirecting funding within the department and providing increased funding as deficiencies in training, recruitment practices, and community programs are discovered. Police reform is an important ongoing issue but true effective reform calls for a close examination of problems and a willingness to fund solutions, not for soundbite driven reactions.

Welcome to Criminal Justice Access

Hello Everyone,

For May at CJ Access check out Editorials and Opinions where I examine whether the National Firearms Act has outlived its usefulness. Current firearms designs, the criminality, or lack thereof, associated with NFA weapons, and a faulty registration system used in prosecutions suggest it’s time to amend the National Firearms Act.

And on the Original Research front, I’m going to be starting a new research project utilizing unused data from my dissertation in an exploratory study of beat officer patrol patterns. During the ride-alongs with 59 officers, I tracked the patrol car movement throughout their patrol for approximately six hour periods. I have turn by turn directions, as well as the location in the beats for the calls for service, and self-initiated stops. I’m planning on analyzing this patrol and stop geographic and time data to examine questions such as;

Do some officers cover more area than others working the same beat and shift and is there a similarity in areas that officers think they should patrol?

How do the patrol patterns of each beat differ by shift?

Do some shifts on the beats engage in broader beat coverage and do some beats get broader coverage than others?

Determining the level of patrol based on the number of passes through areas of the beat and in areas surrounding calls for service and self-initiated stops and do officers focus their patrol closer to areas where they receive calls for service?

Data cleanup and operationalization is going to be first on the list and I’ll be providing updates as the research progresses.

Has the National Firearms Act Outlived Its Usefulness?

Introduction

The National Firearms Act was enacted in 1934 and mandates the registration of certain firearms, firearms accessories, and destructive devices. While originally enacted as a response to well-armed violent criminals and their well-publicized crimes, the NFA may have outlived its usefulness when you consider changes in current firearm design and the amount of crime associated with NFA weapons. I propose changes could be made that lift onerous registration and tax stamps while still providing a modicum of control for fully automatic weapons.

During the 20’s and 30’s the criminal exploits of characters like John Dillinger, Machine Gun Kelly, and Bonnie and Clyde along with the underworld activities of organized crime syndicates thrilled newspaper audiences. Despite these crimes being atypical of violent crime in general, politicians, fueled by media reports of heavily armed criminals wreaking havoc throughout the country thought they found a solution to a perceived wave of violent crime in the NFA.

When bank robbers and other violent armed criminals utilized high powered but shortened weapons like “sawed off” short barreled rifles (SBRs) and short barreled shotguns (SBSs), their concealability and more powerful rounds gave them an advantage over local citizens and police who would typically only be armed with pistols or revolvers. Fully automatic weapons (FAWs) prior to the NFA were available to anyone, citizens and law enforcement alike. However, the typical police officer wouldn’t have such a weapon easily accessible while walking a beat and would again be at a disadvantage facing a determined villain with a full auto weapon. Silencers as well were lumped into this criminal milieu as being associated with hitmen and assassinations. The argument for the NFA was to limit making high-powered weapons like rifles and shotguns concealable (and thus more likely to be used in crime). While these weapons, along with full auto weapons and silencers, could be possessed they required registration with the government and a $200 tax stamp. This was a substantial sum at the time. It was the equivalent to the retail cost of a Thompson submachine gun and $200 dollars far exceeded the costs of rifles and shotguns that might fall under the purview of the NFA. The amount of the tax hasn’t changed, but at $200 per registration as well as the Occupational Tax collected from dealers, for FY 2018 this revenue amounts to $6.7 million collected from dealers and $33.3 million collected from new individual registrations and transfers. The NFA made possession  of unregistered, untaxed SBSs, SBRs, FAWs.(along with some firearms designated as Any Other Weapons, destructive devices like anti-tank weapons, mortars, and grenades, and silencers) a violation of federal law. Criminal sanctions for a violation include up to 10 years in prison and fines ranging between $10,000 and $250,00 for an individual and up to $500,000 for an organization as well as forfeiture of the weapon and the vehicle it was conveyed or concealed in.

Argument against retaining the NFA as it stands

Current firearms designs render the NFA dimensional standards moot. A number of weapons meet the letter of the law as it applies but not the spirit or intent in limiting concealable high power weapons. Gun rights advocates, who often bash the ATF (though based on some of ATF’s past behavior, there is some justification) really have their administrative rulings on weapons and weapon accessories to thank for easy accessibility to short barreled shotguns and what are essentially short barreled rifles.

For a shotgun to be considered an NFA weapon it’s first important to understand that the ATF defines a shotgun as being designed to be fired from the shoulder, meaning it is designed with a stock. The NFA defines a short barreled shotgun as having a barrel under 18 inches or having an overall length of less than 26 inches. What this means for the gun owner is that if they cut the barrel under its legal length or if the stock is cut down rendering the shotgun under the legal length, they have made, and now possess, an unregistered NFA weapon in violation of the law. Gun owners are free to modify a shotgun to an SBS, as well as purchase a shotgun already configured as an SBS, as long as they register the weapon and pay the tax. However the devil is in the details and both Remington and Mossberg have found ways to make short shotgun weapons that the average person would consider a “sawed off shotgun” which follow the letter of the law and avoid being classified as an SBS.

For example, Mossberg took its classic Model 500, a conventional pump shotgun, and installed a 14″ barrel and replaced the shoulder stock with a “bird’s head” pistol grip that maintained a total length of just a fraction over 26 inches, calling it the Shockwave. Mossberg, as a manufacturer, designed the gun this way, however if an average citizen took a conventional Model 500, cut down or replaced the barrel and replaced the stock with a similar pistol grip they have violated the law. Because the conventional Model 500 was designed with, and as purchased had, a shoulder stock, it is a shotgun and must have a barrel exceeding 18 inches and be over 26″ long. Because Mossberg designed the Shockwave without a shoulder stock, it is not a shotgun, it is merely a pistol grip firearm and not subject to barrel length restrictions. Shotshell firing weapons can also fall into the Any Other Weapon (AOW) category if designed as a smoothbore handgun or dual barrel centerfire cartridge and shotshell weapon with a barrel greater than 12 inches but less than 18 inches, and measuring less than 26 inches overall.

These dimensional intricacies, and some would say hypocrisies, can be best illustrated with a meme photo that accurately depicts the slight variations in design of Mossberg 500 shotguns that define an NFA weapon.

If concealability of a high powered weapon is a major concern, the above example illustrates that while their NFA status differs, their concealability is essentially the same. In fact, the longest weapon depicted is the one designated as an SBS and subject to the NFA which was supposed to deter ownership of short shotguns.

In regards to short barreled rifles, the ATF description of a rifle includes a stock and a barrel over 16 inches long, with an overall length, with stock extended, of 26 inches or more. The popularity of the AR and AK rifle platforms have given rise to large, rifle caliber, AR and AK pistols, essentially the rifle version with 9 to 12 inch barrels with no stock. Because these platforms were never designed to function as pistols, they are heavy and ungainly and aftermarket manufacturers have responded by producing arm braces. They are securely affixed to the rear of the firearm in place of the stock and are strapped around the forearm to provide added support in wielding the pistol. In an issue that was eventually addressed by an ATF ruling, there was a question of whether using the arm brace as a shoulder stock was a violation of the SBR definition in the NFA. Again the ATF came down on the side of gun advocates by ruling that merely using a device designed as an arm brace as a stock, didn’t equate to it being a stock, and thus was not a law violation. But as evidenced by the design of these braces, they resemble stocks, albeit uncomfortable ones, and will effectively function as one.

This essentially provides the gun owner with accessibility to a concealable high powered weapon that functions as an SBR without having to go through a registration and tax process. Other than an issue of refined design to enhance ergonomics and comfort, there is essentially no difference between a rifle caliber pistol with an arm brace and an SBR.

Suppressors or silencers, through TV and movie depictions, have typically been associated with spies and assassins. However, what is typically not depicted is suppressor use as a safety device designed to limit the potential for hearing damage as well as noise pollution. That potential, along with the tacti-cool aspect for recreational shooting has prompted pistol manufacturers to increasingly offer threaded barrels either as a standard feature or option. Silencer manufacturers  and their products were relatively sparse twenty years ago but that has changed with aftermarket competition in the field lowering prices and some firearm manufacturers are designing and producing integrally suppressed firearms. No longer an oddity with questionable legitimate purposes, the suppressor has become a common firearm accessory enjoyed by both recreational shooters and hunters.     

The Hughes Amendment to the Firearms Owner Protection Act of 1986, while allowing the possession or transfer of FAWs legally registered prior to May 1986, banned the possession and/or transfer of FAWs manufactured after this date for citizens, leaving an exception for the military and law enforcement. Parts designated by the ATF like fire control groups, receivers, and bolts could also be classified as machine guns as well as items like trigger actuators because they are integral to  the function of, or mimic, a machine gun. However the ATF again came down on the side of gun rights advocates in determining the legality of bump stocks. It was only after public outcry following the mass shooting in Las Vegas and presidential prompting that got the ATF to change its determination that the stock itself constitutes a machine gun.

The limited number of weapons that meet that prior date criteria has raised their prices to many thousands of dollars. The high cost of weapons, their limited availability and the necessity of registration have essentially removed these items from illegally trafficking and criminal use. As gun violence and mass shootings are popular cable news fodder, any recent criminal full auto weapon use would have surely generated notable news coverage. Based on media reports there seems to be little evidence of the use of FAWs in criminal activity. However, there will still be cases of gun owners illegally converting semiauto weapons to full auto capabilities (by virtue of not registering the weapon). While criminality may be primarily limited to a lack of registration, continued registration for FAWs (as well as Destructive Devices, like cannons, mortars, grenades, and missiles) may be warranted. There is a recognizable increase in potential lethality with a FAW, and in reality these weapons’ usefulness are limited to combat, criminal activity, and a fun way to expend ammunition. Thus, a law-abiding individual’s capacity to have fun firing off hundreds of rounds of ammunition is not infringed by having to register the weapon because of its potential criminal use and trafficking potential. However, the required $200 tax stamp could be argued as unnecessary. It was not a tax borne out of necessity but as the ATF states, it was meant to impose a burden and act as a deterrent.

Criminality and the NFA

The issue of criminal use of NFA weapons is hard to determine. We know that street gangs, organized crime, and biker gangs have access to NFA weapons as evidenced by raids and arrests but outside of SBSs and SBRs which can be simply produced, the source of FAWs likely stems from military equipment thefts. The ATF doesn’t compile any readily available data on the use of either unregistered or registered NFA weapons in crime incidents. In opposition to the ATF’s 2013 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPR) change regarding trusts and NFA weapons, the Firearm Industry Consulting Group noted that the ATF “failed to identify a single example where a prohibited person gained actual possession of a NFA firearm by virtue of his relationship to a legal entity, let alone where a person gained possession of a NFA firearm due to his relationship to a legal entity and then used that firearm in the commission of any crime”. Additionally, in response to a FOIA request, the ATF failed to produce any document that showed a single instance where a registered NFA weapon was used in the commission of a crime. An internet search revealed little in the way of data other than historical media accounts like the 1997 North Hollywood bank robbery or the assassination of radio personality Alan Berg by white supremacists where the perpetrators used illegally converted semi auto weapons. NFA weapons haven’t been specifically implicated in mass shooting events and according to the website Statistica, in the past 38 years, pistols have been the predominant weapon in mass shootings and the use of shotguns and rifles (despite the concern over modern sporting rifles, aka “assault rifles”) account for only 26 and 47 incidents respectively.

Criminality associated with NFA weapons is seemingly more focused on the possession of unregistered weapons. However, the determination of whether a weapon was registered can be problematic and result in wasted efforts with investigations and the prosecution of innocent individuals. The NFRTR is fraught with problems that stem back decades. Congressional testimony, internal ATF audits, and Inspector General audits demonstrated that ATF employees have destroyed registration records because they didn’t want to process them, there were major discrepancies when old data was compiled into a new data base following the move from the Treasury Department to the Department of Justice, the software used for the query system of the NFRTR was substandard, and the employees using the system were poorly trained on its data entry and proper use resulting in imputation errors. This has resulted in numerous instances of ATF agents starting investigations and forwarding charges against individuals because the ATF couldn’t find registration documentation, NFA weapons still being registered to deceased individuals, and dealers facing fines because their inventory doesn’t match the faulty ATF database. It can be contended that with the NFRTR being so inaccurate, with estimates of errors in the database ranging historically from 4 to 40%, that it is unsuitable to be used as a standard of proof to convict individuals of unlawful possession.

The ATF acknowledges the intent of Congress in utilizing registration, a substantial tax, and severe penalties was to deter the private ownership of these weapons. However while deterrence was its intended effect, the level of deterrence to possession is hard to gauge by the numbers. As of May 2019, the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record (NFRTR) showed that in the U.S. and it’s territories there were:

  • 62,162 AOWs
  • 155,021 SBSs
  • 413,167 SBRs
  • 699,977 FAWs
  • 1,750,233 Silencers
  •  2,997,630 Destructive Devices         

Just in 2018, there were 21,580 applications to make an NFA weapon and 128,324 individual transfer applications. As well for 2018, there was a total of 339,278 of all registration and transfer applications, with a total number of weapon registrations at over 1.4 million.

Despite a lack of a deterrent effect on possessing these weapons and silencers, there seems to be little indication, especially with FAWs, that these weapons are inordinately used in criminal activity. This ineffectiveness of the NFA does present an opportunity for both proponents and opponents of gun rights to amend it.

Changes to the NFA

Gun rights opponents could suggest that the wording and definitions of the NFA don’t address current firearm design changes that allow for the possession of concealable high powered firearms that the NFA was designed to deter. To address this, gun rights opponents could suggest the following changes:

  • The definition of a shotgun be changed to any firearm or weapon that fires a shotshell, and that a shotgun must have at minimum a 40″ overall length and have at a minimum a 22″ barrel. This would limit the availability of short length shotguns like the Mossberg Shockwave by placing them into the NFA category and keeping conventional shotguns at a length that can still accommodate smaller shooters but limit the weapon’s concealability.
  • The definition of a pistol be changed to bar any device that can be affixed to the rear of the pistol that is intended to support the firearm. Attaching such a device, either a stock or arm brace transforms the pistol into a rifle, subject to the ATF’s definition of a rifle and SBR.
  • The definition of a rifle be changed to define a rifle as having at a minimum a 16″ barrel and a minimum overall length of 36″. This will encompass conventional .22 rifles and centerfire carbines and lever actions which tend to be shorter firearms. AR and AK style pistols would become rifles if a brace or stock is attached and if they did not meet the minimum rifle dimensions, they would become NFA weapons.
  • An amendment to the NFA can be introduced that would no longer allow the transfer of FAWs and Destructive Devices between individuals (however, this will still be allowable under a trust). After the possessor’s demise, the weapon is turned in for destruction.
  • Increase the tax on NFA weapons and silencers to something more in keeping with the current economy. $200 in 1934 was a substantial amount, meeting and often exceeding the cost of the weapon itself which could have acted as a deterrent. Increasing the current tax burden could also act as a deterrent, for example, making the tax equivalent to the price or value of the weapon. This could range from 400 dollars for an SBR or SBS to tens of thousands of dollars for a FAW.

Alternatively, and more in keeping with constitutional freedom, the NFA could be highly modified to align it with current firearm design and shooting sports interest. As previously mentioned the design of short length shotguns, rifle caliber pistols and the popularity of threaded barrels and silencers suggest that the law is out of step with gun owners and the gun industry. The chart below, from the ATF’s 2019 Firearms Commerce in the United States report, indicates the spike in interest in NFA items over the past 15 years.

The NFA could be amended in a number of ways:

  • Eliminate the SBR and SBS categories. As I noted above, current firearm designs make NFA dimensional parameters, which were designed to deter concealability, moot. The removal of these weapons classification from the NFA will essentially have no effect on possession of high powered, concealable firearms as these weapons already exist,, are plentiful and available to the general public in the form of rifle caliber pistols utilizing braces, and weapons like the Mossberg Shockwave. We already know that criminals are not deterred from converting conventional weapons into unregistered NFA items, and so the only deterrent effect is generated on the law abiding public who must go through the arguably infringing process of registration over what is simply a rifle or shotgun, be charged $200 to possess it, and then potentially face prison time, fines, and weapon forfeiture because the ATF poorly maintains the records that demonstrate your legal possession.
  • Eliminate the silencer category from the NFA but require a background check on Form 4417. While there are benefits for both hunters and recreational shooters in the use of silencer/suppressors, much of the public may still associate them with criminal activity. It is true that there is a potential that a suppressor may be used in a crime and in order to address its possible criminal use or prohibited person’s possession, just as is done with all firearms, a purchase could require a background check utilizing the standard Form 4417 that is used in all firearm transfers. There would be no registration fee or tax associated with a suppressor purchase, only what is required with any other firearm purchase.
  • Eliminate the Any Other Weapon category. Many of these weapons are in actuality historical oddities, novelties and antiques that while they can be defined as AOWs do not require registration. Dual barrel survival rifles, and pen and umbrella guns would be unlikely to be used in criminal activity and more likely in self defense if at all. This change would also address inconsistencies with the designation of short barreled shotguns as demonstrated above as well as inconsistencies in shotgun pistol design. The Taurus Judge is designed to fire both .45 long colt rounds as well as .410 shotshells in a conventional double action revolver but despite being a pistol that fires a shotshell it is not defined as an AOW because it has a small amount of rifling at the end of the barrel. However, in practical terms, there is virtually no difference in shotshell lethality by virtue of this small amount of rifling versus a smoothbore. Any larger gauge pistol (since a 12 gauge larger than .5″ bore is not considered a destructive device because of its sporting purpose) could thus be considered as simply a pistol and not an AOW.
  • Retain registration for full auto weapons with a nominal fee but discontinue the tax stamp. The NFA as a law written to deter ownership of firearms, was in its original iteration, meant to require the registration of ALL firearms but this view was walked back as likely facing constitutional grounds challenges. But the law, as it stands, was clearly designed, and its purpose stated as such, as a deterrent to owning certain kinds of firearms. However, the government should not be trying to deter, i.e. infringe, on the exercise of a constitutional right without a compelling interest. The evident lack of the criminal use of FAWs does not support that compelling interest. However, the potential lethality and potential criminal use and trafficking potential justifies continued registration. What is not justified is the $200 tax imposed simply for registering or transferring a weapon. The ATF has used the protected tax status of NFRTR information to impede criminal defense investigations by refusing to release exculpatory evidence that would establish legal possession or information that would demonstrate the inaccuracies inherent in the NFRTR. Rather than a tax, a nominal registration fee should be imposed that is earmarked specifically to fund audits and improvements in the NFRTR, which includes software redesign, proper training for end users, and error reconciliation.

These changes to the NFA will likely have little effect on the possession of NFA style weapons or crimes committed with them, will eliminate the imposition of unjustified burdens on law abiding gun owners, spur gun industry growth, and still maintain some degree of control over full auto weapons. In addition, supporting the maintenance of the NFRTR through registration fees will help ensure the accuracy of the database as it is the only standard of proof in determining lawful possession of NFA weapons. Improving the accuracy of the data will not only save on ATF investigative and administrative time and costs, but also help reduce unwarranted prosecutions on weapon owners and dealers who face sever penalties and fines over what is essentially a paperwork error on the part of the ATF.

Welcome to Criminal Justice Access

This month at CJ Access it’s a Research Brief roundup featuring perceptions and how we perceive crime victims, perpetrators, suspects, and the police. So, explore whether victims’ ambiguous cues and level of physical attractiveness affect the labeling of offenses as sexual assault. Investigate the way bystanders perceive sexual assault and domestic violence and the factors that influence whether they intervene. Find out if factors that typically influence perceptions of police legitimacy in large cities work the same in a medium size city and check out an international view of how lay people perceive the truthfulness of suspects’ alibis. Also in Research Briefs, look into which restrictive firearm policies, if any, may reduce the number of mass shootings and be sure to follow up with research that discusses the differences in mass violence data sources, their limitations, and potential research directions.

Research Briefs

Factors Influencing Labeling Non-consensual Sex as Sexual Assault

Yndo & Zawacki, Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 2020

The authors’ study examined the effects of physical attractiveness and sexual interest cues on men’s sexual perceptions of women and whether increases in sexual perceptions of a woman would lead to decreases in labeling of subsequent non-consensual sex as sexual assault. The authors note that college age women are at high risk for sexual assault and that incidence of sexual assault among college aged women is high, ranging to as high as 50% in some studies, but men’s self-report perpetration averages are significantly lower than the number of  self-reported sexual assaults. The authors surmise this disparity may be partly due to the gendered difference in perception of what constitutes non-consensual sex.

Research has already identified men’s over perception of sexual interest, with males typically rating females participants as more attractive and more seductive and more sexually interested than females do. There is also limited research that suggests the level of a woman’s attractiveness influences the level of men’s misperception of sexual interest, perceiving more attractive women to be more interested in them, in a sense projecting their own sexual interest in the woman and assuming the woman’s level of interest is the same. The authors considered that men’s over perception may lead to misidentifying interested females and, coupled with ambiguous social cues from women that may or may not signal sexual attraction, may produce differing perceptions of actual sexual attraction, and the definition of the sexual activity, and may lead men to not perceive nonconsensual sex as sexual assault.

The authors examined two research questions in the study; What factors in a social interaction increase a man’s sexual perceptions of a woman, and do these increases in a man’s perceptions of a woman’s sexual interest during a social interaction decrease his labeling of subsequent nonconsensual sex as sexual assault? Their study contained 233 male college students who read a vignette describing a hypothetical social interaction between a man and a woman; within the vignette, the female character’s physical attractiveness (attractive vs. less attractive) and the degree to which the female character behaved interested in the male character (uninterested vs. ambiguous) were manipulated. The vignette ends with the male character physically forcing sexual intercourse with the female character. After reading the vignette, participants’ labeling of the nonconsensual sex as sexual assault was addressed. Participants’ perceptions of the female character’s sexual interest in the male character prior to the nonconsensual sex was assessed as a dependent variable during stopping points in the vignette, prior to sexual assault. The authors hypothesized that ambiguous cues (compared to non-interested) and more attractive female characters will result in the participants giving higher ratings of the female characters’ sexual interest in the males, as well as there being an interaction between level of female attractiveness and ambiguous cues, in that only with the ambiguous cues condition will female attractiveness work together to influence perceptions of sexual interest. The authors ultimately hypothesize that increased rating of the female character’s interest will lead to decreased labeling of the non-consensual sex in the vignette as sexual assault.

Utilizing multiple regression, their results indicated that separately, both ambiguous cues of interest and greater physical attractiveness had a significant effect on perceptions of the females character’s interest in the male character, though the interaction effect between the two variables was not significant. Consistent with previous research their results also indicated that  despite level of attractiveness, a lack of ambiguous cues and the presence of uninterested cues indicated the participants perceived a lower level of sexual interest from the female character, supporting that males can more easily distinguish sexual interest in the presence of clear cues and that cue ambiguity leaves more room for physical cues to influence perceptions. The second model also found that the level of perceived sexual interest had a significant effect on participants not labeling the non-consensual sex in the vignette as sexual assault.

While the effects are small, they are significant and having an understanding of the social factors that influence perceptions are important. The authors state that understanding the influence of social factors, such as physical attractiveness and interest cues, provides researchers with knowledge that can be incorporated into prevention programs targeted toward reducing sexual assault. For example, prevention programs should educate men that ambiguous sexual interest cues do not equate to consent. Furthermore, programs can increase awareness that perceptions of sexual interest may be inaccurate while highlighting the importance of gaining sexual consent, in turn encouraging unambiguous sexual consent between partners.

Yndo, M. C., & Zawacki, T. (2020). Factors influencing labeling nonconsensual sex as sexual assault. Journal of interpersonal violence, 35(7-8), 1803-1827.

While perceptions can affect whether non-consensual sex is viewed as a sexual assault, in instances where a sexual assault or domestic violence might be identified as such and witnessed, perception of the incidental factors, including the type of victim and type of assault, can influence whether bystanders intervene as Weitzman and colleagues discuss below.

Bystander Intervention on Behalf of Sexual Assault and Intimate Partner Violence Victims

Weitzman, Cowan, & Walsh, Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 2020

The authors utilized secondary data (data gathered in previous research) from a survey of individuals 15 years and older about bystander intervention and sexual assault and intimate partner violence (IPV). The authors note that  while sexual assault and IPV can co-occur–sexual assault can be a form of IPV and many victims experience both-from the vantage point of interveners, the two types of violence may be perceived quite differently. For instance, the authors note, the general public perceives the typical rape to be perpetrated by a stranger but often fails to perceive forced sex as rape if it occurs in the context of a romantic relationship. Even victims themselves often do not identify forced sex as rape if there is a romantic relationship between them and the perpetrator. Given that, definitionally, sexual assault and IPV are overlapping but distinct, and perceptions of these forms of violence are quite different, bystanders’ willingness to intervene and their strategies of intervention may differ. If these strategies do indeed differ by demographic background or violence type, then policies aimed at increasing bystander intervention would need to anticipate and accommodate these differences in order to be effective.

The authors had previously encountered limited research examining bystander intervention, finding that in the U.S. population at large, and among college students and military personnel specifically, men are more reluctant than women to intervene in instances of sexual assault. Among college students, men’s (but not women’s) willingness to intervene depends on their perceptions of the victim’s situation (e.g., whether they believe a victim increased his or her own risk of victimization) and research also suggests that Black college students are more likely to report intervening in sexual assault than Whites. Bystanders are also more likely to intervene in sexual assault and IPV if they perceive that victims face significant danger than if they don’t. Among college students, existing research finds a greater willingness to intervene on behalf of personally known sexual assault victims than on behalf of strangers, suggesting that this may be because knowing a victim encourages one to feel more responsible to act. College students also report a greater willingness to intervene on behalf of sexual assault victims when they feel supported by their peers, believe they know how to help, and are not in danger themselves. Thus, norms about intervention and education helping individuals to identify instances of sexual assault and IPV may also be critical to the decision to intervene.

The authors explain that once a person decides to intervene, a wide variety of strategies may be employed. These may include preventing violence by changing attitudes and beliefs that lead to assault or intervening in a potentially threatening situation before violence has begun; stopping violence mid-incident (which requires witnessing an event); or providing emotional or physical support after violence has occurred. All three types of interventions (before, during, and after) are theorized to reduce an individual’s subsequent risk of violence.

The dominant bystander intervention model, as stated by the authors, identifies five steps to the intervention process – noticing the situation (step 1), identifying it as an emergency (step 2), taking responsibility to act (step 3), deciding what specifically to do (step 4), and choosing to do it (step 5). According to the only nationally representative study of bystander interventions in IPV, only half of individuals who have known a victim have ever intervened and the authors conclude there are likely many barriers to intervening, at least in IPV, and these barriers may exist at every step.

For the current study, they examined three factors related to previous bystander experiences: whether the respondent has ever known a victim of sexual assault or IPV (separately); if yes, what the relationship was between the respondent and the victim and whether the respondent intervened; and if yes to the latter question, how the respondent intervened, including the relationship of the victim to bystander, type of intervention used, as well as possible barriers to a hypothetical IPV intervention with someone they knew. Demographics include race, age, gender, education, employment status, urban or non-urban status, and geographic region.

Significant differences lie in some demographics variables in the likelihood of knowing a victim of sexual assault and/or IPV as compared to not knowing one, with females more likely to know a victim, and more likely to know an IPV victim, specifically, than males, and Blacks being more likely than Whites to know a sexual assault victim. Significant differences were also found in the odds of knowing an IPV victim for those with some college, those who were students, retired individuals, and being an urban resident.

The authors state their findings show that part of the bystander intervention model (deciding what to do and choosing to do it) depends in part on the type of violence in question and gender. They found significant difference in the types of intervention used in sexual assault compared to IPV, with offering safe haven (47% compared to 60%) and telling the offender to stop (28% compared to 50%) used less frequently in sexual assault compared to IPV while telling the authorities or telling an adult were employed more frequently in IPV than in sexual assault. They also found significant differences in gender with regard to IPV, women are less likely to physically intervene than men, less likely to tell the abuser to stop, and more likely to tell an adult.

The main barriers to intervention in IPV in the current study were found to be that over 40% of respondents were concerned about being injured, while approximately 15% each, expressed concerns of it being a private matter, or being wrong for intervening. Other barriers, to a lesser degree, included losing friendship, being called a liar, and being bullied. This varied by demographic which showed age was a factor in concerns of being bullied and losing a friendship, while for females, risk injury was a greater concern than for men, however women were less likely than men to be concerned about it being a private matter or bullied which the authors surmise might occur because of their greater likelihood of knowing a victim of IPV. In regards to race, Blacks were more concerned about injury compared to Whites. For other demographics, those with post-secondary education were more likely to be concerned about being bullied over the intervention than those with less than a high school education. Full time workers were less likely to be concerned over the incident being a private matter whereas  urban residents were more likely to be concerned with it being a private matter than rural residents, Retired people were more likely to be inhibited with the possibility of being called a liar, and along with students, are more likely to have concerns about being wrong in intervening.

However, many of the respondents reported having intervening for victims of IPV (59%) and for sexual assault victims (29%). The authors analyzed whether the relationship in these instances influences whether an intervention occurs. Logistic regression analysis suggests that the odds of intervening in instances of sexual assault do not vary with relationship to the victim (e.g. whether they are a friend, family member, acquaintance etc.); however, they do differ with demographic background. Hispanic have 159% higher odds of intervening than White respondents (which the authors claim is a suggestion that certain cultural norms promote group welfare among Hispanic individuals). Self-employed respondents have 192% higher odds of intervening than non-employed respondents. However, in IPV, respondents have 70% lower odds of intervening on behalf of an acquaintance than on behalf of a family member. The author note that this finding coincides with previous research among college students, which suggests that individuals are more likely to intervene for friends than for strangers.

The authors conclude that the study indicates there are differences in the approaches individuals take when responding to sexual assault and IPV. They are more likely to involve legal authorities when responding to sexual assault, but more likely to tell the abuser to stop when responding to IPV. They state this finding indicates that some people may believe that sexual assault is a crime typically perpetrated by strangers that should be dealt with by legal authorities, whereas IPV is not a crime but a family issue best addressed by those close to or within the family. The authors believe to dispel these myths, public awareness campaigns should highlight that sexual assault more frequently occurs among individuals who know each other than among strangers, and should further provide specific suggestions for intervention strategies that do not put bystanders in immediate danger.

Weitzman, A., Cowan, S., & Walsh, K. (2020). Bystander interventions on behalf of sexual assault and intimate partner violence victims. Journal of interpersonal violence, 35(7-8), 1694-1718.

Reactions to, and treatment of, sexual assault and domestic violence victims will vary depending on the perceptions that both citizens and law enforcement have of these victims. Reactions to, and the treatment of, police officers are also subject to citizen perceptions, especially in regards to their perceptions of police legitimacy. However, Clark, et al explore whether these perceptions may vary by setting as they discuss in the following.

Differences in Citizen Perceptions of Interactions with Police Officers

Clark, Werling, Chintakrindi, & Randol, The Police Journal, 2019

The authors note the importance of police legitimacy in establishing trust with communities but recognize that a number of factors could affect the perception of legitimacy including race, age, income level, employment status, and education level as well as crime rates, nature and characteristics of an individual’s encounter with the police, media coverage of police activity, and police performance issues like excessive force, bias, and misconduct.

Because perceptions of the police are subjective, the authors looked at psychological perspectives that explain why or why not people defer to authority and find it legitimate. The authors state that two psychological models were found to influence whether a person defers to authorities and whether they see authorities as legitimate: an identity-based relational model, which had the biggest impact on views of legitimacy, and the resource-based instrumental model, which was found to play a smaller but still significant role in forming views on legitimacy. The relational model shows that people willingly defer to authorities, such as the police, and find them legitimate if people believe they are respected and valued by the authorities, are being treated in a neutral way, and can trust the motives behind how the authorities act; which are the same as the basis for the procedural justice concepts discussed at length by criminologist Tyler.

They note another psychological perspective that can help explain trust in the police is a Durkheimian perspective in that the most influential determinants of confidence and trust in the police were a sense of social cohesion and order in the community of the respondent. In a 2001 study, respondents also indicated they trust the police more when they perceive them as protecting moral structures in the community, not necessarily when they are protecting the community from crime. Likewise, fear of crime and signs of physical and social disorder did not have major impacts on citizens’ trust and confidence in the police, especially when controlling for social cohesion.

The authors state that most studies of police legitimacy involve large cities and little research has been done on midsize cities and conducted a survey in a central valley mid-sized California city and obtained 307 respondents. They stratified the sample from the different neighborhoods by police beat. The survey contained questions about how the city Police Department interacts with the community, the top three crimes respondents are concerned about, whether they feel safe in their neighborhood and how they perceive various aspects about the police officers in the city. They also asked a series of questions about the respondent’s contact with the police in the last 12 months and their satisfaction with those interactions. The authors sought to determine the perceptions of the respondents of their interactions with city police officers, utilizing police legitimacy outcome variables of fairness of police officers, trust of police officers, responsiveness to community concerns by police officers, and respectfulness of police officers. The authors utilized predictor variable that were likely to influence the outcome variables; race, household income level, education level, employment status, and crime rate.

In bivariate analyses, few of the predictor variables were correlated with the outcome variables measuring police legitimacy. There were no statistically significant differences between respondents’ perceptions of police respectfulness, and police responsiveness to the community based on race , household income level, education level, employment status, and crime rate. For the outcome variable of perceptions of police fairness, Blacks and American Indians held statistically significant lower views than other races but no other variable demonstrated any significant difference. For perceptions of trust of the police, the only significant difference was in employment status with  unemployed respondents having a significantly  higher trust in the police than employed respondents. The authors also used logistic regression models of the four outcome variables but the only statistically significant differences were in the perceptions of police fairness with White respondents being 2.18 times more likely to rate their interactions with police as being fair ‘A lot or to a great extent’ compared to Non-White respondents.

The author’s hypothesis that higher crime rates would negatively affect views of police legitimacy was not supported and there was only partial support that sociodemographic variables would show differences in views of police legitimacy. While their results differed from other research, the authors suggest the study might be more generalizable to medium sized cities, with more predominantly White populations rather than large cities. They conclude their results indicate “differences in people’s perceptions of interactions with the police are not something inherent within the people themselves or the crime in the areas they live, but something else. The most likely source in these differences in perceptions is something that the city police are doing, or potentially not doing, related to their face-to-face community interactions and training policies around communicating with local residents”. While noting some limitations to the study it suggests that future research can focus on small and medium sized cities, examine polices related to officer communication with the public, as well as explore other potential areas like media presentation that might affect views of police legitimacy.

Clark, N., Werling, R., Chintakrindi, S., & Randol, B. (2019). Differences in citizen perceptions of interactions with police officers. The Police Journal, 0032258X19826855.

Clark and colleagues examined how citizens perceived police officers’ trustworthiness, but how does the average citizen perceive the believability of a suspect’s alibi? Portnoy, et al state that innocent suspects who fail to provide a convincing alibi when interviewed by the police may subsequently be tried in court, where their alibi may be evaluated again by jurors. However, they question, are lay members of the public familiar with factors that may lead to an innocent suspect providing an inaccurate, incomplete or otherwise unconvincing alibi?

Beliefs about Suspect Alibis: A Survey of Lay People in the United Kingdom, Israel, and Sweden

Portnoy, Hope, Vrij, Ask, & Landström, The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 2020.

The authors state that in general during an interrogation or interview, suspects will try to provide an alibi establishing their innocence, first through the recollection of the event and in a second more detailed phase designed to validate their story. However innocent suspects despite being motivated to provide an accurate and convincing alibi may provide inaccurate information. This may result from impaired memory processes, a result of a loss of details of an event over time, or memory conjunction errors, where suspects confuse aspects of two separate occurrences. However, the authors also consider that producing a convincing alibi may be hampered by a presumption of guilt from the interviewer. While the authors conceded that research to date hasn’t supported that presumptive guilt affects suspect’s willingness to deny or confess or that it affects the accuracy of the statements, they contend that presumptive guilt can lead to more aggressive interviewing, with research showing that it increases the probability of believing the suspect’s guilt despite their statements.

In evaluating suspects’ alibis for believability, police interviewers may not attribute inaccurate information to memory errors but rather to deception, and thus guilt. If a belief in their guilt is established, the suspect’s alibi may then be analyzed in court, by jurors, who will be unaware of factors that may have led to the suspect’s alibi as not believable and thus subject to prosecution. However without this understanding of the determinates of believability, jurors cannot make an informed decision.

The authors surveyed 332 people from the UK, Sweden, and Israel who had never provided an alibi in a police investigation to determine the degree in which lay people understood factors that affect believability. Participants were first asked to indicate their belief about the extent to which six types of details are provided in alibis of truthful versus lying suspects. Research has shown that alibis of liars and truth-tellers differ with respect to their tendency to provide these details and they wanted to examine how participants’ knowledge would align with these research findings. To gain additional data on participants’ beliefs about the differences between truthful and deceptive alibis, participants were then asked to describe what strategies they believed truthful and lying suspects typically use to make their alibi seem convincing to the interviewer.

They also asked participants what they believed the relation between the amount of details provided in an alibi and the truthfulness of the alibi to be, and to explain their answer. Since research has demonstrated that statements of truthful suspects are more detailed than those of lying suspects they were interested in the participants’ belief about the relation between alibis’ level of detail and their truthfulness.

Additionally, participants were also asked to indicate their belief regarding the extent to which truthful alibis might contain incorrect details to see whether or not participants would mention the factor of (impaired) memory processes. Participants who indicated that truthful alibis may contain incorrect details were asked to explain their answer in order to see if, and to what extent, they would acknowledge the factor of memory constraints as a reason for mistakes during the provision of alibis by truthful suspects.

The authors also examined the issue of presumption of guilt and first asked participants to indicate when they believed was the point in the course of an investigative interview in which interviewers begin to form their opinion regarding the suspect’s truthfulness. This question was used to examine whether or not participants would consider it likely that interviewers may conduct suspect interviews with a presumption of guilt toward the interviewee. This was followed by asking participants to indicate their belief regarding the extent to which a presumption of guilt held by interviewers at the beginning of suspect interviews might affect the interviewers’ behavior, and to indicate the likelihood that suspects provide more details and confess to committing the crime (regardless of their actual guilt) in response to a guilt-presumptive interviewer.

T-test analyses indicated that, on average, participants believed that most types of details are provided significantly more often in truthful than in deceptive alibis. In  response to common strategies, as two of the three most commonly reported strategies were reported for both truthful and lying suspects (i.e., providing detailed alibis and expressing confidence), they examined whether the proportion to which participants reported each of these two strategies differed for truthful and lying suspects. Analysis showed that participants believed that a detailed alibi occurs more often with respect to lying suspects (39.0%) than truthful suspects (26.6%). .In contrast, participants believed that expressing confidence occurs more often among truthful (30.0%) than lying suspects (16.6%).

Most participants who believed that a detailed alibi is less likely to be truthful explained that liars may believe that a detailed alibi is perceived as truthful and convincing. With respect to participants who believed that a detailed alibi is more likely to be truthful, most of them explained their belief by reporting that the truth is easy to keep track of and thus being informative is not difficult. Finally, most participants who believed that the amount of details provided in an alibi is not related to its truthfulness reported that the truthfulness of an alibi depends on different factors, such as the verifiability of the details provided, the extent to which the details provided are central to the main event, and the suspect’s personal strategy to appear truthful (which may or may not be to provide a detailed alibi).

In other areas of exploration, the study found, on average, participants rated the likelihood that a truthful alibi might contain incorrect details as relatively low. However, most participants who indicated they believed that truthful alibis may contain incorrect details explained that this may be due to impaired memory processes. Analyses also indicated that participants tended to believe significantly more often that interviewers usually begin to form their opinion of the guilt or innocence of suspects prior to hearing their alibi for the first time or while suspects are providing their alibi for the first time.

The study also found that, on average, participants believed that interviewers’ presumption of guilt can affect what interviewers say and how they behave during an interview. The most common explanation provided by participants who strongly believed this to be true was that presumptions of guilt make interviewers conduct harsher interviews, ask leading questions, and pressure the suspect to confess.,Finally, on average, participants believed that when suspects get the impression that the interviewer thinks they are guilty, they will provide more details in their alibi, and provide details even if they are uncertain of their accuracy.

The authors state the most noteworthy finding concerning participants’ beliefs about the qualities of suspect alibis was that participants believed that while truth-tellers are more informative with respect to specific types of details, liars more often try to appear generally informative. Specifically, participants tended to believe that, on average, setting, temporal, object, and person-description details are provided only slightly more often in alibis of truthful suspects than lying suspects. This belief aligns with existing research findings. However, when participants freely reported that suspects provide a generally detailed alibi to appear convincing, this was reported more often with respect to lying suspects than truthful suspects. Most participants also believed that the more details provided in an alibi, the less likely the alibi is to be truthful. Previous survey research has demonstrated similar beliefs of lay people about the relation between the amount of details provided by suspects during police interviews and suspects’ veracity.   Liars may succeed in providing a rich, detailed statement by describing an actual experience that occurred on a different time than that of the crime, with details concerning the crime nevertheless being denied or omitted. However, this belief of participants that a detailed alibi is less likely to be truthful contrasts findings in which statements of truthful suspects are usually more detailed than those of lying suspects.

The authors noted, however, impaired memory processes may prevent liars from remembering what information they have already provided (and to whom). In order not to struggle with remembering a detailed lie, liars are likely to provide a relatively short statement. Indeed, innocent, truthful suspects tend more than guilty, lying ones to employ an alibi-provision strategy of providing a detailed statement. Turning to the issue of impaired memory processes in the context of  innocent suspects’ alibis, participants’ responses indicated that they were reluctant to acknowledge that truthful alibis may unintentionally include incorrect details. This finding embodies another demonstration of lay people’s lack of understanding of issues concerning psychology and law and is consistent with previous findings that demonstrated this poor knowledge by lay people.

However, when examining the explanations of participants as to why they believed that truthful alibis may contain incorrect details, the authors state a more encouraging picture emerges. Participants acknowledged that impaired memory processes may prevent innocent suspects from reporting accurately from memory. For example, participants correctly acknowledged that innocent suspects may not encode relevant event details because of not realizing the importance of remembering the event for a later reporting. Participants also correctly mentioned that event details may be forgotten over time. Participants mentioned the factor of forgetting by truthful suspects also when explaining why they believed a detailed alibi may indicate that the suspect is lying (that is, because impaired memory processes may prevent innocent suspects from providing a detailed alibi).

The authors conclude that altogether, findings from the first part of the questionnaire suggest that participants hold some mistaken beliefs about suspect alibis. Nevertheless, participants did demonstrate an understanding that innocent suspects may provide incorrect details due to impaired memory processes. Results also suggest that lay people are aware of the fact that interviewers might approach suspect interviews while already presuming guilt and that this presumption of guilt might affect how interviewers conduct interviews. The findings also suggest that lay people believe that suspects’ verbal behavior is likely to be negatively affected by a guilt-presumptive interviewer.

The authors suggest future research might compare the beliefs of police interviewers with those of members of the general public about the topics of memory limitations and presumption of guilt in the context of suspect alibis. Specifically, jurors may benefit from being informed that innocent suspects may provide incorrect details due to memory constraints despite being motivated to be accurate. Jurors may also need to be explicitly informed that suspects sometimes provide their alibi to a guilt-presumptive interviewer; this should be done especially when suspects complain that their interviewer treated them as if they had already decided that they were guilty. These findings can also inform the development of interviewing techniques. For example, assuming that participants’ beliefs about the behavior of suspects reflect how they would behave as suspects during police interviews (as was also suggested by some responses), the finding that they believed that a more detailed statement is less likely to be truthful suggests that, as truth-tellers during police interviews, they would not try to provide a detailed statement. Accordingly, when interviewing suspects and instructing them to provide a detailed statement, it may be crucial to also explain to them the importance of being informative, for example, for the course of the investigation and the possibility of exonerating them as suspects by having more details to verify.

Portnoy, S., Hope, L., Vrij, A., Ask, K., & Landström, S. (2020). Beliefs about suspect alibis: A survey of lay people in the United Kingdom, Israel, and Sweden. The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 24(1), 59-74.

Evidence Concerning the Regulation of Firearms Design, Sale, and Carrying on Fatal Mass Shootings in the United States

Webster, McCourt, Crifasi, Booty, & Stuart, Criminology and Public Policy, 2020

The authors (one affiliated with the Bloomberg Center for Gun Policy and Research) suggest that based on past research, the occurrence of mass shootings may be influenced by prohibited individuals, particularly domestic violence perpetrators (which they assert are disproportionately involved in mass shootings) and that while already prohibited from purchasing or possessing a firearm, prohibited individuals may purchase a firearm from someone other than a federally licensed dealer. The authors suggest that Comprehensive Background Checks (CBC), entailing a federal firearms background check on private transfers as well, may prevent some of these prohibited individuals from obtaining a firearm. They also suggest that purchaser licensing where states can tailor background checks, require gun safety courses, and give law enforcement officials discretion over whether a license is issued can be used to limit access to firearms, however the authors concede that there is no research to support that either CBC or purchasing licenses would reduce mass shootings. Indeed, in regards to other variables like assault weapon and large capacity magazine bans and their effect on mass shootings, other research has produced mixed results and contained methodological issues.

The authors used data from the FBI’s Supplemental Homicide Reports and other publicly available databases to calculate state-level annual incidence of 604 fatal mass shootings that had four or more victims between 1984–2017. The authors did note that the SHR did not contain some prominent mass shootings such as the Aurora, CO theater , Sandy Hook  elementary school, and the church in Southerland Springs, TX. The also note that because the SHR limits the number of victims to 11, the Virginia Tech shooting in their data is counted as three incidents. To remedy these and other omissions, they compared the SHR data with data on mass shootings collected by Stanford University (Stanford Mass Shootings in America) for the years 1984–2017 and the Gun Violence Archive for the years 2014–2017 and added any missing incidents to their data set.

Data on gun laws were collected and coded and included a number of state-level statutes: concealed carry laws, handgun purchaser licensing laws that require either in-person application or fingerprinting, laws requiring point-of-sale background checks only, firearm prohibitions for subjects of domestic violence restraining orders that include ex parte orders, firearm prohibitions for subjects of domestic violence restraining orders that include dating partners in the definition of domestic violence, firearm prohibitions for subjects of domestic violence restraining order that do not include ex parte orders or dating partners, laws requiring surrender of  all firearms by subjects of domestic violence restraining orders, firearm prohibitions for violent misdemeanants, assault weapons bans and large capacity magazine bans.

Negative binomial regression models were used to estimate the associations between changes in key gun laws and fatal mass shootings. Analyzed at the state-year level,  they conducted a time series analysis of three dependent variables; domestic violence linked mass shootings, which the authors (with the authors defining domestic relationship broadly to include any offender-victim family relationship, boyfriend/girlfriend, or ex-spouse), non-domestic violence linked mass shootings  (however the SHR defines the offender-victim relationship based on the first  homicide in the incident) and all mass shootings.

Analyses of the statistical models indicated that some of the variables had an effect on the outcomes measures. For total number of mass shootings incidents only two law variables had a statistically significant effect; states that had handgun purchaser licensing laws requiring in-person application with law enforcement or fingerprinting were associated with incidents of fatal mass shootings 56% lower than that of other states and LCM bans indicated a 48% lower risk of fatal mass shootings associated with the policy. They found no evidence that concealed carry laws, assault weapons bans, prohibitions for domestic abusers and violent misdemeanants, or point-of-sale CBC laws were associated with the incidence of fatal mass shootings. In models in which the number of mass shooting victim fatalities was the outcome, statistically significant protective effect variables included handgun purchaser licensing (66% reduction) as well as LCM bans (70% reduction) which, however, also demonstrated a wide confidence interval that calls into question its true effect.

For models examining non-domestic violence related incidents, purchaser licensing was shown to have a significant negative effect on both the number of incidents (62% reduction) and in the number of victims (65% reduction) in these incidents compared to other states. For models examining domestic violence incidents (28% of the sample) only LCM ban laws had a significant reduction effect on the number of incidents (61%) and the number of victims (75%) but states with required comprehensive background checks were associated with a large significant increase (222%) in victim deaths in these incidents.

The authors concede that the findings of this study suggest that the most common policy prescriptions and criticisms offered by gun control advocates-comprehensive background checks, assault weapons bans and “Right to Carry” laws which reduce restrictions on civilian concealed carry-do not seem to be associated with the incidence of fatal mass shootings. Despite the authors attempting to tie domestic violence to mass shootings, with 28% of  the shootings in this study having some connection to domestic violence, they found no evidence that laws designed to keep firearms from perpetrators of domestic violence have affected mass shootings connected to domestic violence. They state this is surprising given that prior research demonstrating that laws prohibiting persons under domestic violence restraining orders from possessing firearms or with prior convictions for violent misdemeanors were associated with reduced intimate partner homicides. The authors conclude their findings suggest that laws requiring firearm purchasers to be licensed through a background check process supported by fingerprints and laws banning LCMs are the most effective gun policies for reducing fatal mass shootings.

Webster, D. W., McCourt, A. D., Crifasi, C. K., Booty, M. D., & Stuart, E. A. (2020). Evidence concerning the regulation of firearms design, sale, and carrying on fatal mass shootings in the United States. Criminology & Public Policy, 19(1), 171-212.

As noted above, different databases may define mass violence offenses differently and that beside the common feature of having multiple victims there is no universal definition of these events, which can make researching these events more challenging. Without clear definitions of mass violence, research and its implications and conclusions can be unclear or forward incomplete or inaccurate policy recommendations. Corzine and Corzine and explore the differences in definitions and subtypes, issues in research, and recommendations for future research.

 The Devil’s In the Details: Measuring Mass Violence

Corzine and Corzine, Criminology and Public Policy, 2020

The authors note that within mass violence incidents, as measured by different sources and databases, major characteristic differences exist. For example the definition of an occurrence as a mass violence event may vary on the minimum number of victim (either 3 or 4 killed, sometimes including the wounded), location (some require a public location while others include residential and private locations), timing (some require them to have occurred within a 24 hour period), and whether a firearm was used. Defining other general characteristics of these events, and research into them, is made more difficult by specific variations in the incidents. For example, age of the typical victim can vary depending on the type of target, an event occurring at a school will have on average younger aged victims than a church. Events may occur based more on the location, rather than on specific individualized targets, and the offender-victim relationships may vary widely or be unknown, just as the motives may vary widely or be unknown.

The authors consider the FBI’s definition of two types of mass violence; a Classic type and a Family type. A killing of at least three family members is defined as a mass murder, or if involving a perpetrator suicide, a mass murder /suicide. If the perpetrator lives and kills four or more family members it’s described as a Family Killing, rather than a mass murder. A Classic type involves a single perpetrator (usually a mentally disordered male) who kills four or more victims in a public place with no cooldown period. These events can also be defined as mass violence victimization, in that while the two previously described types of mass killings will typically vary by location (public or private) victim type, motive, and even weapon use, both with result in physical injury, death, and emotional and psychological trauma for survivors.

However, the authors recognize that events described as public mass murders or mass shootings typically have garnered the most media and research attention with data collections efforts from various official government entities, although with some variation. The Office of Crime Victims (OCV) which has a focus on the toll on crime victims, utilizes data collected from the Mother Jones news organization. The OCV defines mass violence as an intentional violent criminal act, for which a formal investigation has been opened by the FBI or other law enforcement agency, that results in physical, emotional, or psychological injury to a sufficiently large number of people to significantly increase the burden of victim assistance and compensation for the responding jurisdiction. OCV provides general information to program news, training for providers and community leaders, through grants and funding, and in links to numerous fact sheets and articles on victimization.

The FBI’s definition of mass murder consists of four or more victim deaths (not counting the offender) in one or more locations in a close proximity by the offender, is the definition typically adhered to by other official organizations, though the number of qualifying victims was later reduced to three in 2013 by presidential mandate. In contrast, the Congressional Research Service (CRS)  focuses on gun-related mass violence of all types, defining “mass shooting” as a “multiple homicide incident in which four or more victims are murdered with firearms, within one event, and in one or more locations in close proximity”. Mass shootings were broken down by type rather than exclusively by number, and categorized mass murders with firearms as either mass public shootings, familicides, and other mass shootings. These categories demonstrate a shift from analysis based solely on numbers of murdered or injured to one examining the type of event, which the authors contend holds promise for future research in not just describing the events but understanding them.

There are also a number of publicly available and unofficial data sources. These include the Gun Violence Archive, collecting data since 2012, which defined mass violence as four or more shot or killed (this expands the definition to included wounded) in one location, over a short time frame. It obtains its data from the media, law enforcement, and government sources, and their data is also used by the Guardian news organization for their reporting and data collection on mass shootings. Mother Jones’ data, the primary data source for the OCV, started in 1982 collecting data on mass shootings that followed the FBI’s definition of four victims (later three) of “indiscriminate rampages” in public places. Gang violence, armed robbery, and other felony-related events that generated several gun-related deaths are excluded from the data set. The Washington Post in 1966 began collecting data on mass violence, with a focus on firearms used to kill or injure four or more victims, through its own researchers making it a good resource for examining trends in mass violence. Since 2013, Mass Shooting Tracker relies on what they call a “crowd-sourced database.” Volunteers from around the United States report into the main hub where the shootings are recorded. A “mass shooting” is defined as a single “outburst” of violence in which four or more people are killed and/or injured. There is at least one link to a news article from the city where the shooting took place.

From this it can seen that there is variation amongst the most common measures of mass violence including how they are measure, varying between three and four victims and some including only deaths while some include injuries and deaths, with most of the publicly available source focus on incidents involving firearms versus other weapons.

The authors also notes the availability of datasets that are related to but not directly measuring mass violence like the FBI’s and the NYPD’s respective active shooter database tracking incidents of active shooters, primarily for developing evidence based responses to active shooter incidents. Some organizations track all firearm related deaths and injuries in support of laws that restrict gun ownership like Everytown for Gun safety, which primarily utilizes CDC data and sets a threshold of four or more fatalities (excluding the perpetrator) for mass murder or the Brady Campaign and Center, an organization that got its start in the mid 70’s as a gun control group. It collect’s data on firearm injuries and deaths and has developed  a comprehensive plan of strict gun regulation.

Other more detailed sources of data exist in the form of the Supplemental Homicide Reports (SHR) from the FBI, which adds another layer of details to the UCR’s homicide data. While information is provided about victim and offender numbers and demographics, their relationship, the circumstances, and weapons used however it doesn’t denote the location and other additional circumstances around the incident. The National Incident Based Report System (NIBRS) is a much more detailed crime reporting system than the UCR (and SHR), which it was set to replace in 2021, however less than half of law enforcement agencies are participating. Corzine and Corzine state that overall NIBRS will offer significant improvements over the UCR. All of the crimes people are arrested for will be in NIBRS rather than the one most serious crime a suspect is charged with, as is currently recorded in the UCR. NIBRS collects more detailed information on 52 crimes plus ten offenses for which only arrest data are known. By covering all of the crimes that a person committed during an incident of mass violence or with which he or she is being charged, much more is known about the event than can be found using the SHR.

The large number of incident variables which include things like location codes, time of day, and whether the incident as cleared by arrest provides much more detailed data, which is more conducive to statistical analysis research on mass violence incidents. The authors note that none of the official definitions of mass violence or its subtypes to date focus on family mass murders, but state there needs to be more attention given to the private or family type of mass violence, and this data set will allow for the study of 2 or more victims in public and private settings. Even using the more restrictive definition of four fatalities, these comprise approximately half of the mass murder events in the parts of the United States covered by NIBRS.

As the authors illustrated, differences in data sources of mass violence can provide different descriptive results, depending on if a mass shooting is defined by, and it number of victims derived from, different sources as some data include both dead and wounded in victim totals, while some only count the deceased, with starting points that could vary between three and four victims depending on the year the data was obtained. The availability of  particular aspects of mass violence is also dependent on the source as some data sets lack important information like victim-offender relationship and location or setting and while public mass shootings have garnered a lot of attention, private setting or family mass murders provide another important avenue of research into mass violence. In particular the authors outline some implications and challenges for future research:

• One of the first things that must be done is to separate the various types of mass violence, so we can examine the uniqueness of each one.

• We need to study mass murder that occurs in public places and private places.

• We need to study the foiled cases.

• We need to understand how the role of mental health, or the lack thereof, is associated with mass killing.

• We need to explore who offenders choose as their targets and how they do so.

• We need to explore the influence that the hatred of certain groups has on the choice of who and where to target victims.

• We need to understand the role that loss plays in motivation, including the loss of a job, the loss of a loved one through divorce or death, and the loss of being viewed with respect.

The authors state that from a measurement standpoint, the data set that would best satisfy researchers’ needs will include the following:

• Two or more victims per private/family event who have been killed

• Three or more victims per public mass violence event who have been killed

• Any three or four injured persons occurring during the same incident

• Any history of an offender’s mental illness, a criminal record, or domestic violence

• All weapon(s) used to injure and/or kill victims

Having this information will generate more detailed, nuanced data that will allow law enforcement and researchers a better understanding of the circumstance around these events, distinguishing between subtypes of these events, how they might be prevented more often.

Huff‐Corzine, L., & Corzine, J. (2020). The devil’s in the details: Measuring mass violence. Criminology & Public Policy, 19(1), 317-333.

Welcome to Criminal Justice Access

For March, be sure to check out these two features:

At Issue-An examination of stop and frisk, particularly in the context of the NYPD, to explore the particulars of the program, whether it is effective as a crime prevention program, and whether the NYPD program infringed on the 4th and 14th amendments and exhibited racial bias

Editorials and Opinions-My reaction piece to At Issue-Stop and Frisk Practices where I explore the necessity for stop and frisk, and how the practice of stop and frisk can be preserved and revised while minimizing racial discord