Welcome to the New Year everyone. This month at CJ Access check out a new policing-focused posting under Research Briefs. Find out what police officers think about body worn cameras (BWCs), what factors affect their decision to charge and arrest on stalking behaviors in domestic violence, and how likely officers are to adhere to a “blue code of silence”. Also explore a longitudinal study to see if there is any support for claims of a “war on cops”, examine the factors that increase the likelihood of injury to subjects and officers in use of force incidents, and investigate the claim that witness and suspect interview transcriptions distort and contaminate oral testimony and confessions when used in court.
Tag: police corruption
Research Briefs
Tapes, Transcripts and Trials: The Routine Contamination of Police Interview Evidence
Haworth, The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 2018
Haworth contends that the way police interviews are conducted, recorded, transcribed, and then used as evidence in court fundamentally alters the original content and meaning of the interview. This contaminated version, when used in court, is often to reinforce or contradict oral testimony based on the exact wording of the transcript. With the reliance of the prosecution on the written record, this contaminated evidence could influence jurors inappropriately or change the possible outcome of a case. Haworth’s UK study, where she compares and analyzes official police transcripts with her own transcripts, as well as a high profile case where both full audio recordings of the interview and the official transcript were made available, examines four areas common to the process of interview production that will result in errors in meaning or content; audibility, transcription, editing, and courtroom presentation.
Haworth notes that the original context of the interview can never fully be captured; the surroundings, environment, emotional content, and body language cues cannot really be articulated in an audio recording and properly portraying spoken language in a written format can be challenging. Editing for, and the actual production of, the transcript can also omit valuable information.
Audio recordings may be of overall poor quality, with some departments still using cassette recording equipment, and just through circumstances of the interview, some recorded portions may be inaudible. Haworth notes it is rare that transcripts indicate inaudible portions of the recording and references research where transcribers may just insert “what they thought they heard” in such instances, resulting in errors. Haworth also notes that some countries don’t even bother with audio recordings, relying instead on the interviewer recall in writing the interview summary, while some locations don’t provide an actual transcript but a monologue in first or third person that presents a synopsis of the interviewees’ information rather than a back and forth exchange.
The transcription process also is likely not to include the para and extralinguistic features people utilize in interpreting meaning in face to face interactions. Features like intonation, emphasis, breathiness, facial expressions, and body and head movements all provide details in face to face communication that help the viewer interpret truthfulness, emotions, and cognitive processes in the speaker but are typically lost in producing a transcription. The transcription process is also prone to “correcting” spoken word by omitting or changing speaking features like false starts, stammering, inarticulations, repetition, interruptions, and correcting sentence structure, syntax, and grammar to improve readability. However, she notes research has shown this correction is typically used for lawyers and police officers but not for witnesses and suspects. The author’s interviews with transcription clerks in her study indicate there is no transcription training and no formalization in transcribing these features, with each transcriber developing there own personal style to the transcription process. But Haworth notes that pauses convey important meaning in communication which isn’t imparted to the reader or listener. Non-response to questions were also handled differently with some transcribers, indicating everything from no indication in the transcript to transcriptions like “no comment” “no audible reply”, “no response”, “defendant remained silent”, or “defendant refused to answer” and each of the indicators present a slightly different interpretation of the suspects’ reaction following questions.
The transcription process of a police interview also involves substantial editing and typically produces a summary, (for example, just a simple text statement indicating that the suspect was informed about the charges or circumstances and not transcribing the actual interaction) with only certain parts fully transcribed to ease time and resource costs. These civilian employees of the police department were given guidance sheets on different offenses so they knew what particular points or elements of the crime, known as “points to prove”, to focus on instead of full transcription. For example, in regards to theft, points to prove would involve showing dishonesty, appropriation, property, that belonged to another, with intent to permanently deprive. However this relies upon the individual transcribers being knowledgeable enough determine what is relevant enough to be transcribed. This transcription process is also geared toward prosecution. There is no indication that transcribers were given guidance to include full transcription in areas regarding duress, legal justifications, or exculpatory admissions. In summarizing interactions, transcribers can also inadvertently introduce value judgments or interpretations based on their perspective. For example, in summarizing an interaction transcribers can indicate behavioral motivations that are just assumed but not actually stated, or fail to transcribe communication indicating the detailed information and emotional content of responses that removes the tone and attitude of an interaction.
The transcript is typical the only evidence of the interview used in court as opposed to the audio recording of the interview. This evidence presentation system is further contaminated as transcripts are not provided to the jurors but are typically presented orally by prosecutors and police witnesses, thus adding another layer of interpretation to a document that had already gone through interpretive changes. This oral presentation allows for the presenter to produce their own intonation, emotion, inflections, and pauses, and either purposely, or inadvertently, present this evidence with a bias toward producing a conviction. Even when jurors are provided with a copy they are likely to be highly influenced by the oral court presentation which may be biased toward the prosecution. Haworth noted in a particularly high-profile case, that punctuation errors in transcription can change the meaning of the words related orally and that mistakes in reading the transcript aloud or prosecutors attempts to “correctly” use the right intonation or emphasis change the meaning of the transcript presented.
To eliminate or mitigate these problems, Haworth suggests that departments move to digital audio recording as well as incorporate video recording to capture the all important context. She also suggests, for use in legal purposes, the audio recording should be preferentially referred to over the transcript. The transcription process should be standardized with transcription marks indicating emphasis, the length of a pause, and interruption notations. Standardized training in transcription and understanding spoken and written word features is also recommend as is ongoing training in regard to legal changes and how if may affect their transcription process. These recommendation will bolster the evidentiary value of transcripts for their use in legal proceedings by providing more accurate and useful evidence.
Police Use of Force and Injury: Multilevel Predictors of Physical Harm to Subjects and Officers
Hickman, Strote, Scales, Parkin, & Collins, Police Quarterly, 2020
With closer scrutiny on police use of force, the authors sought to make determinations on the factors that lead to increased likelihood of injury to subjects and officers in police/subject encounters at an individual and agency level. They recognize that the police in order to do their job must have the ability to use coercive force in order to gain compliance or effect arrests and that with the use of weapons, injury to either subject or officer, will be inevitable in some of the encounters.
The authors hypothesized that demographically, females and Blacks will have a lower likelihood of injury and that as age increased for subjects their risk of injury will increase, but as officer age increases, their risk of injury will decrease. They also hypothesized that when mental illness or drugs/alcohol were involved, the likelihood of injury to both officer and subject will be higher. Resistance and weapon use will likely increase injury to subjects but not officers but the greater numbers of officers on scene increase the risk of injury to both subjects and officers. The duration of the incident is also known to be related to injury, and they anticipate the longer force is used, the likelihood of injury to both subjects and officers will also increase. The authors also hypothesized that officer knowledge of more serious underlying offenses prior to the use of force, greater threats to officers/self/others, higher levels of subject resistance, warrants, and both attempted and actual flight, will result in higher likelihoods of injury to both subjects and officers. The authors also consider exploratory hypotheses that agency size and type may show some variation as well as the anecdotal hypotheses that agency and state variation on their training for use of force, and emphasis on different or preferred types of force, may also account for variation.
The authors used the Police Force Analysis System and Network, a regional database of law enforcement incident reports and officer narratives. It has served as a police management tool to assess trends and patterns in use of force as well as identify high-risk officers. The analysis utilized 10,564 subject-incidents drawn from 81 agencies across eight states. Most were small to medium municipal agencies serving small to medium towns. Two thirds were from Washington, a fifth from Wisconsin, as well as some from California and a few other states. Their analyses denoted both descriptive statistics as well as using multivariate logistic regression to examine the incidence and risk of injury to subjects and officers.
Across all agencies and incidents, in use of force incidents, subjects were injured 52% of the time and officers were injured 16% of the time, similar to previous research rates. The large majority of subject injuries were minor with, cuts, scrape, bruises, punctures, and Taser probes making up 79% of the injuries while gun and knife wounds and fatalities made up only .7% each of the injuries. 49% received hospital treatment and 35% were treated at the scene, while 16% refused or not offered treatment. While the race of subjects in use of force incidents involved 44% White, 27% Black and 22% Hispanic, as well as other races, the injury rate ranged from 47.5% for Blacks and 50% for Whites to 57% for Hispanics and higher than 60% for Asians and Native Americans.
Injury rates were also higher for subjects and officers if mental illness, drugs/alcohol, prior knowledge of past incidents, and warrants were involved. The severity or seriousness of the investigated offense was also positively correlated with injury rates for subject ranging from 35% to 65% while officer risk was mixed with the lowest rate for a violent offense with a weapon at 13% to the highest for disorderly conduct/drugs/trespassing at 18%. The risk of subject injury increased with severity of the threat the subject presented, ranging from verbal threat (39%) to deadly weapon (68%) but officer injury rates were also mixed with the lowest rate involving deadly weapon (11%) but the highest rate involving assault or self-harm, or less than lethal weapons (22%). The range of subject resistance to officers was also correlated with subject injury rates from 37% with no resistance to 75% to those who resist with a deadly weapon. Officer injury rates remained low in all but the top resistance categories with the highest in active physical resistance (31%) and less than lethal weapon (34%). Both attempted and actual flight from officers showed higher rates of injuries for both subjects, 49% and 59% respectively, and officers, 19% and 17% respectively
The greater the number of force sequences, or duration of the incident, also increased injury rates for both officers and subjects. Officer force factor (subject resistance level subtracted from officer force use) indicates that when resistance and officer force are equal (force factor=zero), subject injury rates were low but increased as force factor increased. Officer injuries rates decreased with higher force factors in use. However when force factors are negative, with subject resistance greater than officer force, risks of injury to both officers and subjects are increased. Weapons used is also indicated in injury risk. Two thirds of incidents were physical force only and 12% involved only a weapon. Physical force presented the lowest risk of injury for subjects while incidents that involved a weapon resulted in 75% of subjects injured. For officers, while injury rates were lowest when using a weapon only (3%) injuries rates increased to 15% when using physical force and were highest at 25% when using both physical force and a weapon. Tactics also affected injuries with subjects and officers receiving the most injuries during strikes, lateral neck restraints and wrestling. The risk of injury for subjects was high with impact weapons, like batons, being associated with a 71% injury rate and canines with a 97.5% injury rate, though officer injury rate was high with baton use and low with canines.
Injury rates for officers and subjects were both associated with agency size and jurisdiction size , with risk of injury increasing as the size increases. Rates for injuries of both subjects and officers was slightly higher in Sheriff’s Departments compared to municipal agencies. The authors, while noting the examination of regional differences was limited, found that Midwestern agencies (18, primarily Wisconsin) had lower subject and officer injury rates (20.5% and 10.5% respectively) than non-Midwestern agencies (63) rates (59 and 17 percent respectively).
The authors’ multivariate regression analyses examined both subject injury and officer injury models. The subject injury model predicted lower rates of injuries for female (compared to males) and Blacks (compared to Whites), while increasing age increases the risk of injury. While the level of threat presented was not significantly associated with risk of injury, level of resistance was, and showed an 188% odds increase in subject injury when a deadly weapon is involved, and a 132% odds increase when active physical resistance is used. Actual flight from officers also raised the odds of subject injury by 22%. Officer use of a weapon had a 342% odds risk increase for subject injury while those involving a weapon and physical force only increased the odds 181%. Each additional sequence (or length of force incident ) increased the risk of injury, so minimizing the length of incident will decrease injuries. However, they also found that officers’ increased level of force, which could end the incident more quickly, was also associated with increased subject injury. Subject injury odds were also greater in larger agencies’ but a decrease in odds if the agency is Midwestern.
For the officer injury model, demographics indicated females subjects and Asian and Native American were associated with decreased risk of officer injury, and risk of officer injury decreased with increase in subject age. While drug/trespass/disorderly crimes were significantly related to a 30 percent increase in officer injury odds, none of the threat or resistance levels were significantly related to officer injury odds. However attempted and actual flight significantly increased the odds of officer injury by 26 and 47 percent, respectively. Force incidents in which an officer only used a weapon was associated with a 78% decreased odds of officer injury as well as those involving alcohol or drugs. Duration and force factors were similar to subject injury analysis where decreased duration and higher force factors by officers were significantly associated with a decrease in odds of officer injury. Officer injuries were less likely in midsized agencies compared to small agencies and if the agency is Midwestern, the odds of officer injuries is 36% lower than in non-Midwestern agencies. The authors suggest that exploratory analysis of tactics used may contribute to additional knowledge on officer and subject injury as weapon use was not as common in Wisconsin agencies. The authors suggest that agencies could adopt more standardized training on use of force but ultimately the use of force will reflect community standards. Further research could focus on the systematic evaluation of training methods as well as other more specific incident variables that may also influence subject and officer injury outcomes.
Ambush Killings of the Police, 1970–2018: A Longitudinal Examination of the “War on Cops” Debate,
White, Police Quarterly, 2020
The author notes that a few high profile ambush attacks on the police in recent years, which have coincided with high profile deaths of minority suspects in police encounters, have led some observers to conclude there is a war on the police. He notes that although recent research shows significant declines in felonious killings of police officers since 1990, data from the FBI indicate an increasing percentage of those deaths are classified as ambush killings which the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) describes by four characteristics: “an element of surprise; concealment of the assailant, their intentions, or weapon; suddenness of the attack; and a lack of provocation”. IACP data indicates that from 1990 to 2012, the proportion of ambush killings increased by 33%. Other research also indicates increases in ambushes, for example, in 2016, ambush attacks against police reached a 10-year high. The research also indicates varied motivation for attacks on police, from revenge for a perceived transgression to attacks that are designed to avoid arrest or facilitate escape. However, the “war on cops” thesis implies a very specific motivation for an ambush: hatred of police and/or desire to seek vengeance in response to police killings of citizens. They authors, utilizing data from the Officer Down Memorial site, examined felonious killings from 1970 to 2018 (n=3,379) and analyzed 913 ambush style attacks, to determine if they’re has been any trends in these killings. In a time series analysis, they examine two types of ambush; one (pre-encounter, n=206) making up 6.1% of all officer killings, where officers had no knowledge of the suspect prior to the attack, had no opportunity to anticipate the attack, and weren’t actively engaged in “police business (such as sitting in a car eating lunch or writing a report): and the other (anticipation, n=707) making up 20.9% of all officer killings, where officers were responding to a call or other police business and had a general knowledge of the suspect but no contact with him prior to the incident (for example searching an area for a suspicious person when the officer is surprise attacked). These trends were also compared to two types of felonious non-ambush killings of officers, one where an officer is attacked in the very initial stages of contact with a suspect, which made up 22% of all officer killings (n=745), and a second which makes up 50.9% of all officer killings, where the attack comes after the initial contact stage, for example during an interview with a subject (n=1,721). The authors also examined if the rate has changed significantly since 2013 to determine if there is support for the war on cops contention. Rates were standardized to ambushes per 100,000 officers to account for changes in officer population fluctuations and the quasi-experimental time series used to points of intervention. July 2013, date of the formation of Black Lives Matter following the acquittal of George Zimmerman in the Trayvon Martin case and August 2014, the month that Michael Brown was killed in Ferguson, MO and BLM was prominent in the media. (Author’s note: Both relatively early occurrences in the current focus on police brutality and racial justice).
The authors note that in 1970, anticipation ambushes rates (12 per 100k officers) were more than three times higher than that of pre-encounter but through the ’70’s and ’80’s anticipation ambushes dropped rapidly to between 1 and 2 officers per 100K and pre-encounter ambushes dropped as well from a high of almost 3 officers per 100k, to one and sometimes less than one officer per 100k through the ’90’s and beyond. While this rate of decline was statistically significant, the authors also found two 20 year high spikes in both 2011 and 2016 for anticipation ambushes and spikes in excess of 1997 rates in 2002, 2014, and 2016 for pre-encounter ambushes. Initial entry, which in general had a lower rate than information stage attacks, and information stage attacks showed a similar trend with sharp drops through the ’70’s and ’80’s, declining 79 to 88 percent. Like ambushes, there were also spikes relative to 1997. In 2005 and 2011 there were spikes in early stage attacks and spikes in 2002, 2004, 2008 and 2017 from later stage attacks, though there was also a sharp decline in 2013. The rates of the declines were also statistically significant. Examining the time series for the two types of ambushes separately and combined, neither showed any significant increases after 2013, indicating that neither the formation of Black Lives Matter or the death of Michael Brown had any effect on police ambushes. Nor is there support for a war on cops based on an overall downward trend. However, eight of the last 20 years studied showed spikes in excessive of the overall decline shown in 1997. These spikes over the period 2009 to 2013 and 2014 toward 2018 accounted for a 25% increase in pre-encounter ambushes, a 9% increase in anticipation ambushes and a 22% increase in later stage attacks. While the downward trend doesn’t suggest a chronic problem, spikes do warrant observation as they can predict the emergence of a chronic problem.
The authors do note limitations in the study include a lack of known motivation for the attacks, such as revenge, which would inform the hypothesis of a “war on cops”. Also, since non-fatal injuries were not included in the study, changes in rates of officer killing may also be a function of advancements in emergency medical response and treatment, police training, and equipment like body armor for officers and may mask increased rates of potentially deadly attacks on officers. (Author’s note: The study also didn’t examine non-injurious attacks on officers. For example, in 2020, the number of officers in Chicago who were shot doubled compared to 2019 but the number officers shot at increased three times, which also may be masking the effect of an increase in attacks on officers).
Police Ethics and Integrity: Keeping the ‘Blue Code’ of Silence
Westmarland and Conway, International Journal of Police Science and Management, 2020
The authors examined police ethics and integrity within a UK police force with a questionnaire presenting ten hypothetical ethical dilemma scenarios. An Us vs Them mentality, the blue code” and the “code of silence” as portrayed in other research suggests that police misconduct may be promoted or go unreported as officers seek to protect their own.. Other research has examined this issue and the current study includes not only sworn police officers but police community support officers, akin to US Community Service Officers, and police support staff. The authors analyzed 1,509 responses from a large non-metropolitan police organization that had both urban and rural policing areas. The survey asked respondents what offenses they found most serious as well as how likely they were to report various types of misdemeanors, what influenced their decision to do so, and their attitudes about reporting offenses. Officers were presented with ethically problematic policing behavior in ten scenarios and, on a 5 point scale, asked to rated them in seriousness and how likely they were to report the behavior, with some scenarios querying whether the officer believed it was against departmental policy and how the officer would go about reporting the offense. Officers were also asked how they felt working with a whistle blower and the degree of confidence in the department’s anonymous messenger system.
Four of the scenarios were regarded as only minor infringements (running a side business unrelated to police work, taking reportedly legal bodybuilding supplements, addressing a disturbance at a party for police staff, and an investigating officer having a romantic relationship with a former crime victim) and were very likely to go unreported, likely because they involved off premise and off duty behavior. Two scenarios were considered major infringements, one involving an officer keeping an expensive watch that was inadvertently received by him, and the other involved an officer taking a sum of cash from a criminal during a search. In regards to the watch, while 85% felt that it was a serious or very serious infringement fewer than half of the respondents stated they would be highly likely to report it, with the authors postulating that keeping the watch may not necessarily be perceived as theft. However, when it came to a clear issue of theft in taking cash from a suspect, 97% responded it was a very serious infringements with 95% of respondents indicating they would be highly likely to report it. Some of the other scenarios also showed some disjuncture between the stated serious and likelihood of reporting. While accessing confidential police data for personal use was considered at the highest level of seriousness by 83% of respondents, only 69% reported they would be highly likely to report the infringement. This was the largest gap evidenced between seriousness levels and other scenarios had notable gaps as well. Witnessing sexual harassment among co-workers was judged as serious to very serious by 93% of respondents though 85% indicated they would be prepared to or likely to report the incident, with a number of responses wanting to gain more information about what they witnessed before reporting. However, opinions were split on the appropriateness of engaging in a romantic relationship with a crime victim by the investigating officer with 39% saying it was acceptable, 26% saying it was inacceptable, while 34% were unsure. While the average response as to whether they would report it was “not very likely”, 40% said they were unlikely to report and only 11% said they were highly likely to report the relationship. Two of the scenarios were regarded as potentially harmful by the researchers, applying extra physical force to a captured fleeing suspect and covering for an off duty officer driving drunk and accordingly, officers viewed these scenarios as very serious (83 and 88 percent respectively) as well most officers being very likely to report the incidents (74 and 77 percent respectively).
The researchers also explored officers’ attitudes about working with whistleblowers and the anonymous messaging system. In regards to the whistleblower question, respondents had the options of choosing more than one response and while some officers had reservation about not wanting to work with the officer, or feeling they couldn’t trust the officer, 42% of officers said they would be on guard around the officer. However two thirds of respondents indicated they would have no reservations working with a whistleblower resulting in some difficulty reconciling officers who both have no reservations about working with a whistle blower, yet feeling they needed to be on guard, or would be mistrustful. The authors suggest that is suggestive of officers commitment to “adhere to formal rules, regulations and ethical principles, while simultaneously recognizing the existence of normative standards which may technically qualify as an infringement”. Confidence in the anonymous messaging system was not high, with respondents’ confidence split mostly evenly between the five levels of confidence, with 17% expressing no confidence to 18% being highly confident with a number of respondents questioning how it could maintain anonymity.
The authors conclude that while research does provide indications of in-group secrecy and solidarity, other research indicates that while new recruits value teamwork and comradeship, the code of silence has been overwritten by the “code of self-protection”. As departments become more accountable to the public and risk aversive, officers fear doing the “wrong thing” more than self-isolation that might come with whistleblowing. The authors’ results indicate that there is some evidence of the blue code with the average gap between level of seriousness and likelihood of reporting at about 10 points, though one departure from this was the high level of very serious assessment of accessing police data but the lower likelihood of reporting it. The authors also note however, that the excessive force and DUI scenarios, which were used in previous research in 2005, showed an over 20% increase in the “highly likely to report” category for both scenarios, suggesting a move toward doing the “right thing” over maintaining a blue code of silence.
A Sign of the Crimes: Examining Officers’ Identification of, and Arrest for, Stalking in Domestic Violence Complaints
Brady, Reyns, & Dreke, Police Quarterly, 2020
The authors state that despite stalking as a risk factor for intimate partner homicide, little research has explored the officer decision making process in domestic violence (DV) complaints that involve stalking. Some research on domestic violence indicates that officers may minimize stalking behavior or fail to recognize stalking behavior as actual stalking. Officers have indicated the complexity of the statues, and the need to establish a pattern of behavior that elicits an emotional reaction from the victim, can make investigation and prosecution difficult. To examine the issue, the authors utilize a focal concerns perspective. Accordingly, “criminal justice actors weigh three main considerations when faced with a decision—the blameworthiness of the offender, protection of the community, and any practical constraints or consequences associated with different courses of action or inaction… theoretically, greater criminal justice action (e.g., arrest, charging, sentencing) is positively related to blameworthiness and the need to protect the community, whereas the effects of practical constraints and consequences will vary depending on the organization and how the concept is operationalized”.
The authors’ study examined five years’ worth (230 cases) of intimate partner complaints that met the legal standard of stalking where officers either did or did not identify stalking behaviors in domestic violence complaints, in order to explore legal and extralegal factors in officers’ decisions to arrest suspects for intimate partner stalking. The authors examined three research questions; to what extent are suspects arrested for stalking in DV complaints, which legal and extralegal factors figure into officers’ identification of stalking behavior in DV complaints, and which of those factors are associated with officers making an arrest versus writing an incident report.
Outcome variables included whether officers acknowledged stalking behavior that is, whether the officer indicated that stalking was an observed offense citied in the incident reports or whether the officer articulated stalking behavior but did not identify a specific charge of stalking in the incident report and whether, in the cases where stalking was cited in the incident report, an arrest was made or if only an incident report was made. For the independent variables, in order to examine the focal concerns perspective, the authors operationalized blameworthiness as whether the victim was threatened, total number of offenses articulated in the report, and whether the suspect had violated an active protection order. Community protection (as gauged on the dangerousness to community or victims) was operationalized as whether the subject had been incarcerated, whether they had committed previous physical assaults, and whether the location of the incident was private or public. Practical constraints and consequences included six variables: whether there had been prior police responses involving the parties, whether there was physical evidence, the presence of witnesses, whether the victim or someone else contacted police, whether the victim exhibited fear, and whether the victim was cooperative. The authors also examined the perceptual shorthand used by officers, the cognitive schemas of credibility, dangerousness, cooperation, and risk of recidivism that come from contact with other officers and work experiences that may be influenced by the current relationship status of the parties, age, race, and ethnicity.
Results showed that officers identified stalking behaviors in less than half of DV complaints reported to RI police departments from 2001 to 2005. Of the 94 police-identified stalking cases, however, the majority resulted in an arrest (61.7%). Of the 141 total cases that resulted in an arrest (61.3%), 41.1% were specifically for stalking and 58.9% were for a non-stalking DV-related offense, meaning stalking arrests accounted for 25.2% of all DV cases reported. Officers were significantly more likely to identify stalking behaviors if subjects had committed a greater number of offenses, if the incident occurred in public and if there had been history of prior police responses involving the parties. Officers were significantly more likely to not specifically identify stalking behavior (classifying the incident as a non-stalking DV complaint) when the victim was the complainant, was threatened, or reported prior physical assault by the subject. The logistic regression model isolated the key factors in officer decision-making. Incidents that occurred in public versus a private location were nearly 4 times more likely to be identified. Officers were also two times more likely to identify stalking behaviors if the suspect had committed multiple offense and almost three times more likely if there were prior police responses to previous complaints. Even though officers articulated stalking behavior in the report itself, officers were significantly more likely to classify incidents as a non-stalking DV-related offense when the suspect threatened the victim (OR .41) or the victim had alleged prior physical assaults by the suspect (OR .39). None of the other factors such as the suspect’s relationship to the victim, age, race, prior criminal history, victim fear, who called the police, the availability of witnesses, physical evidence, victim fear, and the presence of an active protection order significantly influenced officers’ identification of stalking. The logistic regression model also examined the significant variables affecting officers decision to arrest versus generate a report in cases they identified as involving stalking but the only factor that had a significant influence on that decision was whether the victim is deemed cooperative by submitting a written statement. No other independent or demographic variable influenced the decision to arrest.
The authors discuss that the results may explain some officer decision-making processes. In some ways, officers may treat stalking as an “add-on” offense, something to be added when multiple charges are present but not warranting a sole charge, and may be contingent on the other two factors; public incident and prior police involvement as this may signal the relentlessness of the subject which supports the need to establish a pattern of behavior, and public pursuit may provide the opportunity for more corroborating evidence like witnesses and surveillance footage. While some of the variables fall into the scope of focal concerns in identifying stalking, the authors conclude the perspective is not useful in determining the factors related to establishing an arrest in stalking cases, as the sole, and strong, factor influencing this was the victim’s willingness to cooperate by filing a written statement. This cooperation has been shown in previous criminological research to be positively correlated with arrest in other areas as well.
The authors suggest that training and standard operating procedures be developed and implemented that help officers understand the stalking statutes, and identify stalking behavior, by having them inquire specifically about stalking and the presence of fear to establish probable cause. Officers also need to know and accept the illegality of stalking, instead as just a component of the power and control dynamic present in these types of domestic relationships, thus providing better support for victims.
Attitudinal Changes Toward Body-Worn Cameras: Perceptions of Cameras, Organizational Justice, and Procedural Justice Among Volunteer and Mandated Officers
Huff, Katz, Webb, and Hedberg, Police Quarterly, 2020
The authors examine some issues involving body worn cameras (BWCs) by using a recently implemented BWC mandate in the Phoenix, AZ Police Department to determine the attitudes surrounding camera use and its effect on perceived organizational and procedural justice. They note that previous research on BWCs has yielded a variety of results. There are implications that BWCs could have a deterrent effect on officers, limiting their discretion in citizen encounters and making them more mindful of proper behavior and procedures, but that deterrent effect may not be equally found in all officers.
Many of the previous studies focused on attitudes prior to the implementation of a BWC mandate but did not demonstrate how the attitudes abut BWCs may have changed following the mandates. Some research indicated officers believed BWCs would limit their discretion, would increase adherence to departmental policies, and that it may not affect their behavior to a great degree but that it could have a positive effect on citizen behavior, and could assist in report writing and producing better evidence for prosecution.
However, results after BWC adoption have been mixed. UK officers believed that the cameras had a positive impact in a number of areas and was a means of improving officer effectiveness, but in the US, where adoption has met with more resistance, the suggestion is BWCs were to improve problematic officer behavior, with some officers believing they were necessary as the word of a police officer is not trusted in court anymore. Patrol officers versus those in special units also had differing needs and concerns surround BWCs but the findings generally suggest that officers in departments that have already deployed BWCs have a more positive perception of the technology than those where it had yet to be implemented. Studies that have examined officer attitudes toward BWCs prior to, and following, the adoption of BWCs have largely found that officers become more favorable or remain neutral toward BWCs after BWC programs are implemented. They also found officers believed, as the programs went on, that they improved officers’ ability to protect themselves against citizen complaints and that they improved citizens willingness to talk to officers. However, some studies have found evidence that after implementation officers had no change, or a negative change in attitude to BWCs, believing that they limit officer discretion, and force them to act more legalistic than informal in dealing with citizens, but sometimes these individual attitudes depended on the attitudes of officers in their social network as well.
The authors state that two areas that will be affected by BWCs and a possible deterrent effect are perceptions of organizational justice and procedural justice. Perceptions of organizational justice pertain to officers’ feeling of fairness in implementing, utilizing, and monitoring a BWC program, and the outcomes associated with them, which would be associated with officers’ job performance and commitment to the organization. Research has indicated that when officers have concerns about BWCs generating public disapproval and perceive high monitoring of BWC it can affect their emotional well-being, and when they lack organizational support for BWC officers, has also been linked to burnout. When officers felt their department was more just and fair in its monitoring of BWCs they had more positive perceptions of BWCs. Officers’ positive perceptions and support of BWCs were also linked to perceptions of a strong trust relationship with their supervisor. Research also indicated that officers were concerned about how the footage would be reviewed and used, fearing it would be used to hold officers accountable and get them in trouble over minor issues, and thus limit their proactive contacts.
The authors also suggest that BWCs can enhance procedural justice during citizen encounters. “Citizens have higher perceptions of procedural justice when they feel they were allowed to contribute to the encounter, when the officer used objective criteria to make decisions, when the citizen felt they were treated with dignity and respect, and when the citizen trusted the officers’ motives in the interaction” and when citizens perceive more procedural justice they are more likely to be compliant and cooperative. Supervisors have the opportunity to monitor or review BWCs to ensure officers are engaging in procedurally just methods. However, research results are mixed with some officers feeling BWCs made them more professional and patient, while others felt it was stifling and limited establishing rapport, while some research found no effect between establishing procedural justice and BWC usage. Associated reductions in complaints with BWC officers may stem from the appearance of more procedurally just behavior as officers narrate their decision making to the camera as well as citizens.
The authors conducted a survey of 467 officers on their attitudes about BWCs in a pre-test phase before the research entered into the BWC wearing phase. A random sample of 177 survey participants was drawn and three groups were established; a group that declined to volunteer to wear a BWC (resistors, n=96), a group that volunteered to wear the cameras (volunteers, n=47) and a third group who were mandated to wear the cameras (mandated, n=34), A random sample of 110 officers were also selected from the pre-test group that had no involvement in the BWC program to serve as a control group. After 6 months, of the 287 officers in the BWC study 237 completed the post-test survey. The survey, identical to the pre-test, contained items related to officer efficacy, officer behavior, citizen reaction, general perception, overall recommendation, and organizational and procedural justice.
Overall, the researchers “identified few statistically significant and only small substantively meaningful changes in officer perceptions of BWCs, organizational justice, and procedural justice over time.” Relative to the control group, BWC officers had more negative perceptions about officer efficacy (i.e. having a more accurate account of the case, obtaining high quality evidence, or assisting in the prosecution of cases), though the authors suggest this may stem from officers not being privy to the benefits derived in the courtroom as research has shown that BWCs were more likely to result in charging, conviction, and a more punitive sentence. Positively though, relative to the control group, volunteer officers showed small declines in their perceptions that BWCs may negatively affect police officer behavior, being less likely to believe that BWCs inhibit contacts with citizens, cause hesitation in making decisions, and feeling they had less discretion. However, both mandated and volunteer officers had lower levels of agreement than the control group of officers that BWCs would increase citizen cooperation, increase citizen respect, decrease citizen resistance, and decrease citizen aggression, mirroring prior research. The authors suggest that a lack of observable effect in this area may stem from citizens not being aware of officers’ BWCs and thus citizens may be unlikely to change their behavior which increased these officers skepticism that BWCs affect citizen behavior positively, as compared to resisters and the control group which did not vary in their views on this issue. Prior research had indicated when citizens were aware of the camera their behavior changed and the authors suggest this result might inform policy issues regarding informing citizens that a BWC is in use. Compared to the control group, mandated officers were also less likely to have positive general perceptions following their field use. These officers were less likely to agree that police and citizens benefit from BWC use, that BWCs are well received by coworkers, and that BWCs improve job satisfaction and performance, training, and officer safety. Similarly, mandated officers reported more negative overall recommendations for BWC use, being less likely to recommend BWCs to other departments or other officers in their department, however the officers mandated wearing status may have generated feelings of loss of autonomy, and affected those results, the researchers surmised.
In contrast to other research, and in contrast to the control group, resistors, mandated, and volunteer officers all held higher perceptions of organizational justice (support and fairness in implementation, monitoring, and outcomes). The authors note this interesting result in comparison to the other study results which indicate BWC wearers did not see them as having an effect on citizen behavior and were less likely to recommend implementation. The researchers suggest that BWCs represent a supervisory program and with being given the opportunity to wear a BWC, perceived a greater capacity in the department for organizational justice. In contrast, there is no significant difference among any of the groups on BWCs prompting more procedural justice behavior. The authors note that the relatively small changes in officer attitudes, regardless of exposure to BWCs, suggests that “efforts to increase officer support for BWCs should be made early in the BWC adoption process. Our results, combined with prior research, highlight the importance of a communication strategy that disseminates information about the benefits and limitations of BWCs prior to their deployment so that officers buy-in to their agency’s BWC program, rather than resist its implementation.”
Welcome to Criminal Justice Access
Greetings everyone,
While there was no posting for August, for September at CJ Access be sure to check out “Analysis of a Traffic Stop” under For Discussion, as I break down the recent traffic stop between Moorhead, MN police and a local BLM organizer. I examine what both parties did right and wrong and how adopting different behaviors and attitudes could make these encounters less confrontational. Links is provided to the dash cam videos and police reports as well.
Also under Editorials and Opinions in “A Free Cup of Coffee”, I briefly examine and critique a couple of prevalent theories regarding police corruption, the Rotten Apple Theory and the Structural (Rotten Barrel) Theory and suggest an interaction exists between the two as well as examining what remedies might exist to address police corruption.
A Free Cup of Coffee: A Brief Analysis of Police Corruption (2008)
INTRODUCTION
A free cup of coffee. To the general public, it’s not what one usually thinks of in terms of police corruption. But it’s this humble beginning that supposedly will put police officers on a slippery slope of corruption. Police corruption is not a new phenomenon nor is the desire to eliminate it, as evidenced by the Law Enforcement Council report on official corruption from 1973 urging all elements of the criminal justice system “to join it in increased efforts to “eradicate corruption” as urged in a 1969 resolution of the International Association of Chiefs of Police”. (Crime and Delinquency, 1974) That corruption is such a prevailing problem it should, to some degree, be expected in every law enforcement agency given the power and discretion afforded to law enforcement officers.
Police corruption encompasses a broad range of activities but a defining factor in this discussion is the willful behavior of law enforcement, not simple negligence or incompetence. Corruption can manifest itself in literally every aspect and duty of police work. Besides simple gratuities, it can be seen in a variety of street policing activities like theft of property from burglary crime scenes, street shakedowns, organized payoffs and bribes, protection rackets, drug rip-offs and sales, and violent crimes ranging from simple assaults to murder. It can also be seen in unequal treatment of victims and suspects based on racial, gender, ethnic, and socioeconomic status, as well as in false arrest, and illegal search and seizure. It also involves a range of simple job performance related ethical issues; activities like willful non-enforcement of laws beyond the boundaries of established discretionary powers, truthfulness in report writing and in viewing and reporting the actions of other officers, along with other mundane but time and resource wasting activities.
This corruption can also be seen not only in the ranks of patrolmen and detectives but in supervisors and chiefs as well; making biased determinations about the quality of investigations or which investigations are forwarded for prosecution, and stalling or derailing internal investigations. These officials offer little guidance to personnel on the issue of corruption or actually tacitly approve of the corrupt actions of the department’s personnel.
There are a few theories as to why it occurs (including the Society Itself Is Corrupt hypothesis) but this discussion will focus on two predominant theories; The Rotten Apple Theory and The Structural (Rotten Barrel) Theory. One blames the individual officer for lacking in a sufficient moral or ethical code and the other focuses on the culturalization undergone by officers in the rationalization of questionable ethical behavior. Underscoring both of these theories is the existence of the Code of Silence, a thin blue line that officers do not cross in order to prove their allegiance to fellow officers by keeping silent about corruption.
This discussion will analyze these two hypotheses, their causes and remedies, in an attempt to better understand the mindset of officers on corruption issues, how this affects the view of the police by the public, whether it is reasonable to expect high moral standards within the occupation, and how these standards can be achieved.
POSITION A
The traditional view of police corruption, typically espoused by police administration and some criminologists, has been addressed through the Rotten Apple Theory. It harkens back to the cliché that “One rotten apple spoils the barrel”. The theory very simply puts the onus of police corruption on the individual officer.
Corruption exists all around us and it is not limited to a handful of jobs or occupations. Employees from all professions may engage in theft from the employers, ranging from office supplies to actual embezzlement. Theft of time, shortcuts that violate policies (or laws), and falsified reports are not strictly the domain of law enforcement. The common factor is employee honesty and ethics. Human beings, whether viewed as individuals or as parts of an organization are fallible. They are tempted by wealth, power, and status, wherever it is available to them. Police organizations, by their very nature present these potential ethical dilemmas to officers in the field. The discretion and responsibility associated with the power to relieve someone of their freedom or their life can be a heavy burden and when coupled with environments that allow officers easy access to wealth, privilege, and drugs it can challenge even the most ethically stalwart.
It is key then that officers put in a position of the public trust be of the highest character. While a small bribe or gratuity from a diner might easily be accepted by a waiter for preferential treatment and viewed by the public as well as an acceptable way of doing business, the same public has an expectation that our police are and should be above reproach as do law enforcement professionals. The Chicago Crime Commission “placed an emphasis on the type of police officer on the force” in examining the major causes of police criminal behavior. The Commission concluded that poor recruitment methods permitted many men to enter the department who were not suited for law enforcement work. The commission recommended that all police candidates be subject to “a complete character investigation”. (Delattre, 2006 p.84) If substandard candidates are granted employment in law enforcement, we should certainly expect to see corruption within the ranks. These rotten apples not only degrade the image of police in the public’s eyes, they are also detrimental to other officers in the field. Unscrupulous officers may play on the brotherhood inherent within the police community to drag other officers into morally questionable actions, testing these officers resolve in the face of not only temptation, but in the approval and acceptance by partners and/or other shift officers. We cannot simply assume that every individual who has joined a police force did so with an overall altruistic sense. The power and discretion afforded to officers can be a temptation not only to officers already employed but to prospective officers looking for power and opportunity to bolster their own self-worth or to exercise dominance.
The police, as a group of individuals, don’t fail to recognize corruption. They are very aware of it and because corrupt officers do not usually make up the majority of a police force, they believe that severity of the sanctions should be appropriate for the severity of the corrupt behavior and that corrupt behavior should be reported. (Klockars, 2000) What is also evident in the Klockars report is that police officers do not view all corruption as the same. Some hypothetical situations presented in the report prompted officers to respond that some small offenses warrant no, or very minor, reprimands and that these minor offenses do not warrant reporting the officer to a superior. This would suggest that there are indeed different standards in ethical consideration amongst individual officers, in that the issue is not black & white, corrupt or not corrupt. This disparity is certainly influenced by individual officers’ perspectives as not all officers in the study categorized the hypothetical situations at the same level of corruptness.
Police administrators are then confronted with the necessity of detecting and removing rotten apples, preferably before they become entrenched in a department. High employment standards are one remedy. The very concept of policing involves placing a great amount of power in the hands of an individual, leaving that person to use his best judgment in applying his authority. It is foolish to believe that you can employ officers of the highest caliber if hiring standards are lax. Literate, college educated, criminal offense-free candidates are absolutely necessary to populate a department with personnel that are worthy to carry the public trust. The candidates should have a demonstrable ethic code that helps insure that not only are they morally solid but that these morals can withstand assault. Supervisory personnel are also key in seeking out and removing officers who may be prone to and/or engage in corrupt behavior. They must remove the rotten apple before it spoils the barrel. This is accomplished through increased supervision of marginal officers, periodic proactive internal investigations, thorough reactive corruption investigations and psychological screenings before and after employment. All of these remedies can easily exist within a department’s current structure with minimal costs, especially when balanced against the potential costs that a corrupt officer can bring down on a department.
POSITION B
The Structural Theory behind corruption has gained more traction in the past 30 years. As more scholars look deeper into the subculture of police, they have come to realize that corruption is a feature in police work that is ingrained within the structure itself. Delattre explains it as a young, naïve individual enters a profession where the worst of people is exposed to them and they are socialized to this environment by senior officers who have become cynical and lost faith in police work. Under pressure to form bonds of mutual trust and reliance while witnessing corrupt practices, it’s realized that superiors don’t support efforts to behave honorably, that sanctions for corruption are negligible, and the young officer will probably accept the status quo and join in the corrupt practices (Delattre 2006).
The body of work supporting this theory is impressive and evidence of the Structural Theory is witnessed in reports of corruption within units in departments and whole departments themselves. The idea is that prospective officers enter with high ethical standards, as one would expect of a police officer. Because of a great degree of social isolation related to their profession, officers tend to only socialize with officers and consequently take away a similar environmental view. Complaints of public misperceptions of police work reinforce social isolation and the unique nature of the profession, it’s dangers and pitfalls, leaves officers feeling an increased need to bond together, unfortunately forming a siege mentality; it’s Us vs. Them. In such a scenario, mutual trust becomes almost paramount, and this continues up the chain of command. Supervisors who have already been socialized tend to view minor corruption as something that just happens and unless the matter is serious i.e. serious enough to be easily exposed and bring censure or sanctions down on the department, the minor issues are ignored or minimized. If such behavior and attitudes continue up the ranks to the Chief or Police Commissioner, you have a wholly corrupt department.
If we also include the “Code of Silence” in the mix, these strong subcultural norms of support and brotherhood above all, tends to detract from the moral belief systems held by individual officers. We cannot expect police officers to be made of iron, they are human and subject to human frailties and eventually the cynicism and social norms within police work change the officer and allow for the acceptance and practice of behaviors that would have been eschewed outside of the police force.
Within this framework, we can look at two structures that contribute to the problem of police corruption, opportunity and organizational structures as denoted by Kappeler’s 1998 work (White et al, 2008). By the nature of police work and structural organization, there lies an opportunity structure that provides police with a unique authority, a public perception that the police can be trusted, social isolation, high discretion (and I might add low visibility) and a lack of supervision.
Bureaucratic institutions like police departments contain common organizational structure elements that facilitate deviance. These features include a division of labor with specialized units, limited career mobility, and the existence of a distinct sub-culture that is defined by social isolation and solidarity and governed by informal rules that value autonomy, secrecy, and maintaining the status quo. (White et al, 2008).
In viewing these two structures, we have to understand that there are features within the opportunity structure that will be difficult to control but the most amenable to change is the lack of supervision. The expectation is that officers have a good understanding about criminal procedures and the law and that in most cases supervisory input in regards to enforcement duties is not needed. Supervisors must play a larger role though as role models and as an actual supervisory force. Officers typically look to superiors for proper behavior and attitudes in unfamiliar territory and it is crucial that the wrong message not be sent. If the message is anything other than all corruption is wrong, all corruption should be reported, and the reporting of corruption is appreciated, then the wrong message is being sent, allowing officers to utilize their discretion in inappropriate ways. While it may put pressure on some officers, the need for monitoring is essential. It must be realized that even the most ethically strong officer can be tempted, and if there is temptation, there is a possibility of succumbing to that temptation. Supervisors need to be proactive in their monitoring efforts to send a message that misconduct within the force is not tolerated.
From an organizational structure standpoint, the most detrimental feature is existence of the subculture itself. The existence of this subculture is well established and subcultures typically establish their own social norms. The elimination of the subculture is not entirely feasible but what is possible is the modification of some components that facilitate misconduct and, more importantly, hide the misconduct from internal and external view.
There is no denying that an Us vs Them mentality unofficially exists within a number of police departments. Public misconceptions, lack of public appreciation and recognition, and cynicism among officers fosters an attitude that objectifies and labels the public. In doing so, it’s easy for officers to lose their perspective that they are servants of the public and that they should be held accountable to them. It becomes much easier to identify only with their departmental perspective and rely only on the approval and acceptance of other officers. In this way the Code of Silence is a protective function against those who simply don’t understand the police. This unfortunately lends itself to secrecy and an acceptance of the idea that police actions are inherently right.
To counteract these forces, remedies exist both internally and externally. Internally, comprehensive selection processes, effective supervision and internal affairs, and ethics training and policy mandates concerning whistleblowing and misconduct are all viable. Externally criminal and civil liabilities and citizen review boards can address issues of misconduct when a department fails to adequately address them itself.
CRITIQUE OF POSITIONS
The Rotten Apple Theory (RAT) has fallen from favor over the past 30 years to be replaced by Structural Theory (ST). The Knapp Commission characterized RAT as “border(ing) on official department doctrine, any policeman found to be corrupt must be promptly denounced as a rotten apple in an otherwise clean barrel. It must never be admitted that his individual corruption may be symptomatic of an underlying disease.. The rotten apple doctrine has in many ways been a basic obstacle to meaningful reform …[and] the commission examined and rejected the premise upon which the rotten apple doctrine rested” (White 2008). While the Knapp Commission claims to reject the premise of the doctrine, to deny that RAT is not a factor to consider would be short-sighted.
As is typical in certain fields of science, some in the research community would like to see a particular theory (usually their own) elevated to a singular defining analysis of a problem. This is simply not the case. There is no doubt that some misconduct and corruption stems from the personal moral failings of an individual officer, whether this deficiency was present at the time of employment or whether it manifested itself over time if given opportunities to grow. We must consider there is significant interplay and co–dependence within the two theories and even in their remedies. While morally deficient officers do exist within our police forces, it cannot solely be attributed to one theory or the other. “Rotten apples” do exist and they are found in all varieties of occupations. There will always be individuals who are on the look out for opportunities to profit at the expense of others. Inevitably you will find that given the broad scope of human nature that there are certain individuals who should never be police officers. That they exist within a police force, given officers’ power and discretion, should be a cause of grave concern.
If you place ethically deficient officers in a workplace environment where misconduct is merely given a wink and a nudge, you do provide tacit approval of their actions and send a message to the rest of the force that misconduct is acceptable and over time may influence those with stronger ethics to put them aside in place of acceptance within the workplace. The Code of Silence does serve a function in police subculture and while this certainly fosters a sense of brotherhood it also contributes to either theory of corruption. Individual morally deficient officers find that their moral failings are less likely to be noted and censured, allowing for continued morally aberrant behavior. Officers attempting to follow their own reasonably sufficient moral compass find that the subculture they are employed in doesn’t recognize their efforts in maintaining professional ethical standards, let alone community standards.
But how prevalent is the ethical breakdown within the police structure? A self-report study (with its inherent flaws and biases) conducted in Georgia seems to indicate that police have more willingness to, and are more prone to, actually reporting corruption than employees in other civil service positions. While this may speak to officer integrity, the report notes that they are only slightly more prone to this behavior. Given there are features within the Georgia law enforcement departments, like reporting policies, internal investigation units, and polygraph use not present in other civil service jobs, these ST remedies seem to provide for only a slight increase in ethical reporting. One point of the Georgia study is that a mandatory reporting policy was related to almost all of the measures of willingness to blow the whistle, but none of the measures of frequency of whistleblowing. Were those features not present, it is likely that ethical reporting would be at the same level, if not lower, than other civil service positions. This could suggest that overall, people in general, and police officers in particular, have the same basic ethical nature. If that were the case, it is the few rotten apples who have spoiled the barrel.
Even though there was only a slight increase, it doesn’t belie the significance of the ST. If ST remedies do provide only a small positive effect on ethical behavior and reporting, it is better than none at all. The public does expect a higher ethical standard from the police than they would from a city meter reader and it may be necessary to force those ethical standards onto officers through departmental policies and changes to ensure that higher standard. Remedies within the ST do have an influence especially if they come from within the department. Supervisors set the parameters for the street level officers and comprehensive ethics training and the supervisors’ willingness to mandate, approve of, and follow up on reports of misconduct sends a message to lower ranking officers that the former cover of the “blue curtain” has ended. Supervisors and departments must not only expect but require ethical behavior.
As neither theory is completely comprehensive, we must look to a combination of the two. To deny the existence of rotten apples as a feature of police corruption is to put too narrow a focus on the institution. To imagine that a subculture doesn’t significantly influence it’s members is naïve.
AUTHOR’S POSITION
As stated above, a remedy for corruption must come from multiple sources. We would like to expect that our prospective law enforcement candidates come to the academy with the highest ethical standards. This is simply not going to be the case. High employment standards can certainly be used to weed out marginal candidates. While exemplary candidates are preferred, it’s likely we will end up with a typical range of personal ethical standards. In these candidates we will find a typical human thought process. Namely, that we bond with co-workers through trust and respect, that we want others to trust and respect us also, and that in order to function within a workgroup, we must adopt some of their attitudes. The nature of these attitudes is the key here. Hardly anyone, no matter what their occupation, does not have some reservations about getting a co-worker in trouble for what is viewed by the actor, the witness, and the workgroup as merely a minor infraction of policies or law. No one wants to set an impossible standard of behavior yet an environment of integrity must be maintained in the workplace.
Perhaps a more definitive standard of what constitutes misconduct would be beneficial. When a department sets clear policies and guidelines as to what is acceptable and what is not, it will help guide officers’ actions as opposed to them adopting the attitude that “this is the way things are done” among their colleagues. Departments must recognize that officers are human and that not all misconduct necessarily leads to that slippery slope, as long as there are departmental roadblocks. Policies could be designed that actually allow the acceptance of some gratuities while setting clear boundaries as to where gratuities stop and where low level extortion begins. This not only prevents innocuous actions from becoming a slippery slope but it can allow for better rapport between the police and the public. It is important that the police are recognized for the work they do and the permittance of a small gratuity, that free cup of coffee or discounted meal, I think, will help foster better relationships between the public and police. With Community Policing currently being the buzzword within the field, these small gratuities could be seem as humanizing of both the police and the public and hearken back to the day when the policeman was a neighborhood figure and friend.
Given that, serious infractions must be dealt with swiftly and severely. With clear guidelines, departmental policy is the reigning factor and the attitude must be fostered that officer loyalty is first and foremost not to the members of the organization but to what the organization stands for. It must be enforced that officers are called upon to use their discretion in a way that benefits the public. Officers that fail to meet that standard have not just failed other officers and the department but the public and themselves. A very high standard of professionalism, honesty, and ethical behavior must be reinforced as law enforcement qualities. Openness and the freedom to whistleblow must be so ingrained in the subculture as to make the reporting of misconduct an honorable action. The police subculture, as any subculture, is a distinct microcosm that sets the mores of the group. If it can do this, it can also be changed by both the willingness of its members and the added support of the community. Fostering better relationships between the public and the police helps negate their differences and shortens the distances between the two groups. Eliminating the Us vs Them mentality is the only way the Code of Silence can be eliminated. Utilizing community resources like substations, neighborhood watches, and crime meetings help bond officers to the public and vice versa.
While most departments have mechanisms that address allegations of misconduct, i.e. internal affairs, there will be a need for citizen review boards. While it’s uncertain that the public in general will be better able to determine incidents, causes, and remedies of police misconduct, than an internal review. Just as internal review boards should not be a rubber stamp acceptance of police behavior, civilian reviews don’t need to serve as a rubber stamp that finds fault in every police action simply because it involves the police. These boards do bring transparency to the process, and if conducted fairly, that transparency is more important than the results of a civilian review board, as it existence reinforces the notion that the public and police are partners.
It is no mystery that the police function better when the public and the police view themselves as one. Conceptually, it has been shown over and over again. But concepts are meaningless without the backing of the actors involved. Police departments really do have a duty to perform to the benefit of the public and the management of the department not only defines the actions but the attitudes of its officers. Departments must consider themselves not only as a management tool but as a resource that the individual officer can draw upon. The attitudes within police forces are defined by the management of the department and those managers must take definitive steps to foster and enforce ethical attitudes. Most of the measures described in this paper have little cost associated with them. Resources within the community as mentioned above can certainly change the attitudes of both the public and police. It is this change from an Us vs Them mentality that I think is the key to ending corruption. There will always be rotten apples, and some will always find their way into police forces, but what can be eliminated is the systemic corruption that is witnessed when the police stop viewing the public as partners and see them as the enemy.