Welcome to Criminal Justice Access

Hello Everyone,

For May at CJ Access check out Editorials and Opinions where I examine whether the National Firearms Act has outlived its usefulness. Current firearms designs, the criminality, or lack thereof, associated with NFA weapons, and a faulty registration system used in prosecutions suggest it’s time to amend the National Firearms Act.

And on the Original Research front, I’m going to be starting a new research project utilizing unused data from my dissertation in an exploratory study of beat officer patrol patterns. During the ride-alongs with 59 officers, I tracked the patrol car movement throughout their patrol for approximately six hour periods. I have turn by turn directions, as well as the location in the beats for the calls for service, and self-initiated stops. I’m planning on analyzing this patrol and stop geographic and time data to examine questions such as;

Do some officers cover more area than others working the same beat and shift and is there a similarity in areas that officers think they should patrol?

How do the patrol patterns of each beat differ by shift?

Do some shifts on the beats engage in broader beat coverage and do some beats get broader coverage than others?

Determining the level of patrol based on the number of passes through areas of the beat and in areas surrounding calls for service and self-initiated stops and do officers focus their patrol closer to areas where they receive calls for service?

Data cleanup and operationalization is going to be first on the list and I’ll be providing updates as the research progresses.

Welcome to Criminal Justice Access

This month at CJ access were looking at issues of race, police shooting, and police performance so be sure to check out:

Research Briefs-exploring the connection between race, minority dense neighborhoods, and fatal shootings by the police; using better benchmarks to generate more accurate data on racial disparities in fatal officer involved shootings; constructing and utilizing a typology of police shooting errors; and using detailed police officer performance metrics to analyze their performance in police-citizen encounters

For Discussion-Racial profiling is on its face viewed as discriminatory, but does the use of race or ethnicity to focus an investigation or inquiry ever have a place? What are officers’ views? From an investigative standpoint, it may be something to be used with discretion as I explore with an excerpt from my dissertation

Original Research-An academic research article from 2013 where I utilized NCVS data from 12 cities to examine the differences between races on their satisfaction with the police and whether utilizing components of Community Oriented Policing affected that level of satisfaction

Also this month, a new and improved PDF reader is installed on the site, allowing convenient full screen reading and the ability to download PDFs found in Original Research

Research Briefs

Race, Place, and Police-Caused Homicide in U.S. Municipalities

Holmes, Painter II & Smith, Justice Quarterly, 2019

The authors consider that approaches to studying police caused homicides (PCH) have focused typically on two theories, the Minority Threat hypothesis, which borrows from Conflict Theory which suggests that the amount of crime control is directly proportional to the size of the population that threatens the powerful’s interests. Framed as Minority Threat, the theory suggests the level of police caused homicide is in direct relation to the relative size of the Black population. Large populations of Black people are associated with serious criminality and urban violence and are seen as a threat. When increased crime control on the population is enacted, it will thus result in an increase in PCH. In contrast to this linear relationship model, a Power Threat hypothesis suggests a curve, where increases in crime control continues until the minority population reaches enough positions of power, to where their influence decreases the level of crime control on minority populations. The alternative theoretical perspective is the Community Violence hypothesis, which postulates that violent offending will result in more police caused homicides of suspects. Disadvantaged urban black populations have relatively high rates of violence so that Black over-representation in police caused homicides is actually a reflection of the very real threats that officers face in dealing with these greater levels of violence in these communities. Officers use deadly force  when it is necessary in the face of danger and the level of violence in these communities increases the likelihood officers will be put in those situations.

The authors suggest another theoretical approach. The Place hypothesis maintains that the residential segregation of minority populations into areas of concentrated socioeconomic disadvantage increases the likelihood of police officers employing violence against minority citizens. Police patrolling in these disadvantaged places may see minority citizens as particularly threatening, though this is a more subjective threat based on place, rather than the objective threat involved in the Community Violence hypothesis. In this theory the level of threat by minorities is based on  the segregation of the population into what are viewed as dangerous areas, and because minorities are associated with violent crime, they may be automatically viewed as a threat by being segregated in these places. However, research testing Place hypotheses about PCH has produced mixed findings but the authors suggest there may be a non-linear relationship between racial segregation into the disadvantaged areas and PCH.

The authors also considered that the relationship between Hispanics and PCH may need additional exploration. While percentage Hispanic has not typically been found to be a factor in incidence of PCH, the authors consider that group specific models (minority compared to White) may reveal disparities not evident in total incidence analysis, as well as examining the segregation aspect between White and Hispanic populations.

It should be clarified that when the authors are using structural theories like Minority Threat and Place, it is to examine whether these community structures are related to PCH but these theories operate under the unproven assumption that if there is a relationship between community structure and PCH, then that relationship exists because of  biases held by police officers against minorities. These theories, in attempting to make that connection, do not actually examine if the biases exist, nor do they take into account situational factors like suspect demeanor and behavior, the race of officers in these encounters, and attitudes in the community toward police which may either drive that statistical relationship or even negate the relationship between structural conditions and PCH.

Using data from 230 cities with over 100K population who filed Supplemental Homicide Reports with the UCR between 2008 and 2013, their outcome variable was the incidence of felon killed by police officer for the study time period (Range 0-96, Avg. 5.71, S.D. 12.92). The authors noted the small sample size but recognized that other databases include small cities and may have incomplete data,  limited methodological documentation, and a lack of verification procedures. Other variables included city population, population density and geographical region as control variables as well as percent Black and Hispanic to represent the Minority Threat hypothesis, and average violent crime rate, arrest rate per 1,000, and total number of police officers killed in the line of duty during the study period to represent the Community Violence hypothesis. To test Place hypothesis they used two variables, Black and Hispanic dissimilarity taken from the 2010 Discover America in a New Century website, which indicates the degree of separation from Whites across all neighborhoods of a city.

Using negative binomial regression because the data was a count variable, they examined total incidences, finding a larger city population was significantly related to a greater number of PCH, while the Northeast and Midwest regions were negatively associated with PCH. In total incidence, the authors did not find support for the Minority Threat hypothesis; Black percentage was significantly negatively associated with PCH (but ceased to be significant in the group specific analysis) and there was no significant association between Hispanic percentage and PCH. Finding partial support, analysis of Place showed a large significant effect in Black separation but a negligible effect with Hispanic separation. In examining the Power Threat hypothesis there was a curve-linear relationship with the most segregated cites having more incidence of PCH than less segregated cities. In support of the Community Violence hypothesis, the violent crime rate had a large statistically positive relationship with PCH (while both the overall index crime rate and property crime rate were not) as did higher arrest rates. Police officers killed in the line of duty also had a small but significant positive relationship with PCH as well. In addition the researchers also examined but failed to find a relationship between the ratio of Black and Hispanic officers to Black and Hispanic citizen population with PCH, however female officers were significantly positively associated with PCH.

In group specific analysis of Black PCH there were four predictors—black–white segregation, violent crime rate, police officers killed, and percent female officers—with statistically significant, positive relationships to PCH of Blacks. They also saw a similar non-linear effect with Black-White separation with more PCH incidence in areas of greater separation. For Hispanics, the percentage Hispanic, Hispanic-White separation, as well as the Southwest region all had statistically significant positive effects on PCH. However for Hispanics, and in accordance with the Power Threat theory there was a positive relationship with Hispanic population and incidence of PCH until Hispanics reach about 60 % of the population and the relationship reverses with PCH decreasing as Hispanic population increases and they found no non-linear relationship between Hispanic separation and PCH.

The discuss how they found support for both Community Violence and Place hypotheses and some support for all three hypothesis in group specific analyses, noting their study highlighted the importance of using both structural and event based data and variable and group specific analyses. They also note future research could examine officer race in relation to PCH as well as more detailed city and neighborhood analysis of PCH.

Holmes, M. D., Painter, M. A., & Smith, B. W. (2019). Race, place, and police-caused homicide in US municipalities. Justice Quarterly, 36(5), 751-786.

Holmes Painter, II and Smith used variables like population, and arrest rate, to examine the disparity in minority PCH but Tregle, Nix and Alpert remind us that disparity doesn’t equal bias and caution against using imperfect variables like these in examining officer involved shootings (OIS)

Disparity Does Not Mean Bias: Making Sense of Observed Racial Disparities in Fatal Officer-Involved Shootings with Multiple Benchmarks

Tregle, Nix & Alpert, Journal of Crime and Justice, 2019

Following well publicized officer involved shootings incidents starting in2014, Officer Involved Shootings (OIS) started being viewed as not isolated incidents but as a national problem involving bias on the part of the police in their interactions with minorities. However, recent agency level studies show that Blacks are not more likely to be shot by the police than Whites. Unfortunately, the government has failed as to adequately compile data related to OIS to examine this issue on a larger scale. However, in 2015, the Washington Post started compiling data related to fatal OIS, indicating that officers shoot and kill just under 1,000 people a year and 25% are black and 48% are white. While UCR data showed that Blacks made up approximately 37% of violent crime arrests, the Washington Post data revealed that in 2015 more than 80% of fatal OIS invoked a suspect with a weapon (with the UCR showing Blacks accounting for 40-44% of weapon possession arrests).

However, the authors note this data cannot show whether Blacks are more likely to be shot by the police than Whites. Simply because Blacks are over-represented in fatal shootings, relative to their population in general, does not mean there is bias toward Blacks by the police. The authors explain that using population as a measure in this way is flawed. Because, as in medical disease models, the entirety of the population do not all face the same risk of disease, nor do all members of a population face the same risk of coming into contact with the police. For example examining racial disparity in traffic stops based on racial population is inappropriate without determining what portion of the population is actually driving and thus at risk of being stopped. Another issue to contend with is that within that driving population, which groups, because of their driving behavior or vehicle condition (young people, low income citizens), might be more likely to be pulled over.

The authors examine seven variables including, population data, police-citizen interaction data  (from the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ Police Public Contact Survey (PPCS), a supplement to the National Crime Victimization Survey carried out triennial) and UCR arrest data from 2015-2017 to report the odds of Black citizens being shot, relative to White citizens. They note that many studies examining OIS showed Blacks were less likely to be shot or killed by the police compared to Whites, however some studies demonstrated opposite findings, but comparing these studies are difficult because of the use of different benchmarks. To examine whether there were any disparities between race in OIS, the authors utilized seven benchmarks to examine the issue-population, police citizen interactions (police-initiated contacts, traffic stops, and street stops), arrests (total arrests, violent crime arrests, and weapon offense arrests).

Analyzing the odds ratios of Blacks and Whites shot against the benchmarks, the authors first note that fatal OIS are a rare occurrence. For example, although police fatally shot 259 Black citizens in 2015, they did not use lethal force in 140,543 arrests of Black citizens for violent crimes. Similarly, while police fatally shot 497 White citizens in 2015, they did not fatally shoot suspects during 63,967 arrests of White citizens for weapons offenses. The also note that population is a flawed benchmark, that while it indicates that Blacks are over 3.5 times more likely to be shot by the police than Whites, the problem is that the majority of either population are not exposed to the risk of  being fatally shot by the police. Other benchmarks provide mixed and varying results. For clarification, note that odds ratios over 1 indicate Blacks were more likely than Whites to be shot while odds ratios less than one indicate Blacks are less likely than Whites to be shot and the horizontal line represents the confidence interval (the high likelihood that the data point lies within that range). (See Table 1)

Table 1. Black Citizen Odds Ratios of Fatal Officer Involved Shootings Benchmarks

From authors’ publication

The authors note that the popular perception that blacks are disproportionately shot by the police is based on the flawed benchmark of population, which doesn’t consider the races’ different exposure rates to the police. They suggest that arrest rates are a more appropriate measure since it represents the subset of the population that had interactions with the police that could turn deadly, working under these assumptions: (1) OIS occur in response to perceived imminently dangerous citizen behaviors, (2) Criminal behavior is a reasonable proxy for imminently dangerous behavior, and (3) Arrests are a reasonable proxy for criminal behavior. Based on total arrests, Blacks are 1.23 to 1.37 more likely to be fatally shot that Whites in that three-year period but when examining arrests that pose a greater threat to officers like those of weapons offenses or violent crimes, Blacks were slightly less likely to be fatally shot than Whites. However the authors also note that UCR data is not a  complete accounting of all police departments, with small departments being underrepresented, and that arrests are only a subset of police-citizens interactions that could escalate into lethal force incidents like traffic stops, domestics, and mentally ill and suspicious person calls. The authors state that a better benchmark might be police-citizen interactions, however the National Crime Victimization survey also has its limitations regarding who is sampled and that in regards to the risk of being shot, there are a vast number of police-citizen encounters that do not require a level of force, let alone lethal force.

An even better benchmark would be scenarios where officers drew their weapons but did not shoot, comparing shoot-no shoot would exclude interaction where it is improbable that citizens would be shot. However, this benchmark may be more appropriate at a city or agency level, as reporting standards for drawing a firearm vary widely and it may be difficult to compile national data. The authors also note that in examining OIS that the Washington Post database does not include non-fatal OIS. Data from larger cities show that non-fatal OIS range from 20-45%, and fatality may be dependent on other factors like immediacy of medical care. They also note that individual circumstances are not accounted for including suspects’ level of resistance and threatening behavior which will prompt the use of force, and level of force, which may explain some of the racial disparity. In addition, another noteworthy limitation of the study is the inability to benchmark fatal shootings of citizens who posed no imminent threat (i.e., unarmed and not aggressing).

In this case, the research question would be: In order to answer the question of whether Black citizens who pose no imminent threat are more likely to be fatally shot by police than White citizens who pose no imminent threat, given each group’s exposure to police contact, benchmarks would be needed that indicated how often officers interact with unarmed and non-aggressing citizens of each racial group. The authors conclude that the federal government should be compiling data on all OIS to better understand and analyze the conditions under which they occur and that while databases like the Washington Post’s can provide valuable information, the benchmarks used to analyze OIS have assumptions and limitations that must be acknowledged.

Tregle, B., Nix, J., & Alpert, G. P. (2019). Disparity does not mean bias: Making sense of observed racial disparities in fatal officer-involved shootings with multiple benchmarks. Journal of crime and justice, 42(1), 18-31.

While it is apparent that in order to examine any racial disparities in officer involved shooting that appropriate benchmarks be used, we also know that not all OIS are appropriate and that the police do make errors in the application of force. Taylor examined OIS and constructed a typology of police shooting errors, with suggestions on how those errors may addressed.

Beyond False Positives: A Typology of Police Shooting Errors

Taylor, Criminology and Public Policy, 2019

Taylor quotes David Kahneman saying that “There are distinctive patterns in the errors people make. Systemic errors are known as biases, and they recur predictably in particular circumstances. …The availability of diagnostic labels for [these] biases make [them] easier to anticipate, recognize, and understand”. Taylor explains that behavior tends to be systematically connected to the features of peoples’ tools, tasks, previous experiences, training, and environments and that the research findings on human error have consistently demonstrated that situations, behaviors, and decision processes that result in error tend to result in repeated errors across time and people. The examination of errors can be applied to criminal justice research, and more specifically, to police use of deadly force, and a typology of police shooting errors can be constructed.

Error should be defined as, absent any chance outside influence, when a sequence of thoughts or behaviors do not lead to their intended outcome. An officer shooting an unarmed man intentionally is not an error. It may be a violation, but it is not an error because the intent met the outcome. Systemic errors occur when people rely on pattern recognition, developed from repeated exposure to similar patterns and experiences, and automaticity, which is the development of implicit shortcuts in our cognition which speed up our decision making process with a high degree of reliability but can also lead to errors.

In the context of police shooting, errors are typically viewed as either a False Positive error, where a person is presumed to be dangerous by the officer, but is in fact not dangerous, and shot by the officer, or a False Negative, where a police officer or citizen is killed when an officer fails to shoot a dangerous individual. However the authors believe this simple typology can be expanded to cover a wider variety of scenarios, which include misses of the intended target and hits on unintended targets such as citizens and other officers

Table 1. A New Typology of Police Shooting Errors

  TARGET HIT
FIREARM DISCHARGED Intended Unintended
Intended Misdiagnosis Errors Misses
Unintended Misapplication Errors Unintentional Discharge

The authors explain misdiagnosis errors, similar to false-positive errors, as when the officer intended to shoot his firearm, and hit the intended target, but the outcome was unintended, i.e., a non-dangerous person was shot. In these situations, a non-dangerous person was shot in error, sometimes referred to as cell-phone shootings, mistake-of-fact shootings, and perception-only shootings. They note statistics from Los Angeles and Philadelphia that between 2013 and 2017, 14% and 10% respectively, of police shootings involved this type of error. They suggest that while more research is needed, that these errors may stem from pattern recognition. The classic and current police literature notes that through experience officers are attuned to cues of danger and impropriety and these cues prompt the reliance on pattern recognition, where these frequently experienced cues prompt the recognition of, and priming for, a dangerous situation. This leads to decision making shortcuts that prompt officers to go on alert, draw their gun and fire. However these shortcuts can lead to errors when the officer has been primed for a dangerous scenario (such as a dispatch call about a man with a gun), attends to the wrong information , or ignores or misinterprets the right information.

Misapplication errors involved the unintended firing of the firearm but a hit on the intended target. These are referred to in the literature as weapon confusion or Taser confusion shootings , where the officer intended to Taser a person but instead accidentally drew his firearm and shot. This type of error is well documented in the medical and aviation fields, where switching over to a new tool (like a Taser) or procedure has been introduced and a preoccupation or distraction is present, thus causing the misapplication and the unintended outcome. In these cases, training just to sufficiency may be insufficient as newer learned skills tended to be the first to disappear under pressure and replaced by those practiced for a longer period of time. The authors note the typical difference in training time with firearms compared to Tasers, and while it requires more research, this may be a factor in this error.

Misses are an error where the officer intends to fire his firearm but doesn’t hit the intended target, either completely missing or hitting an unintended target. Much of the research on police shooting accuracy indicates a low hit rate, typically less than 50 %, and despite changes in training methods, hasn’t improved over the past 50 years. Between 2013 and 2017, Philadelphia officer hit rates averaged 18% while in that same time period LA officer hit rates  averaged 27%, varying between 18% to 42%. This means that the error is a much more common outcome than the correct one and the authors note there is not a comparative type error in other fields and suggest much more research be conducted to determining and addressing the causes of this type of error.

Unintended discharges are errors which occur when an officer did not intend to fire his weapon, had no intention of hitting a target, but the round in fact struck a target. They are typically referred to as accidental or negligent discharges. Between 2013 and 2017, 17 % of reported LA shooting incidents involved this type of error while between 2006 and 2016, the NYPD reported 19% of their shooting incidents were unintended discharges. Research indicates that unconscious touching of the trigger may be common and when combined with some exertion activity, a co-muscle activation response exerted enough pressure to discharge the weapon. A high number of accidental discharges occurred during routine weapons activity,(storing, cleaning, loading, unloading). Automaticity, where officers have done a task so many times it becomes automatic, allows them to change attentional focus and with a loss of focus on the other task, an error in unintended discharge can occur.

The authors conclude that simply trying to lump all police error shootings into a large sample and look for causal correlation is misguided as the causal mechanics vary between the types of errors but neither is it appropriate to simply look at each case as an isolated incident as causal connections to similar shooting incidents might also be missed. Utilizing this typology will more accurately discriminate between the different types of shooting errors and improve research on police shootings, and, based on the type of error, appropriate means can be employed to reduce those types of errors through policy, training or practice.

Taylor, P. L. (2019). Beyond false positives: A typology of police shooting errors. Criminology & Public Policy, 18(4), 807-822.

Eliminating errors in the use of lethal force is just one way of improving police performance, which can foster and build police legitimacy with the public. James, James, Davis, and Dotson suggest that rather than looking at outcomes to study police-citizen contacts, a more in-depth analysis of police performance that examines officer behavior while accounting for influencing factors, can not only enhance our understanding of officer decision making and behavior but also improve police performance in their contact with citizens.

Using Interval-Level Metrics to Investigate Situational-, Suspect-, and Officer-Level Predictors of Police Performance During Encounters with the Public

James, James, Davis and Dotson, Police Quarterly, 2019

The authors look at factors that may influence how police officers behave during encounters with the public, noting previous research has examined whether suspect race influences officer involved shootings or whether officers use greater force depending on suspect demeanor, or whether neighborhoods predict police-citizen outcomes. However, this research typically focuses on the outcome of the encounter, not the performance of the officer in the encounter. For example, an officer may exhibit fairness and do everything right but still generate a citizen complaint, while another officer may do everything wrong and get away with it if the citizen doesn’t bother to file a complaint. The authors examined a wide variety of 667 incident reports from a large urban department (1500 sworn officers) to examine situational, suspect, and officer level predictors on how officers perform in their interactions with the public. Utilizing a recently established and rigorously developed police encounter performance metric, the authors used interval level metrics to score officer performance across the range of these encounters which include Use of Force, Tactical Social Interaction (officer performance in routine citizen encounters), and Crisis Intervention, which involved officer performance in crisis encounter or encounter with people with mental illness.

Within these three metrics are a wide variety of performance measurements. For example, under Use of Force there are 48 performance variables within the categories of Preplan (expecting to be involved in a deadly force situation, waiting for backup) Observe/assess (correctly identifies threats, identifies pre-assault indicators, aware of what is going on in the periphery, selecting reasonable force options), Officer Behavior (paying attention to details, drawing the weapon, able to use communication skills to defuse, used appropriate level of assertiveness), Tactics (had necessary equipment, prioritizing citizen safety, prioritizing other officer safety, using cover, effectively engaging multiple opponents) and Adapt (correctly responds to a threat, recognizes need to transition to different force option, uses or compensates for environmental conditions). Tactical and Social Interaction and Crisis Intervention also utilized extensive performance variables under similar categories, including Resources, Interaction, and Closing the Encounter.

Each of these variables carried a score indicating that behavior’s impact on performance. The incident reports were than analyzed and coded if the officer took the action, or whether the officer could have taken the action but did not. Not all performance metrics were suitable for every encounter and so were not included in the scoring and analysis. The performance scores of officers are expressed as a percentage, the proportion of all behaviors that were possible in the encounters, as measured by the metrics. In addition to this, the authors also coded situational (nighttime, children present, cultural or language barrier, more than one civilian present), suspect (age, sex, race, non-compliant, armed, hostile, homeless, emotionally disturbed, substance impaired, self-harming behavior), and officer (sex) level variables and analyzed them for their effect on officer performance.

Overall, across all incidents the average performance score was 80.5%. Officers scored highest in crisis encounters (83.6%), aggravated assaults (83.4%), and domestic violence incidents (82.4%) but scored lower in traffic collisions (74.8%), harassment calls (76.9%) and investigation of suspicious circumstances (76.7%). See Table 1 below with average officer performance scores and their error bars at a 95% confidence interval.

Table 1. Citizen Interaction Specific Police Officer Performance Scores

From authors’ publication

To investigate this average 20% performance deficit, the authors examined specific categories and found officers scored highly in Observe/assess (96%) and Closing (93.6%) but less proficient with Preplanning (80.5%), Adapting Tactics (83.8), and use of Tactics (84.4). They also note officers performed far better in crisis encounters (94.5%) than in routine (non-crisis) police/citizen interactions (76.9%).

When the authors examined situational factor influence on officer performance, they found similar performance irrespective of night or day, the presence of children, or the presence of cultural barriers with a slightly better performance in the presence of language barriers (84.2%) than without (81.8%) and statistically significantly better performance with more than one civilian present (81.5%) as compared to only one civilian present (78.6%). In analyzing suspect factors, performance was very similar with teens, young adults, and older adults, and slightly higher performance scores with men as opposed to women (84.7% vs 82.1 %). Officers also performed slightly better (mid 80’s percentiles) with substance impaired citizens, the homeless, self-harming individuals, hostile citizens, and armed suspects than with the opposite counterparts to these factors. Officers also had significantly better performance scores in dealing with emotionally disturbed individuals (84.8%), non-compliant citizens (86.3%) and Blacks (85.8%) compared to Whites (83.2%) or Hispanics (83.8%). While officer gender was the only officer related factor that could be analyzed in this study based on incident reports, there was no statistical difference in performance scores based on gender.

The authors suggest that the results indicate that officers perform better in crisis or “high stakes scenarios as evidenced by their higher performance in crisis incidents like domestics and aggravated assault. This may occur as officers are calling upon tasks that they excel at like vigilant situational assessment, the use of tactics, and adapting those tactics, with officers scoring high in Observe/assess. The large difference between crisis and routine encounters suggests that while measurements show that officers performed very well with performance items like clearly explaining actions, showing empathy, and demonstrating concern for the citizen but perhaps felt the need to demonstrate this more in crisis situations than in routine encounters. The finding that officers performed better with Blacks than non-blacks might be difficult to interpret. The largest differences between Blacks and non-Blacks were in the Observe/assess category, 99% compared to 95%. It could be suggested that officers have a heightened awareness because of implicit bias, unconsciously associating Blacks with weapons or danger, in line with the Minority Threat hypothesis. Alternately, officers may be paying more attention in encounters with Blacks due to a desire to perform well in these encounters and avoid being labeled as biased, with the authors noting that the department had received implicit bias training in the past year. Officers’ better performance with emotionally disturbed and non-compliant individuals suggests that while officers logically would use humanizing and de-escalation techniques in these situations, across the range of performance behaviors, indications seem to be that officers try harder during situations they perceive as more challenging.

Implications from the study suggest using performance metrics are a better way to assess officer behavior than simply analyzing outcomes, such as whether force was used or the presence of citizens complaints as they may provide a distorted picture of actual officer performance. The authors also urge the use of body worn cameras to aid in the assessment of officer performance. They also recognize that outcomes speak to fair enforcement and building public trust to enhance police legitimacy but rather than the sole measure of police encounters, both performance and outcomes can be analyzed to determine how probabilistic outcomes like use of force, or arrest, are, and how much they are dictated by good or bad officer performance. As well as being used to assess training effectiveness like Crisis Intervention Training, officers can be trained to incorporate de-escalation techniques in a broader range of scenarios where there is a likelihood of escalation, including in routine citizen encounters where techniques like empathizing, reducing the police citizen power differential, and being respectful may foster the perception of police legitimacy as well as reduce the 20% officer performance deficit.

James, L., James, S., Davis, R., & Dotson, E. (2019). Using Interval-Level Metrics to Investigate Situational-, Suspect-, and Officer-Level Predictors of Police Performance During Encounters With the Public. Police Quarterly, 22(4), 452-480.

Research Briefs

Under the Microscope: Legal Challenges to Fingerprints and DNA as Methods of Forensic Identification

Wise, International Review of Law, Computers, & Technology, 2004

Wise discusses the advent of both fingerprint and DNA technology, and addresses the legal challenges they’ve faced as well as how the determination of legal validity will affect emerging biometric identification means. He notes that Galton, a 19th century scientist, proclaimed that fingerprints were unique to each individual and permanent, as well as developing a system to identify the unique characteristics of a fingerprint (called Galton points). Sir Edward Henry, a contemporary of Galton took an interest in fingerprints, and with consultation from Galton, developed the Henry Classification System to catalog fingerprint data, thus ushering in the modern era of fingerprint science The classification system is still used today and has enjoyed worldwide acceptance and use.

Challenges to the admissibility of latent prints are based on established standards of evidence admissibility. The 1923 case, Frye vs the United States, originally set a standard for expert testimony (in this case, in the admissibility of lie detector results), in that  experts should only testify if their testimony is based on “general acceptance” in the scientific community. This standard was widely utilized until the 1993 case, Daubert vs Merrel Dow Pharmaceuticals. This case set out new, comprehensive criteria which included, whether the scientific theory has been tested, whether it has been subject to peer review and publication, whether it has a known error rate, whether it has widespread acceptance, and whether there are operating standards. It was from the establishment of the Daubert standard that questions about the admissibility of latent prints arose.

In 1999, the case United States vs Byron Mitchell, was the first to challenge the admissibility of fingerprint evidence, and while the judge dismissed the challenge, the issue came up again in  2002, with United States vs Carlos Ivan Llera Plaza. The judge ruled that  while the analyst may testify to some components of the analysis such as the methodology and the number of matching points between the latent print evidence and the defendant, he would not be allowed to testify as to whether the evidence matched the print of the defendant. The judge ruled latent print analysis did not meet the Daubert standard, because of a lack of known error rate and differing standards on how many Galton points signifies a match. However, the judge later reversed his ruling after reviewing US and UK data, concluding that there was a clearly established standard of analysis in the scientific community to satisfy the Daubert standard. Since the Mitchell case there have been 40 challenges to the admissibility of latent print evidence but in all the cases, fingerprint evidence was allowed.

In 1984, Dr. Alec Jeffreys, a researcher studying gene structures determined that DNA sequences are unique to individuals and two years later was helping law enforcement utilize DNA to identify a serial killer in the UK., which both exonerated an innocent man and was able to match DNA from a suspect to the evidence. Jeffreys’ RFLP method has been refined since then to an STR technique where only a small amount of DNA is required for analysis, as well as developing the use of mitochondrial DNA testing that utilizes a different methodology that works especially well on degraded DNA evidence, and in cases requiring the identification of family members.

The first challenge to RFLP DNA evidence occurred in the late 80’s in the case of United States vs Bonds. The District Court ruled that the DNA evidence was admissible based on the “general acceptance” standard of Frye, however the US Court of Appeals ruled in 1993 that the DNA evidence was admissible under the Daubert standard, despite the laboratory not conducting external blind proficiency tests or referencing a known error rate. The judge determined that if the scientific community was accepting of  the technology, it must also then be accepting of the error rate as well. RFLP DNA analysis was also challenged in the NY case of the People vs Castro. In this case, the court used a three prong Frye test to determine if the theory, and its techniques and experiments, could produce reliable results that were generally accepted by the scientific community, and whether the laboratory performed the accepted scientific techniques in analyzing the sample in the particular case. The court ruled the first two prongs were met,, in that the science was sound, but that the laboratory failed to the meet the accepted scientific testing standards.

STR DNA analysis was also challenged in many courts. For example in State vs Traylor, although Traylor argued the validity of commercial DNA tests are unknown because of the use of proprietary regents used in the analysis, the MN Supreme Court, in 2003, ruled that the DNA Advisory Board and its established guidelines developed by the FBI, met the admissibility criteria and validated the science. While challenges to mtDNA are relatively new to the courts, recent challenges have established that mtDNA analysis  constitutes a “scientific knowledge based on reliable methods and principles”.

Newer DNA analysis technology, like Low Copy Number (LCN), while accepted, may face challenges as well. LCN DNA techniques can utilize very small samples of DNA and produce 17 billion copies to allow for analysis. However the concern is that as the original sample gets smaller in this process, any contamination in the sample will have a larger effect on the results of the analysis. Other concerns are the transfer of LCN DNA from casual contact and the lack of scientific evidence available as to how long this casual contact DNA could remain. While  “shedder indexes” are being investigated to determine the rate at which an individual donates potential DNA material (i.e. skin cells, hair, sweat), researchers have reported that DNA can be detected after transfer to an object for nearly three months in some cases and in one case for 2 years. Even more importantly, with such a small sample size of LCN DNA, there typically is no  material left over after testing for an outside source to run its own analysis and produce data. The FBI, with the exception of the limited application in human remains identification, remains skeptical of LCN DNA. Their official position is that any profiles obtained from LCN DNA should not be entered into the Combined DNA Index\System (CODIS) database of offenders and suspects. They also issued a caution against a rush to re-examine old cases on the hopes that LCN DNA would offer better analysis or change a verdict, mainly because of the risk of evidence contamination from repeated handling.

While fingerprints, and now DNA, are classic biometric measures, new measures of identification are being developed like ear prints, facial and voice recognition, iris, retina, and vein patterns, and hand geometry. The newer technologies will likely face challenges as they are introduced into the courtroom. Part of what drove the acceptance of latent print admissibility is that the scientific standard had been developed over a 100 years of use. Newer technologies will need to demonstrate that they can meet the Frye or Daubert standards and this also puts a burden on the judiciary, highlighting the situation created by Daubert,which requires judges, who are often not trained in the sciences, to act as gatekeepers of evidence admissibility. Even if these new technologies become “generally accepted”, criminal defense attorneys can still criticize the application of the method by the individual laboratory, and if the laboratory demonstrates they meet the scientific standards, the training or performance of the individual analyst can still be called into question.

Wise, J. (2004). Under the microscope: Legal challenges to fingerprints and DNA as methods of forensic identification. International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 18(3), 425-434.

Recognizing the challenges faced in determining admissibility is important for defense attorneys as well as prosecutors, criminalists, and detectives. Being able to present solid, scientific based identifying evidence is crucial for prosecutions, as is producing accurate evidence data from other sources at the crime scene. Knock and Davison  developed a methodology that they believe will produced more detailed, accurate information on the source of blood stain evidence.

Predicting the Position of the Source of Blood Stains for Angled Impacts

Knock & Davison, Journal of Forensic Sciences, 2007

The authors note that in the field determining the source of blood splatter evidence  typically involves the “stringing method. As the authors explain “This technique uses the fact that the width to length ratio of a blood stain is approximately related to its impact angle. Using the calculated angle of impact, a straight line is drawn back from the stain along the line of the impact angle. Where the lines from several stains intersect is assumed to be the source of the stain.” They also note though that the effect of gravity on the flight path of blood droplets isn’t taken into account in making this determination. Knock and Davison experimented by dropping blood droplets of varying sizes at different height and angles against a hard surface. From this data, they produced one equation relating stain size to drop size and velocity for all impact angles, and a second equation, relating the number of spines (blood fingers extending from the center of the drop caused by impact) to drop size, velocity, and surface slope for all impact angles. The authors demonstrated that by combining these two equations, impact velocity can be accurately calculated and thus the true position of the blood stain’s source.

Knock, C., & Davison, M. (2007). Predicting the position of the source of blood stains for angled impacts. Journal of forensic sciences, 52(5), 1044-1049.

Revising and refining scientific methodology can improve the forensic investigative ability of detectives and criminalists but its also necessary to re-evaluate perceptions we hold about certain criminal activity and the perpetrators. Ferguson, et al reminds us that conventional wisdom is not always correct and that the analysis of data is necessary for the proper assessment of contributing and causal behavior in determining who might be at risk for perpetrating a school shooting.

Psychological Profiles of School Shooters: Positive Directions and One Big Wrong Turn

Ferguson, Coulson, & Barnett, Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations, 2011

The authors contend that the stereotype presented by the media and typologies produced both by the American Psychiatric Association and the FBI are simply inaccurate, or too overly broad and vague, to be of use. While conceding that first hand data from shooters who often die in the incident is hard to come by, a more evidence based typology can be utilized.

School shooters are typically portrayed as loners, involved in the Goth subculture or other out-groups, who enjoy violent video games, were bullied, and had disruptive or negligent home lives. When school shootings increased in the’90’s the public, academics, politicians, and activists demanded answers, despite their relative rarity and the overall general decline of youth violence.

In 1999, the FBI provided a threat assessment profile for school shooters cautioning against its use other than in assessing the credibility of a threat already made by an individual. Some criteria seem reasonable like “injustice collector, dehumanizes others, and lacks empathy” while others were vague in definition like an “unreasonable interest in sensational violence” and overly broad like “a failed love relationship, a sense of superiority, exaggerated need for attention, externalizes blame, closed social group, a fascination with violence filled entertainment”.

As of 2010 the APA maintained a warning signs list for serious youth violence including obvious signs like “enjoying hurting animals, detailed plans to commit acts of violence, and announcing threats or plans for hurting others” but like the FBI’s threat assessment, others are vague in definition like “frequent physical fighting” while others could apply to great numbers of mentally-well juveniles like, “feeling rejected or alone, poor school performance, and access to or a fascination with weapons, especially firearms”.as well as including ideas that have been discredited by research like “violence is a learned behavior” and linking violent media, like video games, with violent behavior.

These attempts at recognizing school shooters will result in over-identification and misidentification and while empirical evidence on characteristics of school shooters is scant, a 2002 report from the Secret Service and Dept. of Education does provide a more data derived (albeit descriptive) picture of school shooters. The reported analyzed 37 attacks, involving 41 perpetrators from 1974 to 2000 and utilized school and court records, mental health and legal documents as well as interviews with the ten surviving perpetrators. The report made clear that with the wide difference among perpetrators that no profile for school shooters existed, though there were some features that tended to be more widespread. The report also demonstrated that the stereotypical school shooter image is inaccurate. The SS/DOE report found that video game playing was relatively low, only 15% expressed “some interest in violent video games” and just 59% expressed “some interest in violent media in other forms”, with the authors noting these figures are lower than those found for non-shooter males in other studies. However, 37% were exposed to media violence through their own poems, essays, and journals.

Social isolation was not found to be common with school shooters. Most had friends, 41% belonged to a mainstream social groups, (27% were part of fringe groups but also had friends). In categories that were not mutually exclusive, only 12% had no friends and 34% were described as loners. School and family background also did not figure prominently into school shooters’ behaviors. However mental health issues were a factor. 98% of perpetrators experienced some kind of major loss right before the incident, 78% had a history of suicide attempts or ideation, 71% percent of then perceived themselves as wronged, bullied, or persecuted by others, and 61% had a documented history of significant depression. However very few of the perpetrators had received any mental health care in the past, suggesting a failure of our mental health system that has contributed to these incidents, Two prominent warning signs noted in the SS/DOE report were that 81% of perpetrators warned an uninvolved person prior to the attack and that 93% had already engaged in behaviors that alarmed peers, teachers, parents, or mental health professionals.

These factors have been identified in research on adult perpetrators of mass homicide as well as figuring into youth violence in general. Ferguson noted his upcoming study revealed that violent media was not a factor in youth violence, however current levels of depressive symptoms coupled with antisocial personality traits, were highly predictive of youth violence. The authors suggest that reducing school shootings should focus on preventative measures however, reform in addressing mental health needs is long overdue, and funding for adequate at-risk youth and adults services will be slow in coming. They also note that because of the likelihood that perpetrators may signal their violent intent before the action, that prevention can take the form of peers acting upon what they hear or see and informing law enforcement or school officials.

Ferguson, C. J., Coulson, M., & Barnett, J. (2011). Psychological profiles of school shooters: Positive directions and one big wrong turn. Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations, 11(2), 141-158.

Officers are often called upon to confront resistant and/or violent individuals and by necessity have a choice of non-lethal options they can employ in these encounters. One technique that has caused controversy over its application and the potential for harm to suspects is the chokehold, both historically and as recently as last year. Below, Dr. Koiwai examines factors that may be contributing to deaths in the application of choke holds.

Deaths Allegedly Caused by the Use of “Choke Holds” (Shime-Waza)

Koiwai, Journal of Forensic Sciences, 1987

Author Koiwai, MD, stated that the chokehold technique used by police officers is the same chokehold (Shime-Waze) used in Judo. Yet while officers have been involved in the deaths of suspects following application of the hold, Koiwai notes that since the sport of Judo was established in 1882, there have been no fatalities associated with the use of the hold in Judo.

Koiwai briefly discusses the control techniques used by the police which are similar to Judo chokeholds, including the carotid control hold (fig. 1) the locked carotid control hold (fig 2), as well as the bar arm control hold, where the left hand is placed on the back of the subject’s head forcing it down. All of these holds are finished by using the hold to take the subject down to a seated position and applying the hold until the subject becomes unconscious or ceases resisting.

Koiwai examined the autopsy reports of 13 cases between 1975-1985 which involved a law enforcement chokehold being applied. The decedents were males, Black and White, between the ages of 19 and 58, though the majority were under 40, and their weight ranged from 120-220 pounds, though in only one case did the decedent weigh over 170 pounds. While in all but one case the decedents were violently resisting arrest, which necessitated the use of the chokehold, the case narratives indicate that in six of the cases, the decedents were very violent and combative. In three of the 13 cases, acute intoxication from alcohol or drugs was involved, two other cases involved decedents suffering from psychosis, as well as the findings that in three other cases, pre-existing heart conditions contributed to the death. In almost all the cases medical attention was provided in a timely matter, though in all the cases, asphyxiation was a primary factor, including in some cases, aspiration of vomit, and brain death from oxygen deprivation.

In all 13 cases, the author noted evidence of injuries to the structures of the neck ranging from bruises, lacerations, hemorrhages, and vascular compression, as well as fractures of the cartilage of the neck in five cases, and intervertebral discs in one case. Submucosal or mucosae injuries are noted in the larynx in five cases. All these findings indicate that tremendous force was exerted on the necks of the decedents. Koiwai noted that only a relatively small amount of pressure is necessary to close off the carotid arteries and that unconsciousness should occur in only 10-20 seconds, with regaining consciousness occurring in about the same time length. Koiwai stated that the force applied to collapse the airway, as occurred in these cases, is 6 times greater than necessary to effectively apply a chokehold, which resulted in the injuries seen in the autopsy reports. Properly applied the chokehold puts pressure on the superior carotid triangle, closing off the carotid artery but leaving the vertebral artery unobstructed. (fig 5) Completely obstructing the blood flow to the brain or asphyxia by closure of the trachea can lead to irreversible damage or death.

Koiwai suggests that police department training manuals should emphasize that control holds should be used only when necessary to stop a suspect’s resistance and not necessarily to cause unconsciousness. If police officers are to use the choke holds to subdue violent suspects as a last resort, they should be properly trained and supervised by trained, certified judo instructors to ensure that there will be less misuse or abuse of the technique which when used improperly results in fatalities. These fatalities could be reduced if (1) choke holds are taught by trained and certified instructors (2) if officers become familiar with the anatomical structures of the neck and where the pressure is  to be applied (carotid triangle), (3) if they understand the physiology of choking, in that only a small amount of pressure is needed to cause unconsciousness; (4) if officers are taught to recognize immediately the state of unconsciousness and to release the pressure immediately, (5) learn proper resuscitation methods if unconsciousness is prolonged; and to prevent the aspiration of vomit and not to place the restrained suspect face down, (6) and keep the subject under constant observation. (7) Additionally, police training manuals should be revised to emphasize the above procedures and principles, all of which will prevent deaths from chokeholds.

Koiwai, E. K. (1987). Deaths allegedly caused by the use of “choke holds”(shime-waza). Journal of Forensic Science, 32(2), 419-432.

Police officers face challenges in recognizing when to apply force and the level of force itself. Proper training in different techniques makes for better, more professional officers, as well as decreased injuries and fatalities for suspects. However, having a means to assess officer performance when they face potentially violent encounters is crucial to understanding their behavior and decision making in those encounters. Those observations can then be used to improve officer performance and public safety as well. Vickers and Lewinski examine the differences between elite and rookie police officers in their preparation for use of a firearm in a violent confrontation.

Performing under pressure: Gaze control, decision making and shooting performance of elite and rookie police officers

Vickers & Lewinski, Human Movement Science, 2011

The authors discuss that currently most firearms training programs teach officers to focus their gaze on two locations, first on the sights of their gun, and secondly on the target before pulling the trigger. This gaze strategy works very well in training with rookies achieving high accuracy scores in initial firearms training, but once on the street and faced with a violent firearms encounter they shoot poorly, averaging between 10 and 60% accuracy. The high pressure states that shooters face tend to cause more visual fixations of a shorter duration and reduced ability to detect peripheral information.

When elite shooting athletes were studied they found that they tended to fixate on the target, and kept that sight gaze as they aligned their firearm sights with the target, rather than switching gaze from sights to target; this allowed for a longer final fixation on the target leading to greater accuracy, and the reduction of pressure, anxiety and psychological stress. The authors tested 11 elite Emergency Response Team members and 13 rookie officers nearing the end of their training period, with gaze tracking software, putting them in a role-playing scenario where they are informed a threat may appear in the area they are monitoring. An upset male enters the location and becomes increasing agitated with an individual playing the role of a receptionist. In the final two seconds of the encounter, the male quickly pivots and draws on the officer who is seven yards behind him, drawing either a gun or a cellphone. Officers were assessed on their gaze duration, gaze location, amount of gaze shifting, speed, accuracy and locations of shots fired, time involved in the unholstering, draw, aim, and fire phases, and the rate that they inhibited firing in the cellphone scenario.

Following data analysis, statistically significant differences were revealed.

  Elite Officers Rookie Officers
Hit on assailant 74.5 % 53.9 %
Decision making (fired on cellphone) 12.3 % 61.5 %
Fired before assailant 92.5 % 42.2%
High Performance (meeting all above criteria) 75.0 % 52.9 %
Fixated on more locations where gun could be concealed 50.3 % 30.6 %
Fixated on locations where gun couldn’t be concealed 42.1 % 51.1 %
Fixated on areas off the assailant 7.6 % 18.1 %
Unholstered weapon after assailant entered 1.77 sec. avg 6.28 sec. avg.

Statistically significant differences were also found in the final phases of the scenario between the onset times of the different phases based on officer status.

Onset Elite Rookie
Draw 4.63 sec. 6.04 sec.
Hold 4.81 sec. 6.26 sec.
Aim 5.83 sec. 6.36 sec.
Fire 6.87 sec. 6.93 sec.

There were also statistically significant differences between elite and rookie officers in their visual fixations during the final two seconds of the scenario.

Fixations Elite Rookie
Increased visual fixation on assailant weapon From 18 % to 71 % From 18 % to 34 %
Decreased fixation on non-weapon locations From 78 % to 7 % From 62 % to 16 %
Increased fixation on officer’s weapon to 20 % 39 %
Fixations off assailant 4 % 13 %
Final fixation on officer weapon not assailant 32% 84 %
Final fixation time on assailant  before firing .32 sec. .27 sec
Final fixation time on ofcr. weapon before firing .12 sec .24 sec

In reacting to the threat, rookie officers performed the final phase actions in the last second of the scenario versus elite officers who performed the actions in the last 2.5 seconds, starting the process earlier, taking more time to focus on the assailant and less time focusing on their own weapon. The elite officers’ earlier draw was also preceded by more time spent focusing on assailant weapon locations than rookies. Elite officers maintained more visual focus, drew sooner than rookies in anticipation of the threat, and thus gave themselves more time in the final aim and fire phases for increased fixation focus, which accounted for their better hit and discrimination rates. The authors stated that their results suggest that firearms training should change from a process that inadvertently teaches rookies to fixate on the sights of their own weapon first and the target second, to a type of training that establishes the line of gaze on the target from the outset, followed by alignment of the sights of the weapon to the line of gaze. This change in gaze control would lead to a longer final visual fixation duration on the target prior to pulling the trigger and should contribute to better decision making and performance. If these changes in firearm’s training were implemented, then the gaze control of novice officers should be similar to that of elite athletes and elite officers from the first day of training, which should decrease errors in decision making and improve shooting accuracy.

Vickers, J. N., & Lewinski, W. (2012). Performing under pressure: Gaze control, decision making and shooting performance of elite and rookie police officers. Human movement science, 31(1), 101-117.