IS THERE EVIDENCE OF SYSTEMIC RACISM IN POLICING?

INTRODUCTION

Talk of systemic racial bias in policing has been more prominent in the public forum in the past couple years but this doesn’t mean there has been a lack of research into issues of race and policing. Far from it, research in this area has been going on for decades, it’s now only recently that claims of systemic bias have become more vocal. But while there is ample evidence of racial disparities in police interaction outcomes, as we were taught early in graduate school, “disparities don’t equal discrimination”. So the question becomes, is there evidence of systemic racial bias in policing?

In this literature review, I can only just touch on the massive amount of literature examining racial outcomes in policing that has gone on in even just the last 25 years but I hope to provide a general overview of the issues of disparities, the arguments presented for systemic bias, the explanation of these disparities through the scientific research on arrests and use of force, and the problems with current methodologies that try to prove systemic bias.

RACIAL DISPARITIES DO EXIST BUT IS IT BECAUSE OF RACIAL BIAS?

The prevailing argument for systemic bias is the data showing clear disparities between Whites and Blacks/Hispanics in police interaction outcomes in areas like stops, use of force, and arrests. However, in the public forum this is played out with extensive coverage of Blacks who were killed in confrontations with the police, which then is portrayed as racial injustice and proof of systemic bias to the public. As Reinka and Leach (2017) noted in sociologist Weitzer’s 2015 contention that “the seemingly serialized nature of publicized killing after killing of an unarmed Black person every few months since Trayvon Martin’s killing in 2012 can easily be viewed as a pattern of systemic bias” These minorities are stopped, frisked, arrested, and have force used against them disproportionately in comparison to their population demographic and in comparison to Whites (Petersilia, 1983; D’Alessio and Stolzenberg, 2003; Ridgeway, 2007; Gelman et al., 2007; Tapia, 2011; Buehler, 2017; Balko, 2020; Tobias and Joseph, 2020).

For example Ramchand et al., (2006) reference a study showing Blacks are 2.5 times more likely to arrested for marijuana possession than Whites. Gelman et al. (2007) noted in their examination of NYC PD stop and frisk records that although Blacks and Hispanics are stopped more frequently than Whites, since only 1 out of every 8 White person who was stopped was subsequently arrested, compared to 1 out of 9 Hispanics and 1 out of 10 Blacks, that this demonstrates the police are stopping minorities indiscriminately and with less cause, than Whites. Cooley et al. (2019) even demonstrated that the racial disparities between Blacks and Whites in frisks, searches, arrests, and use of force had slight increases,  between .3 and 1.7%, for people stopped in groups versus those alone, even after accounting for the discovery of illegal contraband. In their meta-analysis of probability of arrest, based on 27 independent data sets, Kochel et al. (2011) calculated that the odds of a Black person being arrested was 26% compared to a 20% chance of a White person being arrested. Lytle’s 2014 meta-analysis of suspect characteristics on arrest also found slightly higher arrest probability with minorities compared to Whites, with  Blacks 1.4 times, and Hispanics, 1.25 times more likely to be arrested than Whites and non-Hispanics. Mitchell and Caudy (2015) examined racial disparities and drug arrest rates  and after finding that the disparities could not be explained by differences in drug offending, non-drug offending, or residing in neighborhoods with heavy police emphasis on drug offending, concluded that racial bias is at work. Ross (2015) in an examination of racial bias in police shootings at the county level found that there was a 3.5 times higher probability of an unarmed Black person being shot by police than an unarmed White person being shot by the police. In a study of 2012 NYPD SQF data Morrow et al. (2017) found Black and Hispanic citizens were significantly more likely to experience non-weapon force than Whites

These disparities are seen of evidence as racist policing. Researchers like Richardson, (2010) and Pratt-Harris et al. (2016) claims that connection between race and crime is illusory and is produced by racist police officers, racist police practices, and other racially biased social institutions. Much of the promotion for systemic racism in policing comes from proponents of critical race theory (CRT) like Tolliver et al. (2016)and Tobias and Joseph (2020) by hearkening back to the country’s founding to make claims of a White supremacist basis of government and policing that was meant to subjugate Blacks and continues to this day. CRT proponents suggest that because of the difficult historical relationship between minorities and the police that policing is racist and populated by officers with racist attitudes,explaining that the police are simply a force to be used by rich White people to control an unruly Black populations (Roberts and Race, 1999; Pratt-Harris et al., 2016; Tobias and Josephs, 2020) and that the socialization that goes on in police departments have promoted the stereotype of Blacks as being violent criminals(Tolliver et al, 2016) and that police focus on minorities is in fact racist (Balko, 2020). Welsh et al. (2020), in their San Francisco PD traffic stop research, state that in interviews with officers that “officers’ accounts excuse, justify, or otherwise negate the role of race in routine police work” but yet despite a lack of explicit racism they see officers verbalize  micro racial aggressions by adhering to racial narratives, which they say will then eventually lead to disparate outcomes. Rose (2018) claims the biased nature of violent police interactions are not held accountable in court because she presumes that racism extends to prosecutors reluctant to judge officers’ actions as wrong, to  grand juries failing to indict, to juries failing to convict, and to judges failing to punish. Kahn et al., in 2016, found that based on use of force case files and subject booking photos, that police used less force with people who looked more “stereotypically White”.

OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH ON ARREST AND USE OF FORCE

However, simply because disparities exist in descriptive statistics or even in multivariate regression models is not evidence that there is racial bias or discrimination.. Descriptive statistics provide only raw numbers and exaggerate racial disparities and further analysis is needed to move beyond correlation and into causation (Ridgeway, 2007). Modeling with appropriate variables is important and can provides answers that less complete or nuanced models cannot. Multivariate statistical modeling is necessary to control for the influence of other variables that might drive the racial differences, such as variables like education, income, poverty, and social status, whose lower levels are both associated with Blacks and with greater likelihood of criminal involvement. Other variables like residency in high crime neighborhoods, crime rates, socially disorganized neighborhoods, and neighborhood gang activity help drive the amount of police presence and activity and these areas are also disproportionately populated by minorities. Because of the correlation, or association, that is shared between these variables and minorities like Blacks and Hispanics, they must be controlled for, in a sense, taken out of the equation. Without that accounting,  it may give the impression that the disparities in outcomes like arrest are because the subject is facing racial bias, when instead it is because of the other criminogenic variables that some minorities are disproportionately associated with. Two areas of policing that have been claimed to be racially driven are arrests and the use of force. In the following sections, an overview of some of the scientific research on race in relation to these police activities is examined that runs counter to the argument of racial bias in policing because of refinements in defining statistical modeling and the inclusion  appropriate variables

Arrests

While some commentators focus on racial disparities in arrest as evidence of racial bias, “social scientists remain unsure as to whether Black or White criminal suspects have a higher probability of arrest” while other research finds no significant association between a suspect’s race and the likelihood of arrest (Arndt et al., 2020). Often there are other variables that once accounted for allow those differences in probability to shrink or disappear and those racial disparities can be explained. While evidence of disparities have existed for decades so has research that examines the reason those racial disparities appear to exist. Disrupted or disorganized social structure, poverty and lower social status can confound racial data on arrests as minorities disproportionately reside in social disorganized and poor neighborhoods. For example both Hollinger (1984) in examining a DUI crackdown and, Sealock and Simpson (1998) in their research on Philadelphia juvenile offenders found the racial effects on arrest lost statistical significance once socioeconomic status (SES) was accounted, indicating a person’s social status, rather than their race, became the significant factor in whether a person was arrested. Fielding-Miller et al. (2020) in studying whether high proportions of drug arrests for Black males were linked to areas of higher levels of White female population found that the connection was attenuated, though not completely eliminated, by including socioeconomic variables in their model concluding that economics must be included in the discussion of criminal justice disparities, not just race alone. In 2008, Kirk also found that Chicago minority youths faced significantly higher levels of concentrated poverty and lower levels of collective efficacy than White youths and that unstable family structure explains much of the disparities in arrest across race and ethnicity. They conclude that while substantial arrest differences still existed,  numerous family level covariates are significantly and substantially associated with arrest and the racial and ethnic differences in  family demographics and structure explain large percentages of the disparities in arrest between Black youth and other racial and ethnic youths. Finkeldey and Demuth (2019)looking for a connection between self-identified race/ethnicity, self-identified skin color, and self-reported arrest found that  focusing on race or ethnicity masks difference in arrest by color but also found that social disadvantage partially explained those associations. In a youth survey, Schleiden et al. (2020) found partial support for a social disorganization hypothesis, determining that Blacks experienced more neighborhood disorder than Whites, which was linked to their young adult arrest rates and it was Blacks exposure to violence that was linked to more alcohol use, delinquency, and arrests in emerging adulthood.

Other behaviors specific to the conditions minorities may live in may be exhibited that expose minorities to a greater likelihood of arrest. Camplain et al. (2020) in their study on drug and alcohol arrests discovered that minorities were more likely than Whites to be booked into jail on both misdemeanor and felony charges alcohol /drug charges than Whites and it cannot be attributed to their greater drug or alcohol use in general. Mitchell and Caudy (2015) arrived at a similar conclusion suggesting disproportionate minority drug arrests are not explained by drug offending, non-drug offending, or residence in neighborhoods with a high police focus on drugs, but instead attribute it to racial bias. However, back in 2006, Ramchand et al. revealed that one likely explanation for part of the disparities is not use but the difference in purchasing behavior between Blacks and Whites. Their analysis showed that Blacks, as compared to Whites, were nearly twice as likely to buy outdoors, three times more likely to buy from a stranger, as well as significantly more likely to be buy away from their homes. These factors afford more police scrutiny and an increased likelihood of arrest.

A number of other factors, once included in statistical models, provide evidence that racial disparities can be explained by other variables, rather than support the suggestion that police officer behaviors are driven by racial bias. One of the most basic variables that needs to be accounted for is differential criminal involvement of different racial groups. Petersilia (1983) in her examination of arrest in California from 1980 found mixed findings with Whites being somewhat more likely than minorities to be arrested on a warrant and considerably less likely to be released with charges. While noting that the actual of likelihood for any offender to arrested is quite low, regardless of race, she found that Blacks were not overrepresented in their race relative to the kind or amount of crimes they commit. As Kirk (2008), Tapia, (2011),Schleiden et al. (2020) and other researchers have noted through official data, the National Crime Victim Survey, and self-reports that Black and Hispanic youths disproportionately commit serious crimes relative to Whites. D’Alessio and Stolzenberg (2003), utilizing National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) data, the successor to the UCR,  examined 335,619 incidents of rape, robbery, and assault in 17 states during 1999 and determined the likelihood of arrest for White and Blacks suspects was roughly equal and that the “disproportionately high arrest rate for Black citizens is most likely attributable to differential involvement in reported crime rather than racially biased law enforcement practices”. Schleiden et al. (2020) while not finding a difference in frequency of delinquent behaviors between Black and White youths, found significant differences in self-reported offenses with Black youth disproportionately being involved in buying, selling, or holding stolen property, deliberately writing a bad check, breaking into a house to steal something, using a weapon to get what they want, and using a weapon in fight. Despite these findings, Schleiden et al. characterize the higher arrest rates for Black youths as possible evidence of racial bias. They did not investigate whether the neighborhood disadvantage and exposure to violence for Blacks could lead to differentiated criminal behavior, for example more serious, or violent behavior, that would more likely result in arrest, as opposed to examining just frequency of behavior.

In that regard, another variable that has to be accounted for is seriousness of the offense, whereas the more serious the offense, the greater the likelihood of arrest.Schleiden and her colleagues (2020) had already noted the research that indicates minorities are committing more crime over a longer period of time, are engaging in more criminal behaviors, and committing more serious crimes than Whites, which consequently are more likely to be reported to the police , and thus more likely to result in arrest. Sealock and Simpson (1998) as well found that officers strongly considered offense seriousness in their decision to arrest. Brown  (2005) also found that regardless of suspect race, legal factors like offense serious influence the decision to arrest. The seriousness of offending was also a factor in Tapia’s  2011 national youth survey. Noting research that indicates Blacks’ self-reported serious offense rates are double that of Whites, Tapia found a disproportionate amount of minorities in gang membership and that delinquency and arrests rates are much higher for gang members than non-gang members. However their regression analysis showed that as gang members they had increased rates of arrest, but their race was not a significant factor in arrest. Tapia concluded that because minority youths make up a much larger portion of gang membership they feel the effect of arrest greater. This likelihood of arrest is affected by the introduction of criminal behavior, not by the race of the gang members themselves. Raphael and Rozo (2019) also found that offense severity and criminal history were significant factors in arrest. While Black juvenile offenders were booked at a higher rate, a significant portion of the Black/White disparity was attributable to differences in arrest offense severity and criminal history.

Another legal factor that also strongly influences the likelihood of arrest is the presence of evidence or solvability factors.Brown (2005) found that regardless of race, the presence of evidence was a significant factor in the decision to arrest. Briggs and Opsal (2012) in examining victim ethnicity on arrest in violent crimes found that while race and ethnicity of the victim are related to police clearance of cases, the relationship between case clearance and case solvability factors is stronger. Arndt et al. (2020) also found that in homicides, suspect race did not play a noteworthy role in influencing the likelihood of arrest once the strength of physical evidence against the subject is accounted for. Solvability and the presence of evidence, as well as arrest itself, may be linked to  demeanor of the individuals involved either as witnesses or suspects. Extensive research has shown that minorities tend to hold more negative views of the police. These negative views can prompt uncooperative behavior from victims and witnesses or behavior that is confrontational or resistive, which will influence the likelihood of arrest. However, Drawve et al. (2014) in their analysis of the likelihood of arrest for aggravated assault, found that Blacks had a significantly lower chance of being arrested than Whites, with the authors postulating that the decreased likelihood of arrest for Blacks may stem from Black witnesses and victims lack of cooperation with the police, or perhaps by less of a focus by police on Black crime linked to this lack of cooperation. Other researchers like Brown (2005) have also found that suspect demeanor plays a role in the likelihood of arrest. More than a negative demeanor may develop from vicarious or actual interactions with the police. Gibbons et al. (2020) in their longitudinal study of Black young adults found that those who perceived to have been racial discriminated against, including being “hassled” by the police, especially in their childhood, were more likely to have reported being arrested or incarcerated as adults. However, in the path to that connection were also self-reported deviant associates, substance use, and illegal behaviors that in all likelihood contributed to being “hassled by the police” and their subsequent higher arrest rates. They also found that those who exhibited high racial pride were less likely to commit illegal acts in general but yet reported more illegal behavior after perceived racial discrimination from the police.

Studies need to account for policing styles, practices, or policies that while not driven by racial bias, may disproportionately affect minorities. Drawve et al. (2014) notes that overall police strategies and resources will affect the likelihood of arrest. Police resources will undoubtedly be focused in areas of greater need as well as for particular efforts that focus on DUIs, street crimes, or drug activity. Crackdowns, problem oriented policing, and hotspot policing have all demonstrated effectiveness on reducing crime When these efforts are occurring in areas with large proportions of minorities, such as high crime areas, minorities will be affected by stops and arrests disproportionately (Weisburd et al, 2016) though Schleiden et al. (2020) fear that will affect officers’ perception of differences in behavior and character between Blacks and Whites. In examining the racial disparities found in the NYPD stop, question, and frisk practices,Evans et al. (2014) found the police focused those activities in areas with high levels of violent crime, which are areas that are highly populated by minorities. Lum (2011) describes that policing is moving away from a person based approach to one based on place. Various factors in areas or neighborhoods help drive criminal activity and disorder and addressing those underlying place based problems is at the core of community based policing, as well as utilized in hotspot policing and anti-gang and drug interventions. These places and their characteristics such as SES, poverty, racial and ethnic makeup, disorder, crime, pedestrian and traffic density and land use provide place-based cues which will affect officer behavior, decision, making and attitude (Lum, 2011) as well as affect precinct and department policy and behavior. She notes while they have proven to be effective as anti-crime efforts they’ve also drawn criticism because police presence in minority areas results in disparate arrest outcomes. In her place based study of the interaction of the proportion of race, level of wealth, and level of violence in an area, the more violent an area accounted for greater arrests but she also found the police more informally handled complaints (less likely to write reports or make an arrest and reducing the seriousness of crime classifications) in areas with greater wealth and in areas of larger Black populations who are more disadvantaged. Lum unfortunately wasn’t able to determine the reason for these opposing results, considering officer attitude or beliefs, department or precinct policing style, amount of police resources, community demands or expectations for service, or an interaction of all of them may have accounted for the results. Raphael and Rozo (2019) found that while there were racial disparities in non-violent felony youth arrest bookings, a very large share of that difference was accounted for by agency variables. Agencies that tended to arrest Black youth were equally likely to arrest Whites and Hispanics. Tougher policies regarding arrest in large cities will also affect minority arrests as these cities have higher minority populations. They note that 75% of the disparity in bookings between Blacks and Whites and 66% of the disparity between Hispanics and Whites were explainable by the observable factors of criminal history offense severity, and the penchant for certain law enforcement agencies to arrest and formerly book youth offenders

One area not frequently examined, typically for lack of data, is officer race in the decision to arrest. Brown and Frank (2006) note that some efforts in police reform have focused on increasing the number of Black officers with little empirical evidence that an officer’s race or ethnicity is actually related to their behavior toward citizens. In their systematic observation study in Cincinnati, they made an interesting finding. In general, White officers were more likely to arrest suspects than Black officers, but Black suspects were more likely to be arrested when the decision maker was a Black officer.

Unfortunately, not all researchers in preparing a study seek out, have access to, or utilize data from these explanatory variables. The types of data will significantly affect the quality of the findings. For example, Penner and Saperstein (2015) used the US National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health to “disentangle the effects of self-identifying as Black compared to others identifying you as Black on subsequently being arrested”. They revealed that the odds of arrest are three times greater for someone identified as Black, proclaiming that racial perceptions play an important role in arrest disparities. However they also admitted that they had no detailed information on the circumstances surrounding the arrests such as evidence, demeanor, or compliance. Other variables that were not included would also have been informative (criminal history, police record, type of offense) as these might also have factored into the arrests. A study like this has little social science value and amounts to little more than an observation as it seeks to determine a component that might have affected arrest, without actually looking at the arrest occurrence itself. Other studies as well face these limitations. In the previously discussed 2008 Kirk study, he notes the lack of data on victim/offender relationship, seriousness of the offense, and subject demeanor would all be factors related to arrest decisions. In preparing his 2011 examination of youth gang arrests, Tapia having discovered insignificantly higher rates of arrest for minority gang members compared to White gang members, also recognized limitations in the study that didn’t account for the complainant’s demand for arrest, presence of evidence, and subject demeanor which all affect the decision to arrest.

Other sociological reasons that lead to higher arrest issues that should be accounted for in samples include substance use and mental health issues, (Schleiden et al., 2020) which will likely have a disproportionate affected on disordered or poor neighborhoods, which will also likely be high crime neighborhoods with large populations of minorities. They emphasize that it is crucial that in examining racial disparities “to simultaneously consider multiple theories and include a variety of individual and contextual factors within the analyses”. However, Lantz and Wenger (2019) also demonstrated that researchers must approach their overall analytical approach carefully. They stated that in their quasi experiment examining potential differences in arrest for Black and White co-offenders, using traditional logistic regression, Black offenders were 75% less likely than White offenders to be arrested. Putting the data into a multi-level model with partnership data, including victim and offense characteristics, nested with demographic and arrest data, in examining within partnership differences between Black and White co-offenders they found that Black offenders were 3% more likely to be arrested than their White co-offenders. While the authors suggest that traditional regression analysis may contain significant selection and omitted variable bias, they do not provide an explanation about why the disparity may exist. Elliot (1995) even notes using arrest statistics to show anything representative about the general population or police activity is flawed. While many researchers are aware that arrest data may include false positives and errors of omission, it should be noted that arrest statistics may not be representative of offenders in the population. Elliot states that compared to self-reports of violent crime, arrest data underreports these offenses and research results are mixed on whether there are any racial differences in the number of self-reported offenses. Ultimately Lum (2011) determines that the only way to understand why the disparities occur is to continue to use further systematic and qualitative approaches including social observation, ethnographic analyses and in-depth interviews, and psychological examination of both officer and citizen mentality.

Use of Force

The same issues surrounding research into racial disparities in arrest exist for those disparities in the use of force. Researchers like Tolliver, et al. (2016) contend that the U.S. has a White supremacy basis and a racist adherence to the stereotype of Black males as violent criminals. They contend that White privilege is the cause of higher incidence of use of force with Black subjects. For proof, they reference evidence taken from shoot/don’t shoot videogame studies that a shooter bias exists because some results indicate Blacks were shot faster than Whites. The disparities witnessed between Blacks and other races in police use of force are often attributed to racial bias and discrimination (Buehler, 2017; Hehman et al., 2018;Ross et al., 2020; Durlauf and Heckman, 2020) For example, Pratt-Harris et al. (2016)contend that the core of policing is racist, incorrectly attributing policing’s roots to American slave patrols, and that Blacks disproportionate involvement in crime is untrue, blaming crime in those neighborhoods on racist city policies. They believe a stronger focus should be put on revealing the racist aspects of policing and that focusing on individual “bad apple” officers dilutes the message of systemic racism.

However, as with arrests, alternative explanations rather than racism exist as to why these disparities occur. Fridell and Lim (2016) note that neighborhoods matter; with more force used in disadvantaged, high crime neighborhoods. While these places are typically populated with minorities, once controlling for neighborhood context, the disparity in racial use of force disappears. Lautenschlager and Omori (2017), found a different neighborhood effect. While they found that use of force was concentrated in Black neighborhoods, neighborhoods with higher ethnic  and racial diversity  have decreasing force incidents but with increasing severity. Ross (2015) found that racial bias was most likely to occur in large metropolitan counties with low median income and a sizable portion of Black residents, especially with high financial equity, however he did not find racial bias in shootings to be associated with county crime rates.

It is well known and easily understood that serious crimes and crimes involving weapons or violence will more likely involve the use of force then other incidents. Arrest and complaint data have consistently shown a significantly higher degree of involvement of Blacks in these types of offenses like robbery, aggravated assault, and murder, which then drives disparities in use of force data. Research has indicated that use of force is related to racial/ethnic minority involvement in criminal activity and their resistance to police intervention (Fridell and Lim, 2016). Cesario et al. (2019) examined two year worth of officer involved fatal shootings. When adjusting for crime rate and minority criminal involvement they found no evidence of anti-Black disparities in fatal shootings, fatal shootings of unarmed citizens, and fatal shootings involving misidentification of harmless objects.

Subject demeanor compliance, and resistance strongly influence the application of force (Engel et al., 2000; Fridell and Lim, 2016; Mears, et al., 2017; Morrow et al., 2017) examined use of force in Terry stops and while Black and Hispanic had small but significant effects on the use of non-weapon force, many other factors had a much greater influence on whether force was used, including being frisked, arrested, matching subject description, engaging in violence, and noncompliance. In weapon use of force, race was no longer a significant factor but rather noncompliance was strongly related to that use of force, along with matching subject description, suspected of a violent crime, presence of weapons, being searched, frisked, proximity to offense and whether it was radio dispatch. High crime areas though had significantly lower use of weapons use and the racial makeup of the police precincts had no significant influence on whether force was used. Fryer (2019) found that in non-lethal force, while Blacks and Hispanics were 50% more likely than Whites to experience force in a police interaction, once situational context and subject behavior was accounted for no racial differences were found. He also found in officer involved shootings there were no racial disparities present. Atiba Goff and Barsamian Kahn (2012) suggest that officers have two kinds of authority, moral and physical. When subjects portray officers as illegitimate because of a presumption of racism, officers are stripped of their moral authority in the eyes of the subject, and thus themselves, and have only physical authority to rely on for compliance. This reliance on physical authority, generated from the situational context, may then generate racial disparities in the use of force, rather than actual racial discrimination.

Linking Implicit Bias to Racism in the Use of Force

Drakulich, et al. (2020) state that modern racism rests on two key principles: a denial or minimization of contemporary racial discrimination and inequalities, and a focus on individualism and meritocracy that (implicitly or explicitly) blames racial disparities on people of color by arguing that they lack the proper work ethic and discipline to succeed in today’s fair, equal-opportunity society. Levinson and Young (2009) declare that racism has been shifting away from overt and intentional racism of the past to covert and unintentional. They complained that in attempting to proving a case of racism; showing intent, and not just an adverse effect, is difficult and we should focus more on whether anything symbolic of racism was present rather than an actual intent to discriminate. They contend that racism can be non-conscious and automatic and that these biases can be uncovered by using the Implicit Association Test (IAT). Holroyd (2015) claims that because implicit bias exists, then if must be causing police officers to behave in a racially biased manner, and if it affects police officers then it must also affect policy makers in the department causing them to be racially biased as well, thus supporting his contention of institutionalized racism. Holroyd both calls for studies to examine if and how implicit bias affects policing, and yet proclaims that implicit bias is causing discriminatory police work. He states that raising awareness of implicit bias can change it, and that the effects of implicit bias must be mitigated because evidence of implicit bias mean policing is racially biased and thus illegitimate.

The Implicit Association Test basically measures the speed of a pushbutton response in an image/word association test. An image type, for example those indicating different races or genders, is paired with words that either have a positive connotation, like happy, or a negative connotation, like disgust, and participants are measured on their speed in correctly responding. The image and word types are then reversed and participants are measured again. If an individual associates a negative word faster with one image type than another it suggests they hold a bias or adherence to a stereotype. Humans tend to categorize people and object in to group membership, attributing stereotypes to those members in order to make sense  and add structure their world. These implicit biases operate outside of conscious awareness and are not necessarily based in animosity as research has shown that implicit biases exist in people who consciously hold no prejudiced attitudes (Fridell and Lim, 2016). Fridell and Lim also note that people can override their implicit biases and have controlled responses. By recognizing their biases, motivated individuals can implement bias-free behavior (2016).

Tests like these demonstrated that people have an inherent bias toward their ingroup (the type of people that resemble them the most) and bias against outgroups (individuals who do not resemble them) and that these biases occur within all people in areas of gender, race, sexual orientation, religion, and body shape (Fridell, 2016; Fridell and Lim, 2016). In that regard, people naturally will be quicker to make positive associations toward people that look more like them and slower to make those positive associations toward people who appear different to them. Likewise, people will naturally be slower in making negative associations about their ingroup and faster in making negative associations about outgroups. Fridell and Lim also note however, these tests can also demonstrate the possible degree that people adhere to negative stereotypes about race and possibly indicate a racial bias in an individual they were perhaps unaware of or preferred to outwardly conceal (2016).

Commentators and researchers state that a persistent stereotype of the violent criminal as a Black male may generate bias against Blacks and may prompt the use of force, or greater use of force than would be necessary, as compared to police reactions to other races. Wilson et al. (2017) found in college student studies that photo examples of Blacks were subjectively assessed to a very small, but significant, degree, as having greater size, strength, or formidability of threat. However, in 2019, Johnson and Wilson found that while race does impact judgments of size and strength to a certain degree, raters primarily tracked objective physical features. They even found that in some cases racial stereotypes actually improved group level accuracy as these stereotypes aligned with nationally representative data of racial group differences in size and strength  Kahn and her associates, in 2016, examined subject’s booking photos and coded them for the presence of  typical Black or White facial features while examining the severity of force used in the arrest. In their regression analysis the police used less force with highly stereotypically featured Whites and they suggest an intragroup bias from White officers is a protective factor in the severity of use of force.

However while there are stereotypes of Blacks as dangerous, violent, or criminals, other stereotypes that citizens have about policing exist as well. Mears et al. (2017)states that both police and citizens can bring their biases to police encounters and that when minorities express negative views of the police, question police legitimacy, and believe their neighborhoods are subject to coercive policing, Blacks and other minorities may still perceive professional and courteous demeanor from the police as discriminatory (2017). Both direct and vicarious experiences influence minorities’ views of the police and their behavior, and negative perceptions of the police by minorities have been longstanding (Tapia, 2011). This will lead to noncompliance and resistance, and prompts the use of force from officers. Mears (2017) also notes that in encounters with subjects who are defiant, disrespectful, or violent may also mold officers perceptions and biases as well. Cooley et al. (2019) demonstrated in two studies that after merely reading about White privilege, study participants had increased perceptions of racism in violent encounters between the police and Black men, indicating the perception of racism in police actions is subjective and subject to outside and vicarious influences. Levin and Thomas (2005) in a study of how racial identity affects perceptions of police brutality, produced videotapes of a police interaction, changing the race of the officers in the different recordings, and found that both Black and White participants were significantly more likely to identify identical behavior in police officers as racist when both officers were White. Hall et al. (2016) suggest, without any supporting evidence, that police officers are high in Social Dominance Orientation and are thus more likely to inflict severe punishment on those who don’t submit to there demands. They also claimed, again without evidence, that police officers  typically have high conformity and low universalism values and, similarly to the non-officers participants in their study, would rate failure to comply more seriously, are more supportive of harsh punishment, and have less sympathy for offenders. The authors suggest that it’s the officers’ desire for dominance that prompts them to use “resisting arrest” or “failure to comply” as a precursor and justification to employ lethal force when their demands aren’t met.

Research to determine if implicit bias affects behavior typically took the form of video shooter simulations. Participants watch a video portrayal and must correctly identify whether the Black or White target in the video is armed with a weapon or holding a harmless object and push either a “a shoot” or don’t shoot” button. Participants are timed in the speed of their responses and their accuracy in decision making. Results of these types of studies revealed some consistent results (Correll et al. 2007). Participants of all races were quicker to decide to shoot armed Black targets than armed White targets and decide not to shoot unarmed White targets faster than unarmed Black targets (Correll et al., 2002; Correll et al., 2007; Correll and Keesee, 2009; Sadler et al., 2012; Senholzi et al., 2015). This suggests an adherence to the stereotype that Black males are violent or dangerous and the magnitude of the bias varied based on the perceptions of the cultural stereotype but not with personal racial prejudice (Correll et, 2002). However, when comparing police officers to citizen participants, officers also were quicker to decide to shoot Black subjects, but while citizens tended to favor a shoot response for Black subjects, suggesting bias,  officers, who’s racial bias in response times did not differ between White and non-White officers, were significantly more accurate than citizens in making the right choice  and showed weak or non-existent  racial bias in their shoot/don’t shoot decisions  (Correll, 2007; Correll and Keesee, 2009;Sadler et al., 2012, Atiba Goff and Barsamian Kahn, 2012).  James et al. (2014)wanted to explore the possibility that the racial biases exhibited truly affected behavior and questioned whether those type of video shooter studies would accurately predict real world behavior as the tests differ significantly from a real life situation. The researches utilized general population participants in a highly realistic deadly force shooting scenario and found, similar to other research, that associations between race and violence did not translate to biases in shooting behavior.

Implicit bias is not universal or immutable. Individuals can control their implicit biases through implicit bias awareness, cognitive control, and training, (Richardson, 2010) which may be available to some officers as well as conventional officer training, that while not affecting response time on stereotype-incongruent subjects (unarmed Blacks and armed Whites), did improve accurate responses over those of a citizen (Correll, 2007; Correll  and Keesee, 2009;Sadler, 2012; Atiba Goff and Barsamian Kahn, 2012; Correll, et al., 2014). Fridell and Lim (2016) also note that reaction time biases amongst officers were not universal, with bias large for officers from large cities, those with high minority or Black populations, and for officers who perceive greater violence in their communities. As members of a community, officers may share the same biases of their community or area and it’s critical to examine these biases in the communities they serve and how these might influence officer attitudes and the implementation of police policies(Correll, 2007).

Plant et al. (2011) also explored the little researched interaction of gender and race influencing the use of force. Using a shoot/don’t shoot video simulator in a study examining gender, White participants were biased against shooting a White female compared to a White male. In a second study, White participants showed a bias toward shooting Black men but a bias against shooting Black women and White ingroup members. The authors indicate that not just race, but gender, and its connection to perceptions of violence, is an important factor in shootings that have a racial component. Sadler et al. (2012) also explored biases toward other groups than Blacks. Interestingly, while college students participants only showed a bias against Blacks in their reaction times, officer participants also demonstrated reaction time biases toward Latinos relative to Asians and Whites, and toward Whites relative to Asians; racial biases in their reaction times that mirrored perceived racial criminal involvement. They did find that the more aggressive police officers perceived the stereotype of Blacks to be, the more accurate they were in decisions about whether Blacks were armed. While increased perceptions of aggressiveness in Asians led officer to be more accurate in their decisions, they were less accurate with Latinos when having holding perceptions of aggressiveness. Participants were also better able to distinguish between weapons and  non-threatening objects better when held by Black and Latino subjects compared to Whites and Asians. The authors consider that the association of Blacks and Latinos with danger may lead to faster correct responses through increased cognitive attention to a potential threat but these biases in reaction times did not manifest themselves in the decisions themselves and no racial bias was evident in officers’ decision-making.

The influence of a potential threat doesn’t have to be based in race, but in the perception of the level of threat based on contextual cues or how attentive one is to potential interpersonal threat.. Correll et al. (2011)argue that the bias seen in faster shoot responses to armed Black targets and faster don’t shoot responses to unarmed White targets may not stem from  racial animosity but reflects the perception of threat, specifically the threat associated with Black males. To examine the influence of danger cues other than race, the researches used a shoot/don’t shoot video simulator with the targets embedded in threatening and safe backgrounds. While a typical racial bias was seen in decision making toward Black and White targets in safe backgrounds, threatening backgrounds saw this racial bias disappear as the dangerous contextual cues provided more influence on shooting behavior, with the reduction in racial bias largely due to an increased tendency to shoot White targets. . However, Miller et al. (2012) suggest that the basis of shooter bias may not involve racial or cultural stereotypes. In one study, using arbitrarily formed groups not based on racial or cultural stereotypes, and in another, using Asians as a group typically not stereotyped as dangerous, they found that participants with strong beliefs about interpersonal threats were more likely to mistakenly shoot outgroup members than ingroup members.

Different neural mechanisms underlie this increased cognitive attention to threat assessment based on the stereotype of the violent Black male. Senholzi et al. (2015) conducted a shoot/don’t shoot video simulator study with participants connected to an MRI. They exhibited the typical bias toward quicker shoot response for Blacks and  quicker to not shoot for Whites but different parts of the brain were activated depending on the race of the target. Greater implicit Black-danger associations were associated with increased activity in the amygdala (the portion of the brain responsible for the fight or flight response). The parietal and occipital regions (responsible for processing movement and vision information) also exhibited greater activity for armed Blacks than Whites and a greater connectivity of these regions to the amygdala with armed Blacks. However, the anterior cingulate cortex (an area of the brain that detects and monitors for error and suggests an appropriate motor reaction) was preferentially engaged for unarmed White targets over unarmed Black targets.

Correll et al. (2014) notes that while target race does affect officers’ reaction times they generally do not show a pattern of biased shooting, suggesting that police performance depends on the exercise of cognitive control which allows officers to overcome the influence of stereotypes. Mears, et al. (2017) also expands on the cognitive processes that goes into these decisions. Police/citizen encounters require rapid assessment that demands reliance on cognitive shortcuts, “thinking fast”. When rapid mental processing is needed, as in  a dangerous situation, all people rely on cognitive short cuts to make the quickest, most accurate assessments in a situation. However if those shortcuts are based on a flawed assumption they can lead to decision making errors. Ma et al. (2013) consider though that officers must have ample cognitive resources to fully regulate automatic response, and thus control implicit bias. If this cognitive control is compromised through fatigue it may lead to great racial disparities in shoot/don’t shoot decisions.Similarly, James (2018)in examining the stability of implicit bias in police officers found that implicit bias was not stable and that when officers slept less prior to testing they demonstrated stronger associations between Blacks and weapons. Nieuwenhuys et al. (2012)also explored the effect of anxiety on officers’ decision to shoot. By utilizing low and high anxiety physical experiment conditions, the researchers found that officers in anxious conditions made more mistakes in correctly shooting only armed targets, had reduced shot accuracy, but also responded more quickly when the target had a gun. With gaze behavior not changing, the authors concluded in anxious conditions officers were more inclined to respond on the basis of threat related inferences and expectations than relying on visual information.

Research Issues in the Use of Force

Methodological issues and disagreement between researchers complicate the question of racial bias in the use of force. While Ross (2015) found that Blacks had a slightly lower probability of being shot if armed vs unarmed compared to Whites and Hispanics, unarmed Blacks had a 3.5 greater chance of being shot than unarmed Whites. However, Ross’ study did not include important variables like level of compliance or resistance, type of weapons subjects were armed with, whether threats were made, the seriousness of the offenses, and encounter rates. Despite the authors stating that they can’t know all the circumstances involved or the psychology of the officers at the time, they suggest the disparities exist because of racist norms in police departments. However they ignore clear evidence supporting community violence as a factor as well as evidence of Social Disorder theory. Other study design and analysis problems exit as well. Legewie (2016) examined the rate of change in use of force incidents following the line of duty deaths of NY police officers. However, while the pretest period gathered data for a year, the post test period following the officers deaths was only two weeks. Legewie states that there was a significant increase in use of force against Blacks following two Black incidents, there was not a significant increase after a White and Hispanic incident, and no evidence of any institutional bias. However the small sample and a lack of examination of contextual issues lessens the quality of the study. Such things as,  three of the four suspects were killed or arrested shortly after the incidents, the attacker still on the loose was Black, one of the Black attacks was an ambush, and that Blacks contributed to more than one death may have influenced officer actions based more on the circumstances and less on race.

Fridell (2016) notes that seven studies on race and police use of force came out in the first half of 2016 that were announced in the media that paraphrased them ranging from “there is bias in the use of force”, to :there is bias in some types of force, but not others”, to “there’s no bias in the use of force”. She explains that these disparate findings hinge on the methodologies used; sample characteristics, the number and types of agencies examined, how concepts were operationalized and the number and types of variables used. The quality of the study making a claim is important and research consumers need to critically analyze the results of studies. Rivera and Ward (2017)also make the case for improving analytic frameworks and utilizing an integrated approach in the study of race and policing in both methodology and evaluative analysis. Perspective, approach, and study quality all matter. Differing methodologies and analyses, with varying degrees of rigor, can produce disparate results, with no clear research consensus. Hollis and Jennings (2018) conducted a meta review of 41 studies which examined public and police officer perceptions of force, rates of use of force, types of force used, neighborhood context correlates of use of force and the severity of the force used. In the end they concluded that the relationship between race and use of force “remains unclear”‘ This was the conclusion Petersilia reached in 1983, when 30 years of prior research still did not have a definitive answer. Fryer (2018) states that at while there are racial differences in the use of non-lethal force, in regards to potentially lethal use of force the most granular data shows there is no bias in police shootings. However Durlauf and Heckman (2020) take issue with that conclusion, contending that just because statistically no difference was shown between races in police shooting, doesn’t mean there wasn’t racial discrimination. Ross et al. (2020) also argue against the conclusions of Cesario et al. (2019) who stated that with proper benchmarking, data analysis shows no racial bias in shootings. Ross et al. argue that Cesario et al.’s benchmarking of crime rates doesn’t properly control for crime rate differences but instead masks true racial disparities in the killing of unarmed people by the police. Ross argues that unarmed individuals who were killed should be benchmarked as a ratio of the “noncriminal population”, simply assuming that not being armed, meant you were not aggressive, and thus not a  criminal. Taking those assumption, Ross states it would show there were racial biases. Roussell et al. (2017) takes issue with a James et al. 2016 study that demonstrated that officers had slower response times and fewer shooting errors in a video simulation. James and associates suggested that a fear of adverse legal and social consequences led police officers to be more cautious in shooting decisions involving Blacks than Whites, dubbing this a “reverse racism” effect. Roussell et al. take offense at this characterization, stating reverse racism can’t exist, the term is used to undermine efforts toward racial equity, that if officers  did fear repercussions they must realize how unlikely it would be that they are punished, and criticized James et al. for not properly considering that studying police and race is actually about studying racism and policing.

MAKING SENSE OF DISPARITIES

Atiba Goff and Barsamian Kahn, in 2012, examined why we know less than we should in regard to racial bias in policing. While research has found evidence of disparities, there is a lack of evidence establishing that racial discrimination exists in the social institution of policing. Public opinion data about the presence of systemic bias, often based on disparities, carries no value as it offers only subjective views and no evidence. Distinguishing between disparity and discrimination can be complicated by a number of factors. Limitations in department data, subjective claims of racism without witnesses, limitations in national data on crime and race, and other factors make it difficult to distinguish between simple racial disparities in policing and racial discrimination at the officer, local, or national level. In 1983, Petersilia discussed the reasons for disparate results and the difficulty of distinguishing racial discrimination from racial disparities, reasons that still exist today.. Some studies utilize databases that are too small to permit generalization, others failed to control for enough (or any) of the other factors that might account for apparent racial discrimination. Atiba Goff and Barsamian Kahn (2012) discuss finding the appropriate benchmark for the variables used in analysis can be problematic. For example, in research on racial profiling or racial disparities in stops or arrestees, trying to find an accurate ratio, essentially getting the proper denominator, is crucial, and different benchmarks can provide disparate results. In their analysis of pedestrian stops, using the population of crime suspect descriptions, Blacks pedestrians were stopped 20 to 30 percent lower than their representations in crime suspect descriptions. But Blacks were stopped at nearly the same rate as their representation in the arrestee population. However in using the least reliable (as it doesn’t take into account differential rates of crime participation by race or for differential exposure to the police) but more widely used census data, Black pedestrians were stopped at  rate 50% higher than their representation in the census.

Atiba Goff and Barsamian Kahn (2012) state while some research puts police officers racial bias at roughly the same level as the public in general it does not show that theses biases translate to discriminatory behavior, noting that in social psychology attitudes traditionally predicts less than 10 % of the variance in behavior. They note that even if racially biased attitudes produce some level of biased behavior it’s not clear how much it produces. Ridgeway discovered in 2007 that in the NYPD SQF program just 7% (2,756) of the total number of officers accounted for 54% of the total number of 2006 stops. In patrolling the same areas, at the same times, and with the same assignments a very small percentage of officers (15 total) stopped substantially more Blacks or Hispanics than other officers. Internal benchmarks are necessary to compare officers performance to similar officers to see if any discriminatory patterns exist but these can measure only officer behavior, not institutional behavior (Ridgeway, 2007; Ridgeway and MacDonald, 2009; Atiba Goff and Barsamian Kahn, 2012) However this would provide a statistical means to identify the “bad apples” in the department, important as these bad apples are possibly performing racially biased police, affecting those they interact with, as well as continue to reinforce the arguable narrative of racist policing (Futterman et al., 2007). Goff & Kahn also recount the problems of a lack of access to police data through secrecy or because it was uncollected, and a difference in police and academic culture that can result in a poor collaboration as well as problems with methodology and rigor. Using low quality data and focusing on base rates and descriptive statistics, research like this fails to utilize multivariate analyses which can isolate the roles of the institution and officer to examine their influences. With these limitations in demographics, policies, and outcomes, it is difficult to develop principles and theoretical frameworks with which to predict racial disparities and diagnose racial discrimination.

CONCLUSION

While the current social narrative beats the drum of systemic racial bias in policing, research tells a different, more nuanced story. It is a well-researched and undeniable fact that racial disparities exist in police/citizen interactions. But regardless of the opinions of social commentators and some researchers, these disparities are in no way proof of racial discrimination. Raw data and descriptive statistics exaggerate the real racial differences in police activities. Researchers need to locate and utilize appropriate benchmarks. Discrimination can’t be determined if the ratios that would indicate that conclusion are not calculated appropriately. Descriptive statistics do not allow to take into account other factors that will affect the likelihood of having force used or being arrested. There are a large number of factors that go into a decision to arrest or use force. While no statistical analysis can be perfect, if we are studying racial disparities in these areas, inclusion of as many of these important variables are necessary before claims of systemic bias can possibly be supported.

However, problems in methodologies arise in attempting to show that systemic bias in policing is present as much criminal justice research is conducted using pre-existing data; the data sets used for these analyses can be lacking important variables and their associated data. Criminal justice research has already established the wide variety of variables that strongly affect police activities like arrest and use of force outside of any racial effect. Research  with these data sets may not provide a complete picture of what is driving criminal justice outcomes when they lack important variables related to racial difference that affect outcome measures.

When examining police behavior for bias, the statistical model depends on the variables available within the dataset(s) used. If only a few independent controlling variables are used, the explanatory power is reduced. Many statistical models that rely on descriptive statistics, and even some multi-variate models will lack important variables that could influence racial disparities.

Some are geographical like neighborhood crime rates, neighborhood race demographics, crime distribution, and policing initiatives put in place by police or city management. Some are situational context variables at the scene like  violence occurring, the presence of weapons and evidence and may be hard to measure such as the victims’ desire for charges or arrests, witness cooperation and truthfulness, degree of evidence present, and factors contributing to the risk of officer safety like physical location, surroundings, number of people present, There also some contextual variables related to the subject, variables that may be disproportionately associated with minorities, like the seriousness of the crime, racial differences in crime involvement, presence in high crime areas, and demeanor, noncompliance and resistance.  All of these variables have a significant effect on whether or not an arrest is performed or force is used. Research has demonstrated once these variables are controlled for, the racial disparities shrink or disappear. The racially disproportionate amount of arrests and use of force stem from the other variables that drive crime and police activity, which negates a racial bias argument.

While comprehensive, well-constructed studies with quality data sets and rigorous methodologies do not suggest there is any systemic racial bias in policing, the search for racial bias has continued by examining behavior, specifically whether unconscious biases about race may generate racial disparities in the use of force. Even the concept of implicit bias doesn’t clearly indicate racial bias might occur in behavior. Research has shown that not everyone has the same implicit biases or even biases against outgroups, and that implicit bias can be controlled or mitigated, as well as that outside factors, like current events, situational factors, and physiological effects, can affect the level of implicit bias and how well it can be controlled.

The Implicit Association Test is a well established technique for examining biases held by individuals. It seems to also be well-established from the shoot/no shoot video simulations that not just police officers but the general population, of all races, adhere to the stereotype of the violent Black male by being quicker to react to armed Black targets and slower to react to armed White targets. However, some research actually shows officers reacting slower to armed Black targets, perhaps using an overabundance of caution that might result from implicit bias awareness training or from an awareness of the scrutiny that police/Black citizen interactions can generate. In regards to the behavioral response, while the general public tended to make significantly more errors by shooting unarmed Black targets, officers did not, further indicating a lack of racial bias.

However, none of this addresses policing activities in general. Despite the existence of implicit bias, there is no way to measure it at any specific moment in a real police interaction, and subject behavior and demeanor will all have an influence on the strength of the implicit bias, that if present, may also affect police behavior. It is unknown whether in any given instance of police contact to what degree, if any, implicit bias is at work, and what degree other factors affecting police behavior are accounted for such as, types of calls for service, suspect description, witness statements evidence of a commission of a crime, and objectively suspicious behavior (though Richardson, 2010, claimed that police cannot objectively gauge suspicious behavior because of the racial bias that must be inherently present in policing because of their contact with minority criminality) may influence or account for officer behavior.

When comprehensive modeling is used, research has shown that often the disparities between Black and White outcomes disappear or become reduced to a level that could be explained by other important variables not measured. Without a statistically significant indication of any sizable racial disparity in arrests and use of force, with indications that a small percent of officers may generate notable disparities, without clear evidence of systemic overtly racist departmental policies or behavior, and a lack of proof that implicit bias against minorities is ongoing in police interactions and actually affects their behavior, the argument of systemic racial bias in policing is not supported. While it appears that there is no evidence of systemic racial bias in policing, it doesn’t mean that improvements can’t be made in race relations with the police and that we shouldn’t continue to monitor policing for indications of racial discrimination. There are undoubtedly “bad apples” in police departments around the country who are racially biased and who have very profound effects on peoples’ of color lives. But in a desire to eliminate racism from policing, efforts to identify it must be conducted with scientific rigor, because the truth matters. As Fryer (2018) said, “Of course, Black lives matter as much as any other lives. Yet we do this principle a disservice if we do not adhere to strict standards of evidence and take at face value descriptive statistics that are consistent with our preconceived ideas. “Stay woke”-but critically so”.

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Welcome to Criminal Justice Access

For March, be sure to check out these two features:

At Issue-An examination of stop and frisk, particularly in the context of the NYPD, to explore the particulars of the program, whether it is effective as a crime prevention program, and whether the NYPD program infringed on the 4th and 14th amendments and exhibited racial bias

Editorials and Opinions-My reaction piece to At Issue-Stop and Frisk Practices where I explore the necessity for stop and frisk, and how the practice of stop and frisk can be preserved and revised while minimizing racial discord

Stop and Frisk Practices

Introduction

Recently, former democratic presidential candidate Michael Bloomberg was criticized for his past comments supporting  the stop and frisk policy in New York during his tenure as mayor. On the face of his comments, he’s not wrong. Good police management puts resources where they are needed most and if a law enforcement or order maintenance perspective is being addressed, then the resources are put in high crime areas. Communities and citizens want the police to be proactive, not merely just responding to crimes that have already happened, but taking action to reduce or stop crime before it happens. If  we want the police to stop crime in high crime areas, they should focus their investigative efforts on those most likely to commit crimes or carry weapons. As Bloomberg noted, the high crime areas in New York City are urban, disadvantaged neighborhoods with a high minority populations, and those most likely to commit crimes are their male residents aged 15 to 30.

However, because of the perception that stop and frisk practices unfairly target minorities, stop and frisk is currently being viewed as biased at least, and racist at worst. The questions at issue become; is stop and frisk a useful or effective law enforcement technique, is it at its core biased, or is it a matter of how its applied, and as it has been applied in NYC and other places, was the practice biased? In this literature review, I will be examining early assessments of stop and frisk, more current perceptions of stop and frisk, and the scientific literature that examines whether disparities in stops are actually evidence of bias and whether stop and frisk had had any effect on violent crime. As this review will focus to a great degree on NYC and its practices, stop and frisk practices will be referenced as SQF in this review, which in NYC and other localities, signifies Stop, Question, and Frisk.

Early Overview

In 1968 stop and frisk as a practice was formalized by Terry v. Ohio when the Supreme Court ruled that police officers have the right to stop an individual on the street if they have a reasonable suspicion that the person is involved in a crime, that a crime has just occurred, or is about to occur. The ruling also allowed officers to briefly search an individual (a pat-down, or frisk) for the purpose of ensuring the individual didn’t have a weapon, done to help ensure officer safety. Prior to this, stop and frisk had been a common practice for police officers but this ruling established some constitutional limits and guidelines on the practice. With a reasonable suspicion (a lower standard than the probable cause used in 4th amendment search and seizure cases) an officer can make a stop (a temporary detention as opposed to a seizure) for investigative purposes and conduct a frisk or pat down of the outer clothing (as opposed to a formalized search).

During the ’60’s there were concerns over the possibility of infringement on civil rights when engaging in SQF. In fact while Terry v. Ohio was decided in 1968, in 1964 Ronayne was examining the newly enacted NY stop and frisk law noting in English common law the use of a reasonable suspicion in searching from early 19th century policing, a concept that carried over to American policing. The NY law pushed for by the police department through the mayor’s office authorized the temporary detention of persons if the officer reasonably suspects that a felony, or certain misdemeanors, is occurring, had occurred, or was about to occur in order to ascertain information. Once stopped, if the officer reasonably suspects he is in danger of life or limb, may frisk that person for a dangerous weapon. Ronayne states that the main issue from the first half of the 20th century was whether such a stop actually is an arrest. One school of thought held that it is dependent on the individual, that once the person feels they are not free to leave the presence of the officer, an arrest has occurred. The other school of thought is that it is dependent on the officer to decide when an arrest, the actual taking into physical custody for a criminal offense, has occurred. In a variety of states, court cases arguing whether arrests and searches were constitutional typically came down on the side of law enforcement, as well as making the distinction between probable cause and reasonable suspicion, and the difference between a temporary detention and arrest, thereby establishing a right to investigate for the police (Ronayne, 1964).

In 1965, Kuh also commented on politicians and defense attorneys “pontificating” on the unconstitutionality of New York’s 1964 stop and frisk law. He claimed media sources had distorted the meaning by ignoring the wording of the law, and defends the use of the words “reasonable” as an already well defined term in the US legal system and “suspects” (as opposed to “believes”) as it takes in the experiences, observations, and judgements of police officers as a determinate of what raises suspicion to warrant a stop and frisk. He also notes the English common law usage of the term “reasonably suspects” as well as similar language in the US Uniform Arrest Act as providing historical precedent. NY’s law also states that while not an arrest, any person not identifying themselves or explaining their actions to the satisfaction of the officer may be detained and investigated for up to two hours, but Kuh also argues that contrary to critics, it doesn’t violate the 5th amendment against self-incrimination because the law doesn’t not command that the person do so. He argues as well about the clear distinction between a search and pat down, which is done to ensure officer safety, not to gather evidence.

However, in 1967, Schwartz contends that police training that tells officers to consider everyone as being possibly armed, and working in high crime neighborhoods, can too easily translate into an excuse to frisk everyone officers encounter. Schwartz also states that some case law has found that simply feeling a bulge that may be a weapon does not constitute the probable cause necessary to conduct a warrantless search by reaching into the pocket and removing the item. Schwartz notes that some cases appear more to involve the police searching for a weapon they anticipate the person will be carrying rather than out of fear of officer safety. Schwartz also argues that the definition “reasonably suspects” may be questionable as the police by nature are suspicious to a degree more so than an average, reasonable person. Officers may unjustly be suspicious of a minority in a white area, or a manner of dress or behavior may unjustly arouse their suspicions which will complicate already difficult police minority relations. This leads Schwartz to question the constitutionality of the law and whether it could be adequately policed and free from bias, asserting any law enforcement benefit is not balanced by the infringement of rights.

The Nineties Perspective

Some 30 years later, Schwartz’s and others’ early views were predictive both of the constitutionality challenges stop and frisk laws and practices must face as well as the impact it may have on minority communities. 1n 1994, Harris concludes that the courts permissive attitudes toward stop and frisk have widened the net as to what constitutes reasonable suspicion and well as when a frisk may be conducted to the point that all persons may be subject to a search. If the reasonable suspicion involved a crime that may be associated with violence police have the right to automatically frisk and don’t need an articulable reasonable suspicion of danger to the officer.

However, what crimes may be associated with violence is subjective. Two offenses Harris claims have watered down Terry are drug cases and burglaries. While drug traffickers may commonly be in possession of weapons, this has translated to anyone who may be involved with drugs may also be armed, thus requiring an automatic frisk over what may be simple drug possession. Harris notes several state court cases where officers have overstepped their bounds and conducted searches framed as frisks without probable cause or sometimes even reasonable suspicion, as well as the US Supreme Court case Mn v. Dickerson that allowed officers to seize contraband as admissible evidence if its identity as such is readily apparent through touch during a frisk. Harris also notes this net widening of frisks includes burglary, as the tools of the trade could be used as weapons, as well as what’s termed dangerous places and people such as in illegal gambling houses, high crime areas, companions of individuals arrested, people present during a search warrant, and people placed in squad cars. He concludes to much deference is given to police testimonial in contentious cases and that data should be gathered on the level of dangerousness in requiring frisks, as well as new and clear guidelines  that establish what is allowable in these types of police interactions. Harris states too often race, seen as a proxy for criminality and dangerousness by the police, and becomes a component in reasonable suspicion. and Harris asserts that the existence of dangerousness must be present, not just could be present, in allowing a frisk.

Other jurisdictions faced the same challenges and questions as Murrill (1993) indicates in his review of Louisiana’s stop and frisk law and the 66 cases surrounding its use. Following Terry, four cases have helped define the ruling in Terry with the Supreme Court finding that: certain classes of typically non-violent crime (e.g. narcotics possession) don’t warrant an automatic frisk; an informant’s tip regarding weapon possession is sufficient to conduct a frisk; the physical observation of something that could be a weapon is sufficient to frisk, that persons in a location subject to a search warrant can’t be frisked, as well that specific circumstances, which while not separately signaling danger, that when taken in their totality, may present a  reasonable risk of officer safety.  However, state courts may not always follow these precedents in deciding stop and frisk cases. Louisiana law is similar to New York’s, indicating an officer may stop and question if a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity exists and may frisk, either if the officer reasonably suspects he’s in danger or if the officer reasonably suspects the person is carrying a weapon. Murrill notes certain types of cases often appear under the application of  Louisiana stop and frisk; description cases where the person matches a description of someone wanted by the police for a violent crime, including in cases where information and descriptions are provided by informants; conduct cases where the conduct of the individual either before the stop, such as in a the Terry cases where the officer suspected a daytime robbery was about to occur, or during the stop, for example if a person makes a sudden or furtive movement toward an area, like a pocket or under a car-seat, which had the potential of containing a weapon, indicates a reasonable suspicion of weapon possession; appearance cases where the subject’s physical appearance leads to a suspicion they are armed, such as a bulge in the clothing suggestive of a concealed weapon, or in cases of intoxication as the justification is that intoxicated people may act irrationally, increasing danger to the officer, or in cases of fitting a drug courier profile. Other factors in these cases provided supplemental justification for these stops and searches including the presence of a high crime areas (which may disproportionately or adversely impact these high minority areas) officer’s personal knowledge of the suspect, the time of day or night, and the presence of more suspects than officers.

Murrill notes that 80% of the courts’ analyses examined the justification of the frisk separate from the justification for the stop itself, though in his view many of the cases disproportionately focus on the stop and pay a lesser attention to the justification of the frisk while the rest primarily considered the two actions as one. Murrill suggests that the court develop a more structured approach to stop and frisk analysis as each intrudes on different constitutional protections. Structure definition, and guidelines in differentiating and describing arrests versus Terry stops are important in making the distinction between the two but as Saleem (1997) notes, this may be increasingly difficult.

Saleem (1997) contends that the lower courts expansion on the Terry decision has watered down the standards of the 4th amendment because of the Supreme Courts reliance on an “artificial reasonableness” standard. Saleem asserts that societal fear of crime prompted the Supreme Court to dilute the probable cause standard of the 4th amendment and adopt a reasonable suspicion standard. This standard is insufficient, Saleem argues, as it presupposed a quintessential reasonableness standard, it’s employed in a biased manner to protect police without consideration of individual rights, and can be utilized to inappropriately focus on minorities. Increasing the ability of officers to stop and frisk also gives rise to more incidents of police use of force and longer periods of detention to effect the stops and frisks, all without meeting the probable cause standards of typical arrests and searches and introducing difficulty in making the distinction between a formal arrest and a stop and frisk. Saleem also contends that the public and police’s association of Blacks with crime make them a target for stops and frisks of an unreasonable nature. Saleem believes that as long as Blacks and other members of the public perceive the police to be biased or racist, then a stop by police of Blacks will have difficulty being construed as reasonable

Saleem also calls for more rules and guidelines that bring stop and frisks more in line with the tenets of the 4th amendment and for the Supreme Court to take a more active role in directing lower US court decision as well as provide clear guidance and distinction between an arrest and Terry stop, limit the use of force in Terry stops, and ensure that reasonable suspicions are clearly articulable and not couched in racial identity.

The 1999 NY OAG Report on NYPD Stop and Frisk Practices

1n 1999, the New York Attorney General’s office reviewed the practice and data related to SQF (Spitzer, 1999). The NYPD kept records of the stop and frisks conducted through form UF 250. A UF 250 needed to completed for every SQF officers conducted and it contained demographic information about the subject, details about the circumstances of the stop like place and time of day, and checkboxes to complete that detailed the reasonable suspicion justifications that the officer used to conduct a stop or frisk. This was in response to the case of Diallo v NY where the NYPD as sued over the shooting death of Diallo in a stop and frisk incident (Harris, 2013). The report analyzed 175,000 UF 250 SQF forms from 1998 through the beginning of 1999. Total stops were broken down by race; 50.6% Black (Black pop. 25.6%), 33% Hispanic (Hispanic pop. 23.7%) and 12.9% White (White pop. 43.4%). By precinct, where minorities constitute the majority of the population, they tended to see more SQF than white majority precincts, though a third of white majority precincts were in the top half of precincts with the most stops. Even with the understanding that high crime precincts tended to have large minority populations, this connection couldn’t fully explain the racial disparity in stops and they also found that the street crimes unit stopped blacks at a higher rate than the NYPD even after accounting for different crime rates

However, in terms of producing productive stops, that racial disparity is not evident in arrests, with the rate of arrests per stop for Blacks ( 1 per 9.5), Hispanics (1 per 8.8), and Whites (1 per 7.9) being similar. Stop rates compared to arrest rates also showed no racial disparity with Blacks making up 50% of the stops and 51% of arrests, Hispanics making up 33% of the stops and 30% of arrests, and Whites making up 13% of stops and 16% of arrests. However, while hit rates by race were also similar for Blacks (10.6%), Hispanics (11.6%), and White (12.6%), the low overall hit rate indicates the tactic is not particularly effective in effecting arrests or seizing contraband.

When examining stops by crime types across all the precincts and crime types Blacks were stopped 23% more than whites, while Hispanics were stopped 39% more than Whites. For suspicion of violent crime Blacks were stopped 2.1 time more than Whites and 2.0 times more than Whites on suspicion of carrying a weapon; these two types of stops accounted for slightly more than 53% of all stops. Blacks were also significantly less likely to stopped than whites or Hispanics on suspicion of property crimes (Spitzer, 1999).

Following the ruling against the NYPD and the release of the Attorney General’s 1999 report, as crime declined, contrarily, the NYPD  increased the use of SQF. In 2003, officers stopped and frisked 160,000 people but by 2009 the number increased to more than 575,00, and by 2011, more than 685,000 people (Harris, 2013) This was driven by a desire to get guns off the street and reduce violent crime by focusing on the right places and right people. This intensive deterrence program that focused on those most likely to be involved in violent crime (minorities) in the most likely places (high crime neighborhood hotspots) led to increased criticism that the program was in violation of the 4th and 14th amendments. For example, Gelman (2006) examined 175,000 stops over a 15 month period used in the 1999 OAG report and disaggregated stops by precinct and accounted for race specific crime rates in the precincts to see if race specific crime rates could explain the racial disparity in stops. Using hierarchical modeling, even after controlling for these variables, they found Blacks and Hispanics were stopped more frequently than whites and surmised that the standards for stopping minorities were more relaxed than for whites as indicated by lower arrest rates for minorities.

The Rand Corporation (Ridgeway, 2007), also examined racial disparity in stops but examined it from a perspective of developing better benchmarks to determine if racial disparity exists. They note that using the general population to determine if a racial disparity exists is overly simplistic and prone to error. They suggest comparing the number of stops to either the racial distribution of criminal suspect descriptions or to race distribution of arrestees. An additional benchmark to determine the extent of racial disparities was to examine each individual officers stopping patterns in relation to stops made in similar circumstances to other officers. Using these benchmarks, racial disparity is not as evident. Utilizing criminal suspect description, Blacks were stopped at 20 to 30% lower than their representation in criminal descriptions would suggest, however Hispanics were stopped 5 to 10 % higher than their representation in criminal suspect descriptions.

Using the racial percentages of arrestees, Blacks were stopped at nearly the same rate as Whites but Hispanics were stopped at a slightly higher rate than would be suggested by racial arrest rate. These more refined benchmarks would suggest much less racial disparity when compared to the less accurate benchmark of total population which showed exaggerated racial disparity with Blacks stopped at a rate 50% higher than their general population.

The benchmark analyzing individual officers indicated that some racial disparity may be explained by officer activity. They found that just 7% (2,756) of the total number of officers accounted for 54% of the total number of 2006 stops. In patrolling the same areas, at the same times, and with the same assignments a very small percentage of officers (15 total) stopped substantially more Blacks or Hispanics than other officers, while another very small percentage of officers (13 total) stopped substantially less Blacks and Hispanics (Ridgeway, 2007).

In examining rates of frisk, search, use of force, and arrest while they found minorities experienced slightly more frisks and searches than whites, the recovery rate of contraband was higher for Whites than Blacks. In weapon recovery rates, there were no differences by race. Overall Rand found only small racial disparities when appropriate benchmarks are used and suggest that large restructuring of the NYPD’s SQF program may not be necessary.

Floyd v. NY and Current Perceptions

In 2008, The Center for Constitutional Rights initialed a class action suit against NYC and the NYPD alleging 4th and 14th amendment violations by the NYPD in the way SQF was performed. The court held that officers need reasonable , articulable suspicion of criminality to make stops consistent with the 4th amendment and that the plaintiffs were required to show that not only did SQF have a disparate racial impact but that it was at least in part of adopted for its adverse effects on certain racial groups (Huq, 2016). A 2013 ruling by US District Court Judge Scheindlin in the class action suit of Floyd v New York found that the NYPD had violated the 4th amendment as the stops lacked sufficient legal justifications (despite the Supreme Court’s previous ruling establishing that presence in a high crime area met the legal test of reasonable suspicion) and violated the 14th amendment by engaging in racial bias in its use of the SQF program (Meares, 2014). While the city stated that any apparently disproportional stopping of Blacks and Hispanics could be explained by racial differences in crime rates (Bellin, 2014), Meares also notes that a racial disparity or disparate impact on one portion of the community is not sufficient to show a violation but rather it must be shown that the state had discriminatory purposes. Such a ruling would require that for the government to have infringed on civil rights without violation, that it show a compelling interest and that this action was narrow in focus (Starkey, 2012). While stating that the effectiveness of SQF was not at issue, she did emphasize that only 1.5% of frisks found a weapon, with an even smaller percentage finding a gun (Bellin, 2014). However Bellin (2014) claims that by not permitting, let alone considering, the program’s effectiveness, the judge hampered the City’s ability to show it had a compelling interest (violent crime reduction) that was narrowly tailored (targeted to hot spots within precincts).

The 2013 NY OAG report states that following the Floyd decision, which was under appeal, neither the lower or appeals court addressed the effectiveness of stop and frisk in fighting crime. The report sought to determine effectiveness in the program by examining post-stop data from 2009 to 2012. The report found that between 2009 and 2012, those 2.4 million stops resulted in a 6% arrest rate, with only half of those leading to a conviction, and half of those (1.5% of total stops) led to a jail or prison sentence but just .15% of total stops led to a prison sentence longer than a year. Only one in 50 SQF arrests led to a conviction of a crime of violence and only 1 in 50 of these arrests led to a conviction of weapon possession (NY & Schneiderman, 2013)

The Floyd decision was almost immediately appealed and following the Floyd decision, criticism of SQF, NYC, and the NYPD was widespread. The examination by the court renewed examination by law professors and other academics on both 4th and 14th amendment grounds as well as in the context of the original Terry ruling. Law scholars were quick to find fault with the 4th and 14th amendment constitutionality of the program, sometimes to the point of hyperbole with article titles like “Stop and Frisk is Hazardous to your Health” (Ross, 2016), “From Stop and Frisk to Shoot and Kill” (Carbado, 2017), and even characterizing stop and frisk as torture-lite and terrorism in minority communities (Butler, 2014). Cooper (2018) describes SQF as a societal program for crime control that engages political entities and communities with conservative criminology, which caters to the police (who deem minorities as dangerous and crime prone), allowing them to exercise their explicit and implicit bias against minorities. Cooper claims the call for law and order is actually a backlash against the civil rights movement, and political forces have weakened the safeguards of Terry, allowing officers to operate with impunity. Carbado (2017) believes that when officers are trained to use violence and the legal system considers it justifiable, officers will use it indiscriminately in their increased encounters with minorities. While Howell  (2015) notes a decrease in SQFs in NYC since the Floyd ruling, he claims that the NYPD is using gang policing as a way to continue to engage in SQF and control minorities. He states that large gang activity has been on the decrease for years and dismisses the NYPD’s claim that smaller, more geographically centered “crews” are engaging in significant gang activity.

While many of these criticisms focused on the NYPD, SQF was never exclusive to NYC, it has been in use throughout the US since the inception of policing (Kuh, 1965) but its use in major cities has been problematic; Chicago, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, New Orleans, Seattle, Baltimore, Cleveland, Newark, Oakland, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and Boston, have either been forced to operate under a consent decree or by civil court order to revise and monitor its use of SQF (Harris, 2013, Huq 2017). What was different from these other urban centers was that the NYPD was documenting information of the stops they made, which helped make the case for the plaintiff in Floyd by demonstrating the documented racial disparities in SQFs.

4th Amendment Issues

At issue with the 4th amendment, Carbado (2017) states, was that the Terry decision actually weakened the amendment. The new standard of reasonable suspicion could too easily and arbitrarily applied to the detriment of minorities as was originally mentioned in the Terry ruling. The previous net-widening from what the original Terry ruling defined as a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and threats to officer safety, and the sheer number of stops, likely has contributed stops and frisks that lacked legal sufficiency. The 1999 NY OAG report analyzed the UF 250 forms and found that while 61.1% met the legal requirement of reasonable suspicion, 15.4% did not meet the legal test, and 23.5% didn’t state a sufficient factual basis to determine if a reasonable suspicion existed. When Abrams (2014) looked at SQF in Philadelphia (who conducted SQF at much higher rates than NYC) following their entry into a consent decree in 2011, he found evidence that 40-50% of stops consistently lacked sufficient legal grounds

At issue as well was that the original intent of the Terry ruling as an investigative tool is different than the intent and practice engaged in a programmatic deterrence approach like New York’s (Meares, 2014; Skogan, 2017). Terry was intended to stop crime in progress which should then have a positive effect on arrests and weapon seizures, but many observers note that in NY “hit rates” for seizures and arrests per stop were quite low (Starkey, 2012; Meares, 2014; Ross, 2016; Goel, et al 2016). For example between 2004 and 2012 out of 4.4 million stops, and subsequent 2.3 million frisks only 6% were arrested and officers only seized guns in .1% of stops (Ross, 2016). However, the counter argument put forth by NYC and the NYPD is that the low rates of seizure and arrests are indicators the program is doing what it’s supposed to, deter people from breaking the law and carrying weapons (Harris, 2013, Ross, 2016).

Bellin (2014) found that while deterrence is effective, it’s unconstitutionality is what allows it to be effective, by incorporating arbitrary stops and indirect racial profiling. If individuals carrying weapons can simply avoid being subjected to a Terry stop by not appearing to engage in suspicious behavior, they can carry a gun with impunity. However, if individuals are subjected to high volume stop and frisk without justification, the likelihood of being discovered with a weapon increases. If being searched is inevitable, a powerful deterrence effect occurs (Bellin, 2014).

14th Amendment Issues

Critics of SQF see the high percentage of minorities stopped as evidence of racial bias, whether based either on percentage of total stops involving minorities or whether in the context of a rate comparing the general population’s racial makeup to the racial makeup of those most frequently stopped. This is often related as over 80 percent of stops were minorities while they only make up approximately half the city population (e.g. Starkey, 2012). However, for the argument of 14th amendment allowable infringement on civil rights, the state must show a compelling interest and a narrowly targeted action. However, a violation exists if it is shown the state intended its action to have a discriminatory effect. In dealing with a protected class like race, not employing SQF based on officers’ individual observations and judgment but rather on social characteristics of race, gender, age, and SES unfairly distributes the effect (Skogan, 2017) Even if crime prevention was the goal, the state would know its activity, which would likely be perceived negatively, was intended to focus on minorities, based on its own statistics. Indeed, NYPD testimony from Floyd made clear who should be a focus of SQF; “within the pool of people displaying reasonably suspicious behavior, those who fit the general race, gender, and age profile of the criminal suspects in the area should be particularly target for stops” additionally claiming “it’s not racism just statistics”. From the criminological perspective of racial threat theory, the fact that disadvantaged neighborhoods are primarily made up of minorities and that police resources are focused in these areas already suggests that the state has an implicit bias against minorities and the places they reside as needing to be managed because of their criminality (Kramer and Remster, 2016). Adding to the suggestion of the existence of racial bias is the harm disparate impacts may have.

Harm caused

Many observers as well note the harm that intrusive and constitutionally questionable practices has on police legitimacy. Random searches, seemingly without justification, that seem to be inordinately targeting minorities, generates fear and mistrust of the police. Ross (2016) claims the program is designed to cause the public to fear the police. Butler (2014) contends that SQF is discriminatory and an abuse of power designed to humiliate and control minorities. This in turn leads to emotional and psychological harm, which might cause withdrawal from outside community activities, and generate poor overall health, depression, stress, and PTSD (Butler 2014; Ross, 2016). Some authors (e.g. Ross, 2014; Harris, 2013) noted that any crime control benefits must be balanced against the harm they may cause. Huq (2017) states that  the problematic history of police/minority relations must be taken into consideration when contemplating the introduction of a program that may have a negative effect on minorities. This lack of legitimacy also hampers the ability of the police to be effective, generates non-compliance in subjects, and contributes to larger negative perceptions of the police (Butler, 2014; Meares, 2014; Hanink, 2014; Ross, 2016; Skogan, 2017; ) How that perception is generated is somewhat dependent on the individual, their environment, and their experiences (Meares, 2014). Bellin’s (2014) data indicated that while youths did not like NYC’s SQF policy they did admit they thought it was effective at keeping guns off the street. Evans and Williams’ 2017 research examined public perceptions of SQF policy controlling for race, experiences with the police, and education among other variables They found, in general, Whites had more support for SQF than Blacks or Hispanics. However, they found that those who had experienced SQF, or who knew a close friend or family member who experienced SQF, were less supportive of SQF while those who were more highly educated, who knew more about the program, or who knew a police officer were more supportive. They also found that for Blacks, an increase in knowledge led to less support, which the authors surmise as an effect of the media’s focus on racial bias of the program (as opposed to crime reduction) which operates in a similar matter to the negative perceptions generated by vicarious accounts.

Remedies

Researchers proffered solutions to the constitutionally challenged practice such as Plaintiff Burdened Deliberate Indifference which takes the onus off plaintiffs in proving a defendant intended to discriminate, and instead replaces it with the  requirements that the defendant be notified of an inequality in application, be provided with an alternative action that would not exhibit bias, and subsequently the defendant failed to act upon it (Starkey, 2012). Fradella and White (2017) contend that changes in officer selection, improved training, clearer policies, a reinforcement of utilizing procedural justice in encounters, enhanced supervision, and outside oversight could allow the continued use of stop and frisk in an unbiased legally defensible manner. Limiting officer discretion through revised standards and clear policy, setting clear, specific, and definable law enforcement goals to be accomplished through SQF, and changes in the reporting form, requiring narrative spaces rather than check boxes are some of Fallon’s (2013) suggestions in eliminating inappropriate uses, along with better middle management engagement in officer conduct and refining the definition of reasonably suspicious behavior.

Current Research

Effect on Crime

Opponents of SQF contend that the low number of arrests and seizures of contraband (weapons and drugs) demonstrate that it is an ineffective program. However, proponents claim that its true effect on crime is one of deterrence, as evidenced by the low number of seizures, signifying that the program is dissuading young people from carrying weapons. It bears mentioning again that SQF as conducted in NYC between 1999 and 2013 were not simply Terry stops where officers are investigating what appears to be a crime in process or behavior related to criminal activity in a specified context. It was a generalized stop and frisk program conducted for the purpose of reducing violent crime, conducted in hotspots of violent crime throughout NYC, and focused on individuals that statistically were more involved in violent crime; young, black males. The Mayor’s office and the NYPD were clear in their desire to reduce violent crime and focus on “the right people”. Indeed, NYPD data shows suspects in shootings were 78% Black, 19% Hispanic, 2.4% White and .5% Asian (Bellin, 2014).

Bellin (2014) makes the point about deterrence effectiveness in his analysis of a number of benchmarks examined during a time period of extensive SQF. Utilizing data from CDC and the NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene surveys, Bellin suggests that SQF deterred high schools students from carrying a gun, cutting it in approximately half from 1997 to 2011.Other data also indicates that teenagers carrying a gun in the last 30 days was also cut in half between 1997 and 2011. The Health Department emphasized that prevalence of gun carrying in NYC was the lowest among 26 other cities studied with Black teenagers experiencing almost a threefold reduction in gun carrying. Bellin also found between 2000 and 2011, the rate of firearm homicides fell by a third, rate of firearm injury hospitalizations decreased by 20% as well as a 21% reduction in firearm assault injuries. Shootings fell during this period as well with firearms deaths decreasing from 524 to 366, and with a reduction in non-lethal shootings as well.

Bellin notes similar effects found in Kansas City and Philadelphia citing the strongest argument for the effectiveness of these programs is the lack of alternative explanations. While crime everywhere, including NYC, was on the decline, no other major city experienced the precipitous drop in firearm violence that NYC experienced during this period of SQF nor was the effect of any other program or practice evidenced as causing such a sharp decline. Cassell and Fowles (2018) also support the deterrence effect generated by intensive SQF programs. They contend that the ACLU’s consent decree activity to suppress Chicago’s SQF program in December 2015 led to an increase in homicides. Following a sharp decrease in SQF, in 2016 the authors estimate approximately 236 additional victims were killed and 1,115 additional shootings occurred, with these costs of violence distributed amongst the minority populations.

In exploring effectiveness of SQF, Weisburd, et al (2016) recognized that SQF activities are concentrated in hotspots, so a microunit of analysis was more appropriate than larger geographic areas for their analysis of daily and weekly crime incidents. They indicted two causal chains were at work, that crime incidents prompted SQF and that the application of SQF reduces crime, and that trends of both distributions are strongly related over time. Their results indicated that SQF in hotspots caused a significant decrease in crime within small areas across short periods of time. They also found little evidence of crime displacement but there was evidence of diffusion of the crime control benefits. Weisburd, et al state this provides support for the effectiveness of deterrence and they aren’t surprised by the results as focusing police resources on hotspots has typically been an effective crime reduction technique. While effective, they also concede that aggressive policing tactics may be a threat to police legitimacy.

While having reasonable suspicion factors to initiate a stop form the constitutionally protected 4th amendment basis for the practice, analysis of reasonable suspicion justifications and their legal sufficiency, or lack thereof, may indicate bias, as one possible explanation for racial disparity. Swank’s (2018) interviews with officers probed their reasonable suspicion justification, which fell within five categories; Suspect Behavior (suspected drug activity, furtive body movements, taking flight, hiding, unspecified nervous behavior, and being in possession of a firearm), Location of Suspect (presence in high crime area, drug activity location), Time of Incident (nighttime encounters), Policing Style (officers felt being proactive was part of community policing, not just being reactive), and Knowledge of the Suspect (prior knowledge of subject’s drug activity or weapon possession, knowledge from other officers,-some responded, depending on knowing the officer, intel could be as good as if they’ observed it themselves). However none of the officers admitted to using any extralegal criteria, such as race. Avdija (2014) also examined reasonable suspicion justifications and the frequency of their use. (See Chart 1)

Chart 1.Reasonable suspicion justifications in stop and frisk

If SQF were to be conducted in line with the original Terry ruling, that of a reasonable suspicion that a crime is, has , or is about to take place, many of the reasons indicated above do not meet that criteria but entail only generally suspicious behavior. Only six of the 14 justifications actually address possible criminal behavior with others being highly subjective such as fugitive movements, a suspicious bulge, or carrying a suspicious object.

Racial Disparity or Bias

While many commenters (e.g. Starkey, 2012) point to the fact that over 80% of SQF  were effected against Blacks even though they made up only slightly more than half of NYC’s population as evidence of racial bias, this position is overly simplistic (Ridgeway, 2007). For an appropriate analysis of whether the program was racially biased the unit of analysis should focus on the activity by precinct (as many of the researchers below do) as these more closely corresponded to the hotspots that were the focus of intense SQF. The racial and ethnic population makeup of these precincts is a more appropriate denominator to use in calculating rates of stops, frisks, and arrests. Consideration also has to be given to the populations of those hotspots, which tend to be overwhelmingly minority, and that crime rates are high in these disadvantaged neighborhoods, in whether bias exists in SQF. Abrams (2014) in discussing research on SQF noted that in the Floyd case, Fagan (2004) used regression analysis to estimate the impact of race on stop rates but Abrams stated this approach is “difficult to implement and interpret” because these analyses are only as good as the number and importance of variables that are controlled for. It falls upon researchers to develop the most comprehensive models they can but there is still the risk that important variables with explanatory power, such as economic status of the area, or its crime rates might not be included. As with the research discussed below, these models varied as to what variables are controlled for. Within the unit of analysis, more appropriately a precinct, beat, or neighborhood, and within the stop, variables like demographic makeup, level of police presence, officer race, subject demeanor, behavior and compliance, location of the stop, time of day of stop, and  type of stop justifications utilized, all may provide explanatory power as to why racial disparities are observed. For example, in 2015 Coviello and Persico examined whether SQF is biased, at either the individual officer level or at the Chief level, as defined by the police resources allocated, however they found no evidence in that aspect. They considered that racial bias by officers could be identified by examining the success rates of stops. They also did not find support for officer bias in arrest as arrest rates for stopped Blacks and Whites were essentially identical. They noted that Blacks are stopped more frequently than Whites but the authors conclude that this disparity could be explained by unaccounted variables and not necessarily by officer bias.

The research does indicate that while race is not the strongest factor in determining rates of police activity it does play into the equation. Hanink’s 2014 study of NYPD’ SQF  sought to determine if the rate of SQF was dependent on a precinct’s crime rate or if it was also influenced by other factors like race or poverty. He found the strongest predictor was the precinct’s crime rate, but also that an interaction between Black and percentage below the poverty was a statistically significant predictor of the rate of stops. Evans, et al (2014) notes that the highest stop and frisk rates by race occurred in geographic areas with high numbers of those races, as well as that these areas correspond to hotspots of criminal activity. Their regression analysis of NYC precincts showed that Black and Hispanic race had a significant positive association with SQF rates but they also found a significant negative relationship between owner occupied hosing and rates of SQF. (This may be explainable in that with more rental property in the area, public space is utilized more than private space, leaving residents more observable to the police). However, their regression models only explained a third of the variation in total stops and only about half the variation in rates of Black SQF. They recognized some of the limitations of their study including a lack of variables like suspect demeanor, precinct crime rate, race of officer, and extent of police presence in the area.

In 2016 Goel, et al examined 3 million stops over five years, focusing on suspected criminal weapon possession and calculated the ex-ante probability of finding a weapon and found in over 40% of cases the likelihood of finding a weapon was less than 1%. They also found Blacks and Hispanics were disproportionately stopped and had lower hit rates (2.5% and 3.6%, respectively) compared to White hit rates (11%) which, rather than racial bias, they trace to a low threshold for stopping, regardless of race in high crime areas and a lower threshold for stopping Blacks relative to similarly situated Whites. They note stop and frisk is an extremely localized tactic that was concentrated in high crime areas, which are predominantly populated by minorities so a  lower tolerance for suspicious behavior in high crime areas (and thus lower hit rates) could account for the racial disparities. When accounting for this they note that most of the racial disparity disappears. The authors also discussed how utilizing a probability formula that includes a simple scoring threshold of the three most common productive weapon indicators, officers can improve hit rates by conducting the stops most likely to be productive. They demonstrated that hit rates can vary widely by location; 1% in some public housing locations, up to 30% for transits stops in some areas but within these regions, hit rates are much more similar between blacks and whites than citywide averages. They state that while some disparity may be driven by discrimination, variation in local stop thresholds appear to be the main driving force behind racial disparity. However, from their search probability calculus they estimate that only 6% of the stops needed to have been made to recover the majority of weapons, while conducting 58% of the stops deemed most likely would have turned up 90% of the weapons. This approach would not only save on police resources but mitigate police relations problems.

Avdija (2014) analyzed whether there was racial bias in utilizing a frisk by examining factors that were predicative of a frisk, He found the strongest predictor was male gender, being 2.8 times more likely than females, followed by proximity to crime scene, (2.0x), and evasive in questioning (1.9x). Blacks and Hispanics were both 1.7 times more likely than Whites to be frisked. Avdija suggests this is more gendered policing than race, as males are typically targeted but also contends that neither variable has much explanatory power in SQF in that targeted policing is based on place, offense, offender, and time specific dependency. Avdija states the reason for disparity in SQF is that because of ecological conditions minorities disproportionately commit more crimes. It is not racial bias that causes officers to focus on minorities rather it is the individual actions of criminals that generate the profiles that are used in proactive policing practices like SQF, thus establishing the legitimacy of racial disparities.

For comparison, Skogan (2017) examined SQF in Chicago with survey data and his research showed  that in 2013, Chicago’s stopping rate was four times higher that NYC, and the racial break downs were similar, 72% Black, 17% Hispanic, and 9% White. Analysis showed in Chicago the main predictor of being stopped was being under age 35 followed by Black race and male gender. Other disparities were evident, 75% of Blacks and Hispanics were asked for ID (White 56%) Black and Hispanic searches ranged between 20-30% (Whites 6-9%). While 30-35% of Blacks and Hispanics  stated they had some form of force used against them (compared to 14% of Whites), it was people 16-35, those less educated, and those with lower incomes that were most likely to have force used against them. Besides these disparities, Skogan also found large disparities in perceptions of legitimacy and trust for the police with only 44.5% of Blacks exhibiting any trust in Chicago PD compared to 68% of Hispanics and 80% of Whites, a significant finding even after controlling for their SQF experiences.

In 2018, Kramer and Remster also examined to see if there was any disparity in use of force against minorities during SQF utilizing four hypotheses. Operating under the racial threat theory, they presumed that if disparities exist they can be explained by officer racial bias (however the authors doesn’t include race of the officer as a control variable in the analysis). They do, however, concede that a number of other variables not accounted for in their research could influence the use of force including subject demeanor, levels of racial noncompliance, and variations in race for violent crime activity. They hypothesized that after controlling for their other variables,  Blacks, compared to Whites, would experience more police use of force, that any racial disparity in use of force will be large in productive stops, that with any racial disparity, use of force will be greater with younger people, and that post Floyd, racial disparities will be reduced compared to pre-Floyd. Logistic regression showed that many other variables to greater extent than Black race made the use of force more likely. While Blacks were only 1.3 times more likely than Whites to have force used, other variables including the Stop Outcomes of arrest made (3.2 times more likely), weapon found (2.1), contraband found (1.5), as well as the variables of younger people aged 10 to 34 (1.3-1.5), male gender (1.6), and Civilian Behavior of verbal threat (1.7 times), violent crime suspect (2.4), and non-compliant (2.6) carried a higher risk of experiencing any kind of use of force (Kramer and Remster, 2018).

Examining just one of the force categories, gun drawn, the odds of experiencing this form of force for Blacks did not change compared total force. However, factor like Stop Outcomes, and Civilian Behavior demonstrated  an increased likelihood of being a factor in gun drawn force compared to total force. In dividing between productive and unproductive stops, Blacks, while still experiencing slightly greater risk of increased force than Whites (1.3 times) in non-productive stops, their risk of experiencing force actually decreased during productive stops. However, their odds went from 1.2 to 1.6 for a gun drawn during a productive stop. Again, Civilian Behavior increased the risk of having all manner of force applied as well as having a gun drawn in both nonproductive and productive stops and to a far greater degree than the Black race variable. Male and age continued to be significant factors to a greater degree than Black in productive cases where a gun is drawn. The authors also didn’t support for their fourth hypothesis; there was no significant difference in Blacks experiencing any kind of force between pre and post reform and despite officers increasing the use of guns drawn post reform, there was no significant difference between Blacks and Whites with this potential lethal force (2018).

Kramer and Remster’s research indicated that civilian behavior does seem to factor into use of force. In 2018, Rahman examined UF 250 forms from 2005-2012 to determine whether a subject’s  non-compliance, within the context of race, would generate use of force in a SQF. Their analysis found that Blacks and Hispanics were overrepresented in the use force relative to their representation in the total distribution of stops, both in compliant or non-compliant encounters (though the researchers did not account for crime rate in area of the stop or type of crime that was being investigated by the stop). They also found that the precincts with the greatest number of stops using force were also mainly populated by minorities. The author’s data did show that a greater percentage of stops involved non-compliance with Blacks (70%) compared to Hispanics (68%) and Whites (63%) however they did not analyze these numbers to see if there was a statistically significant difference. The data also demonstrated that the difference between the rates of force used in noncompliant stops by race were small. Force was used in noncompliant stops 27.3% of the time with Blacks, compared to 21.3% of the time with Whites. Overall, their regression models found that between 30 and 38% of the variance in the decision to use force was driven by precinct characteristics. However as noted in the introduction, inclusion of more variables  may further explain these disparities. For example, the authors used seven measures of noncompliance that included changing direction at the sight of a police officer, evasive response to questioning, visibly engaging in criminal activity, making furtive movements, refusing to comply with the officer’s directives, verbal threats by the suspect, and criminal possession of a weapon. However some of these non-compliant behaviors will undoubtedly be more likely to generate the use of force than others, so it would be informative in analyzing racial disparities in use of force to determine if there were differences in the kinds of noncompliant behavior between races.

Conclusions

In what started as a long overdue formalization of a common policing practice, the investigative tool of stop and frisk, established as an expansion of the 4th amendment, transformed into a general deterrence program in NYC and other cities. Widening the definition of what conditions generate a reasonable suspicion allowed officers justification to increase the number of stops. However, as the number of stops increased so did criticism of the program, asserting that it violated both the 4th and 14th amendments, Critics argues that SQF as applied by the NYPD, besides being ineffective at stopping crime, as measured by the low hit rates ins stops, and low numbers of arrests, too often lacked the legal justification of an articulable reasonable suspicion of criminal activity afoot. Critics also contend the practice violated the 14th amendment because racial disparities were found in some analyses. Proponents argue that the required 4th amendment justifications for stopping and frisking have been established by legal precedent and that the low rates of seizures and arrests actually indicates that the intensive policing has caused a deterrence effect, which they claim was responsible for the dropping violent crime rate. Proponents also argue that racial disparities are not an indication of bias, a necessary component in violations of the 14th amendment. They instead contend that the racial makeup of stops and frisks reflects the inhabitants of the high crime areas where SQF is typically applied as well as the higher crime rates among minorities and the prevalence of minorities in suspect descriptions. A 2013 US District Court decision, however, found the city violated the amendments and as many researchers and observers noted, the program and the subsequent court decision has damaged police legitimacy.

Research into whether the program was effective depends on your perspective. In terms of seizures, arrests, and convictions, research consistently showed low rates suggesting ineffectiveness but research also demonstrated that deterrence was an effective means at reducing gun carrying and gun violence. However, what makes the deterrence program effective, the random but omnipresent nature of being stopped and searched, sometimes without clear legal justification for what sometimes could be innocuous behavior, is what the 4th amendment was designed to protect the people from. The issue of 14th amendment violation rested on evidence of bias, which could be assumed if, after for controlling for alternative explanations, disparities still exist. The research demonstrated that proper benchmarks need to be used to first determine disparity before considering bias. Because SQF was a targeted program, analysis consistently showed it was heavily applied in hotspots of crime. The residents of these hotspots were overwhelmingly minorities. Thus, just by the nature of the precinct demographics, the racial rates of SQF, while overwhelmingly focused on minorities, closely mirrored the populations of the area. Other disparities beyond that can be at least partially accounted for by lower thresholds for stopping in high crime neighborhoods, racial crime rates, and subject demeanor. However as evidenced in this review, the importance of the comprehensive but correct inclusion of variables can vary from study to study and that as analyses in this area becomes more refined, racial disparities tend to diminish, presenting the conclusion there is little if any racial bias present in remaining disparities.

Practical remedies for improving and refining the practice are broad ranging from improved office training, documentation form revision, policy and guideline development and implementation, increased middle management interaction with officers, outside review, analysis, and oversight, and the incorporation of procedural justice elements. The changes would be expected to meet the legal standards of the 4th amendment and Terry ruling, prevent mistreatment during SQF, improve hit rates, mitigate disparate impacts on the minority communities, and improve police relations with the public

References

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Fixing Stop and Frisk

Support for Stop and Frisk as an Incident Practice

The fact that stop and frisk, within the context of the Terry ruling, was misused, doesn’t preclude it from being necessary and useful. Stop and frisk is an important investigative tool for law enforcement. Without the ability to stop and frisk, the police are hamstrung in their efforts in proactive policing. We have an expectation that the police will be proactive in an attempt to halt or prevent crime by investigating suspicious circumstances, trusting in the individual officers’ training, experiences, and abilities to identify and react to these circumstances. Police officers need the ability to act on their suspicions. Without the ability to temporarily detain and question in order to identify the subject and satisfy their suspicions, criminally minded individuals could simply ignore officers’ questions and commands and walk away with impunity. However, besides those who question the constitutionality of the Terry ruling, there are concerns, and as indicated in At Issue, some evidence, that not all stop and frisks met the Terry standard. While its use as a program versus incidental use is discussed below, for incidental stops there should be assurances that officers are operating within the guidelines of the Terry ruling.

Revising Stop and Frisk Documentation

To assist in that regard, the establishment of a reporting system, or the refinement to existing forms and systems is necessary. With an appropriate design, the form will allow for the collection of criminal intel that could be gathered from the stop, allowing for both police departments and researchers’ examination of the form data for analysis of criminal intel as well as statistical program analysis. The field stop form should exist in both an electronic format that is accessible, searchable, and fileable from the car, and in a short form paper format that officers can fill out as the stop progresses, as opposed to filling out the form later, or transferring field notes from a notebook to the form. Ultimately, the form will contain data on the different aspects of the stop with spaces for information on the:

Officer-Name, Age, Gender, Race or Ethnicity, Years with dept., Precinct, Beat, Shift

Subject-Name, Age, Gender, Race or Ethnicity, Height, Weight (if able to be determined or verified through officer or subject), Level of non-compliance, and Statements made

Location and Circumstances-Physical location or address of stop, Time of day, Weather, Whether the stop was associated with a particular location like a business, housing project, or public transit spot

Reason for Stop-Utilizing a blank space for a narrative, not checkboxes with preprinted justifications

Officer and Subject information will allow departments to examine individual officer performance; to determine the number of stops performed, the productivity of the stops (hit rates), whether more experienced officers are more productive and can be utilized as a training resource, and, based on subject demographics, data could be used to deflect or verify criticisms of individual officer bias. Departments can also use the data to analyze precinct, beat, and shift activity for patterns of effective operation, developing problem areas, and changes in geographic and demographic criminal activity. For researchers, these benefits are the same, with variables like officer race and subject noncompliance being especially informative in examining issues of racial bias by officers in stops, frisks, and arrests.

Location and circumstances information will provider a more comprehensive picture of the circumstances under which stop and frisk are conducted (night, bad weather) and how those may have influenced any of the other circumstances or outcomes of the stop. It will also be informative to have a determination of whether the stop and frisk activity may be focused on certain locations (as well as dependent on the time of day, shift, or beat). At Issue discussed the findings that the productivity of stops varied widely by location. Certain businesses and locations can be criminogenic, drawing both criminals and victims, and while the beat officer may realize this, it also provides a mechanism for intelligence analysis and dissemination across shifts, beats, and precincts. Utilizing this data may allow departments to better refine their focus on existing or emerging criminogenic locations and businesses.

Incorporating a blank space for stop justifications rather than checkboxes is one way to help preserve the Terry standard, and defend against 4th amendment violations. Having officers write out their justifications forces them to comply with an important component of “reasonable suspicion”, that the reason for the stop be articulable. Utilizing checkboxes allows officers to habitually start using cognitive shortcuts by having the decisions written out in front of them, waiting for them to choose one, or retroactively choosing the justification that seemed most appropriate. While some commenters have lamented the net widening of justification for stops (and frisks), officers have to be given some deference in determining what is (articulable) suspicious in making a stop. Recognizing suspicious behavior that may be a prelude to criminality is a skill not well understood by the general public and most academics and one, that for officers, takes both natural aptitude and investigative street experience, to obtain. The cues that officers receive may be innocuous to many observers; the subject nervously hitching up his pants indicates he could take flight, unconsciously touching the waistband or pocket likely indicates a concealed weapon, subtly changing one’s stance indicates they are about to be combative, how often a person scans the environment indicates a lookout, the length and type of contact between two individuals on the street could indicate a drug transaction. For officers to be proactive we assume and expect that they develop those skills of picking out suspicious behavior. They should be allowed to act upon them as long as they articulable. In having to articulate them officers can more easily self-monitor the appropriateness and legal sufficiency of their actions.

The stop is a temporary detention to allow officers to investigate, i.e. question, the subject. Either through questioning, or the presentation of identification, the identity and address of the subject should be determined, the request for this information wholly justified by their presentation of suspicious behavior. All of the information obtained should also be incorporated on the field stop form. The questioning process will always vary depending on the particular situation and the matter under investigation but officers typically will look for explanations, given to their satisfaction, for the subject’s behavior or presence in the area. It can be from this questioning that additional suspicions can arise (as well as from the justification for the stop) that will prompt an officer to frisk a subject.

This is another feature that can’t be denied to officers, as long as it follows the Terry standard of being minimally intrusive. The expansion of  situations that might comprise an issue of officer safety is justified, however they need to be limited to weapons searches and not expanded into other contraband. High crimes areas, by virtue of being so, constitute an increased risk to officer safety, and within these high crime area, public attitudes toward the police can be hostile, which might result in greater non-compliance, threats and attacks on the police. While drug possession is typically considered a nonviolent crime, drug transactions are another matter. As drug transactions that will be observable to officers will likely occur in the relative open in high crime areas, both the dealer and buyer run the risk of violence perpetrated against them through deals gone sour, and by street robbery and rival crews. Conducting transactions in risky areas will certainly prompt many of these individuals to arm themselves for protection, and in turn the police need protection from these individuals by a weapons frisk. But in keeping a broader acceptable range of frisk justifications, they also must be articulable, with an appropriate narrative of such included on the field stop form.

Changing the Way Stop and Frisk is Done With Individuals

However, there are ways that stop and frisk can be utilized that can mitigate some of the intrusiveness and perceived bias, and help promote police legitimacy. Regardless of the officers’ justifications for the stop, its crucial for officers to take a procedural justice approach. Hit rates can vary widely and, as the data showed in NYC and other places, it is more unlikely than likely an officer will recover contraband or make an arrest. So to help mitigate that intrusion on a possibly innocent person, officers will use their communication skills to approach the stop with dignity and respect for the subject, to be upfront and truthful with the subject, to allow the subject to have a voice in the matter, and to be fair and without bias in dealing with the subject. This entails maintaining politeness and respect as the subject is approached. The subject should be informed why he is being stopped, which should be the same reason articulated on the field stop form. When questioning, that same level of respect should try to be maintained, (though admittedly this is difficult when the subject is lying to you). The officer should explain what information he is seeking and why, so that it is clear to the subject what it was that made the officer suspicious and the purpose of the officer’s  questioning. For example, to identify the subject, to seek information about a crime that occurred, or to ask the subject to explain his suspicious actions. Rather than asking “what ya doing around here”, officers need to be more precise, and polite, in their approach. “I stopped you because you were loitering in a drug trafficking area. Are from this area, or do have some business here?”.

Frisks also need to be done appropriately and with a statement to the subject about the justification for the frisk, the same as the articulable reason on the field stop form, with an explanation to the subject that it is done for both the officer’s and the subject’s safety and that it is only checking for weapons. The officer should explain to the subject where, and in the manner, they are going to be touched during the frisk, and be empathetic toward feelings of intrusion they may feel. These approaches help ensure that the public feels like the police have trustworthy motives and is listening to the subject and communicating rather than just talking at them. In doing so, the effects of an intrusive encounter can be mitigated while bolstering police legitimacy.

To assist officers in employing procedural justice during stop and frisks, practical experience in conducting and explaining stop and frisk behavior should be provided both to new officers and as in-service training. Improving their written communication skills is important as well in assisting officers in how to translate their observational experience (as noted above in the discussion of stops) into articulable statements. Officers often refer to a hunch, gut feeling, or their sixth sense in what draws their attention and makes them want to investigate. However, the Terry ruling was clear that a hunch is insufficient for a stop. In my discussions with police officers, this hunch is likely an unconsciously generated cue based on their past observational experiences. Its something an officer has seen before that was prelude to criminality or danger, it signals to the officer that “something isn’t right”. The challenge is assisting officers in breaking down their hunches to those base cues that are articulable and written communication skills programs could assist in that.

Changing the Way Stop and Frisk is Done in the Community

Stop and frisk is problematic as a general deterrence program. Even though evidence suggests it was targeted to hotspots and appropriately focused on those most likely to be involved in violent crime, ultimately it casts too wide of a net and generated feelings of over-policing and rights violations. However, larger scale deterrence generated by stops and frisks can still be utilized if limited in scope in a crackdown. Crackdowns (on guns for example) could be cycled through major hotspots for limited periods of time, or applied as necessary to flareups in hotspots. To help mitigate tensions, buy-in and cooperation with local community or neighborhood leaders is important. They can assist in announcing the crackdown beforehand to the community, neighborhood, or beat, provide a voice of community support for the police in its efforts on crime, and serve as a liaison, monitor, and information source between the community and the police. This will still provide for a deterrent effect but its limited scope, and coordination with the neighborhood and its leaders, will help repair or establish police legitimacy. The stops and frisks themselves will still need to be done with adherence to Terry and in a procedurally just manner however, officers won’t be increasing the number of stops they make which could lead to a weakening of reasonable suspicion justifications, but rather increasing the number of officers in the crackdown area.

An Alternative to Stop and Frisk

Terry stops were meant to be used as an investigative practice necessary for proactive policing and officer safety and were not intended for programmatic use. However as justifications expanded, it was morphed into a deterrence program, like Broken Windows Theory morphed into Zero Tolerance policing, that overstepped its boundaries and damaged police/public relations. The deterrence program may have been effective in reducing violent crime as it focused on high crime areas and those individuals more likely to be involved in crime (younger male residents). But by doing so communities did and will pay a cost in anger and mistrust of the police, as those primarily focused on were minorities which results in a loss of police legitimacy and hampers law enforcement efforts as the public becomes uncooperative.

Stop and frisk in NYC was focused on the “right kind of people” which is supposed to be young males in high crime areas. While its violation of the 14th amendment may be arguable as it was not the state’s intention to utilize SQF to adversely affect or benefit one racial group over another, but rather the state was indifferent to the racial disparities and its effect and perception of the practice suggests it targets minorities. Because with programmatic SQF there is no real discrimination between who are actually the right people, the criminals, and who are the law abiding, non-problematic residents of the neighborhoods.

While as an investigator, it might be tempting to just shake the trees and see what falls out, an alternative to stops and frisk, is an informal field stop which can be useful for gathering information. Rather than shaking down youths in the neighborhoods, officers could take a  more nonconfrontational approach. Officers can approach individuals not based on suspicion but just as a potential information source. Officers take a friendlier, more informal approach and try to build a rapport with the subject to have a conversation rather than an interrogation. A friendlier approach allows people to let their guard down and building a rapport with the subject will get them talking more freely, which allows the officer to guide the conversation toward what he wants to know.

It is important to get to know the residents of the beat; a good cop should be able to read people and figure out through the interactions, and the intel gathered in these interactions, who the problem people are and who the law abiding ones are. This allows officers to focus their efforts on the bad guys while building a sense of trust with the law abiding neighborhood residents. Good street cops should be using these contacts and developing formal and informal informants from their interactions, as well as building rapport, trust, and good will with residents. This approach in either stop and frisks or in an informal stop, can turn a potentially negative encounter for both parties into one that may be neutral for the public and positive for the officer as he may be able to gather intel either on general or specific criminality  on his beat or will get to know and distinguish between the different types of people on his beat. This will also benefit future investigations as well as enhance their proactive behavior by having a better idea on who to focus on rather than just blindly casting a wide net.

Approach to Racial Bias Analysis

In the situation with NYC, racial disparities were cast as racial bias, but just like the rule “correlation doesn’t mean causation”, disparity doesn’t mean discrimination. In trying to understand disparity and disparate impact we can’t forget to utilize a disease risk model, which in a policing context means not considering the population as a whole but only the portion of the population at risk for SQF. And there is a far greater likelihood of being subjected to a SQF if you are a young male (the universal profile), even more so if you reside or are in a high crime area, irrespective of race. Social conditions however have situated a high percentage of minorities in these disadvantaged high crime areas. While this may generate a disparate impact within the community, it may struggle to actually be a racial disparity, given the specific population demographics, racial crime rates, and criminal suspect descriptions. This focus on minority populated hotspots of crime does not provide evidence for any institutionalized bias, as by necessity and public expectation, more police resources are focused on higher crime areas.

As was discussed in At Issue, in the analysis of SQF for racial bias, methodology is very important. To examine racial disparities or bias an appropriate unit of analysis must be determined. While most researchers have focused on precincts rather than city population as whole I suggest that the beat, a smaller microunit of analysis, be utilized. A precinct can encompass a relatively large area and within that precinct are districts, sectors or beats that could be similar but could just as likely vary widely from the adjoining beat. One beat might hold a lot of retail businesses while an adjoining beat might be residential, while another adjoining beat might be commercial/industrial. The crime rates  of each beat, which could vary widely based on the businesses, residents, and potential targets, when averaged for a precinct crime rate might mask, for analysis purposes, a high level of criminal activity in one of the beats.

Increased stop and frisk activity generated from this beat may, when viewed from a perspective of precinct crime rates, seem disproportionate, but is actually inline with the crime happening on that particular beat. Beat demographics are then a more appropriate denominator to calculate rates because disparity is only proven with the correct population demographics and if the demographics of SQF match that of the beat and its criminal subjects, there is no disparity and thus no bias. As was discussed in At Issue, evidence suggests that hit rates can vary by location, with some locations being criminogenic. Those locations are much better determined and analyzed at a beat level as well.

As discussed earlier in the section on revising stop and frisk documentation, the comprehensive inclusion of appropriate variables is also important in trying to determine if racial bias in stops or frisks exist, and variables like officer race and subject noncompliance must be included. Some commenters in At Issue approach officer motivation in these stops with an almost automatic assumption of implicit bias, if not some policing subculture learned bias, against minorities. This may exist to some degree on an individualized basis with some officers, but it also impugns the vast majority of officers who really are motivated by preventing crime and promoting safety and don’t care what race the subject is, only about determining if he’s a good citizen or a bad guy. The inclusion of officer race in these encounters will surely provide a more nuanced look at the possible existence of racial bias toward minority subjects, especially in cities like NYC and others who have a large percentage of minority officers. Similarly in frisks and arrests, the level of noncompliance is going to be an important determining factor in whether these frisks and arrests occur. Research has shown that Blacks tend to be more confrontational with the police than Whites and differing levels of non-compliance may have some explanatory power in disparities seen here.

Conclusion

Stop and frisk has gone from an essential investigative tool to something that’s vilified as constitutionally challenged and racist. However,  the truth is that the practice itself while acceptable and necessary, can be misapplied and mismanaged, which in turn can unintentionally damage police legitimacy. If departments can more closely adhere to the Terry ruling, scale back its use, refine and improve its use, and seek alternatives to its use, the practice itself will gain back some of its legitimacy as will the departments themselves.