INTRODUCTION
A free cup of coffee. To the general public, it’s not what one usually thinks of in terms of police corruption. But it’s this humble beginning that supposedly will put police officers on a slippery slope of corruption. Police corruption is not a new phenomenon nor is the desire to eliminate it, as evidenced by the Law Enforcement Council report on official corruption from 1973 urging all elements of the criminal justice system “to join it in increased efforts to “eradicate corruption” as urged in a 1969 resolution of the International Association of Chiefs of Police”. (Crime and Delinquency, 1974) That corruption is such a prevailing problem it should, to some degree, be expected in every law enforcement agency given the power and discretion afforded to law enforcement officers.
Police corruption encompasses a broad range of activities but a defining factor in this discussion is the willful behavior of law enforcement, not simple negligence or incompetence. Corruption can manifest itself in literally every aspect and duty of police work. Besides simple gratuities, it can be seen in a variety of street policing activities like theft of property from burglary crime scenes, street shakedowns, organized payoffs and bribes, protection rackets, drug rip-offs and sales, and violent crimes ranging from simple assaults to murder. It can also be seen in unequal treatment of victims and suspects based on racial, gender, ethnic, and socioeconomic status, as well as in false arrest, and illegal search and seizure. It also involves a range of simple job performance related ethical issues; activities like willful non-enforcement of laws beyond the boundaries of established discretionary powers, truthfulness in report writing and in viewing and reporting the actions of other officers, along with other mundane but time and resource wasting activities.
This corruption can also be seen not only in the ranks of patrolmen and detectives but in supervisors and chiefs as well; making biased determinations about the quality of investigations or which investigations are forwarded for prosecution, and stalling or derailing internal investigations. These officials offer little guidance to personnel on the issue of corruption or actually tacitly approve of the corrupt actions of the department’s personnel.
There are a few theories as to why it occurs (including the Society Itself Is Corrupt hypothesis) but this discussion will focus on two predominant theories; The Rotten Apple Theory and The Structural (Rotten Barrel) Theory. One blames the individual officer for lacking in a sufficient moral or ethical code and the other focuses on the culturalization undergone by officers in the rationalization of questionable ethical behavior. Underscoring both of these theories is the existence of the Code of Silence, a thin blue line that officers do not cross in order to prove their allegiance to fellow officers by keeping silent about corruption.
This discussion will analyze these two hypotheses, their causes and remedies, in an attempt to better understand the mindset of officers on corruption issues, how this affects the view of the police by the public, whether it is reasonable to expect high moral standards within the occupation, and how these standards can be achieved.
POSITION A
The traditional view of police corruption, typically espoused by police administration and some criminologists, has been addressed through the Rotten Apple Theory. It harkens back to the cliché that “One rotten apple spoils the barrel”. The theory very simply puts the onus of police corruption on the individual officer.
Corruption exists all around us and it is not limited to a handful of jobs or occupations. Employees from all professions may engage in theft from the employers, ranging from office supplies to actual embezzlement. Theft of time, shortcuts that violate policies (or laws), and falsified reports are not strictly the domain of law enforcement. The common factor is employee honesty and ethics. Human beings, whether viewed as individuals or as parts of an organization are fallible. They are tempted by wealth, power, and status, wherever it is available to them. Police organizations, by their very nature present these potential ethical dilemmas to officers in the field. The discretion and responsibility associated with the power to relieve someone of their freedom or their life can be a heavy burden and when coupled with environments that allow officers easy access to wealth, privilege, and drugs it can challenge even the most ethically stalwart.
It is key then that officers put in a position of the public trust be of the highest character. While a small bribe or gratuity from a diner might easily be accepted by a waiter for preferential treatment and viewed by the public as well as an acceptable way of doing business, the same public has an expectation that our police are and should be above reproach as do law enforcement professionals. The Chicago Crime Commission “placed an emphasis on the type of police officer on the force” in examining the major causes of police criminal behavior. The Commission concluded that poor recruitment methods permitted many men to enter the department who were not suited for law enforcement work. The commission recommended that all police candidates be subject to “a complete character investigation”. (Delattre, 2006 p.84) If substandard candidates are granted employment in law enforcement, we should certainly expect to see corruption within the ranks. These rotten apples not only degrade the image of police in the public’s eyes, they are also detrimental to other officers in the field. Unscrupulous officers may play on the brotherhood inherent within the police community to drag other officers into morally questionable actions, testing these officers resolve in the face of not only temptation, but in the approval and acceptance by partners and/or other shift officers. We cannot simply assume that every individual who has joined a police force did so with an overall altruistic sense. The power and discretion afforded to officers can be a temptation not only to officers already employed but to prospective officers looking for power and opportunity to bolster their own self-worth or to exercise dominance.
The police, as a group of individuals, don’t fail to recognize corruption. They are very aware of it and because corrupt officers do not usually make up the majority of a police force, they believe that severity of the sanctions should be appropriate for the severity of the corrupt behavior and that corrupt behavior should be reported. (Klockars, 2000) What is also evident in the Klockars report is that police officers do not view all corruption as the same. Some hypothetical situations presented in the report prompted officers to respond that some small offenses warrant no, or very minor, reprimands and that these minor offenses do not warrant reporting the officer to a superior. This would suggest that there are indeed different standards in ethical consideration amongst individual officers, in that the issue is not black & white, corrupt or not corrupt. This disparity is certainly influenced by individual officers’ perspectives as not all officers in the study categorized the hypothetical situations at the same level of corruptness.
Police administrators are then confronted with the necessity of detecting and removing rotten apples, preferably before they become entrenched in a department. High employment standards are one remedy. The very concept of policing involves placing a great amount of power in the hands of an individual, leaving that person to use his best judgment in applying his authority. It is foolish to believe that you can employ officers of the highest caliber if hiring standards are lax. Literate, college educated, criminal offense-free candidates are absolutely necessary to populate a department with personnel that are worthy to carry the public trust. The candidates should have a demonstrable ethic code that helps insure that not only are they morally solid but that these morals can withstand assault. Supervisory personnel are also key in seeking out and removing officers who may be prone to and/or engage in corrupt behavior. They must remove the rotten apple before it spoils the barrel. This is accomplished through increased supervision of marginal officers, periodic proactive internal investigations, thorough reactive corruption investigations and psychological screenings before and after employment. All of these remedies can easily exist within a department’s current structure with minimal costs, especially when balanced against the potential costs that a corrupt officer can bring down on a department.
POSITION B
The Structural Theory behind corruption has gained more traction in the past 30 years. As more scholars look deeper into the subculture of police, they have come to realize that corruption is a feature in police work that is ingrained within the structure itself. Delattre explains it as a young, naïve individual enters a profession where the worst of people is exposed to them and they are socialized to this environment by senior officers who have become cynical and lost faith in police work. Under pressure to form bonds of mutual trust and reliance while witnessing corrupt practices, it’s realized that superiors don’t support efforts to behave honorably, that sanctions for corruption are negligible, and the young officer will probably accept the status quo and join in the corrupt practices (Delattre 2006).
The body of work supporting this theory is impressive and evidence of the Structural Theory is witnessed in reports of corruption within units in departments and whole departments themselves. The idea is that prospective officers enter with high ethical standards, as one would expect of a police officer. Because of a great degree of social isolation related to their profession, officers tend to only socialize with officers and consequently take away a similar environmental view. Complaints of public misperceptions of police work reinforce social isolation and the unique nature of the profession, it’s dangers and pitfalls, leaves officers feeling an increased need to bond together, unfortunately forming a siege mentality; it’s Us vs. Them. In such a scenario, mutual trust becomes almost paramount, and this continues up the chain of command. Supervisors who have already been socialized tend to view minor corruption as something that just happens and unless the matter is serious i.e. serious enough to be easily exposed and bring censure or sanctions down on the department, the minor issues are ignored or minimized. If such behavior and attitudes continue up the ranks to the Chief or Police Commissioner, you have a wholly corrupt department.
If we also include the “Code of Silence” in the mix, these strong subcultural norms of support and brotherhood above all, tends to detract from the moral belief systems held by individual officers. We cannot expect police officers to be made of iron, they are human and subject to human frailties and eventually the cynicism and social norms within police work change the officer and allow for the acceptance and practice of behaviors that would have been eschewed outside of the police force.
Within this framework, we can look at two structures that contribute to the problem of police corruption, opportunity and organizational structures as denoted by Kappeler’s 1998 work (White et al, 2008). By the nature of police work and structural organization, there lies an opportunity structure that provides police with a unique authority, a public perception that the police can be trusted, social isolation, high discretion (and I might add low visibility) and a lack of supervision.
Bureaucratic institutions like police departments contain common organizational structure elements that facilitate deviance. These features include a division of labor with specialized units, limited career mobility, and the existence of a distinct sub-culture that is defined by social isolation and solidarity and governed by informal rules that value autonomy, secrecy, and maintaining the status quo. (White et al, 2008).
In viewing these two structures, we have to understand that there are features within the opportunity structure that will be difficult to control but the most amenable to change is the lack of supervision. The expectation is that officers have a good understanding about criminal procedures and the law and that in most cases supervisory input in regards to enforcement duties is not needed. Supervisors must play a larger role though as role models and as an actual supervisory force. Officers typically look to superiors for proper behavior and attitudes in unfamiliar territory and it is crucial that the wrong message not be sent. If the message is anything other than all corruption is wrong, all corruption should be reported, and the reporting of corruption is appreciated, then the wrong message is being sent, allowing officers to utilize their discretion in inappropriate ways. While it may put pressure on some officers, the need for monitoring is essential. It must be realized that even the most ethically strong officer can be tempted, and if there is temptation, there is a possibility of succumbing to that temptation. Supervisors need to be proactive in their monitoring efforts to send a message that misconduct within the force is not tolerated.
From an organizational structure standpoint, the most detrimental feature is existence of the subculture itself. The existence of this subculture is well established and subcultures typically establish their own social norms. The elimination of the subculture is not entirely feasible but what is possible is the modification of some components that facilitate misconduct and, more importantly, hide the misconduct from internal and external view.
There is no denying that an Us vs Them mentality unofficially exists within a number of police departments. Public misconceptions, lack of public appreciation and recognition, and cynicism among officers fosters an attitude that objectifies and labels the public. In doing so, it’s easy for officers to lose their perspective that they are servants of the public and that they should be held accountable to them. It becomes much easier to identify only with their departmental perspective and rely only on the approval and acceptance of other officers. In this way the Code of Silence is a protective function against those who simply don’t understand the police. This unfortunately lends itself to secrecy and an acceptance of the idea that police actions are inherently right.
To counteract these forces, remedies exist both internally and externally. Internally, comprehensive selection processes, effective supervision and internal affairs, and ethics training and policy mandates concerning whistleblowing and misconduct are all viable. Externally criminal and civil liabilities and citizen review boards can address issues of misconduct when a department fails to adequately address them itself.
CRITIQUE OF POSITIONS
The Rotten Apple Theory (RAT) has fallen from favor over the past 30 years to be replaced by Structural Theory (ST). The Knapp Commission characterized RAT as “border(ing) on official department doctrine, any policeman found to be corrupt must be promptly denounced as a rotten apple in an otherwise clean barrel. It must never be admitted that his individual corruption may be symptomatic of an underlying disease.. The rotten apple doctrine has in many ways been a basic obstacle to meaningful reform …[and] the commission examined and rejected the premise upon which the rotten apple doctrine rested” (White 2008). While the Knapp Commission claims to reject the premise of the doctrine, to deny that RAT is not a factor to consider would be short-sighted.
As is typical in certain fields of science, some in the research community would like to see a particular theory (usually their own) elevated to a singular defining analysis of a problem. This is simply not the case. There is no doubt that some misconduct and corruption stems from the personal moral failings of an individual officer, whether this deficiency was present at the time of employment or whether it manifested itself over time if given opportunities to grow. We must consider there is significant interplay and co–dependence within the two theories and even in their remedies. While morally deficient officers do exist within our police forces, it cannot solely be attributed to one theory or the other. “Rotten apples” do exist and they are found in all varieties of occupations. There will always be individuals who are on the look out for opportunities to profit at the expense of others. Inevitably you will find that given the broad scope of human nature that there are certain individuals who should never be police officers. That they exist within a police force, given officers’ power and discretion, should be a cause of grave concern.
If you place ethically deficient officers in a workplace environment where misconduct is merely given a wink and a nudge, you do provide tacit approval of their actions and send a message to the rest of the force that misconduct is acceptable and over time may influence those with stronger ethics to put them aside in place of acceptance within the workplace. The Code of Silence does serve a function in police subculture and while this certainly fosters a sense of brotherhood it also contributes to either theory of corruption. Individual morally deficient officers find that their moral failings are less likely to be noted and censured, allowing for continued morally aberrant behavior. Officers attempting to follow their own reasonably sufficient moral compass find that the subculture they are employed in doesn’t recognize their efforts in maintaining professional ethical standards, let alone community standards.
But how prevalent is the ethical breakdown within the police structure? A self-report study (with its inherent flaws and biases) conducted in Georgia seems to indicate that police have more willingness to, and are more prone to, actually reporting corruption than employees in other civil service positions. While this may speak to officer integrity, the report notes that they are only slightly more prone to this behavior. Given there are features within the Georgia law enforcement departments, like reporting policies, internal investigation units, and polygraph use not present in other civil service jobs, these ST remedies seem to provide for only a slight increase in ethical reporting. One point of the Georgia study is that a mandatory reporting policy was related to almost all of the measures of willingness to blow the whistle, but none of the measures of frequency of whistleblowing. Were those features not present, it is likely that ethical reporting would be at the same level, if not lower, than other civil service positions. This could suggest that overall, people in general, and police officers in particular, have the same basic ethical nature. If that were the case, it is the few rotten apples who have spoiled the barrel.
Even though there was only a slight increase, it doesn’t belie the significance of the ST. If ST remedies do provide only a small positive effect on ethical behavior and reporting, it is better than none at all. The public does expect a higher ethical standard from the police than they would from a city meter reader and it may be necessary to force those ethical standards onto officers through departmental policies and changes to ensure that higher standard. Remedies within the ST do have an influence especially if they come from within the department. Supervisors set the parameters for the street level officers and comprehensive ethics training and the supervisors’ willingness to mandate, approve of, and follow up on reports of misconduct sends a message to lower ranking officers that the former cover of the “blue curtain” has ended. Supervisors and departments must not only expect but require ethical behavior.
As neither theory is completely comprehensive, we must look to a combination of the two. To deny the existence of rotten apples as a feature of police corruption is to put too narrow a focus on the institution. To imagine that a subculture doesn’t significantly influence it’s members is naïve.
AUTHOR’S POSITION
As stated above, a remedy for corruption must come from multiple sources. We would like to expect that our prospective law enforcement candidates come to the academy with the highest ethical standards. This is simply not going to be the case. High employment standards can certainly be used to weed out marginal candidates. While exemplary candidates are preferred, it’s likely we will end up with a typical range of personal ethical standards. In these candidates we will find a typical human thought process. Namely, that we bond with co-workers through trust and respect, that we want others to trust and respect us also, and that in order to function within a workgroup, we must adopt some of their attitudes. The nature of these attitudes is the key here. Hardly anyone, no matter what their occupation, does not have some reservations about getting a co-worker in trouble for what is viewed by the actor, the witness, and the workgroup as merely a minor infraction of policies or law. No one wants to set an impossible standard of behavior yet an environment of integrity must be maintained in the workplace.
Perhaps a more definitive standard of what constitutes misconduct would be beneficial. When a department sets clear policies and guidelines as to what is acceptable and what is not, it will help guide officers’ actions as opposed to them adopting the attitude that “this is the way things are done” among their colleagues. Departments must recognize that officers are human and that not all misconduct necessarily leads to that slippery slope, as long as there are departmental roadblocks. Policies could be designed that actually allow the acceptance of some gratuities while setting clear boundaries as to where gratuities stop and where low level extortion begins. This not only prevents innocuous actions from becoming a slippery slope but it can allow for better rapport between the police and the public. It is important that the police are recognized for the work they do and the permittance of a small gratuity, that free cup of coffee or discounted meal, I think, will help foster better relationships between the public and police. With Community Policing currently being the buzzword within the field, these small gratuities could be seem as humanizing of both the police and the public and hearken back to the day when the policeman was a neighborhood figure and friend.
Given that, serious infractions must be dealt with swiftly and severely. With clear guidelines, departmental policy is the reigning factor and the attitude must be fostered that officer loyalty is first and foremost not to the members of the organization but to what the organization stands for. It must be enforced that officers are called upon to use their discretion in a way that benefits the public. Officers that fail to meet that standard have not just failed other officers and the department but the public and themselves. A very high standard of professionalism, honesty, and ethical behavior must be reinforced as law enforcement qualities. Openness and the freedom to whistleblow must be so ingrained in the subculture as to make the reporting of misconduct an honorable action. The police subculture, as any subculture, is a distinct microcosm that sets the mores of the group. If it can do this, it can also be changed by both the willingness of its members and the added support of the community. Fostering better relationships between the public and the police helps negate their differences and shortens the distances between the two groups. Eliminating the Us vs Them mentality is the only way the Code of Silence can be eliminated. Utilizing community resources like substations, neighborhood watches, and crime meetings help bond officers to the public and vice versa.
While most departments have mechanisms that address allegations of misconduct, i.e. internal affairs, there will be a need for citizen review boards. While it’s uncertain that the public in general will be better able to determine incidents, causes, and remedies of police misconduct, than an internal review. Just as internal review boards should not be a rubber stamp acceptance of police behavior, civilian reviews don’t need to serve as a rubber stamp that finds fault in every police action simply because it involves the police. These boards do bring transparency to the process, and if conducted fairly, that transparency is more important than the results of a civilian review board, as it existence reinforces the notion that the public and police are partners.
It is no mystery that the police function better when the public and the police view themselves as one. Conceptually, it has been shown over and over again. But concepts are meaningless without the backing of the actors involved. Police departments really do have a duty to perform to the benefit of the public and the management of the department not only defines the actions but the attitudes of its officers. Departments must consider themselves not only as a management tool but as a resource that the individual officer can draw upon. The attitudes within police forces are defined by the management of the department and those managers must take definitive steps to foster and enforce ethical attitudes. Most of the measures described in this paper have little cost associated with them. Resources within the community as mentioned above can certainly change the attitudes of both the public and police. It is this change from an Us vs Them mentality that I think is the key to ending corruption. There will always be rotten apples, and some will always find their way into police forces, but what can be eliminated is the systemic corruption that is witnessed when the police stop viewing the public as partners and see them as the enemy.
