IS THERE EVIDENCE OF SYSTEMIC RACISM IN POLICING?

INTRODUCTION

Talk of systemic racial bias in policing has been more prominent in the public forum in the past couple years but this doesn’t mean there has been a lack of research into issues of race and policing. Far from it, research in this area has been going on for decades, it’s now only recently that claims of systemic bias have become more vocal. But while there is ample evidence of racial disparities in police interaction outcomes, as we were taught early in graduate school, “disparities don’t equal discrimination”. So the question becomes, is there evidence of systemic racial bias in policing?

In this literature review, I can only just touch on the massive amount of literature examining racial outcomes in policing that has gone on in even just the last 25 years but I hope to provide a general overview of the issues of disparities, the arguments presented for systemic bias, the explanation of these disparities through the scientific research on arrests and use of force, and the problems with current methodologies that try to prove systemic bias.

RACIAL DISPARITIES DO EXIST BUT IS IT BECAUSE OF RACIAL BIAS?

The prevailing argument for systemic bias is the data showing clear disparities between Whites and Blacks/Hispanics in police interaction outcomes in areas like stops, use of force, and arrests. However, in the public forum this is played out with extensive coverage of Blacks who were killed in confrontations with the police, which then is portrayed as racial injustice and proof of systemic bias to the public. As Reinka and Leach (2017) noted in sociologist Weitzer’s 2015 contention that “the seemingly serialized nature of publicized killing after killing of an unarmed Black person every few months since Trayvon Martin’s killing in 2012 can easily be viewed as a pattern of systemic bias” These minorities are stopped, frisked, arrested, and have force used against them disproportionately in comparison to their population demographic and in comparison to Whites (Petersilia, 1983; D’Alessio and Stolzenberg, 2003; Ridgeway, 2007; Gelman et al., 2007; Tapia, 2011; Buehler, 2017; Balko, 2020; Tobias and Joseph, 2020).

For example Ramchand et al., (2006) reference a study showing Blacks are 2.5 times more likely to arrested for marijuana possession than Whites. Gelman et al. (2007) noted in their examination of NYC PD stop and frisk records that although Blacks and Hispanics are stopped more frequently than Whites, since only 1 out of every 8 White person who was stopped was subsequently arrested, compared to 1 out of 9 Hispanics and 1 out of 10 Blacks, that this demonstrates the police are stopping minorities indiscriminately and with less cause, than Whites. Cooley et al. (2019) even demonstrated that the racial disparities between Blacks and Whites in frisks, searches, arrests, and use of force had slight increases,  between .3 and 1.7%, for people stopped in groups versus those alone, even after accounting for the discovery of illegal contraband. In their meta-analysis of probability of arrest, based on 27 independent data sets, Kochel et al. (2011) calculated that the odds of a Black person being arrested was 26% compared to a 20% chance of a White person being arrested. Lytle’s 2014 meta-analysis of suspect characteristics on arrest also found slightly higher arrest probability with minorities compared to Whites, with  Blacks 1.4 times, and Hispanics, 1.25 times more likely to be arrested than Whites and non-Hispanics. Mitchell and Caudy (2015) examined racial disparities and drug arrest rates  and after finding that the disparities could not be explained by differences in drug offending, non-drug offending, or residing in neighborhoods with heavy police emphasis on drug offending, concluded that racial bias is at work. Ross (2015) in an examination of racial bias in police shootings at the county level found that there was a 3.5 times higher probability of an unarmed Black person being shot by police than an unarmed White person being shot by the police. In a study of 2012 NYPD SQF data Morrow et al. (2017) found Black and Hispanic citizens were significantly more likely to experience non-weapon force than Whites

These disparities are seen of evidence as racist policing. Researchers like Richardson, (2010) and Pratt-Harris et al. (2016) claims that connection between race and crime is illusory and is produced by racist police officers, racist police practices, and other racially biased social institutions. Much of the promotion for systemic racism in policing comes from proponents of critical race theory (CRT) like Tolliver et al. (2016)and Tobias and Joseph (2020) by hearkening back to the country’s founding to make claims of a White supremacist basis of government and policing that was meant to subjugate Blacks and continues to this day. CRT proponents suggest that because of the difficult historical relationship between minorities and the police that policing is racist and populated by officers with racist attitudes,explaining that the police are simply a force to be used by rich White people to control an unruly Black populations (Roberts and Race, 1999; Pratt-Harris et al., 2016; Tobias and Josephs, 2020) and that the socialization that goes on in police departments have promoted the stereotype of Blacks as being violent criminals(Tolliver et al, 2016) and that police focus on minorities is in fact racist (Balko, 2020). Welsh et al. (2020), in their San Francisco PD traffic stop research, state that in interviews with officers that “officers’ accounts excuse, justify, or otherwise negate the role of race in routine police work” but yet despite a lack of explicit racism they see officers verbalize  micro racial aggressions by adhering to racial narratives, which they say will then eventually lead to disparate outcomes. Rose (2018) claims the biased nature of violent police interactions are not held accountable in court because she presumes that racism extends to prosecutors reluctant to judge officers’ actions as wrong, to  grand juries failing to indict, to juries failing to convict, and to judges failing to punish. Kahn et al., in 2016, found that based on use of force case files and subject booking photos, that police used less force with people who looked more “stereotypically White”.

OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH ON ARREST AND USE OF FORCE

However, simply because disparities exist in descriptive statistics or even in multivariate regression models is not evidence that there is racial bias or discrimination.. Descriptive statistics provide only raw numbers and exaggerate racial disparities and further analysis is needed to move beyond correlation and into causation (Ridgeway, 2007). Modeling with appropriate variables is important and can provides answers that less complete or nuanced models cannot. Multivariate statistical modeling is necessary to control for the influence of other variables that might drive the racial differences, such as variables like education, income, poverty, and social status, whose lower levels are both associated with Blacks and with greater likelihood of criminal involvement. Other variables like residency in high crime neighborhoods, crime rates, socially disorganized neighborhoods, and neighborhood gang activity help drive the amount of police presence and activity and these areas are also disproportionately populated by minorities. Because of the correlation, or association, that is shared between these variables and minorities like Blacks and Hispanics, they must be controlled for, in a sense, taken out of the equation. Without that accounting,  it may give the impression that the disparities in outcomes like arrest are because the subject is facing racial bias, when instead it is because of the other criminogenic variables that some minorities are disproportionately associated with. Two areas of policing that have been claimed to be racially driven are arrests and the use of force. In the following sections, an overview of some of the scientific research on race in relation to these police activities is examined that runs counter to the argument of racial bias in policing because of refinements in defining statistical modeling and the inclusion  appropriate variables

Arrests

While some commentators focus on racial disparities in arrest as evidence of racial bias, “social scientists remain unsure as to whether Black or White criminal suspects have a higher probability of arrest” while other research finds no significant association between a suspect’s race and the likelihood of arrest (Arndt et al., 2020). Often there are other variables that once accounted for allow those differences in probability to shrink or disappear and those racial disparities can be explained. While evidence of disparities have existed for decades so has research that examines the reason those racial disparities appear to exist. Disrupted or disorganized social structure, poverty and lower social status can confound racial data on arrests as minorities disproportionately reside in social disorganized and poor neighborhoods. For example both Hollinger (1984) in examining a DUI crackdown and, Sealock and Simpson (1998) in their research on Philadelphia juvenile offenders found the racial effects on arrest lost statistical significance once socioeconomic status (SES) was accounted, indicating a person’s social status, rather than their race, became the significant factor in whether a person was arrested. Fielding-Miller et al. (2020) in studying whether high proportions of drug arrests for Black males were linked to areas of higher levels of White female population found that the connection was attenuated, though not completely eliminated, by including socioeconomic variables in their model concluding that economics must be included in the discussion of criminal justice disparities, not just race alone. In 2008, Kirk also found that Chicago minority youths faced significantly higher levels of concentrated poverty and lower levels of collective efficacy than White youths and that unstable family structure explains much of the disparities in arrest across race and ethnicity. They conclude that while substantial arrest differences still existed,  numerous family level covariates are significantly and substantially associated with arrest and the racial and ethnic differences in  family demographics and structure explain large percentages of the disparities in arrest between Black youth and other racial and ethnic youths. Finkeldey and Demuth (2019)looking for a connection between self-identified race/ethnicity, self-identified skin color, and self-reported arrest found that  focusing on race or ethnicity masks difference in arrest by color but also found that social disadvantage partially explained those associations. In a youth survey, Schleiden et al. (2020) found partial support for a social disorganization hypothesis, determining that Blacks experienced more neighborhood disorder than Whites, which was linked to their young adult arrest rates and it was Blacks exposure to violence that was linked to more alcohol use, delinquency, and arrests in emerging adulthood.

Other behaviors specific to the conditions minorities may live in may be exhibited that expose minorities to a greater likelihood of arrest. Camplain et al. (2020) in their study on drug and alcohol arrests discovered that minorities were more likely than Whites to be booked into jail on both misdemeanor and felony charges alcohol /drug charges than Whites and it cannot be attributed to their greater drug or alcohol use in general. Mitchell and Caudy (2015) arrived at a similar conclusion suggesting disproportionate minority drug arrests are not explained by drug offending, non-drug offending, or residence in neighborhoods with a high police focus on drugs, but instead attribute it to racial bias. However, back in 2006, Ramchand et al. revealed that one likely explanation for part of the disparities is not use but the difference in purchasing behavior between Blacks and Whites. Their analysis showed that Blacks, as compared to Whites, were nearly twice as likely to buy outdoors, three times more likely to buy from a stranger, as well as significantly more likely to be buy away from their homes. These factors afford more police scrutiny and an increased likelihood of arrest.

A number of other factors, once included in statistical models, provide evidence that racial disparities can be explained by other variables, rather than support the suggestion that police officer behaviors are driven by racial bias. One of the most basic variables that needs to be accounted for is differential criminal involvement of different racial groups. Petersilia (1983) in her examination of arrest in California from 1980 found mixed findings with Whites being somewhat more likely than minorities to be arrested on a warrant and considerably less likely to be released with charges. While noting that the actual of likelihood for any offender to arrested is quite low, regardless of race, she found that Blacks were not overrepresented in their race relative to the kind or amount of crimes they commit. As Kirk (2008), Tapia, (2011),Schleiden et al. (2020) and other researchers have noted through official data, the National Crime Victim Survey, and self-reports that Black and Hispanic youths disproportionately commit serious crimes relative to Whites. D’Alessio and Stolzenberg (2003), utilizing National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) data, the successor to the UCR,  examined 335,619 incidents of rape, robbery, and assault in 17 states during 1999 and determined the likelihood of arrest for White and Blacks suspects was roughly equal and that the “disproportionately high arrest rate for Black citizens is most likely attributable to differential involvement in reported crime rather than racially biased law enforcement practices”. Schleiden et al. (2020) while not finding a difference in frequency of delinquent behaviors between Black and White youths, found significant differences in self-reported offenses with Black youth disproportionately being involved in buying, selling, or holding stolen property, deliberately writing a bad check, breaking into a house to steal something, using a weapon to get what they want, and using a weapon in fight. Despite these findings, Schleiden et al. characterize the higher arrest rates for Black youths as possible evidence of racial bias. They did not investigate whether the neighborhood disadvantage and exposure to violence for Blacks could lead to differentiated criminal behavior, for example more serious, or violent behavior, that would more likely result in arrest, as opposed to examining just frequency of behavior.

In that regard, another variable that has to be accounted for is seriousness of the offense, whereas the more serious the offense, the greater the likelihood of arrest.Schleiden and her colleagues (2020) had already noted the research that indicates minorities are committing more crime over a longer period of time, are engaging in more criminal behaviors, and committing more serious crimes than Whites, which consequently are more likely to be reported to the police , and thus more likely to result in arrest. Sealock and Simpson (1998) as well found that officers strongly considered offense seriousness in their decision to arrest. Brown  (2005) also found that regardless of suspect race, legal factors like offense serious influence the decision to arrest. The seriousness of offending was also a factor in Tapia’s  2011 national youth survey. Noting research that indicates Blacks’ self-reported serious offense rates are double that of Whites, Tapia found a disproportionate amount of minorities in gang membership and that delinquency and arrests rates are much higher for gang members than non-gang members. However their regression analysis showed that as gang members they had increased rates of arrest, but their race was not a significant factor in arrest. Tapia concluded that because minority youths make up a much larger portion of gang membership they feel the effect of arrest greater. This likelihood of arrest is affected by the introduction of criminal behavior, not by the race of the gang members themselves. Raphael and Rozo (2019) also found that offense severity and criminal history were significant factors in arrest. While Black juvenile offenders were booked at a higher rate, a significant portion of the Black/White disparity was attributable to differences in arrest offense severity and criminal history.

Another legal factor that also strongly influences the likelihood of arrest is the presence of evidence or solvability factors.Brown (2005) found that regardless of race, the presence of evidence was a significant factor in the decision to arrest. Briggs and Opsal (2012) in examining victim ethnicity on arrest in violent crimes found that while race and ethnicity of the victim are related to police clearance of cases, the relationship between case clearance and case solvability factors is stronger. Arndt et al. (2020) also found that in homicides, suspect race did not play a noteworthy role in influencing the likelihood of arrest once the strength of physical evidence against the subject is accounted for. Solvability and the presence of evidence, as well as arrest itself, may be linked to  demeanor of the individuals involved either as witnesses or suspects. Extensive research has shown that minorities tend to hold more negative views of the police. These negative views can prompt uncooperative behavior from victims and witnesses or behavior that is confrontational or resistive, which will influence the likelihood of arrest. However, Drawve et al. (2014) in their analysis of the likelihood of arrest for aggravated assault, found that Blacks had a significantly lower chance of being arrested than Whites, with the authors postulating that the decreased likelihood of arrest for Blacks may stem from Black witnesses and victims lack of cooperation with the police, or perhaps by less of a focus by police on Black crime linked to this lack of cooperation. Other researchers like Brown (2005) have also found that suspect demeanor plays a role in the likelihood of arrest. More than a negative demeanor may develop from vicarious or actual interactions with the police. Gibbons et al. (2020) in their longitudinal study of Black young adults found that those who perceived to have been racial discriminated against, including being “hassled” by the police, especially in their childhood, were more likely to have reported being arrested or incarcerated as adults. However, in the path to that connection were also self-reported deviant associates, substance use, and illegal behaviors that in all likelihood contributed to being “hassled by the police” and their subsequent higher arrest rates. They also found that those who exhibited high racial pride were less likely to commit illegal acts in general but yet reported more illegal behavior after perceived racial discrimination from the police.

Studies need to account for policing styles, practices, or policies that while not driven by racial bias, may disproportionately affect minorities. Drawve et al. (2014) notes that overall police strategies and resources will affect the likelihood of arrest. Police resources will undoubtedly be focused in areas of greater need as well as for particular efforts that focus on DUIs, street crimes, or drug activity. Crackdowns, problem oriented policing, and hotspot policing have all demonstrated effectiveness on reducing crime When these efforts are occurring in areas with large proportions of minorities, such as high crime areas, minorities will be affected by stops and arrests disproportionately (Weisburd et al, 2016) though Schleiden et al. (2020) fear that will affect officers’ perception of differences in behavior and character between Blacks and Whites. In examining the racial disparities found in the NYPD stop, question, and frisk practices,Evans et al. (2014) found the police focused those activities in areas with high levels of violent crime, which are areas that are highly populated by minorities. Lum (2011) describes that policing is moving away from a person based approach to one based on place. Various factors in areas or neighborhoods help drive criminal activity and disorder and addressing those underlying place based problems is at the core of community based policing, as well as utilized in hotspot policing and anti-gang and drug interventions. These places and their characteristics such as SES, poverty, racial and ethnic makeup, disorder, crime, pedestrian and traffic density and land use provide place-based cues which will affect officer behavior, decision, making and attitude (Lum, 2011) as well as affect precinct and department policy and behavior. She notes while they have proven to be effective as anti-crime efforts they’ve also drawn criticism because police presence in minority areas results in disparate arrest outcomes. In her place based study of the interaction of the proportion of race, level of wealth, and level of violence in an area, the more violent an area accounted for greater arrests but she also found the police more informally handled complaints (less likely to write reports or make an arrest and reducing the seriousness of crime classifications) in areas with greater wealth and in areas of larger Black populations who are more disadvantaged. Lum unfortunately wasn’t able to determine the reason for these opposing results, considering officer attitude or beliefs, department or precinct policing style, amount of police resources, community demands or expectations for service, or an interaction of all of them may have accounted for the results. Raphael and Rozo (2019) found that while there were racial disparities in non-violent felony youth arrest bookings, a very large share of that difference was accounted for by agency variables. Agencies that tended to arrest Black youth were equally likely to arrest Whites and Hispanics. Tougher policies regarding arrest in large cities will also affect minority arrests as these cities have higher minority populations. They note that 75% of the disparity in bookings between Blacks and Whites and 66% of the disparity between Hispanics and Whites were explainable by the observable factors of criminal history offense severity, and the penchant for certain law enforcement agencies to arrest and formerly book youth offenders

One area not frequently examined, typically for lack of data, is officer race in the decision to arrest. Brown and Frank (2006) note that some efforts in police reform have focused on increasing the number of Black officers with little empirical evidence that an officer’s race or ethnicity is actually related to their behavior toward citizens. In their systematic observation study in Cincinnati, they made an interesting finding. In general, White officers were more likely to arrest suspects than Black officers, but Black suspects were more likely to be arrested when the decision maker was a Black officer.

Unfortunately, not all researchers in preparing a study seek out, have access to, or utilize data from these explanatory variables. The types of data will significantly affect the quality of the findings. For example, Penner and Saperstein (2015) used the US National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health to “disentangle the effects of self-identifying as Black compared to others identifying you as Black on subsequently being arrested”. They revealed that the odds of arrest are three times greater for someone identified as Black, proclaiming that racial perceptions play an important role in arrest disparities. However they also admitted that they had no detailed information on the circumstances surrounding the arrests such as evidence, demeanor, or compliance. Other variables that were not included would also have been informative (criminal history, police record, type of offense) as these might also have factored into the arrests. A study like this has little social science value and amounts to little more than an observation as it seeks to determine a component that might have affected arrest, without actually looking at the arrest occurrence itself. Other studies as well face these limitations. In the previously discussed 2008 Kirk study, he notes the lack of data on victim/offender relationship, seriousness of the offense, and subject demeanor would all be factors related to arrest decisions. In preparing his 2011 examination of youth gang arrests, Tapia having discovered insignificantly higher rates of arrest for minority gang members compared to White gang members, also recognized limitations in the study that didn’t account for the complainant’s demand for arrest, presence of evidence, and subject demeanor which all affect the decision to arrest.

Other sociological reasons that lead to higher arrest issues that should be accounted for in samples include substance use and mental health issues, (Schleiden et al., 2020) which will likely have a disproportionate affected on disordered or poor neighborhoods, which will also likely be high crime neighborhoods with large populations of minorities. They emphasize that it is crucial that in examining racial disparities “to simultaneously consider multiple theories and include a variety of individual and contextual factors within the analyses”. However, Lantz and Wenger (2019) also demonstrated that researchers must approach their overall analytical approach carefully. They stated that in their quasi experiment examining potential differences in arrest for Black and White co-offenders, using traditional logistic regression, Black offenders were 75% less likely than White offenders to be arrested. Putting the data into a multi-level model with partnership data, including victim and offense characteristics, nested with demographic and arrest data, in examining within partnership differences between Black and White co-offenders they found that Black offenders were 3% more likely to be arrested than their White co-offenders. While the authors suggest that traditional regression analysis may contain significant selection and omitted variable bias, they do not provide an explanation about why the disparity may exist. Elliot (1995) even notes using arrest statistics to show anything representative about the general population or police activity is flawed. While many researchers are aware that arrest data may include false positives and errors of omission, it should be noted that arrest statistics may not be representative of offenders in the population. Elliot states that compared to self-reports of violent crime, arrest data underreports these offenses and research results are mixed on whether there are any racial differences in the number of self-reported offenses. Ultimately Lum (2011) determines that the only way to understand why the disparities occur is to continue to use further systematic and qualitative approaches including social observation, ethnographic analyses and in-depth interviews, and psychological examination of both officer and citizen mentality.

Use of Force

The same issues surrounding research into racial disparities in arrest exist for those disparities in the use of force. Researchers like Tolliver, et al. (2016) contend that the U.S. has a White supremacy basis and a racist adherence to the stereotype of Black males as violent criminals. They contend that White privilege is the cause of higher incidence of use of force with Black subjects. For proof, they reference evidence taken from shoot/don’t shoot videogame studies that a shooter bias exists because some results indicate Blacks were shot faster than Whites. The disparities witnessed between Blacks and other races in police use of force are often attributed to racial bias and discrimination (Buehler, 2017; Hehman et al., 2018;Ross et al., 2020; Durlauf and Heckman, 2020) For example, Pratt-Harris et al. (2016)contend that the core of policing is racist, incorrectly attributing policing’s roots to American slave patrols, and that Blacks disproportionate involvement in crime is untrue, blaming crime in those neighborhoods on racist city policies. They believe a stronger focus should be put on revealing the racist aspects of policing and that focusing on individual “bad apple” officers dilutes the message of systemic racism.

However, as with arrests, alternative explanations rather than racism exist as to why these disparities occur. Fridell and Lim (2016) note that neighborhoods matter; with more force used in disadvantaged, high crime neighborhoods. While these places are typically populated with minorities, once controlling for neighborhood context, the disparity in racial use of force disappears. Lautenschlager and Omori (2017), found a different neighborhood effect. While they found that use of force was concentrated in Black neighborhoods, neighborhoods with higher ethnic  and racial diversity  have decreasing force incidents but with increasing severity. Ross (2015) found that racial bias was most likely to occur in large metropolitan counties with low median income and a sizable portion of Black residents, especially with high financial equity, however he did not find racial bias in shootings to be associated with county crime rates.

It is well known and easily understood that serious crimes and crimes involving weapons or violence will more likely involve the use of force then other incidents. Arrest and complaint data have consistently shown a significantly higher degree of involvement of Blacks in these types of offenses like robbery, aggravated assault, and murder, which then drives disparities in use of force data. Research has indicated that use of force is related to racial/ethnic minority involvement in criminal activity and their resistance to police intervention (Fridell and Lim, 2016). Cesario et al. (2019) examined two year worth of officer involved fatal shootings. When adjusting for crime rate and minority criminal involvement they found no evidence of anti-Black disparities in fatal shootings, fatal shootings of unarmed citizens, and fatal shootings involving misidentification of harmless objects.

Subject demeanor compliance, and resistance strongly influence the application of force (Engel et al., 2000; Fridell and Lim, 2016; Mears, et al., 2017; Morrow et al., 2017) examined use of force in Terry stops and while Black and Hispanic had small but significant effects on the use of non-weapon force, many other factors had a much greater influence on whether force was used, including being frisked, arrested, matching subject description, engaging in violence, and noncompliance. In weapon use of force, race was no longer a significant factor but rather noncompliance was strongly related to that use of force, along with matching subject description, suspected of a violent crime, presence of weapons, being searched, frisked, proximity to offense and whether it was radio dispatch. High crime areas though had significantly lower use of weapons use and the racial makeup of the police precincts had no significant influence on whether force was used. Fryer (2019) found that in non-lethal force, while Blacks and Hispanics were 50% more likely than Whites to experience force in a police interaction, once situational context and subject behavior was accounted for no racial differences were found. He also found in officer involved shootings there were no racial disparities present. Atiba Goff and Barsamian Kahn (2012) suggest that officers have two kinds of authority, moral and physical. When subjects portray officers as illegitimate because of a presumption of racism, officers are stripped of their moral authority in the eyes of the subject, and thus themselves, and have only physical authority to rely on for compliance. This reliance on physical authority, generated from the situational context, may then generate racial disparities in the use of force, rather than actual racial discrimination.

Linking Implicit Bias to Racism in the Use of Force

Drakulich, et al. (2020) state that modern racism rests on two key principles: a denial or minimization of contemporary racial discrimination and inequalities, and a focus on individualism and meritocracy that (implicitly or explicitly) blames racial disparities on people of color by arguing that they lack the proper work ethic and discipline to succeed in today’s fair, equal-opportunity society. Levinson and Young (2009) declare that racism has been shifting away from overt and intentional racism of the past to covert and unintentional. They complained that in attempting to proving a case of racism; showing intent, and not just an adverse effect, is difficult and we should focus more on whether anything symbolic of racism was present rather than an actual intent to discriminate. They contend that racism can be non-conscious and automatic and that these biases can be uncovered by using the Implicit Association Test (IAT). Holroyd (2015) claims that because implicit bias exists, then if must be causing police officers to behave in a racially biased manner, and if it affects police officers then it must also affect policy makers in the department causing them to be racially biased as well, thus supporting his contention of institutionalized racism. Holroyd both calls for studies to examine if and how implicit bias affects policing, and yet proclaims that implicit bias is causing discriminatory police work. He states that raising awareness of implicit bias can change it, and that the effects of implicit bias must be mitigated because evidence of implicit bias mean policing is racially biased and thus illegitimate.

The Implicit Association Test basically measures the speed of a pushbutton response in an image/word association test. An image type, for example those indicating different races or genders, is paired with words that either have a positive connotation, like happy, or a negative connotation, like disgust, and participants are measured on their speed in correctly responding. The image and word types are then reversed and participants are measured again. If an individual associates a negative word faster with one image type than another it suggests they hold a bias or adherence to a stereotype. Humans tend to categorize people and object in to group membership, attributing stereotypes to those members in order to make sense  and add structure their world. These implicit biases operate outside of conscious awareness and are not necessarily based in animosity as research has shown that implicit biases exist in people who consciously hold no prejudiced attitudes (Fridell and Lim, 2016). Fridell and Lim also note that people can override their implicit biases and have controlled responses. By recognizing their biases, motivated individuals can implement bias-free behavior (2016).

Tests like these demonstrated that people have an inherent bias toward their ingroup (the type of people that resemble them the most) and bias against outgroups (individuals who do not resemble them) and that these biases occur within all people in areas of gender, race, sexual orientation, religion, and body shape (Fridell, 2016; Fridell and Lim, 2016). In that regard, people naturally will be quicker to make positive associations toward people that look more like them and slower to make those positive associations toward people who appear different to them. Likewise, people will naturally be slower in making negative associations about their ingroup and faster in making negative associations about outgroups. Fridell and Lim also note however, these tests can also demonstrate the possible degree that people adhere to negative stereotypes about race and possibly indicate a racial bias in an individual they were perhaps unaware of or preferred to outwardly conceal (2016).

Commentators and researchers state that a persistent stereotype of the violent criminal as a Black male may generate bias against Blacks and may prompt the use of force, or greater use of force than would be necessary, as compared to police reactions to other races. Wilson et al. (2017) found in college student studies that photo examples of Blacks were subjectively assessed to a very small, but significant, degree, as having greater size, strength, or formidability of threat. However, in 2019, Johnson and Wilson found that while race does impact judgments of size and strength to a certain degree, raters primarily tracked objective physical features. They even found that in some cases racial stereotypes actually improved group level accuracy as these stereotypes aligned with nationally representative data of racial group differences in size and strength  Kahn and her associates, in 2016, examined subject’s booking photos and coded them for the presence of  typical Black or White facial features while examining the severity of force used in the arrest. In their regression analysis the police used less force with highly stereotypically featured Whites and they suggest an intragroup bias from White officers is a protective factor in the severity of use of force.

However while there are stereotypes of Blacks as dangerous, violent, or criminals, other stereotypes that citizens have about policing exist as well. Mears et al. (2017)states that both police and citizens can bring their biases to police encounters and that when minorities express negative views of the police, question police legitimacy, and believe their neighborhoods are subject to coercive policing, Blacks and other minorities may still perceive professional and courteous demeanor from the police as discriminatory (2017). Both direct and vicarious experiences influence minorities’ views of the police and their behavior, and negative perceptions of the police by minorities have been longstanding (Tapia, 2011). This will lead to noncompliance and resistance, and prompts the use of force from officers. Mears (2017) also notes that in encounters with subjects who are defiant, disrespectful, or violent may also mold officers perceptions and biases as well. Cooley et al. (2019) demonstrated in two studies that after merely reading about White privilege, study participants had increased perceptions of racism in violent encounters between the police and Black men, indicating the perception of racism in police actions is subjective and subject to outside and vicarious influences. Levin and Thomas (2005) in a study of how racial identity affects perceptions of police brutality, produced videotapes of a police interaction, changing the race of the officers in the different recordings, and found that both Black and White participants were significantly more likely to identify identical behavior in police officers as racist when both officers were White. Hall et al. (2016) suggest, without any supporting evidence, that police officers are high in Social Dominance Orientation and are thus more likely to inflict severe punishment on those who don’t submit to there demands. They also claimed, again without evidence, that police officers  typically have high conformity and low universalism values and, similarly to the non-officers participants in their study, would rate failure to comply more seriously, are more supportive of harsh punishment, and have less sympathy for offenders. The authors suggest that it’s the officers’ desire for dominance that prompts them to use “resisting arrest” or “failure to comply” as a precursor and justification to employ lethal force when their demands aren’t met.

Research to determine if implicit bias affects behavior typically took the form of video shooter simulations. Participants watch a video portrayal and must correctly identify whether the Black or White target in the video is armed with a weapon or holding a harmless object and push either a “a shoot” or don’t shoot” button. Participants are timed in the speed of their responses and their accuracy in decision making. Results of these types of studies revealed some consistent results (Correll et al. 2007). Participants of all races were quicker to decide to shoot armed Black targets than armed White targets and decide not to shoot unarmed White targets faster than unarmed Black targets (Correll et al., 2002; Correll et al., 2007; Correll and Keesee, 2009; Sadler et al., 2012; Senholzi et al., 2015). This suggests an adherence to the stereotype that Black males are violent or dangerous and the magnitude of the bias varied based on the perceptions of the cultural stereotype but not with personal racial prejudice (Correll et, 2002). However, when comparing police officers to citizen participants, officers also were quicker to decide to shoot Black subjects, but while citizens tended to favor a shoot response for Black subjects, suggesting bias,  officers, who’s racial bias in response times did not differ between White and non-White officers, were significantly more accurate than citizens in making the right choice  and showed weak or non-existent  racial bias in their shoot/don’t shoot decisions  (Correll, 2007; Correll and Keesee, 2009;Sadler et al., 2012, Atiba Goff and Barsamian Kahn, 2012).  James et al. (2014)wanted to explore the possibility that the racial biases exhibited truly affected behavior and questioned whether those type of video shooter studies would accurately predict real world behavior as the tests differ significantly from a real life situation. The researches utilized general population participants in a highly realistic deadly force shooting scenario and found, similar to other research, that associations between race and violence did not translate to biases in shooting behavior.

Implicit bias is not universal or immutable. Individuals can control their implicit biases through implicit bias awareness, cognitive control, and training, (Richardson, 2010) which may be available to some officers as well as conventional officer training, that while not affecting response time on stereotype-incongruent subjects (unarmed Blacks and armed Whites), did improve accurate responses over those of a citizen (Correll, 2007; Correll  and Keesee, 2009;Sadler, 2012; Atiba Goff and Barsamian Kahn, 2012; Correll, et al., 2014). Fridell and Lim (2016) also note that reaction time biases amongst officers were not universal, with bias large for officers from large cities, those with high minority or Black populations, and for officers who perceive greater violence in their communities. As members of a community, officers may share the same biases of their community or area and it’s critical to examine these biases in the communities they serve and how these might influence officer attitudes and the implementation of police policies(Correll, 2007).

Plant et al. (2011) also explored the little researched interaction of gender and race influencing the use of force. Using a shoot/don’t shoot video simulator in a study examining gender, White participants were biased against shooting a White female compared to a White male. In a second study, White participants showed a bias toward shooting Black men but a bias against shooting Black women and White ingroup members. The authors indicate that not just race, but gender, and its connection to perceptions of violence, is an important factor in shootings that have a racial component. Sadler et al. (2012) also explored biases toward other groups than Blacks. Interestingly, while college students participants only showed a bias against Blacks in their reaction times, officer participants also demonstrated reaction time biases toward Latinos relative to Asians and Whites, and toward Whites relative to Asians; racial biases in their reaction times that mirrored perceived racial criminal involvement. They did find that the more aggressive police officers perceived the stereotype of Blacks to be, the more accurate they were in decisions about whether Blacks were armed. While increased perceptions of aggressiveness in Asians led officer to be more accurate in their decisions, they were less accurate with Latinos when having holding perceptions of aggressiveness. Participants were also better able to distinguish between weapons and  non-threatening objects better when held by Black and Latino subjects compared to Whites and Asians. The authors consider that the association of Blacks and Latinos with danger may lead to faster correct responses through increased cognitive attention to a potential threat but these biases in reaction times did not manifest themselves in the decisions themselves and no racial bias was evident in officers’ decision-making.

The influence of a potential threat doesn’t have to be based in race, but in the perception of the level of threat based on contextual cues or how attentive one is to potential interpersonal threat.. Correll et al. (2011)argue that the bias seen in faster shoot responses to armed Black targets and faster don’t shoot responses to unarmed White targets may not stem from  racial animosity but reflects the perception of threat, specifically the threat associated with Black males. To examine the influence of danger cues other than race, the researches used a shoot/don’t shoot video simulator with the targets embedded in threatening and safe backgrounds. While a typical racial bias was seen in decision making toward Black and White targets in safe backgrounds, threatening backgrounds saw this racial bias disappear as the dangerous contextual cues provided more influence on shooting behavior, with the reduction in racial bias largely due to an increased tendency to shoot White targets. . However, Miller et al. (2012) suggest that the basis of shooter bias may not involve racial or cultural stereotypes. In one study, using arbitrarily formed groups not based on racial or cultural stereotypes, and in another, using Asians as a group typically not stereotyped as dangerous, they found that participants with strong beliefs about interpersonal threats were more likely to mistakenly shoot outgroup members than ingroup members.

Different neural mechanisms underlie this increased cognitive attention to threat assessment based on the stereotype of the violent Black male. Senholzi et al. (2015) conducted a shoot/don’t shoot video simulator study with participants connected to an MRI. They exhibited the typical bias toward quicker shoot response for Blacks and  quicker to not shoot for Whites but different parts of the brain were activated depending on the race of the target. Greater implicit Black-danger associations were associated with increased activity in the amygdala (the portion of the brain responsible for the fight or flight response). The parietal and occipital regions (responsible for processing movement and vision information) also exhibited greater activity for armed Blacks than Whites and a greater connectivity of these regions to the amygdala with armed Blacks. However, the anterior cingulate cortex (an area of the brain that detects and monitors for error and suggests an appropriate motor reaction) was preferentially engaged for unarmed White targets over unarmed Black targets.

Correll et al. (2014) notes that while target race does affect officers’ reaction times they generally do not show a pattern of biased shooting, suggesting that police performance depends on the exercise of cognitive control which allows officers to overcome the influence of stereotypes. Mears, et al. (2017) also expands on the cognitive processes that goes into these decisions. Police/citizen encounters require rapid assessment that demands reliance on cognitive shortcuts, “thinking fast”. When rapid mental processing is needed, as in  a dangerous situation, all people rely on cognitive short cuts to make the quickest, most accurate assessments in a situation. However if those shortcuts are based on a flawed assumption they can lead to decision making errors. Ma et al. (2013) consider though that officers must have ample cognitive resources to fully regulate automatic response, and thus control implicit bias. If this cognitive control is compromised through fatigue it may lead to great racial disparities in shoot/don’t shoot decisions.Similarly, James (2018)in examining the stability of implicit bias in police officers found that implicit bias was not stable and that when officers slept less prior to testing they demonstrated stronger associations between Blacks and weapons. Nieuwenhuys et al. (2012)also explored the effect of anxiety on officers’ decision to shoot. By utilizing low and high anxiety physical experiment conditions, the researchers found that officers in anxious conditions made more mistakes in correctly shooting only armed targets, had reduced shot accuracy, but also responded more quickly when the target had a gun. With gaze behavior not changing, the authors concluded in anxious conditions officers were more inclined to respond on the basis of threat related inferences and expectations than relying on visual information.

Research Issues in the Use of Force

Methodological issues and disagreement between researchers complicate the question of racial bias in the use of force. While Ross (2015) found that Blacks had a slightly lower probability of being shot if armed vs unarmed compared to Whites and Hispanics, unarmed Blacks had a 3.5 greater chance of being shot than unarmed Whites. However, Ross’ study did not include important variables like level of compliance or resistance, type of weapons subjects were armed with, whether threats were made, the seriousness of the offenses, and encounter rates. Despite the authors stating that they can’t know all the circumstances involved or the psychology of the officers at the time, they suggest the disparities exist because of racist norms in police departments. However they ignore clear evidence supporting community violence as a factor as well as evidence of Social Disorder theory. Other study design and analysis problems exit as well. Legewie (2016) examined the rate of change in use of force incidents following the line of duty deaths of NY police officers. However, while the pretest period gathered data for a year, the post test period following the officers deaths was only two weeks. Legewie states that there was a significant increase in use of force against Blacks following two Black incidents, there was not a significant increase after a White and Hispanic incident, and no evidence of any institutional bias. However the small sample and a lack of examination of contextual issues lessens the quality of the study. Such things as,  three of the four suspects were killed or arrested shortly after the incidents, the attacker still on the loose was Black, one of the Black attacks was an ambush, and that Blacks contributed to more than one death may have influenced officer actions based more on the circumstances and less on race.

Fridell (2016) notes that seven studies on race and police use of force came out in the first half of 2016 that were announced in the media that paraphrased them ranging from “there is bias in the use of force”, to :there is bias in some types of force, but not others”, to “there’s no bias in the use of force”. She explains that these disparate findings hinge on the methodologies used; sample characteristics, the number and types of agencies examined, how concepts were operationalized and the number and types of variables used. The quality of the study making a claim is important and research consumers need to critically analyze the results of studies. Rivera and Ward (2017)also make the case for improving analytic frameworks and utilizing an integrated approach in the study of race and policing in both methodology and evaluative analysis. Perspective, approach, and study quality all matter. Differing methodologies and analyses, with varying degrees of rigor, can produce disparate results, with no clear research consensus. Hollis and Jennings (2018) conducted a meta review of 41 studies which examined public and police officer perceptions of force, rates of use of force, types of force used, neighborhood context correlates of use of force and the severity of the force used. In the end they concluded that the relationship between race and use of force “remains unclear”‘ This was the conclusion Petersilia reached in 1983, when 30 years of prior research still did not have a definitive answer. Fryer (2018) states that at while there are racial differences in the use of non-lethal force, in regards to potentially lethal use of force the most granular data shows there is no bias in police shootings. However Durlauf and Heckman (2020) take issue with that conclusion, contending that just because statistically no difference was shown between races in police shooting, doesn’t mean there wasn’t racial discrimination. Ross et al. (2020) also argue against the conclusions of Cesario et al. (2019) who stated that with proper benchmarking, data analysis shows no racial bias in shootings. Ross et al. argue that Cesario et al.’s benchmarking of crime rates doesn’t properly control for crime rate differences but instead masks true racial disparities in the killing of unarmed people by the police. Ross argues that unarmed individuals who were killed should be benchmarked as a ratio of the “noncriminal population”, simply assuming that not being armed, meant you were not aggressive, and thus not a  criminal. Taking those assumption, Ross states it would show there were racial biases. Roussell et al. (2017) takes issue with a James et al. 2016 study that demonstrated that officers had slower response times and fewer shooting errors in a video simulation. James and associates suggested that a fear of adverse legal and social consequences led police officers to be more cautious in shooting decisions involving Blacks than Whites, dubbing this a “reverse racism” effect. Roussell et al. take offense at this characterization, stating reverse racism can’t exist, the term is used to undermine efforts toward racial equity, that if officers  did fear repercussions they must realize how unlikely it would be that they are punished, and criticized James et al. for not properly considering that studying police and race is actually about studying racism and policing.

MAKING SENSE OF DISPARITIES

Atiba Goff and Barsamian Kahn, in 2012, examined why we know less than we should in regard to racial bias in policing. While research has found evidence of disparities, there is a lack of evidence establishing that racial discrimination exists in the social institution of policing. Public opinion data about the presence of systemic bias, often based on disparities, carries no value as it offers only subjective views and no evidence. Distinguishing between disparity and discrimination can be complicated by a number of factors. Limitations in department data, subjective claims of racism without witnesses, limitations in national data on crime and race, and other factors make it difficult to distinguish between simple racial disparities in policing and racial discrimination at the officer, local, or national level. In 1983, Petersilia discussed the reasons for disparate results and the difficulty of distinguishing racial discrimination from racial disparities, reasons that still exist today.. Some studies utilize databases that are too small to permit generalization, others failed to control for enough (or any) of the other factors that might account for apparent racial discrimination. Atiba Goff and Barsamian Kahn (2012) discuss finding the appropriate benchmark for the variables used in analysis can be problematic. For example, in research on racial profiling or racial disparities in stops or arrestees, trying to find an accurate ratio, essentially getting the proper denominator, is crucial, and different benchmarks can provide disparate results. In their analysis of pedestrian stops, using the population of crime suspect descriptions, Blacks pedestrians were stopped 20 to 30 percent lower than their representations in crime suspect descriptions. But Blacks were stopped at nearly the same rate as their representation in the arrestee population. However in using the least reliable (as it doesn’t take into account differential rates of crime participation by race or for differential exposure to the police) but more widely used census data, Black pedestrians were stopped at  rate 50% higher than their representation in the census.

Atiba Goff and Barsamian Kahn (2012) state while some research puts police officers racial bias at roughly the same level as the public in general it does not show that theses biases translate to discriminatory behavior, noting that in social psychology attitudes traditionally predicts less than 10 % of the variance in behavior. They note that even if racially biased attitudes produce some level of biased behavior it’s not clear how much it produces. Ridgeway discovered in 2007 that in the NYPD SQF program just 7% (2,756) of the total number of officers accounted for 54% of the total number of 2006 stops. In patrolling the same areas, at the same times, and with the same assignments a very small percentage of officers (15 total) stopped substantially more Blacks or Hispanics than other officers. Internal benchmarks are necessary to compare officers performance to similar officers to see if any discriminatory patterns exist but these can measure only officer behavior, not institutional behavior (Ridgeway, 2007; Ridgeway and MacDonald, 2009; Atiba Goff and Barsamian Kahn, 2012) However this would provide a statistical means to identify the “bad apples” in the department, important as these bad apples are possibly performing racially biased police, affecting those they interact with, as well as continue to reinforce the arguable narrative of racist policing (Futterman et al., 2007). Goff & Kahn also recount the problems of a lack of access to police data through secrecy or because it was uncollected, and a difference in police and academic culture that can result in a poor collaboration as well as problems with methodology and rigor. Using low quality data and focusing on base rates and descriptive statistics, research like this fails to utilize multivariate analyses which can isolate the roles of the institution and officer to examine their influences. With these limitations in demographics, policies, and outcomes, it is difficult to develop principles and theoretical frameworks with which to predict racial disparities and diagnose racial discrimination.

CONCLUSION

While the current social narrative beats the drum of systemic racial bias in policing, research tells a different, more nuanced story. It is a well-researched and undeniable fact that racial disparities exist in police/citizen interactions. But regardless of the opinions of social commentators and some researchers, these disparities are in no way proof of racial discrimination. Raw data and descriptive statistics exaggerate the real racial differences in police activities. Researchers need to locate and utilize appropriate benchmarks. Discrimination can’t be determined if the ratios that would indicate that conclusion are not calculated appropriately. Descriptive statistics do not allow to take into account other factors that will affect the likelihood of having force used or being arrested. There are a large number of factors that go into a decision to arrest or use force. While no statistical analysis can be perfect, if we are studying racial disparities in these areas, inclusion of as many of these important variables are necessary before claims of systemic bias can possibly be supported.

However, problems in methodologies arise in attempting to show that systemic bias in policing is present as much criminal justice research is conducted using pre-existing data; the data sets used for these analyses can be lacking important variables and their associated data. Criminal justice research has already established the wide variety of variables that strongly affect police activities like arrest and use of force outside of any racial effect. Research  with these data sets may not provide a complete picture of what is driving criminal justice outcomes when they lack important variables related to racial difference that affect outcome measures.

When examining police behavior for bias, the statistical model depends on the variables available within the dataset(s) used. If only a few independent controlling variables are used, the explanatory power is reduced. Many statistical models that rely on descriptive statistics, and even some multi-variate models will lack important variables that could influence racial disparities.

Some are geographical like neighborhood crime rates, neighborhood race demographics, crime distribution, and policing initiatives put in place by police or city management. Some are situational context variables at the scene like  violence occurring, the presence of weapons and evidence and may be hard to measure such as the victims’ desire for charges or arrests, witness cooperation and truthfulness, degree of evidence present, and factors contributing to the risk of officer safety like physical location, surroundings, number of people present, There also some contextual variables related to the subject, variables that may be disproportionately associated with minorities, like the seriousness of the crime, racial differences in crime involvement, presence in high crime areas, and demeanor, noncompliance and resistance.  All of these variables have a significant effect on whether or not an arrest is performed or force is used. Research has demonstrated once these variables are controlled for, the racial disparities shrink or disappear. The racially disproportionate amount of arrests and use of force stem from the other variables that drive crime and police activity, which negates a racial bias argument.

While comprehensive, well-constructed studies with quality data sets and rigorous methodologies do not suggest there is any systemic racial bias in policing, the search for racial bias has continued by examining behavior, specifically whether unconscious biases about race may generate racial disparities in the use of force. Even the concept of implicit bias doesn’t clearly indicate racial bias might occur in behavior. Research has shown that not everyone has the same implicit biases or even biases against outgroups, and that implicit bias can be controlled or mitigated, as well as that outside factors, like current events, situational factors, and physiological effects, can affect the level of implicit bias and how well it can be controlled.

The Implicit Association Test is a well established technique for examining biases held by individuals. It seems to also be well-established from the shoot/no shoot video simulations that not just police officers but the general population, of all races, adhere to the stereotype of the violent Black male by being quicker to react to armed Black targets and slower to react to armed White targets. However, some research actually shows officers reacting slower to armed Black targets, perhaps using an overabundance of caution that might result from implicit bias awareness training or from an awareness of the scrutiny that police/Black citizen interactions can generate. In regards to the behavioral response, while the general public tended to make significantly more errors by shooting unarmed Black targets, officers did not, further indicating a lack of racial bias.

However, none of this addresses policing activities in general. Despite the existence of implicit bias, there is no way to measure it at any specific moment in a real police interaction, and subject behavior and demeanor will all have an influence on the strength of the implicit bias, that if present, may also affect police behavior. It is unknown whether in any given instance of police contact to what degree, if any, implicit bias is at work, and what degree other factors affecting police behavior are accounted for such as, types of calls for service, suspect description, witness statements evidence of a commission of a crime, and objectively suspicious behavior (though Richardson, 2010, claimed that police cannot objectively gauge suspicious behavior because of the racial bias that must be inherently present in policing because of their contact with minority criminality) may influence or account for officer behavior.

When comprehensive modeling is used, research has shown that often the disparities between Black and White outcomes disappear or become reduced to a level that could be explained by other important variables not measured. Without a statistically significant indication of any sizable racial disparity in arrests and use of force, with indications that a small percent of officers may generate notable disparities, without clear evidence of systemic overtly racist departmental policies or behavior, and a lack of proof that implicit bias against minorities is ongoing in police interactions and actually affects their behavior, the argument of systemic racial bias in policing is not supported. While it appears that there is no evidence of systemic racial bias in policing, it doesn’t mean that improvements can’t be made in race relations with the police and that we shouldn’t continue to monitor policing for indications of racial discrimination. There are undoubtedly “bad apples” in police departments around the country who are racially biased and who have very profound effects on peoples’ of color lives. But in a desire to eliminate racism from policing, efforts to identify it must be conducted with scientific rigor, because the truth matters. As Fryer (2018) said, “Of course, Black lives matter as much as any other lives. Yet we do this principle a disservice if we do not adhere to strict standards of evidence and take at face value descriptive statistics that are consistent with our preconceived ideas. “Stay woke”-but critically so”.

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Stop and Frisk Practices

Introduction

Recently, former democratic presidential candidate Michael Bloomberg was criticized for his past comments supporting  the stop and frisk policy in New York during his tenure as mayor. On the face of his comments, he’s not wrong. Good police management puts resources where they are needed most and if a law enforcement or order maintenance perspective is being addressed, then the resources are put in high crime areas. Communities and citizens want the police to be proactive, not merely just responding to crimes that have already happened, but taking action to reduce or stop crime before it happens. If  we want the police to stop crime in high crime areas, they should focus their investigative efforts on those most likely to commit crimes or carry weapons. As Bloomberg noted, the high crime areas in New York City are urban, disadvantaged neighborhoods with a high minority populations, and those most likely to commit crimes are their male residents aged 15 to 30.

However, because of the perception that stop and frisk practices unfairly target minorities, stop and frisk is currently being viewed as biased at least, and racist at worst. The questions at issue become; is stop and frisk a useful or effective law enforcement technique, is it at its core biased, or is it a matter of how its applied, and as it has been applied in NYC and other places, was the practice biased? In this literature review, I will be examining early assessments of stop and frisk, more current perceptions of stop and frisk, and the scientific literature that examines whether disparities in stops are actually evidence of bias and whether stop and frisk had had any effect on violent crime. As this review will focus to a great degree on NYC and its practices, stop and frisk practices will be referenced as SQF in this review, which in NYC and other localities, signifies Stop, Question, and Frisk.

Early Overview

In 1968 stop and frisk as a practice was formalized by Terry v. Ohio when the Supreme Court ruled that police officers have the right to stop an individual on the street if they have a reasonable suspicion that the person is involved in a crime, that a crime has just occurred, or is about to occur. The ruling also allowed officers to briefly search an individual (a pat-down, or frisk) for the purpose of ensuring the individual didn’t have a weapon, done to help ensure officer safety. Prior to this, stop and frisk had been a common practice for police officers but this ruling established some constitutional limits and guidelines on the practice. With a reasonable suspicion (a lower standard than the probable cause used in 4th amendment search and seizure cases) an officer can make a stop (a temporary detention as opposed to a seizure) for investigative purposes and conduct a frisk or pat down of the outer clothing (as opposed to a formalized search).

During the ’60’s there were concerns over the possibility of infringement on civil rights when engaging in SQF. In fact while Terry v. Ohio was decided in 1968, in 1964 Ronayne was examining the newly enacted NY stop and frisk law noting in English common law the use of a reasonable suspicion in searching from early 19th century policing, a concept that carried over to American policing. The NY law pushed for by the police department through the mayor’s office authorized the temporary detention of persons if the officer reasonably suspects that a felony, or certain misdemeanors, is occurring, had occurred, or was about to occur in order to ascertain information. Once stopped, if the officer reasonably suspects he is in danger of life or limb, may frisk that person for a dangerous weapon. Ronayne states that the main issue from the first half of the 20th century was whether such a stop actually is an arrest. One school of thought held that it is dependent on the individual, that once the person feels they are not free to leave the presence of the officer, an arrest has occurred. The other school of thought is that it is dependent on the officer to decide when an arrest, the actual taking into physical custody for a criminal offense, has occurred. In a variety of states, court cases arguing whether arrests and searches were constitutional typically came down on the side of law enforcement, as well as making the distinction between probable cause and reasonable suspicion, and the difference between a temporary detention and arrest, thereby establishing a right to investigate for the police (Ronayne, 1964).

In 1965, Kuh also commented on politicians and defense attorneys “pontificating” on the unconstitutionality of New York’s 1964 stop and frisk law. He claimed media sources had distorted the meaning by ignoring the wording of the law, and defends the use of the words “reasonable” as an already well defined term in the US legal system and “suspects” (as opposed to “believes”) as it takes in the experiences, observations, and judgements of police officers as a determinate of what raises suspicion to warrant a stop and frisk. He also notes the English common law usage of the term “reasonably suspects” as well as similar language in the US Uniform Arrest Act as providing historical precedent. NY’s law also states that while not an arrest, any person not identifying themselves or explaining their actions to the satisfaction of the officer may be detained and investigated for up to two hours, but Kuh also argues that contrary to critics, it doesn’t violate the 5th amendment against self-incrimination because the law doesn’t not command that the person do so. He argues as well about the clear distinction between a search and pat down, which is done to ensure officer safety, not to gather evidence.

However, in 1967, Schwartz contends that police training that tells officers to consider everyone as being possibly armed, and working in high crime neighborhoods, can too easily translate into an excuse to frisk everyone officers encounter. Schwartz also states that some case law has found that simply feeling a bulge that may be a weapon does not constitute the probable cause necessary to conduct a warrantless search by reaching into the pocket and removing the item. Schwartz notes that some cases appear more to involve the police searching for a weapon they anticipate the person will be carrying rather than out of fear of officer safety. Schwartz also argues that the definition “reasonably suspects” may be questionable as the police by nature are suspicious to a degree more so than an average, reasonable person. Officers may unjustly be suspicious of a minority in a white area, or a manner of dress or behavior may unjustly arouse their suspicions which will complicate already difficult police minority relations. This leads Schwartz to question the constitutionality of the law and whether it could be adequately policed and free from bias, asserting any law enforcement benefit is not balanced by the infringement of rights.

The Nineties Perspective

Some 30 years later, Schwartz’s and others’ early views were predictive both of the constitutionality challenges stop and frisk laws and practices must face as well as the impact it may have on minority communities. 1n 1994, Harris concludes that the courts permissive attitudes toward stop and frisk have widened the net as to what constitutes reasonable suspicion and well as when a frisk may be conducted to the point that all persons may be subject to a search. If the reasonable suspicion involved a crime that may be associated with violence police have the right to automatically frisk and don’t need an articulable reasonable suspicion of danger to the officer.

However, what crimes may be associated with violence is subjective. Two offenses Harris claims have watered down Terry are drug cases and burglaries. While drug traffickers may commonly be in possession of weapons, this has translated to anyone who may be involved with drugs may also be armed, thus requiring an automatic frisk over what may be simple drug possession. Harris notes several state court cases where officers have overstepped their bounds and conducted searches framed as frisks without probable cause or sometimes even reasonable suspicion, as well as the US Supreme Court case Mn v. Dickerson that allowed officers to seize contraband as admissible evidence if its identity as such is readily apparent through touch during a frisk. Harris also notes this net widening of frisks includes burglary, as the tools of the trade could be used as weapons, as well as what’s termed dangerous places and people such as in illegal gambling houses, high crime areas, companions of individuals arrested, people present during a search warrant, and people placed in squad cars. He concludes to much deference is given to police testimonial in contentious cases and that data should be gathered on the level of dangerousness in requiring frisks, as well as new and clear guidelines  that establish what is allowable in these types of police interactions. Harris states too often race, seen as a proxy for criminality and dangerousness by the police, and becomes a component in reasonable suspicion. and Harris asserts that the existence of dangerousness must be present, not just could be present, in allowing a frisk.

Other jurisdictions faced the same challenges and questions as Murrill (1993) indicates in his review of Louisiana’s stop and frisk law and the 66 cases surrounding its use. Following Terry, four cases have helped define the ruling in Terry with the Supreme Court finding that: certain classes of typically non-violent crime (e.g. narcotics possession) don’t warrant an automatic frisk; an informant’s tip regarding weapon possession is sufficient to conduct a frisk; the physical observation of something that could be a weapon is sufficient to frisk, that persons in a location subject to a search warrant can’t be frisked, as well that specific circumstances, which while not separately signaling danger, that when taken in their totality, may present a  reasonable risk of officer safety.  However, state courts may not always follow these precedents in deciding stop and frisk cases. Louisiana law is similar to New York’s, indicating an officer may stop and question if a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity exists and may frisk, either if the officer reasonably suspects he’s in danger or if the officer reasonably suspects the person is carrying a weapon. Murrill notes certain types of cases often appear under the application of  Louisiana stop and frisk; description cases where the person matches a description of someone wanted by the police for a violent crime, including in cases where information and descriptions are provided by informants; conduct cases where the conduct of the individual either before the stop, such as in a the Terry cases where the officer suspected a daytime robbery was about to occur, or during the stop, for example if a person makes a sudden or furtive movement toward an area, like a pocket or under a car-seat, which had the potential of containing a weapon, indicates a reasonable suspicion of weapon possession; appearance cases where the subject’s physical appearance leads to a suspicion they are armed, such as a bulge in the clothing suggestive of a concealed weapon, or in cases of intoxication as the justification is that intoxicated people may act irrationally, increasing danger to the officer, or in cases of fitting a drug courier profile. Other factors in these cases provided supplemental justification for these stops and searches including the presence of a high crime areas (which may disproportionately or adversely impact these high minority areas) officer’s personal knowledge of the suspect, the time of day or night, and the presence of more suspects than officers.

Murrill notes that 80% of the courts’ analyses examined the justification of the frisk separate from the justification for the stop itself, though in his view many of the cases disproportionately focus on the stop and pay a lesser attention to the justification of the frisk while the rest primarily considered the two actions as one. Murrill suggests that the court develop a more structured approach to stop and frisk analysis as each intrudes on different constitutional protections. Structure definition, and guidelines in differentiating and describing arrests versus Terry stops are important in making the distinction between the two but as Saleem (1997) notes, this may be increasingly difficult.

Saleem (1997) contends that the lower courts expansion on the Terry decision has watered down the standards of the 4th amendment because of the Supreme Courts reliance on an “artificial reasonableness” standard. Saleem asserts that societal fear of crime prompted the Supreme Court to dilute the probable cause standard of the 4th amendment and adopt a reasonable suspicion standard. This standard is insufficient, Saleem argues, as it presupposed a quintessential reasonableness standard, it’s employed in a biased manner to protect police without consideration of individual rights, and can be utilized to inappropriately focus on minorities. Increasing the ability of officers to stop and frisk also gives rise to more incidents of police use of force and longer periods of detention to effect the stops and frisks, all without meeting the probable cause standards of typical arrests and searches and introducing difficulty in making the distinction between a formal arrest and a stop and frisk. Saleem also contends that the public and police’s association of Blacks with crime make them a target for stops and frisks of an unreasonable nature. Saleem believes that as long as Blacks and other members of the public perceive the police to be biased or racist, then a stop by police of Blacks will have difficulty being construed as reasonable

Saleem also calls for more rules and guidelines that bring stop and frisks more in line with the tenets of the 4th amendment and for the Supreme Court to take a more active role in directing lower US court decision as well as provide clear guidance and distinction between an arrest and Terry stop, limit the use of force in Terry stops, and ensure that reasonable suspicions are clearly articulable and not couched in racial identity.

The 1999 NY OAG Report on NYPD Stop and Frisk Practices

1n 1999, the New York Attorney General’s office reviewed the practice and data related to SQF (Spitzer, 1999). The NYPD kept records of the stop and frisks conducted through form UF 250. A UF 250 needed to completed for every SQF officers conducted and it contained demographic information about the subject, details about the circumstances of the stop like place and time of day, and checkboxes to complete that detailed the reasonable suspicion justifications that the officer used to conduct a stop or frisk. This was in response to the case of Diallo v NY where the NYPD as sued over the shooting death of Diallo in a stop and frisk incident (Harris, 2013). The report analyzed 175,000 UF 250 SQF forms from 1998 through the beginning of 1999. Total stops were broken down by race; 50.6% Black (Black pop. 25.6%), 33% Hispanic (Hispanic pop. 23.7%) and 12.9% White (White pop. 43.4%). By precinct, where minorities constitute the majority of the population, they tended to see more SQF than white majority precincts, though a third of white majority precincts were in the top half of precincts with the most stops. Even with the understanding that high crime precincts tended to have large minority populations, this connection couldn’t fully explain the racial disparity in stops and they also found that the street crimes unit stopped blacks at a higher rate than the NYPD even after accounting for different crime rates

However, in terms of producing productive stops, that racial disparity is not evident in arrests, with the rate of arrests per stop for Blacks ( 1 per 9.5), Hispanics (1 per 8.8), and Whites (1 per 7.9) being similar. Stop rates compared to arrest rates also showed no racial disparity with Blacks making up 50% of the stops and 51% of arrests, Hispanics making up 33% of the stops and 30% of arrests, and Whites making up 13% of stops and 16% of arrests. However, while hit rates by race were also similar for Blacks (10.6%), Hispanics (11.6%), and White (12.6%), the low overall hit rate indicates the tactic is not particularly effective in effecting arrests or seizing contraband.

When examining stops by crime types across all the precincts and crime types Blacks were stopped 23% more than whites, while Hispanics were stopped 39% more than Whites. For suspicion of violent crime Blacks were stopped 2.1 time more than Whites and 2.0 times more than Whites on suspicion of carrying a weapon; these two types of stops accounted for slightly more than 53% of all stops. Blacks were also significantly less likely to stopped than whites or Hispanics on suspicion of property crimes (Spitzer, 1999).

Following the ruling against the NYPD and the release of the Attorney General’s 1999 report, as crime declined, contrarily, the NYPD  increased the use of SQF. In 2003, officers stopped and frisked 160,000 people but by 2009 the number increased to more than 575,00, and by 2011, more than 685,000 people (Harris, 2013) This was driven by a desire to get guns off the street and reduce violent crime by focusing on the right places and right people. This intensive deterrence program that focused on those most likely to be involved in violent crime (minorities) in the most likely places (high crime neighborhood hotspots) led to increased criticism that the program was in violation of the 4th and 14th amendments. For example, Gelman (2006) examined 175,000 stops over a 15 month period used in the 1999 OAG report and disaggregated stops by precinct and accounted for race specific crime rates in the precincts to see if race specific crime rates could explain the racial disparity in stops. Using hierarchical modeling, even after controlling for these variables, they found Blacks and Hispanics were stopped more frequently than whites and surmised that the standards for stopping minorities were more relaxed than for whites as indicated by lower arrest rates for minorities.

The Rand Corporation (Ridgeway, 2007), also examined racial disparity in stops but examined it from a perspective of developing better benchmarks to determine if racial disparity exists. They note that using the general population to determine if a racial disparity exists is overly simplistic and prone to error. They suggest comparing the number of stops to either the racial distribution of criminal suspect descriptions or to race distribution of arrestees. An additional benchmark to determine the extent of racial disparities was to examine each individual officers stopping patterns in relation to stops made in similar circumstances to other officers. Using these benchmarks, racial disparity is not as evident. Utilizing criminal suspect description, Blacks were stopped at 20 to 30% lower than their representation in criminal descriptions would suggest, however Hispanics were stopped 5 to 10 % higher than their representation in criminal suspect descriptions.

Using the racial percentages of arrestees, Blacks were stopped at nearly the same rate as Whites but Hispanics were stopped at a slightly higher rate than would be suggested by racial arrest rate. These more refined benchmarks would suggest much less racial disparity when compared to the less accurate benchmark of total population which showed exaggerated racial disparity with Blacks stopped at a rate 50% higher than their general population.

The benchmark analyzing individual officers indicated that some racial disparity may be explained by officer activity. They found that just 7% (2,756) of the total number of officers accounted for 54% of the total number of 2006 stops. In patrolling the same areas, at the same times, and with the same assignments a very small percentage of officers (15 total) stopped substantially more Blacks or Hispanics than other officers, while another very small percentage of officers (13 total) stopped substantially less Blacks and Hispanics (Ridgeway, 2007).

In examining rates of frisk, search, use of force, and arrest while they found minorities experienced slightly more frisks and searches than whites, the recovery rate of contraband was higher for Whites than Blacks. In weapon recovery rates, there were no differences by race. Overall Rand found only small racial disparities when appropriate benchmarks are used and suggest that large restructuring of the NYPD’s SQF program may not be necessary.

Floyd v. NY and Current Perceptions

In 2008, The Center for Constitutional Rights initialed a class action suit against NYC and the NYPD alleging 4th and 14th amendment violations by the NYPD in the way SQF was performed. The court held that officers need reasonable , articulable suspicion of criminality to make stops consistent with the 4th amendment and that the plaintiffs were required to show that not only did SQF have a disparate racial impact but that it was at least in part of adopted for its adverse effects on certain racial groups (Huq, 2016). A 2013 ruling by US District Court Judge Scheindlin in the class action suit of Floyd v New York found that the NYPD had violated the 4th amendment as the stops lacked sufficient legal justifications (despite the Supreme Court’s previous ruling establishing that presence in a high crime area met the legal test of reasonable suspicion) and violated the 14th amendment by engaging in racial bias in its use of the SQF program (Meares, 2014). While the city stated that any apparently disproportional stopping of Blacks and Hispanics could be explained by racial differences in crime rates (Bellin, 2014), Meares also notes that a racial disparity or disparate impact on one portion of the community is not sufficient to show a violation but rather it must be shown that the state had discriminatory purposes. Such a ruling would require that for the government to have infringed on civil rights without violation, that it show a compelling interest and that this action was narrow in focus (Starkey, 2012). While stating that the effectiveness of SQF was not at issue, she did emphasize that only 1.5% of frisks found a weapon, with an even smaller percentage finding a gun (Bellin, 2014). However Bellin (2014) claims that by not permitting, let alone considering, the program’s effectiveness, the judge hampered the City’s ability to show it had a compelling interest (violent crime reduction) that was narrowly tailored (targeted to hot spots within precincts).

The 2013 NY OAG report states that following the Floyd decision, which was under appeal, neither the lower or appeals court addressed the effectiveness of stop and frisk in fighting crime. The report sought to determine effectiveness in the program by examining post-stop data from 2009 to 2012. The report found that between 2009 and 2012, those 2.4 million stops resulted in a 6% arrest rate, with only half of those leading to a conviction, and half of those (1.5% of total stops) led to a jail or prison sentence but just .15% of total stops led to a prison sentence longer than a year. Only one in 50 SQF arrests led to a conviction of a crime of violence and only 1 in 50 of these arrests led to a conviction of weapon possession (NY & Schneiderman, 2013)

The Floyd decision was almost immediately appealed and following the Floyd decision, criticism of SQF, NYC, and the NYPD was widespread. The examination by the court renewed examination by law professors and other academics on both 4th and 14th amendment grounds as well as in the context of the original Terry ruling. Law scholars were quick to find fault with the 4th and 14th amendment constitutionality of the program, sometimes to the point of hyperbole with article titles like “Stop and Frisk is Hazardous to your Health” (Ross, 2016), “From Stop and Frisk to Shoot and Kill” (Carbado, 2017), and even characterizing stop and frisk as torture-lite and terrorism in minority communities (Butler, 2014). Cooper (2018) describes SQF as a societal program for crime control that engages political entities and communities with conservative criminology, which caters to the police (who deem minorities as dangerous and crime prone), allowing them to exercise their explicit and implicit bias against minorities. Cooper claims the call for law and order is actually a backlash against the civil rights movement, and political forces have weakened the safeguards of Terry, allowing officers to operate with impunity. Carbado (2017) believes that when officers are trained to use violence and the legal system considers it justifiable, officers will use it indiscriminately in their increased encounters with minorities. While Howell  (2015) notes a decrease in SQFs in NYC since the Floyd ruling, he claims that the NYPD is using gang policing as a way to continue to engage in SQF and control minorities. He states that large gang activity has been on the decrease for years and dismisses the NYPD’s claim that smaller, more geographically centered “crews” are engaging in significant gang activity.

While many of these criticisms focused on the NYPD, SQF was never exclusive to NYC, it has been in use throughout the US since the inception of policing (Kuh, 1965) but its use in major cities has been problematic; Chicago, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, New Orleans, Seattle, Baltimore, Cleveland, Newark, Oakland, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and Boston, have either been forced to operate under a consent decree or by civil court order to revise and monitor its use of SQF (Harris, 2013, Huq 2017). What was different from these other urban centers was that the NYPD was documenting information of the stops they made, which helped make the case for the plaintiff in Floyd by demonstrating the documented racial disparities in SQFs.

4th Amendment Issues

At issue with the 4th amendment, Carbado (2017) states, was that the Terry decision actually weakened the amendment. The new standard of reasonable suspicion could too easily and arbitrarily applied to the detriment of minorities as was originally mentioned in the Terry ruling. The previous net-widening from what the original Terry ruling defined as a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and threats to officer safety, and the sheer number of stops, likely has contributed stops and frisks that lacked legal sufficiency. The 1999 NY OAG report analyzed the UF 250 forms and found that while 61.1% met the legal requirement of reasonable suspicion, 15.4% did not meet the legal test, and 23.5% didn’t state a sufficient factual basis to determine if a reasonable suspicion existed. When Abrams (2014) looked at SQF in Philadelphia (who conducted SQF at much higher rates than NYC) following their entry into a consent decree in 2011, he found evidence that 40-50% of stops consistently lacked sufficient legal grounds

At issue as well was that the original intent of the Terry ruling as an investigative tool is different than the intent and practice engaged in a programmatic deterrence approach like New York’s (Meares, 2014; Skogan, 2017). Terry was intended to stop crime in progress which should then have a positive effect on arrests and weapon seizures, but many observers note that in NY “hit rates” for seizures and arrests per stop were quite low (Starkey, 2012; Meares, 2014; Ross, 2016; Goel, et al 2016). For example between 2004 and 2012 out of 4.4 million stops, and subsequent 2.3 million frisks only 6% were arrested and officers only seized guns in .1% of stops (Ross, 2016). However, the counter argument put forth by NYC and the NYPD is that the low rates of seizure and arrests are indicators the program is doing what it’s supposed to, deter people from breaking the law and carrying weapons (Harris, 2013, Ross, 2016).

Bellin (2014) found that while deterrence is effective, it’s unconstitutionality is what allows it to be effective, by incorporating arbitrary stops and indirect racial profiling. If individuals carrying weapons can simply avoid being subjected to a Terry stop by not appearing to engage in suspicious behavior, they can carry a gun with impunity. However, if individuals are subjected to high volume stop and frisk without justification, the likelihood of being discovered with a weapon increases. If being searched is inevitable, a powerful deterrence effect occurs (Bellin, 2014).

14th Amendment Issues

Critics of SQF see the high percentage of minorities stopped as evidence of racial bias, whether based either on percentage of total stops involving minorities or whether in the context of a rate comparing the general population’s racial makeup to the racial makeup of those most frequently stopped. This is often related as over 80 percent of stops were minorities while they only make up approximately half the city population (e.g. Starkey, 2012). However, for the argument of 14th amendment allowable infringement on civil rights, the state must show a compelling interest and a narrowly targeted action. However, a violation exists if it is shown the state intended its action to have a discriminatory effect. In dealing with a protected class like race, not employing SQF based on officers’ individual observations and judgment but rather on social characteristics of race, gender, age, and SES unfairly distributes the effect (Skogan, 2017) Even if crime prevention was the goal, the state would know its activity, which would likely be perceived negatively, was intended to focus on minorities, based on its own statistics. Indeed, NYPD testimony from Floyd made clear who should be a focus of SQF; “within the pool of people displaying reasonably suspicious behavior, those who fit the general race, gender, and age profile of the criminal suspects in the area should be particularly target for stops” additionally claiming “it’s not racism just statistics”. From the criminological perspective of racial threat theory, the fact that disadvantaged neighborhoods are primarily made up of minorities and that police resources are focused in these areas already suggests that the state has an implicit bias against minorities and the places they reside as needing to be managed because of their criminality (Kramer and Remster, 2016). Adding to the suggestion of the existence of racial bias is the harm disparate impacts may have.

Harm caused

Many observers as well note the harm that intrusive and constitutionally questionable practices has on police legitimacy. Random searches, seemingly without justification, that seem to be inordinately targeting minorities, generates fear and mistrust of the police. Ross (2016) claims the program is designed to cause the public to fear the police. Butler (2014) contends that SQF is discriminatory and an abuse of power designed to humiliate and control minorities. This in turn leads to emotional and psychological harm, which might cause withdrawal from outside community activities, and generate poor overall health, depression, stress, and PTSD (Butler 2014; Ross, 2016). Some authors (e.g. Ross, 2014; Harris, 2013) noted that any crime control benefits must be balanced against the harm they may cause. Huq (2017) states that  the problematic history of police/minority relations must be taken into consideration when contemplating the introduction of a program that may have a negative effect on minorities. This lack of legitimacy also hampers the ability of the police to be effective, generates non-compliance in subjects, and contributes to larger negative perceptions of the police (Butler, 2014; Meares, 2014; Hanink, 2014; Ross, 2016; Skogan, 2017; ) How that perception is generated is somewhat dependent on the individual, their environment, and their experiences (Meares, 2014). Bellin’s (2014) data indicated that while youths did not like NYC’s SQF policy they did admit they thought it was effective at keeping guns off the street. Evans and Williams’ 2017 research examined public perceptions of SQF policy controlling for race, experiences with the police, and education among other variables They found, in general, Whites had more support for SQF than Blacks or Hispanics. However, they found that those who had experienced SQF, or who knew a close friend or family member who experienced SQF, were less supportive of SQF while those who were more highly educated, who knew more about the program, or who knew a police officer were more supportive. They also found that for Blacks, an increase in knowledge led to less support, which the authors surmise as an effect of the media’s focus on racial bias of the program (as opposed to crime reduction) which operates in a similar matter to the negative perceptions generated by vicarious accounts.

Remedies

Researchers proffered solutions to the constitutionally challenged practice such as Plaintiff Burdened Deliberate Indifference which takes the onus off plaintiffs in proving a defendant intended to discriminate, and instead replaces it with the  requirements that the defendant be notified of an inequality in application, be provided with an alternative action that would not exhibit bias, and subsequently the defendant failed to act upon it (Starkey, 2012). Fradella and White (2017) contend that changes in officer selection, improved training, clearer policies, a reinforcement of utilizing procedural justice in encounters, enhanced supervision, and outside oversight could allow the continued use of stop and frisk in an unbiased legally defensible manner. Limiting officer discretion through revised standards and clear policy, setting clear, specific, and definable law enforcement goals to be accomplished through SQF, and changes in the reporting form, requiring narrative spaces rather than check boxes are some of Fallon’s (2013) suggestions in eliminating inappropriate uses, along with better middle management engagement in officer conduct and refining the definition of reasonably suspicious behavior.

Current Research

Effect on Crime

Opponents of SQF contend that the low number of arrests and seizures of contraband (weapons and drugs) demonstrate that it is an ineffective program. However, proponents claim that its true effect on crime is one of deterrence, as evidenced by the low number of seizures, signifying that the program is dissuading young people from carrying weapons. It bears mentioning again that SQF as conducted in NYC between 1999 and 2013 were not simply Terry stops where officers are investigating what appears to be a crime in process or behavior related to criminal activity in a specified context. It was a generalized stop and frisk program conducted for the purpose of reducing violent crime, conducted in hotspots of violent crime throughout NYC, and focused on individuals that statistically were more involved in violent crime; young, black males. The Mayor’s office and the NYPD were clear in their desire to reduce violent crime and focus on “the right people”. Indeed, NYPD data shows suspects in shootings were 78% Black, 19% Hispanic, 2.4% White and .5% Asian (Bellin, 2014).

Bellin (2014) makes the point about deterrence effectiveness in his analysis of a number of benchmarks examined during a time period of extensive SQF. Utilizing data from CDC and the NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene surveys, Bellin suggests that SQF deterred high schools students from carrying a gun, cutting it in approximately half from 1997 to 2011.Other data also indicates that teenagers carrying a gun in the last 30 days was also cut in half between 1997 and 2011. The Health Department emphasized that prevalence of gun carrying in NYC was the lowest among 26 other cities studied with Black teenagers experiencing almost a threefold reduction in gun carrying. Bellin also found between 2000 and 2011, the rate of firearm homicides fell by a third, rate of firearm injury hospitalizations decreased by 20% as well as a 21% reduction in firearm assault injuries. Shootings fell during this period as well with firearms deaths decreasing from 524 to 366, and with a reduction in non-lethal shootings as well.

Bellin notes similar effects found in Kansas City and Philadelphia citing the strongest argument for the effectiveness of these programs is the lack of alternative explanations. While crime everywhere, including NYC, was on the decline, no other major city experienced the precipitous drop in firearm violence that NYC experienced during this period of SQF nor was the effect of any other program or practice evidenced as causing such a sharp decline. Cassell and Fowles (2018) also support the deterrence effect generated by intensive SQF programs. They contend that the ACLU’s consent decree activity to suppress Chicago’s SQF program in December 2015 led to an increase in homicides. Following a sharp decrease in SQF, in 2016 the authors estimate approximately 236 additional victims were killed and 1,115 additional shootings occurred, with these costs of violence distributed amongst the minority populations.

In exploring effectiveness of SQF, Weisburd, et al (2016) recognized that SQF activities are concentrated in hotspots, so a microunit of analysis was more appropriate than larger geographic areas for their analysis of daily and weekly crime incidents. They indicted two causal chains were at work, that crime incidents prompted SQF and that the application of SQF reduces crime, and that trends of both distributions are strongly related over time. Their results indicated that SQF in hotspots caused a significant decrease in crime within small areas across short periods of time. They also found little evidence of crime displacement but there was evidence of diffusion of the crime control benefits. Weisburd, et al state this provides support for the effectiveness of deterrence and they aren’t surprised by the results as focusing police resources on hotspots has typically been an effective crime reduction technique. While effective, they also concede that aggressive policing tactics may be a threat to police legitimacy.

While having reasonable suspicion factors to initiate a stop form the constitutionally protected 4th amendment basis for the practice, analysis of reasonable suspicion justifications and their legal sufficiency, or lack thereof, may indicate bias, as one possible explanation for racial disparity. Swank’s (2018) interviews with officers probed their reasonable suspicion justification, which fell within five categories; Suspect Behavior (suspected drug activity, furtive body movements, taking flight, hiding, unspecified nervous behavior, and being in possession of a firearm), Location of Suspect (presence in high crime area, drug activity location), Time of Incident (nighttime encounters), Policing Style (officers felt being proactive was part of community policing, not just being reactive), and Knowledge of the Suspect (prior knowledge of subject’s drug activity or weapon possession, knowledge from other officers,-some responded, depending on knowing the officer, intel could be as good as if they’ observed it themselves). However none of the officers admitted to using any extralegal criteria, such as race. Avdija (2014) also examined reasonable suspicion justifications and the frequency of their use. (See Chart 1)

Chart 1.Reasonable suspicion justifications in stop and frisk

If SQF were to be conducted in line with the original Terry ruling, that of a reasonable suspicion that a crime is, has , or is about to take place, many of the reasons indicated above do not meet that criteria but entail only generally suspicious behavior. Only six of the 14 justifications actually address possible criminal behavior with others being highly subjective such as fugitive movements, a suspicious bulge, or carrying a suspicious object.

Racial Disparity or Bias

While many commenters (e.g. Starkey, 2012) point to the fact that over 80% of SQF  were effected against Blacks even though they made up only slightly more than half of NYC’s population as evidence of racial bias, this position is overly simplistic (Ridgeway, 2007). For an appropriate analysis of whether the program was racially biased the unit of analysis should focus on the activity by precinct (as many of the researchers below do) as these more closely corresponded to the hotspots that were the focus of intense SQF. The racial and ethnic population makeup of these precincts is a more appropriate denominator to use in calculating rates of stops, frisks, and arrests. Consideration also has to be given to the populations of those hotspots, which tend to be overwhelmingly minority, and that crime rates are high in these disadvantaged neighborhoods, in whether bias exists in SQF. Abrams (2014) in discussing research on SQF noted that in the Floyd case, Fagan (2004) used regression analysis to estimate the impact of race on stop rates but Abrams stated this approach is “difficult to implement and interpret” because these analyses are only as good as the number and importance of variables that are controlled for. It falls upon researchers to develop the most comprehensive models they can but there is still the risk that important variables with explanatory power, such as economic status of the area, or its crime rates might not be included. As with the research discussed below, these models varied as to what variables are controlled for. Within the unit of analysis, more appropriately a precinct, beat, or neighborhood, and within the stop, variables like demographic makeup, level of police presence, officer race, subject demeanor, behavior and compliance, location of the stop, time of day of stop, and  type of stop justifications utilized, all may provide explanatory power as to why racial disparities are observed. For example, in 2015 Coviello and Persico examined whether SQF is biased, at either the individual officer level or at the Chief level, as defined by the police resources allocated, however they found no evidence in that aspect. They considered that racial bias by officers could be identified by examining the success rates of stops. They also did not find support for officer bias in arrest as arrest rates for stopped Blacks and Whites were essentially identical. They noted that Blacks are stopped more frequently than Whites but the authors conclude that this disparity could be explained by unaccounted variables and not necessarily by officer bias.

The research does indicate that while race is not the strongest factor in determining rates of police activity it does play into the equation. Hanink’s 2014 study of NYPD’ SQF  sought to determine if the rate of SQF was dependent on a precinct’s crime rate or if it was also influenced by other factors like race or poverty. He found the strongest predictor was the precinct’s crime rate, but also that an interaction between Black and percentage below the poverty was a statistically significant predictor of the rate of stops. Evans, et al (2014) notes that the highest stop and frisk rates by race occurred in geographic areas with high numbers of those races, as well as that these areas correspond to hotspots of criminal activity. Their regression analysis of NYC precincts showed that Black and Hispanic race had a significant positive association with SQF rates but they also found a significant negative relationship between owner occupied hosing and rates of SQF. (This may be explainable in that with more rental property in the area, public space is utilized more than private space, leaving residents more observable to the police). However, their regression models only explained a third of the variation in total stops and only about half the variation in rates of Black SQF. They recognized some of the limitations of their study including a lack of variables like suspect demeanor, precinct crime rate, race of officer, and extent of police presence in the area.

In 2016 Goel, et al examined 3 million stops over five years, focusing on suspected criminal weapon possession and calculated the ex-ante probability of finding a weapon and found in over 40% of cases the likelihood of finding a weapon was less than 1%. They also found Blacks and Hispanics were disproportionately stopped and had lower hit rates (2.5% and 3.6%, respectively) compared to White hit rates (11%) which, rather than racial bias, they trace to a low threshold for stopping, regardless of race in high crime areas and a lower threshold for stopping Blacks relative to similarly situated Whites. They note stop and frisk is an extremely localized tactic that was concentrated in high crime areas, which are predominantly populated by minorities so a  lower tolerance for suspicious behavior in high crime areas (and thus lower hit rates) could account for the racial disparities. When accounting for this they note that most of the racial disparity disappears. The authors also discussed how utilizing a probability formula that includes a simple scoring threshold of the three most common productive weapon indicators, officers can improve hit rates by conducting the stops most likely to be productive. They demonstrated that hit rates can vary widely by location; 1% in some public housing locations, up to 30% for transits stops in some areas but within these regions, hit rates are much more similar between blacks and whites than citywide averages. They state that while some disparity may be driven by discrimination, variation in local stop thresholds appear to be the main driving force behind racial disparity. However, from their search probability calculus they estimate that only 6% of the stops needed to have been made to recover the majority of weapons, while conducting 58% of the stops deemed most likely would have turned up 90% of the weapons. This approach would not only save on police resources but mitigate police relations problems.

Avdija (2014) analyzed whether there was racial bias in utilizing a frisk by examining factors that were predicative of a frisk, He found the strongest predictor was male gender, being 2.8 times more likely than females, followed by proximity to crime scene, (2.0x), and evasive in questioning (1.9x). Blacks and Hispanics were both 1.7 times more likely than Whites to be frisked. Avdija suggests this is more gendered policing than race, as males are typically targeted but also contends that neither variable has much explanatory power in SQF in that targeted policing is based on place, offense, offender, and time specific dependency. Avdija states the reason for disparity in SQF is that because of ecological conditions minorities disproportionately commit more crimes. It is not racial bias that causes officers to focus on minorities rather it is the individual actions of criminals that generate the profiles that are used in proactive policing practices like SQF, thus establishing the legitimacy of racial disparities.

For comparison, Skogan (2017) examined SQF in Chicago with survey data and his research showed  that in 2013, Chicago’s stopping rate was four times higher that NYC, and the racial break downs were similar, 72% Black, 17% Hispanic, and 9% White. Analysis showed in Chicago the main predictor of being stopped was being under age 35 followed by Black race and male gender. Other disparities were evident, 75% of Blacks and Hispanics were asked for ID (White 56%) Black and Hispanic searches ranged between 20-30% (Whites 6-9%). While 30-35% of Blacks and Hispanics  stated they had some form of force used against them (compared to 14% of Whites), it was people 16-35, those less educated, and those with lower incomes that were most likely to have force used against them. Besides these disparities, Skogan also found large disparities in perceptions of legitimacy and trust for the police with only 44.5% of Blacks exhibiting any trust in Chicago PD compared to 68% of Hispanics and 80% of Whites, a significant finding even after controlling for their SQF experiences.

In 2018, Kramer and Remster also examined to see if there was any disparity in use of force against minorities during SQF utilizing four hypotheses. Operating under the racial threat theory, they presumed that if disparities exist they can be explained by officer racial bias (however the authors doesn’t include race of the officer as a control variable in the analysis). They do, however, concede that a number of other variables not accounted for in their research could influence the use of force including subject demeanor, levels of racial noncompliance, and variations in race for violent crime activity. They hypothesized that after controlling for their other variables,  Blacks, compared to Whites, would experience more police use of force, that any racial disparity in use of force will be large in productive stops, that with any racial disparity, use of force will be greater with younger people, and that post Floyd, racial disparities will be reduced compared to pre-Floyd. Logistic regression showed that many other variables to greater extent than Black race made the use of force more likely. While Blacks were only 1.3 times more likely than Whites to have force used, other variables including the Stop Outcomes of arrest made (3.2 times more likely), weapon found (2.1), contraband found (1.5), as well as the variables of younger people aged 10 to 34 (1.3-1.5), male gender (1.6), and Civilian Behavior of verbal threat (1.7 times), violent crime suspect (2.4), and non-compliant (2.6) carried a higher risk of experiencing any kind of use of force (Kramer and Remster, 2018).

Examining just one of the force categories, gun drawn, the odds of experiencing this form of force for Blacks did not change compared total force. However, factor like Stop Outcomes, and Civilian Behavior demonstrated  an increased likelihood of being a factor in gun drawn force compared to total force. In dividing between productive and unproductive stops, Blacks, while still experiencing slightly greater risk of increased force than Whites (1.3 times) in non-productive stops, their risk of experiencing force actually decreased during productive stops. However, their odds went from 1.2 to 1.6 for a gun drawn during a productive stop. Again, Civilian Behavior increased the risk of having all manner of force applied as well as having a gun drawn in both nonproductive and productive stops and to a far greater degree than the Black race variable. Male and age continued to be significant factors to a greater degree than Black in productive cases where a gun is drawn. The authors also didn’t support for their fourth hypothesis; there was no significant difference in Blacks experiencing any kind of force between pre and post reform and despite officers increasing the use of guns drawn post reform, there was no significant difference between Blacks and Whites with this potential lethal force (2018).

Kramer and Remster’s research indicated that civilian behavior does seem to factor into use of force. In 2018, Rahman examined UF 250 forms from 2005-2012 to determine whether a subject’s  non-compliance, within the context of race, would generate use of force in a SQF. Their analysis found that Blacks and Hispanics were overrepresented in the use force relative to their representation in the total distribution of stops, both in compliant or non-compliant encounters (though the researchers did not account for crime rate in area of the stop or type of crime that was being investigated by the stop). They also found that the precincts with the greatest number of stops using force were also mainly populated by minorities. The author’s data did show that a greater percentage of stops involved non-compliance with Blacks (70%) compared to Hispanics (68%) and Whites (63%) however they did not analyze these numbers to see if there was a statistically significant difference. The data also demonstrated that the difference between the rates of force used in noncompliant stops by race were small. Force was used in noncompliant stops 27.3% of the time with Blacks, compared to 21.3% of the time with Whites. Overall, their regression models found that between 30 and 38% of the variance in the decision to use force was driven by precinct characteristics. However as noted in the introduction, inclusion of more variables  may further explain these disparities. For example, the authors used seven measures of noncompliance that included changing direction at the sight of a police officer, evasive response to questioning, visibly engaging in criminal activity, making furtive movements, refusing to comply with the officer’s directives, verbal threats by the suspect, and criminal possession of a weapon. However some of these non-compliant behaviors will undoubtedly be more likely to generate the use of force than others, so it would be informative in analyzing racial disparities in use of force to determine if there were differences in the kinds of noncompliant behavior between races.

Conclusions

In what started as a long overdue formalization of a common policing practice, the investigative tool of stop and frisk, established as an expansion of the 4th amendment, transformed into a general deterrence program in NYC and other cities. Widening the definition of what conditions generate a reasonable suspicion allowed officers justification to increase the number of stops. However, as the number of stops increased so did criticism of the program, asserting that it violated both the 4th and 14th amendments, Critics argues that SQF as applied by the NYPD, besides being ineffective at stopping crime, as measured by the low hit rates ins stops, and low numbers of arrests, too often lacked the legal justification of an articulable reasonable suspicion of criminal activity afoot. Critics also contend the practice violated the 14th amendment because racial disparities were found in some analyses. Proponents argue that the required 4th amendment justifications for stopping and frisking have been established by legal precedent and that the low rates of seizures and arrests actually indicates that the intensive policing has caused a deterrence effect, which they claim was responsible for the dropping violent crime rate. Proponents also argue that racial disparities are not an indication of bias, a necessary component in violations of the 14th amendment. They instead contend that the racial makeup of stops and frisks reflects the inhabitants of the high crime areas where SQF is typically applied as well as the higher crime rates among minorities and the prevalence of minorities in suspect descriptions. A 2013 US District Court decision, however, found the city violated the amendments and as many researchers and observers noted, the program and the subsequent court decision has damaged police legitimacy.

Research into whether the program was effective depends on your perspective. In terms of seizures, arrests, and convictions, research consistently showed low rates suggesting ineffectiveness but research also demonstrated that deterrence was an effective means at reducing gun carrying and gun violence. However, what makes the deterrence program effective, the random but omnipresent nature of being stopped and searched, sometimes without clear legal justification for what sometimes could be innocuous behavior, is what the 4th amendment was designed to protect the people from. The issue of 14th amendment violation rested on evidence of bias, which could be assumed if, after for controlling for alternative explanations, disparities still exist. The research demonstrated that proper benchmarks need to be used to first determine disparity before considering bias. Because SQF was a targeted program, analysis consistently showed it was heavily applied in hotspots of crime. The residents of these hotspots were overwhelmingly minorities. Thus, just by the nature of the precinct demographics, the racial rates of SQF, while overwhelmingly focused on minorities, closely mirrored the populations of the area. Other disparities beyond that can be at least partially accounted for by lower thresholds for stopping in high crime neighborhoods, racial crime rates, and subject demeanor. However as evidenced in this review, the importance of the comprehensive but correct inclusion of variables can vary from study to study and that as analyses in this area becomes more refined, racial disparities tend to diminish, presenting the conclusion there is little if any racial bias present in remaining disparities.

Practical remedies for improving and refining the practice are broad ranging from improved office training, documentation form revision, policy and guideline development and implementation, increased middle management interaction with officers, outside review, analysis, and oversight, and the incorporation of procedural justice elements. The changes would be expected to meet the legal standards of the 4th amendment and Terry ruling, prevent mistreatment during SQF, improve hit rates, mitigate disparate impacts on the minority communities, and improve police relations with the public

References

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School Resource Officer Effectiveness and Evaluation

Introduction

When I originally approached this literature review, I had  in mind an examination of studies that would empirically demonstrate the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of School Resource Officers (SROs) on some different measures of their duties. However, in examining the literature, there has been limited research into measuring the effectiveness of SROs (Cray and Weiler, 2011) and some lack methodological rigor such as relatively few time series studies (pre and post SRO installation), experiments or quasi-experiments, and designs that didn’t address possible confounding variables that might have influenced perceptions, arrests, or reported incidents (James and McCallion, 2013). The following literature review will cover what some of these studies have found, noting the above caveat, as well as examine the criticism of criminalizing students, and what constitutes a good SRO program.

Early Implementation

School resource officers programs have been in existence since the ‘80’s but following well publicized school shootings, from 1995-2002, there was a greater push to get police officers into schools to not only enhance security by providing a quick response to active shooters but to address other student safety and crime issues as well (Stevenson, 2011). The 1999 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act encouraged partnerships between schools and the police, encouraged new SRO programs, and providing funding for existing programs (Stevenson, 2011) In the 21st century, SRO funding grants were made available through a number of programs like Cops in Schools, Safe and Drug Free Schools and Communities, and the Comprehensive School Safety program under the COPS program (James & McCallion, 2013).

Measuring Effectiveness

Studies looking at the effectiveness of SROs tended to examine two different research fronts. One was perceptual, which utilized surveys of students or school administrators to enquire about feelings of school safety, number of SRO contacts, and feelings about the SROs. The other is more number-data driven, examining juvenile court and schools records pertaining to the number and types of complaints, incidents, or arrests.

Earlier research from the late ‘90’s to early ‘00’s demonstrated support from both administrators and students for SROs, feeling that they made schools safer and reduced violent and criminal incidents (Finn & McDevitt, 2005; Stevenson, 2011). When more current research examines the perceptions of students, large percentages of middle and high school students felt that the SROs treated students fairly and did a good job (Theriot, 2016), enhanced school safety (Finn & McDevitt, 2005; Thomas, et al, 2013; Theriot, 2016) improved their perception of police at school, and had a good relationship with students (Theriot, 2016), as well as generating a positive opinion of the SRO with students (Finn & McDevitt, 2005; Theriot, 2016) . Theriot’s 2016 study also examined school connectedness and found that the greater the number of contacts with SROs produced more positive feelings about SROs, more school connectedness and greater feelings of safety at school. However, students who experienced more types or more intense violence at schools tended to have more negative feelings about SROs (Theriot, 2016) as well as feeling less safe (Theriot & Orme, 2016). Finn and McDevitt  (2005) also found that the frequency of interactions with the SRO, having a positive opinion of the SRO, and feeling safe at schools were positively associated with being comfortable reporting a crime to the SRO. However, Theriot and Orme’s 2016 study of middle and high schools students found that while interacting with SROs wasn’t related to feeling safe at school, students with more school connectedness and more positive attitudes about SROs felt safer.

The research that explored the perceptions of administrators found some similar support for SROs (Finn and McDevitt, 2005, Thomas et al, 2013), feeling that utilizing a full-time SRO was effective in increasing school safety (Anderson, 2011; Gauthier, 2015) as well as combatting the threat of a school shooting (Gauthier, 2015). They were also viewed as building good relations with teachers and staff (Anderson, 2011). School administrators perceived that when SROs demonstrated procedural fairness with students, they are viewed as more legitimate authority figures and are more effective at  improving school safety (Wolfe, et al, 2017)

Other research also focused on records data that compared the numbers of arrests and incidents pre and post SRO, and the number of different offenses SROs responded to. These studies would hypothesize that SROs might either increase the number of arrests as student disciplinary problems are criminalized (or alternatively, that an SRO is handling criminal issues that had previously gone unaddressed) or that arrests and incidents would decrease from a deterrence effect. Incidents that are focused on in the studies typically were associated with drugs, violence, weapons, and disorderly conduct and the results are mixed.

Theriot (2009), found that schools with SROs had a higher arrest rate than schools without an SRO but once accounting for economic disadvantage, there were no differences in the total arrests or arrests for disorderly conduct, assault, weapons, or drug and alcohol possession, nor did they find any bias against low income students as arrests declined as poverty increased in SRO schools. Anderson’s 2018 study discovered that providing matching funds to increase policing, and their training in schools, was not associated with a decrease in reporting school infractions. Noting that school violence was significantly higher in schools with a greater frequency of bullying, racial tensions, student disrespect, and gang crimes. Jennings et al (2011) conducted a study on the presence of SRO and serious violent crime incidents and found that the presence of an SRO was significantly related to a school having a high incidence of crime but was also significantly associated with lower incidence of serious violent crime. Na and Gottfredson (2013) found that as schools utilized more SROs, arrests for weapons and drug increased as well as reporting a higher percentage of non-serious violent crime to law enforcement and Devlin, D. N., & Gottfredson, D. C. (2018), in a longitudinal study, found that a police presence in schools led to an increase in reporting and recording crime. Stevenson’s longitudinal study (2011) found that having an SRO, two years after implementation, did not decrease the total number of school incidents reported however, following an initial increase in reporting assaults, there was a reduction in assault and weapons reports which the author suggest mays be due to a deterrence effect. Zhang (2019) indicated that while the presence of SROs were associated with increased drug related crime reports, whether in a single year or across multiple years, there was a reduction across years for violent crime and disorder incidents when SROs were present in schools, also suggesting a deterrent effect.

Arrests and Criminalizing Students

One of the major criticisms of SRO programs is that officers and school administrations are criminalizing “normal” student behavior, and (by way of the criminological Labeling Theory) that by utilizing a law enforcement response to criminal and disruptive activity in schools, students are introduced to the criminal justice system. This labels them as criminal, stigmatizes them, and causes them to adapt a delinquent role. This prompts more offending as well as leading to worse educational outcomes when exclusionary discipline like suspensions and expulsions are utilized, which also may adversely affect minority students since their number of arrests tend to be higher (Petteruti, 2011; Lynch et al, 2016; Ryan et al, 2018, Courtney, 2019)).

However, the “School to Prison Pipeline” is a narrative forwarded by some academics and the media that is lacking both theoretically and factually. Labeling theory fell out of fashion in the ‘80’s as research found little support for it in the criminology field. This current revisiting of the theory doesn’t fare much better. Much of what has prompted concerns is the zero tolerance stance taken by many schools regarding drugs and weapons (policies which some researchers contend has led to the mass incarceration of adult minorities) and the primarily anecdotal accounts of officers or schools over-reacting to trivial rule or conduct violations. While some of the anecdotes seem excessive, like gum chewing or hat wearing, the data on arrests and incidents tell a different story, suggesting a lack of evidence supporting the ”school to prison pipeline” narrative.

Na and Gottfredson (2013) found that students at schools with SROs, compared to those without, were not any more likely to face harsh discipline for committing any offense that was reported to the police. Johnson’s review of the literature (2016) found that SROs were just as likely as other officers to refer juvenile for processing in serious felonies but less likely to process them for misdemeanors and status offenses. He states he found “no empirical evidence to suggest widespread actions by SROs in the US criminalize the minor behaviors of students in general, or minority students in particular” and that the general pattern is that SROs make arrests under the same circumstances that would cause a school principal to call the police. Fisher and Hennessy (2016)  examined two meta-analysis of SROs and exclusionary discipline and while one analysis found a significant relationship between SROs in high school and exclusionary discipline, the other meta-analysis found no relation between the two. May et al (2018) found that SRO juvenile justice referrals were similar to those made by law enforcement outside of schools for status and serious offenses and SROs were less likely to refer juveniles for minor offense compared to police outside of a school setting. Pigott et al (2018) found “zero evidence” that the presence of SROs increased the likelihood of high school students being official processed through the criminal justice system or removed from school.

Different factors may influence SROs decision to arrest. Hall’s study (2015)  found that SROs with 10 or more years of experience believed the juvenile justice system could benefit and deter misbehaving students. She also found that females SROs were more likely than males to arrest to calm a student down while males SROs were more likely than females to arrest for reasons of ensuring a misbehaving student received punishment or to maintain control of the school environment. School administration policies and decisions also play a part.in the reporting, and thus the arrest decision. Brown (2006) examined what offenses school administrators typically reported to the police. While the majority reported illegal drugs and weapon incidents, they typically did not report tobacco and alcohol use, or fighting on school grounds. However, May, et al (2018) concluded that schools, not solely police in schools, make a large contribution to the number of juveniles referred to the justice system for less serious offenses.

SRO Multiple Roles

While much of the focus on SROs is their law enforcement role, SRO programs are designed to utilize SROs in teaching and counseling roles (Theriot & Anfara Jr., 2011; Thomas et al, 2013; Lynch et al, 2016; Rhodes, 2017). SROs are in a prime position to present programming related to school connectedness and school safety, to be key stakeholders in setting school policies, and alleviate fear and mistrust of the police (Theriot and Anfara, Jr., 2011). Finn and McDevitt (2005) in their national assessment of SRO programs found on average the SROs spent 20 hours a week on law enforcement, 10 hours on advising or mentoring, 5 hours on teaching, and 6-7 hours on other activities. In over half the programs, SROs advise school staff, students, or families and about half the programs focused on teaching students about drugs, legal issues, safety education, crime awareness, and conflict resolution. However, they did find that many programs were facing many more school safety problems than they were originally established to address and that many SROs were engaging in activities for which they hadn’t been trained including mentoring and teaching. Lynch et al (2016) found that, according to school administrators, SROs in more disadvantaged schools compared to schools with greater social and educational advantage engaged in more law enforcement duties (security enforcement and patrol, maintaining school discipline, coordinating with the police, identifying problems and seeking solutions) than education duties (train teachers in school safety, and teach, train, and mentor students).

Ivey (2016) in a survey of SROs, their supervisors, and school principals, discovered that while the principals, generally agreeing with SROs and supervisors, felt that SROs’ law-related counseling was effective, the principals disagreed with law enforcement, generally feeling that SROs law-related education efforts were ineffective. However, their association with students is likely a factor in SROs being more effective educators and planners of anti-bullying initiatives than other departmental officers (Kudronowicz, 2016). School administrators also found disagreement with SROs (and school mental health professionals) with administrators giving less effective appraisals of crisis response plans and crisis postvention activities.

The views of SROs are informative in regards to the roles they engage in and their interaction with administrators. Rhodes (2017) found that SROs who work in urban schools and high schools engaged in more law enforcement activities and order maintenance, while SROs who were supportive of community-oriented policing engaged in more service, mentoring, and teaching roles. SROs felt establishing rapport with students was important in receiving information, providing guidance, and gaining cooperation, and that they acted as mentors, parental figures  advisors, and informal counselors to students. Some officers focused on helping at-risk students. However, they less frequently advised parents, teachers, and school staff and less commonly worked with teachers on addressing student issues but instead worked more in partnership with administrators. While it was apparent that SROs functioned as educators, only about half  taught or regularly presented in classes. When Barnes (2016) interviewed SROs in the model North Carolina SRO program he found that they also spent a lot of time in positive interaction with students, attempting to counter negative impressions about the police, alleviate fear of, and create more regard for, law enforcement. Officers felt that their interactions with students provided for an intelligence source and that they enhanced school security and safety, as well as providing a deterrent. However, they cautioned against the administration misusing them, feeling that it was important that the administration used them properly. SROs related that too often teachers and administrators didn’t understand the SRO role and used them as security guards and go-fers, and over-used them to respond to minor issues like bathroom monitoring and classroom control. SROs were also expected by teachers and administrators to deal with discipline issues despite not being authorized to do so and they felt that teachers had abdicated their disciplinary role. SROs related that using them inappropriately will cause the program to lose focus and not meet program goals..

SRO Program Evaluation and Improvement

Research has also evaluated some of the SRO programs and suggestions exist on how these programs might be strengthened or improved. Counts et al (2018)  in their review of state policies and recommendations on SRO programs found no state legally required the use of four recommended practices; required certification, required training, the creation of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), and evidence of data based decision  making regarding the need for and effectiveness of SRO programs.

Crucial to meeting program goals, conducting program evaluations, and fostering good relationships with students, faculty, and parents is the utilization of a Memorandum of Understanding (Cray & Weiler, 2011; Weiler and Cray, 2011, James & McCallion, 2013). These documents, produced through the joint effort of the school or school district and law enforcement, sets out the duties and expectations of the SRO in the school. MOUs address issues like appropriateness and guidelines for student and locker searches, under what circumstances arrests will be made, to what degree SROs will be utilized for minor disruption and disciplinary issues, and the roles and extent of those roles for SROs as educators and counselors (Thomas et al, 2013; Courtney, 2019). Having an MOU in place can help schools avoid the inappropriate or excessive actions by SROs in dealing with student incidents and discipline (Ryan et al, 2018). The MOU should also address the goals of the program which will be dependent upon the desired outcomes of both school administrators and the SROs and could include things like, increasing feelings of safety for students, reducing the number of specific types of offense, increasing the likelihood of students reporting a crime, or improving relationships between the police and youth (Thomas et al, 2013). Proper training is also viewed as essential, in that officers should be familiar with techniques and practices like the proactive SARA model, effective counseling approaches, and trauma informed interviewing, as well as insuring that in-service training is available, funded and utilized (Thomas et al, 2013; Courtney, 2019). Because of the importance and necessity of student contact in the roles SROs engage in, the manner in which SROs are chosen for the program also needs attention to ensure that the officers have the right temperament, and be well versed in communication, social skills, and rapport building. The ability to liaison with school and community stakeholders, and to be actively engaged in policy discussion with school administrators will also be crucial to the acceptance and success of the program in reaching its goals (Thomas et al, 2013; Courtney, 2019). Finally, a system of program evaluation should be utilized to ensure that standards are met, guidelines and policies are adhered to, and that goals of the SRO program are being addressed or reached (Thomas et al, 2013; Courtney, 2019).

Implications

While SRO programs seem to be enjoying strong support from law enforcement, school administrators, and students, there is room for improvement, both in SRO programs and the research analyzing them. .Longitudinal studies will be more informative then cross sectional ones in analyzing the effects of SROs in schools as the outcomes variables can be assessed before and after SRO implementation, however these studies also need to account for variables that may have an effect on perceptions of safety, of the SRO, and any increases or decreases in reporting or arrests, which may include school administrative policies and actions, prior student victimization, school conduct records of arrestees, school safety and crime climate, race of students, students’ acceptance of criminal behavior and misconduct in the schools, and the existence of, and adherence to, an MOU. SRO programs would benefit from a revisiting of their stated goals and purposes, with an eye toward establishing good communication, a best practices approach, and a means of evaluating the program.

The majority of students had positive feelings about SROs in school and this majority of students, their well-being, and their connectedness toward school should be paramount rather than focusing on an imagined school to prison pipeline. Violent, delinquent youth in the schools would likely be engaging in this kind of behavior outside of the school, subjecting them already to law enforcement scrutiny, and with the presence of an SRO, those unwanted illegal and disruptive behaviors might be somewhat curtailed through deterrence, or when they occur,  properly addressed in the legal system, just as they would be if they occurred on the streets. We shouldn’t expect that schools provide a sanctuary for illegal, violent, and disruptive behavior, especially when these few students have such a negative effect on the much larger student population.

Removing aggressive students from the school may have benefits. Despite claims there is a school to prison pipeline for those put into the juvenile justice system, research has shown that individuals who exhibit bullying behavior (assaults, threatening behavior, school disruptions) are already more prone to engage in criminogenic behaviors including skipping and missing school, and substance abuse. Bullies cause harm both to their victims and bystanders who witness the events. School connectedness is important for more positive life outcomes, yet victims of bullies, and bystanders who witness bullying events, are also more prone to substance abuse and missing school, negatively affecting their school connectedness and reducing feelings of safety. There is an expectation that when dealing with these problematic students in a serious way, that it will support the tenets of deterrence (which is a desired effect of having an SRO in the school) by ensuring that certainty of repercussion takes place and that it is both done quickly, and with appropriately administered severity. Longitudinal studies suggest deterrence is a factor in reducing violent crime and weapons charges in schools. When students witness these no-nonsense responses to disruptive, aggressive, violent, and illegal behavior, we can expect the majority of students to feel safer and more positive about SROs.

It is when SROs are ineffectively or inappropriately used, typically through mismanagement by the school administration or by ignoring the MOU, that less positive impressions of SROs are generated. As a wider disciplinary net is cast, there is less time available for positive interactions with students and officers have less opportunity to engage in the role of educator and policy and plan developer. This means they may be less able to effectively engage in problem solving to address issues of bullying and violence, which will lead to higher levels of victimization, which in turn decreases positive views of SROs and decreases students’ feelings of safety.

References

Anderson, C. R. (2011). The benefits of a school resource officer program to school districts and law enforcement agencies.

Anderson, K. A. (2018). Policing and Middle School: An Evaluation of a Statewide School Resource Officer Policy. Middle Grades Review, 4(2), n2.

Barnes, L. M. (2016). Keeping the peace and controlling crime: What school resource officers want school personnel to know. The Clearing House: A Journal of Educational Strategies, Issues and Ideas, 89(6), 197-201.

Brown, B. (2006). Understanding and assessing school police officers: A conceptual and methodological comment. Journal of Criminal Justice, 34(6), 591-604.

Counts, J., Randall, K. N., Ryan, J. B., & Katsiyannis, A. (2018). School Resource Officers in Public Schools: A National Review. Education and Treatment of Children, 41(4), 405-430.

Courtney, M. T. (2019). Improving school resource officer programs to address issues posed by school-to-prison pipeline research.

Cray, M., & Weiler, S. C. (2011). Policy to practice: A look at national and state implementation of school resource officer programs. The Clearing House: A Journal of Educational Strategies, Issues and Ideas, 84(4), 164-170.

Devlin, D. N., & Gottfredson, D. C. (2018). The roles of police officers in schools: Effects on the recording and reporting of crime. Youth violence and juvenile justice, 16(2), 208-223.

Eklund, K., Meyer, L., & Bosworth, K. (2018). Examining the role of school resource officers on school safety and crisis response teams. Journal of school violence, 17(2), 139-151.

Finn, P., & McDevitt, J. (2005). National Assessment of School Resource Officer Programs. Final Project Report. Document Number 209273. US Department of Justice.

Fisher, B. W., & Hennessy, E. A. (2016). School resource officers and exclusionary discipline in US high schools: A systematic review and meta-analysis. Adolescent Research Review, 1(3), 217-233.

Gauthier, D. H. (2015). Perspectives of Law Enforcement and Principals in Effectiveness of School Resource Officers and Armed Staff.

Hall, M. S. (2015). Functionality of school resource officer arrests in schools: Influencing factors and circumstances (Doctoral dissertation, Capella University).

Ivey, C. A. S. (2017). School Resource Officer Program Evaluation in the United States. Journal of Law and Criminal Justice, 5(2), 43-56.

James, N., & McCallion, G. (2013). School resource officers: Law enforcement officers in schools. 977-1020.

Jennings, W. G., Khey, D. N., Maskaly, J., & Donner, C. M. (2011). Evaluating the relationship between law enforcement and school security measures and violent crime in schools. Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations, 11(2), 109-124.

Johnson, R. R. (2016). What effects do school resource officers have on schools. Dolan Consulting Group, 1-4.

Kudronowicz, K. (2016). The effectiveness of bullying interventions between school resource officers hired by school districts compared to law enforcement agencies.

Lynch, C. G., Gainey, R. R., & Chappell, A. T. (2016). The effects of social and educational disadvantage on the roles and functions of school resource officers. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 39(3), 521-535.

May, D. C., Barranco, R., Stokes, E., Robertson, A. A., & Haynes, S. H. (2018). Do school resource officers really refer juveniles to the juvenile justice system for less serious offenses?. Criminal justice policy review, 29(1), 89-105.

Na, C., & Gottfredson, D. C. (2013). Police officers in schools: Effects on school crime and the processing of offending behaviors. Justice Quarterly, 30(4), 619-650.

Petteruti, A. (2011). Education under arrest: The case against police in schools (Vol. 1). Washington, DC: Justice Policy Institute. Ret. from http://www.justicepolicy.org/research/3177

Pigott, C., Stearns, A. E., & Khey, D. N. (2018). School resource officers and the school to prison pipeline: Discovering trends of expulsions in public schools. American Journal of Criminal Justice, 43(1), 120-138.

Rhodes, T. (2017). School resource officer perceptions and correlates of work roles. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice.

Ryan, J. B., Katsiyannis, A., Counts, J. M., & Shelnut, J. C. (2018). The growing concerns regarding school resource officers. Intervention in School and Clinic, 53(3), 188-192.

Stevenson, Q. W. (2011). School resource officers and school incidents: A quantitative study (Doctoral dissertation, University of Alabama Libraries).

Theriot, M. T. (2009). School resource officers and the criminalization of student behavior. Journal of Criminal Justice, 37(3), 280-287.

Theriot, M. T. (2016). The impact of school resource officer interaction on students’ feelings about school and school police. Crime & Delinquency, 62(4), 446-469.

Theriot, M. T., & Anfara Jr, V. A. (2011). School resource officers in middle grades school communities. Middle School Journal, 42(4), 56-64.

Theriot, M. T., & Orme, J. G. (2016). School resource officers and students’ feelings of safety at school. Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice, 14(2), 130-146.

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Wolfe, S. E., Chrusciel, M. M., Rojek, J., Hansen, J. A., & Kaminski, R. J. (2017). Procedural justice, legitimacy, and school principals’ evaluations of school resource officers: Support, perceived effectiveness, trust, and satisfaction. Criminal justice policy review, 28(2), 107-138.

Zhang, G. (2019). The effects of a school policing program on crime, discipline, and disorder: A quasi-experimental evaluation. American Journal of Criminal Justice, 44(1), 45-62.

Marijuana Driving Impairment and Roadside Testing

Introduction

            This literature review will examine marijuana’s effects on driving performance, determining impairment levels, and the use and effectiveness of Drug Recognition Experts (DREs) and roadside testing in making determinations of driving under the influence of marijuana. Marijuana use and acceptance is on the rise and this has contributed to more incidence of drugged driving. 34 states have legalized medical marijuana, and while some strains are produced with relatively higher CBD to THC ratios to optimize their medical use, some strains ostensibly sold for medical purposes may have a relatively high THC level that has the potential for misuse. Legalization at the state level has been expanding. Currently 11 states and Washington D.C. have legalized recreational marijuana, while in 15 states decriminalization has been an ongoing process. When combined with a change in public perception, this can lead to increased incidence of driving under the influence of marijuana. A 2001 study examining roadside testing found that of 209 positive drug tests, 113 indicated cannabis (Steinmeyer, et al). A ten-year Swedish study found measurable THC levels between 18 and 36 percent of suspected drugged drivers (Jones, et al. 2008) and a UK lab sample of over 3,600 suspected drugged drivers showed 58% were positive for cannabis (Wolff and Johnston, 2014).

What was once an underlying marijuana subculture decades ago, has now reached a new level of acceptance in overall society as research has dispelled some of the myths about marijuana use and its negative consequences, and revealed suggested medical uses and benefits. Marijuana awareness, and its use, are also becoming more normalized with depictions in popular media in the form of news reports and specials, programming focusing both specifically and tangentially on its use, movie and TV characters using marijuana in a normalized context similar to how drinking has been portrayed, and websites that describe and rate different strains of marijuana as well as provide growing and usage tips. This normalization may contribute to some users minimizing the risks of driving while high.

Research into Driving Effects

Marijuana users have believed, and research has shown, that frequent users who are experienced drivers are able to compensate to a certain degree for marijuana’s effects while driving (Robbe, 1998; Kelly, 2004; Sewell, et al, 2009; Wolff and Johnston, 2014; Micallef et al, 2018) and some users forward the argument that driving high is safer than driving drunk (Kelly, 2004) . However, marijuana can impair driving performance, but typically in a way that differs from the effect of alcohol on driving performance. In research, impairment identification testing while under the influence of THC typically measures car following (maintaining distance with a car under varying speeds) and the standard deviation in lateral position (SDLP), or lane tracking (amount of weaving off center within the lane), as well as some other driving related tasks. Studies typically provided THC in two ways, either in 100-300 microgram/kilogram of subject body weight, or in 10-30 milligram doses of THC, irrespective of subject body weight.

Many studies when examining driving performance find significant effects on car following and SDLP. Robbe (1998) found at higher doses of THC tracking and following were significantly negatively affected compared to a control group and Ramaekers et al’s (2000) research revealed that low doses only moderately impair drivers actual driving performance in those areas Micallef, et al (2018), also found THC had a significant effect on lane tracking. However, a 2001 Netherlands study didn’t find any significant difference in visual search frequency with a 100 microgram/Kg THC dose (Lamers, et al). In 2009, Sewell and colleagues reviewed marijuana driving impairment studies and found, beside marijuana effects on driving being dose dependent, that there were differences in the type of impairment between alcohol and marijuana. Marijuana’s effects are more pronounced with tasks requiring a higher automatic driving function as opposed to alcohol’s more pronounced effects on conscious, cognitive function. SLP is affected by marijuana and not subject to compensatory behavior the way other driving functions are, and other effects like poor speedometer monitoring, increased decision time in passing, and increased time in responding to a light change or sudden sound were also present. Alcohol was implicated more in pursuit tracking, divided attention, signal detection, hazard perception, and lowered concentration, reaction time, and hand-eye coordination.

Research has shown the driving impairment effects are dose, and frequency of past use, dependent, as well as demonstrating significant effects differences from placebo or control groups at the THC levels used for testing. But how marijuana contributes to car crashes also requires examination. In 2014, Romano and Pollini, examining 12 years of crash data, found 26% of single car fatal crashes involved a drug other than alcohol, with cannabinoids present in approximately a quarter of those cases. However, previous work has not provided a clear indication of marijuana’s influence. Kelly (2004) in a review of driving studies found inconsistent associations of THC with traffic accident involvement. A 2005 multivariate study found that once accounting for things like speed, seatbelt use, and BAC, marijuana use was no longer a significant factor in car crash injury. However, it was a significant factor in those that identified as habitual marijuana users (Blows, et al). In 2014, Wolff and Johnston reviewing a meta-analysis showed that drivers were twice as likely to be involved in a car accident with a THC blood plasma level of 5 micrograms/liter. Huestis (2015) in her review of two recent meta analyses found a significantly increased crash risk (2-2.6 times more likely) with a measurable amount of THC and a six-fold increased risk at a 5 microgram/liter level. However, in 2016 Rogeberg and Elvik found that marijuana involvement in crash risk is low to moderate, similar to a BAC level of .04-.05.

While the possibility of increased risk of car crashes may yet to be determined because of dose dependent effects and other factors, research has been consistent on the effects of combining a small amount of alcohol with marijuana. BACs of .04-.05 when combined with even low levels of THC significantly increased the severity of driving impairment, resulting in impairment equal to a BAC of .08-1.9 (Robbe, 1998; Ramaekers, et al, 2000; Blows et al, 2005; Sewell, 2009; Huestis, 2015).

Determining and Setting Intoxication and Impairment Standards and Limits

            As a practical application, identifying and utilizing THC levels in determining impairment for drivers in the real world is important for state legislatures and municipalities in legalization states, as well as for those adjoining states, and other states considering legalization, as the country continues to progress toward greater medical and recreational legalization. Standards are typically expressed as THC parts per volume of oral fluid or serum/plasma concentrations, either as nanograms/milliliter or as micrograms/liter (note that these are equivalent measures-1 nanogram/milliliter = 1 microgram/liter). Setting driving limits typically take two approaches; a per se approach, where any amount of THC above a preset limit indicates a violation of the law, similar to the .08 BAC limit currently used in the U.S. but could also resemble a zero-tolerance level where any detectable THC amount is a violation of law. The other approach is to determine a THC fluid concentration that indicates impairment, often based on driving performance deficits comparable to a specified BAC level.

The approaches vary around the world, and approaches and levels can change or be set by a combination of research, politics, and public opinion. In 2007, a toxicology lab survey in 24 states found cutoff and confirmation levels of THC ranged from 2 to 70 ng/ml. While recommending that a 2 ng/ml confirmation level be used in drugged driving investigations, it is a level based more on good analytic methodology and lab practice than in an indication of impairment (Farrell, et al, 2007). While European workplace testing typically has a cutoff (the drug screening point where a concentration above the cutoff indicates a positive test for the substance, and below that point is a negative result) of 10 ng/ml (Moore, 2012) European driving limits varied widely; Sweden (a zero-tolerance country) sets a cutoff at .3 micrograms/liter, Germany-.5, France-1.0, Norway-1.3(declaring it an impairment limit), Switzerland-1.5 (declaring it a prosecution limit), and Portugual-3. A Swiss study of drug impaired drivers found that a 5 microgram/liter fluid level correlated to observable driving impairment (Wolff and Johnston, 2014). However, a German study from 2007 suggested a range of 7-10 micrograms/liter as a non-zero per se limit after finding that it correlated to an impairment comparable to a .05 BAC and that concentrations below 10 micrograms/liter were not associated with increased accident risk (Grotenherman, et al). Huestis (2015), in reflecting on an appropriate measure for the U.S. suggests a two-tiered approach, similar to what is used in some European countries and Australia. that when combined with driver education, has been shown to deter drugged driving. It provides for a small fine and driver education for exceeding a per se limit and provides for a more severe penalty and criminal prosecution for demonstrated impairment.      

Testing for Marijuana Intoxicated Drivers

            Regardless of where the cutoff points are established, the concern for law enforcement is utilizing the tools at their disposal to identify drivers who are intoxicated or impaired. Drug Recognition Experts (DREs) and roadside testing can be utilized both on active patrol and at driving checkpoints. DRE use is expanding and the options for roadside testing include oral fluid (saliva) testing with point of collection testing (POCT) that can provide results in minutes. Time can be an important factor as THC concentration levels peak approximately 15 minutes after smoking but then go on a rapid decline over the first hour after smoking, and drops even further between one and three hours after smoking. However, while THC levels drop off quickly, the subjective high of the user declines at a much slower rate, meaning people who have a broad range of THC levels may exhibit the same level of being high, and thus impairment.

DRE Effectiveness

            According to Brown, (2001), the DRE program was first started as a partnership between the LAPD and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in the 80’s and the program became more popular in the 90’s, resulting in the majority of states utilizing DREs in law enforcement agencies. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) is the national certifying agency for DREs and instructors.

There are three phases of training and DREs must re-certify based on the past two years of their evaluations. Typically, DREs are called in during a DUI traffic stop when the suspected driver appears intoxicated from something other than alcohol. The DRE evaluation is a 12-step process that involves a BAC test, pulse checks, eye examinations, temperature, muscle rigidity, and ingestion exams, interviews with the suspect and arresting officer, a standardized field sobriety test (SFST), the DRE’s opinion, and a toxicology test. Some studies have demonstrated moderate to high effectiveness in determining intoxication and drug classification. A 1995 Phoenix PD study compared DRE opinions to the toxicology reports and found DREs identified at least one of the drugs in 91% of the samples confirmed as containing drugs and overall the DREs impaired decisions were correct 83.5 %. Marijuana was the drug most often missed though, and the study notes it’s unknown whether this was due to DRE accuracy, or the time course of the drug (Burns and Adler, 1995). A 2002 study found that when DREs reports were stripped of all information except DRE observations, the DREs tested were 95% accurate in determining intoxication and 81% accurate in identifying the cannabis category. Beirness, et al (2009) examined over 1,300 Canadian DRE evaluations and found the DREs were 95% accurate in determining true positives, 80% accurate in determining true negatives, and 92% accurate on drug classification, compared to lab results.

However, in 2009 Porath-Waller, Beirness, and Beasley were examining whether a simpler approach to the DRE evaluation could be utilized, focusing on the most relevant of the twelve physiological testing criteria for the three most common classifications; stimulants, cannabis, and narcotics. They found nine of the criteria were more predictive of drug category including pulse rate, condition of the eyes and eyelids, lack of convergence, hippus, reaction to light, rebound dilation, systolic blood pressure, and the presence of injection sites with an overall accuracy of 81% across the three drug classifications, however only 72% accuracy in identifying cannabis.

Other research has focused on the SFST. In 2014, Porath-Waller and Beirness examined three components of the SFST in determining THC impairment; the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN), the One Leg Stand (OLS), and the Walk And Turn (WAT). Their results showed only the OLS was a significant predictor of THC. In a two-year study, Declues et al (2016) found that while SFTSs are sensitive to marijuana impairment that there was no correlation between SFTS performance and an average 9 ng/ml THC level, however the number of SFTS cues were greater the higher the THC level. Their study found that the WAT was a better indicator of marijuana intoxication that the OLS (contrary to DRE evaluation studies) and the Lack Of Convergence (circular tracking with eye cross) was also a strong indicator. Hartman et al (2016) arrived at somewhat different conclusions. In their study they found no difference in SFST performance between those above and below 5 ng/ml. They found the Finger To Nose test was the best predictor of cannabis intoxication, along with MRB eyelid tremors, OLS sway, pupil rebound dilation and two or more WAT cues.

Brown, in 2001, did raise an issue related to the accuracy of DRE’s and whether they can provide valid, reliable, expert testimony. He argues because DREs are labeled as experts and are construed by juries to be giving expert testimony then the basis of their evaluations should be subjected to Daubert or Frye tests of evidence admissibility. Brown considers the program would or should not pass these tests as they have not faced peer reviewed evaluations, or general acceptance in the relevant scientific community. However, some court rulings have concluded that the twelve-step evaluation is not scientifically novel enough to warrant putting it to the test of admissibility. Brown believes that with reviews of different DRE programs indicating correct hit rates of between 47 and 86%, and with only a 75% correct hit rate needed for re-certification, that DRE evaluations should not be considered reliable scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge and should continue to face challenges of admissibility in court.

ROADSIDE TESTING

THC can be found in high levels in the saliva immediately after smoking, and similar to blood serum levels, declines quickly in the first hour and steadily downward over a few hours (Cone, 1993). Roadside testing has focused on oral fluid testing as opposed to urine or blood for a number of reason including, it is less intrusive, a smaller amount of fluid is needed for a sample, it’s easier to administer, can identify parent drugs, not just metabolites, has a close correlation to serum drug concentrations, and provides quicker results (Cone, 1993; Verstraete, 2005; Bosker, 2009; Huestis, 2011). A 2001 German study of roadside testing found they were 97.6% accurate compared to lab results, with no false negatives and only 2.4% false positives. In a 2009 Australian study of random roadside testing, cannabis was the third most common drug, found in 26% of drugged drivers. Their results showed that oral fluid testing correctly identified targeted drugs 98% of the time.

But there are some caveats to oral fluid testing. Delays in testing may yield negative results if cutoffs are set too low, (Cone and Huestis, 2007) and there is a lack of conclusive evidence tying THC levels to the subjective high, (Cone, 1993) and thus, possible impairment. Verstraete (2005) considers that there should be a better correlation between drug presence and impairment, better discrimination for cannabis, better proficiency in testing, and safeguards against passive contamination before oral fluid testing will be forensically reliable. Earlier devices suffered from poor accuracy and current devices still lacked adequate reliability (Boker et al, 2009) but Huestis (2011) predicts that the move to oral fluid testing will expand as better tests become available.

Evaluations of more recent devices provided varying results. A 2007 study of the RapiScan tester demonstrated a 96% accuracy for positive samples and 100% accuracy for negative samples but was more sensitive to stimulants than cannabis (Dewey et al, 2007). Couch and associates’ 2008 study of ten different tests including RapiScan, DrugWipe, and OraLab showed nine of the ten devices were accurate in identifying THC but all had a much higher cutoff than the 4 ng/ml suggested by SAMSHA. A European Union 2011 study evaluated eight testers on sensitivity (ability to detect a positive result), specificity (distinguishing between negative and positive samples) and accuracy (the rate of true results compared to false results). Cutoff levels for the devices varied between 5 to 100 ng/ml. Specificity ranged between 90 and 100% but sensitivity was poor, ranging from 20-60%, resulting in accuracy between 78-88% for the five best performing devices. None of these multidrug testers had over 80% in each of the three measurement categories. A 2012 Italian study of four different devices found the sensitivity ranged from 38-92% accurate compared to lab results. In 2019, a Brazilian study analyzed four devices for ease of use, operational success, and acceptable analysis and collection time, using feedback from patrol officers. Three of the four devices were rated in the 80th percentile in these categories. To complicate things, some drugged drivers may be trying to confound the test by using different fluids or mouthwashes to dilute a possible sample. de Castro (2014) found that a commercial product designed to dilute for the test was ineffective, but a plain water mouthwash at 3 hours after use was effective in dropping THC to below 25 ng/ml. However, developments continue to be made in oral fluid testing. Plouffe et al (2017) describe a new roadside testing technique they were developing, utilizing existing fluorescent scanners, that’s highly reliable, can utilize a cutoff of 1 ng/ml or lower, and from sample insertion to readout, take less than 10 minutes to complete.

IMPLICATIONS

            As improvements are made in oral fluid roadside testing, the role of a DRE may be scaled back to assisting in drug investigations or in cases involving an indeterminate drug, as may be the case as synthetic designer drugs continue to be developed and find their way into the recreational market. But in order to make oral fluid testing a viable means of deterring, detecting and stopping drugged driving, yet distinguishing from residual THC in the system that has no effect on driving performance, reasonable, science-based decisions will need to be made regarding per se or impairment levels, and the proper testing device for the intended purpose, such as the suitability of using the device for a DUID checkpoint. Jurisdictions should also be prepared for legal challenges to the admissibility of testimony from DREs as well as challenges to the reliability of some testing devices. Despite some drawbacks still present in oral fluid testing devices and the validity in determining impairment by THC level, it is the direction that roadside testing is moving. As such, jurisdictions and legislatures will need to stay current on the best testing equipment, and best practices and research, in this continually emerging field.

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